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In anthropology as much as in popular imagination, kings are figures of 
fascination and intrigue, heroes or tyrants in ways presidents and prime 
ministers can never be. This collection of essays by two of the world’s 
most distinguished anthropologists—David Graeber and Marshall 
Sahlins—explores what kingship actually is, historically and anthropo-
logically. As they show, kings are symbols for more than just sovereignty: 
indeed, the study of kingship offers a unique window into fundamental 
dilemmas concerning the very nature of power, meaning, and the human 
condition.
Reflecting on issues such as temporality, alterity, and utopia—not to 
mention the divine, the strange, the numinous, and the bestial—Graeber 
and Sahlins explore the role of kings as they have existed around the 
world, from the BaKongo to the Aztec to the Shilluk and beyond. Richly 
delivered with the wit and sharp analysis characteristic of Graeber and 
Sahlins, this book opens up new avenues for the anthropological study 
of this fascinating and ubiquitous political figure. 
* * *
If you deem that anthropology is neither a form of pompous navel-
gazing, nor an exercise in making preposterous generalizations out 
of sketchy personal experiences, this book is for you. With impecca-
ble scholarship, conceptual imagination, and wit, David Graeber and 
Marshall Sahlins think anew, and within a broad comparative scope, an 
ancient and illustrious question: why and how can a single man come to 
rule over the many as the embodiment or the delegate of a god? Such a 
question, they show, can only be answered by shifting towards an analysis 
where human, non-human, and meta-human persons are treated on the 
same ontological level as parts of a hierarchical cosmic polity. A golden 
spike in the coffin of eurocentrism, sociocentrism and anthropocentrism!
Philippe Descola (Collège de France), author of Beyond nature and culture
The wealth and volume of the ethnographic data analyzed in this book 
is dizzying. The authors allow us to venture along a variety of paths, 
ranging from the well-established kingdoms of Africa and Asia to the 
apparently egalitarian societies of Papua New Guinea and the Americas, 
revealing the astonishing dispersal of the “stranger king” model. The 
authors’ decisive step was to reject, on a strictly ethnographic basis, the 
commonplace analytic division made between cosmology and politics. 
It is in the ritual sphere, where spirits of diverse kinds meet with hu-
mans, that the diverse forms of state originate. A relationship that shows 
spiritual life, even in societies marked by egalitarianism, to be a domain 
impregnated with the same relations of hierarchy, control and subjection 
that characterize the kingdoms of this world. A work that will make 
history for sure.
Aparecida Vilaça (Museu Nacional/Universidade Federal do Rio de 
Janeiro), author of Praying and preying: Christianity in indigenous Amazonia
Two of the world’s leading anthropologists combine their “complemen-
tary observations” to offer the most productively disruptive work on king-
ship since Hocart. The lost world they exhume is a continual affront to 
contemporary theory: a world where superstructure determines base and 
sociology recapitulates cosmology (kings are gods imitating men, not the 
reverse); where connection, competition, and imitation (of galactic he-
gemons, for example) are the reality and the monadic society a fiction. At 
the same time, their paleohistory of sovereignty points the way toward a 
deeper understanding of our contemporary moment, where sovereignty 
has become “popular” and we are ruled by kleptocrats and buffoon kings. 
Sheldon Pollock (Columbia University), author of The language of the 
gods in the world of men
Graeber and Sahlins’ On kings—a dialogue, not a union—takes Divine 
Kingship from its burial ground in the classics and puts it deep into 
enduring concerns about the brutality of political processes over the 
long haul of human history, ancient and current in ever new forms. In 
case studies of sovereign rulers conceived as gods, demons, nurslings, 
ancestral guests, and populist heroes—ultimate strangers—Graeber and 
Sahlins invite us to reconsider the nature of tyranny from inside the 
tiger’s many mouths and to ask how we might, for once, refuse the king 
his long customary seat at the table. 
Gillian Feeley-Harnik (University of Michigan), author of The Lord’s 
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Preface
This book is more of a conjunction than a collaboration of its two authors. The 
several studies on kingship and kingly politics assembled here were originally 
conceived and written separately by one or the other—for conferences or on 
other occasions—and were then elaborated with these common purposes in 
mind. Accordingly, the effect is a set of complementary observations on king-
ship rather than a cumulative and sustained argument. The closest thing to the 
latter is the Introduction, where we gather the observations on various aspects 
of kingship featured in the several individual studies. It almost goes without 
saying that the overall result is a work “on kings,” but not all about kings: it does 
not pretend to deal with kingship in all its structural dimensions and historical 
manifestations. Except where otherwise indicated, our observations on king-
ship concern its so-called “traditional,” premodern, or archaic forms—which 
are, however, its most common, indeed archetypal, forms.
Of the seven essays comprising the book, all but two are published here for 
the first time. The exceptions are Marshall Sahlins’ “The original political society” 
(chapter 1, published simultaneously with this book in HAU: Journal of Ethno-
graphic Theory 7 [2], 2017: 91–128) and David Graeber’s “The divine kingship of 
the Shilluk: On violence, utopia, and the human condition” (chapter 2, original: 
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 1 [1], 2011: 1–62). “The original political 
society” is based on the Inaugural Arthur M. Hocart Lecture at SOAS, Univer-
sity of London, April 29, 2016). Chapter 3 by Sahlins, “The atemporal dimen-
sions of history: In the old Kongo kingdom, for example,” was developed from 
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a paper in the conference on The varieties of historical experience at the Univer-
sity of Chicago (April 2014); chapter 4 by Sahlins, “The stranger-kingship of 
the Mexica,” was a plenary lecture at the Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration of 
the Museo Nacional de Antropología, Mexico (October 2014); chapter 5 by 
Graeber, “People as nursemaids of the king: notes on monarchs as children, 
women’s uprisings, and the return of the ancestral dead in central Madagascar,” 
was written for this volume but appeared in abbreviated form as “Le peuple, 
nurse du roi: notes sur les monarques enfants dans le centre de Madagascar,” in 
Madagascar, d’une crise l ’autre: ruptures et continuité, edited by Mireille Razafin-
drakoto, François Roubaud, and Jean-Michel Wachsberger (Paris: ORSTOM, 
2017, pp. 120–44); chapter 6 by Sahlins, “Cultural politics of core–periphery 
relations,” was developed from the keynote lecture of a conference on Cul-
tural imperialism and soft power at the University of Chicago Center, Beijing 
(December 2016); and chapter 7 by Graeber, “Notes on the politics of divine 
kingship: Or, elements for an archaeology of sovereignty,” was written for this 
volume and has not been published elsewhere in any form. 
* * *
D. G.: I would like to thank all those who thought with, argued with, helped, or 
generally put up with me during the period in question, but since I can’t fit in 
all their names, I would like to draw special attention to (in alphabetical order) 
Neil Aptaker, the late Roy Bhaskar, Sophie Carapetian, Rebecca Coles, Boris T. 
Corovic, Ayca Cubukcu, Giovanni da Col, Ewa Domaradzka, Magdalen Drum-
mond, Gillian Feeley-Harnik, Stephan Feuchtwang, Livia Filotico, Charlie 
Gilmore, Stephanie Grohmann, Andrej Grubacic, Havin Guneser, Keith Hart, 
Rebecca Hudson, Insa Koch, Zeynep Kurban, Erica Lagalisse, Mark Lamont, 
Nhu Le, Lauren Leve, Rona Lorimer, Sharifa Syed Ahmad Mayang, Christina 
Moon, Dyan Neary, Yancey Orr, Mathijs Pelkman, Elif Sarican, Alpa Shah, 
John Summers, Marine Temersohn, Terence Turner, David Wengrow, Hylton 
White, and Heather Williams. Finally, of course, to my teacher and mentor, 
Marshall Sahlins. There was a widespread rumor in Chicago that I was “un-
teachable.” I like to think this volume demonstrates that this was not the case.
M. S.: For intellectual aid and comfort in relation to the composition of one 
or more of my essays, I would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Mauro 
Alameida, Ralph Austen, Robert Brightman, Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, 
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Giovanni da Col, Cécile Fromont, Bruce Lincoln, Alan Rumsey, Gregory 
Schrempp, Alan Strathern, Dame Marilyn Strathern, and Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro. Special thanks also to my research assistants, Jonathan Doherty, Sean 
Dowdy, and Rob Jennings. And gratitude for aid in presentations of relevant 
lectures or conference papers goes to the following: in Mexico, Antonio Soborit 
and Leopoldo Trejo Barrientos; in Chicago, Stephan Palmie, Richard Rosen-
garten, and Charles Stewart; in London, Giovanni da Col, Fabio Gygi, and 
Edward Simpson; and in Beijing, Judith Farquhar, and Bruce Lincoln. I should 
acknowledge in advance the patience of readers—or beg their indulgence—for 
the recurrent expositions of aspects of stranger-kingship and galactic polities. 
It is not only that these lectures or essays were written on different occasions 
for different audiences, but that discussions of these same phenomena were 
necessary for the arguments in each of them. Finally, special thanks to David 
Graeber: David was a student of mine; I supervised his thesis at the University 
of Chicago. Since then it has been difficult to say who is the student and who 
the teacher. 





David Graeber and Marshall Sahlins
STRUCTURES
Kingship in general
Kingship is one of the most enduring forms of human governance. While we 
cannot know its precise historical origins in time and space, it is attested during 
virtually all eras on all continents, and for most of human history the tendency 
was for it to become more common, not less.
What’s more, once established, kings appear remarkably difficult to get rid of. 
It took extraordinary legal acrobatics to be able to execute Charles I and Louis 
XVI; simply killing a royal family, as with the tsars, leaves one (apparently for-
ever) burdened with substitute tsars; and even today, it seems no coincidence 
the only regimes almost completely untroubled by the Arab Spring revolts of 
2011 were those with longstanding monarchies. Even when kings are deposed, 
the legal and political framework of monarchy tends to live on, as evidenced 
in the fact that all modern states are founded on the curious and contradictory 
principle of “popular sovereignty,” that the power once held by kings still exists, 
just now displaced onto an entity called “the people.”
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One unanticipated side-effect of the collapse of European colonial empires has 
been that this notion of sovereignty has become the basis of constitutional or-
ders everywhere—the only partial exceptions being a few places, like Nepal or 
Saudi Arabia, which had monarchies of their own already.
It follows that any theory of political life that does not take account of this, or 
that treats kingship as some sort of marginal, exceptional, or secondary phe-
nomenon, is not a very good theory.
In this volume, then, we propose some elements for a theory of kingship. The 
arguments set out from territory we have both explored already: in the one case, 
in the classic essays on the stranger-king; in the other, in the divine kingship of 
the Shilluk. The collection focuses particularly on what has been called “divine” 
or “sacred” kingship, but with the understanding that a thorough examination 
of its common features can reveal the deep structures underlying monarchy, and 
hence politics, everywhere.
What follows are a series of general propositions inspired by the findings of 
the essays collected in this book. Certain entries, perhaps, lean more toward the 
perspective of one author than the other, but we believe the dialogic tension to 
be fertile, and that the resulting propositions may suggest important new direc-
tions for research. 
The cosmic polity
Human societies are hierarchically encompassed—typically above, below, and 
on earth—in a cosmic polity populated by beings of human attributes and me-
tahuman powers who govern the people’s fate. In the form of gods, ancestors, 
ghosts, demons, species-masters, and the animistic beings embodied in the crea-
tures and features of nature, these metapersons are endowed with far-reaching 
powers of human life and death, which, together with their control of the con-
ditions of the cosmos, make them the all-round arbiters of human welfare and 
illfare. Even many loosely structured hunting and gathering peoples are thus 
subordinated to beings on the order of gods ruling over great territorial domains 
and the whole of the human population. There are kingly beings in heaven even 
where there are no chiefs on earth.
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It follows that the state of nature has the nature of the state. Given the govern-
ance of human society by metaperson authorities with ultimate life-and-death 
powers, something quite like the state is a universal human condition.
It also follows that kings are imitations of gods rather than gods of kings—the 
conventional supposition that divinity is a reflex of society notwithstanding. In 
the course of human history, royal power has been derivative of and dependent 
on divine power. Indeed, no less in stateless societies than in major kingdoms, 
the human authorities emulate the ruling cosmic powers—if in a reduced form. 
Shamans have the miraculous powers of spirits, with whom, moreover, they inter-
act. Initiated elders or clan leaders act the god, perhaps in masked form, in presid-
ing over human and natural growth. Chiefs are greeted and treated in the same 
ways as gods. Kings control nature itself. What usually passes for the divinization 
of human rulers is better described historically as the humanization of the god.
As a corollary, there are no secular authorities: human power is spiritual pow-
er—however pragmatically it is achieved. Authority over others may be acquired 
by superior force, inherited office, material generosity, or other means; but the 
power to do or be so is itself deemed that of ancestors, gods, or other external 
metapersons who are the sources of human vitality and mortality. In this cul-
tural framework, a privileged relation to the metapersonal rulers of the human 
fate is the raison d’être of earthly social power. Moreover, as demonstrated in 
worldly accomplishments, this access to metahuman powers may have subjuga-
tion effects on people beyond those directly affected by the acts of the persons 
of authority. It’s “charisma”—in the original, god-infused sense. 
In this god-infused sense, Shilluk say the king is Juok (the god), but Juok is not 
the king. The divinity of the king is a kind of intersubjective animism. As a mo-
dality of the One over Many, divinity itself can be understood as the personified 
head of a class of things that are thus so many instances/instantiations of the 
godhead—which is also to say that as a partible person, the god is immanent in 
the creatures and features of his or her realm. Hawaiians speak of symbolically 
relevant plants, animals, and persons as so many “bodies” (kino lau) of the god: 
in which sense Captain Cook was famously the god Lono, but Lono was not 
Captain Cook. Such intersubjective animism is not all that rare: shamans are 
possessed by their familiars and victims by their witches. Idolatry and kinship 
are likewise forms of a broad metaphysics of intersubjective being. 
4 ON KINGS
Compared with the kind of cosmic polities that exist among foragers and many 
others, mortal kingship represents a limit on state power. There is simply no 
way that any mortal human, whatever his pretensions, whatever the social ap-
paratus at his disposal could ever really wield as much power as a god. And 
most kings, despite the absolute nature of their claims, never seriously make 
the attempt. 
For half of humanity, though, the creation of mortal kingship represents a ma-
jor blow: because kings are, in virtually every known case, archetypically male. 
Nowadays, scholars are used to writing off Paleolithic or Neolithic representa-
tions of powerful female figures as mere “mythological” representations, of no 
political significance, but in the cosmic polities which then existed, this could 
not have been the case. If so, fixing divine political power in the male head of a 
royal household was a blow for patriarchy in two ways: not only was the primary 
human manifestation of divine power now masculine, but the main purpose of 
the ideal household is producing powerful men.
The precise historical trajectory by which divine powers—sovereignty prop-
erly speaking—devolved from metahuman beings to actual human beings, if 
it can ever be reconstructed, will be likely to take many unexpected turns. For 
instance: we know of societies (in aboriginal California, or Tierra del Fuego) 
where arbitrary orders are given only during rituals in which human beings 
impersonate gods, but those who give the orders are not the gods, but clowns, 
who appear to represent divine power in its essence; in related societies (e.g., 
the Kwakiutl), this develops into clown-police who hold sway during an en-
tire ritual season; then, in yet others, into more straightforward seasonal po-
lice. In such cases, sovereignty is contained in time: outside the specific ritual 
or seasonal context, decentralization ensues, and those vested with sovereign 
powers during the ritual season are no different from, and have no more say 
than, anybody else. Sacred kingship, in contrast, would appear to be largely a 
means of containing sovereign power in space. The king, it is almost always 
asserted, has total power over the lives and possessions of his subjects; but 
only when he is physically present. As a result, an endless variety of strategies 
are employed to limit the king’s freedom of motion. Yet there is at the same 
time a mutually constitutive relation between the king’s containment and his 




Stranger-kingdoms are the dominant form of premodern state the world around, 
perhaps the original form. The kings who rule them are foreign by ancestry and 
identity. The dynasty typically originates with a heroic prince from a greater 
outside realm: near or distant, legendary or contemporary, celestial or terres-
trial. Alternatively, native rulers assume the identity and sovereignty of exalted 
kings from elsewhere and thus become foreigners—as in the Indic kingdoms of 
Southeast Asia—rather than foreigners becoming native rulers. The polity is in 
any case dual: divided between rulers who are foreign by nature—perpetually so, 
as a necessary condition of their authority—and the underlying autochthonous 
people, who are the “owners” of the country. The dual constitution is constantly 
reproduced in narrative and ritual, even as it is continuously enacted in the dif-
ferential functions, talents, and powers of the ruling aristocracy and the native 
people.
The kingdom is neither an endogenous formation nor does it develop in isola-
tion: it is a function of the relationships of a hierarchically ordered, intersocietal 
historical field. The superiority of the ruling aristocracy was not engendered by 
the process of state formation so much as the state was engendered by the a 
priori superiority of an aristocracy from elsewhere—endowed by nature with 
a certain libido dominandi. The ruling class precedes and makes a subject class. 
On his way to the kingdom, the dynastic founder is notorious for exploits of in-
cest, fratricide, patricide, or other crimes against kinship and common morality; 
he may also be famous for defeating dangerous natural or human foes. The hero 
manifests a nature above, beyond, and greater than the people he is destined to 
rule—hence his power to do so. However inhibited or sublimated in the estab-
lished kingdom, the monstrous and violent nature of the king remains an essen-
tial condition of his sovereignty. Indeed, as a sign of the metahuman sources of 
royal power, force, notably as demonstrated in victory, can function politically as 
a positive means of attraction as well as a physical means of domination. 
For all the transgressive violence of the founder, however, his kingdom is often 
peacefully established. Conquest is overrated as the source of “state formation.” 
Given their own circumstances—including the internal and external conflicts 
of the historical field—the indigenous people often have their own reasons for 
demanding a “king to lead us and to go out before us and fight our battles” 
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(1 Samuel 8:20). Even in the case of major kingdoms, such as Benin or the 
Mexica, the initiative may indeed come from the indigenous people, who solicit 
a prince from a powerful outside realm. Some of what passes for “conquest” in 
tradition or the scholarly literature consists of usurpation of the previous regime 
rather than violence against the native population. 
While there is frequently no tradition of conquest, there is invariably a tradition 
of contract: notably in the form of a marriage between the stranger-prince and 
a marked woman of the indigenous people—most often, a daughter of the na-
tive leader. Sovereignty is embodied and transmitted in the native woman, who 
constitutes the bond between the foreign intruders and the local people. The 
offspring of the original union—often celebrated as the traditional founder-
hero of the dynasty—thereby combines and encompasses in his own person the 
essential native and foreign components of the kingdom. Father of the country 
in one respect, as witness also his polygynous and sexual accomplishments, the 
king is in another the child-chief of the indigenous people, who comprise his 
maternal ancestry.
Even where there is conquest, by virtue of the original contract it is reciprocal: 
the mutual encompassment of the autochthonous people by the stranger-king 
and of the king by the autochthonous people. The installation rites of the king 
typically recreate the domestication of the unruly stranger: he dies, is reborn, 
and nurtured and brought to maturity at the hands of native leaders. His wild or 
violent nature is not so much eliminated as it is sublimated and in principle used 
for the general benefit: internally as the sanction of justice and order, and exter-
nally in the defense of the realm against natural and human enemies. But even 
as the king is domesticated, the people are civilized. The kingship is a civilizing 
mission. The advent of the stranger-king is often said to raise the native people 
from a rudimentary state by bringing them such things as agriculture, cattle, 
tools and weapons, metals—even fire and cooking, thus a transformation from 
nature to culture (in the Lévi-Straussian sense). As has been said of African 
societies, it is not civilized to be without a king. 
As allegorized in the original union, the synthesis of the foreign and autoch-
thonous powers—male and female, celestial and terrestrial, violent and peaceful, 
mobile and rooted, stranger and native, etc.—establishes a cosmic system of 
social viability. In a common configuration, the autochthonous people’s access 
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to the spiritual sources of the earth’s fertility is potentiated by king’s conveyance 
of fecundating forces, such as the rain and sun that make the earth bear fruit. 
Each incomplete in themselves, the native people and foreign rulers together 
make a viable totality—which is what helps the kingdom to endure, whatever 
the tensions of their ethnic-cum-class differences. 
Although they have surrendered the rule to the foreign king, the native people 
retain a certain residual sovereignty. By virtue of their unique relation to the 
powers of the earth, the descendants of the erstwhile native rulers are the chief 
priests of the new regime. Their control of the succession of the king, includ-
ing the royal installation rituals, is the warrant of the foreign-derived ruler’s 
legitimacy. In the same vein, the native leaders characteristically have temporal 
powers as councilors of the stranger-king, sometimes providing his so-called 
“prime minister.” To a significant extent, the principle that the sovereignty of 
the king is delegated by the people, to whom it belongs by origin and by right, 
is embedded in stranger-king formations, hence widely known before and apart 
from its early modern European expressions.
Notwithstanding the superiority and perpetual foreign ethnicity of the ruling 
aristocracy, they are often not dominant linguistically or culturally, but are as-
similated in these respects by the indigenous population. Correlatively, the iden-
tity of the kingdom is usually that of the native people.
European colonization is often in significant aspects a late historical form of 
indigenous stranger-kingship traditions: Captain Cook, Rajah Brooke, and 
Hernando Cortés, for example.
KINGSHIP POLITICS
In general
Political struggle over the power of the king generally takes the form of a battle 
between two principles: divine kingship and sacred kingship. In practice, divine 
kingship is the essence of sovereignty: it is the ability to act as if one were a god; 
to step outside the confines of the human, and return to rain favor, or destruc-
tion, with arbitrariness and impunity. Such power may be accompanied by the 
theory that the king by doing so demonstrates he is an actual embodiment of 
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some already-existing metahuman being. But it may not be; it could as easily 
be that by acting in this way, the king himself becomes a metahuman being. 
Japanese shoguns (a few anyway), Roman emperors, or Ganda kabaka could all 
become gods in their own right. To be “sacred,” in contrast, is to be set apart, 
hedged about by customs and taboos; the restrictions surrounding sacralized 
kings—“not to touch the earth, not to see the sun” in Frazer’s famous dictum—
are ways not only of recognizing the presence of unaccountable divine power, 
but also, crucially, of confining, controlling, and limiting it. One could see these 
two principles as refractions of different moments of the stranger-king narra-
tive: the first, of the terrible power of the king on his arrival; the second, his 
encompassment and defeat by his subjects. But in this larger sense, both are 
always present simultaneously.
All the classic issues of divine kingship, then—the royal displays of arbitrary 
power, the king as scapegoat, regicide (by duel or sacrifice), the use of royal ef-
figies, the oracular role of dead monarchs—can best be understood as different 
moves in a continual chess game played between king and people, in which the 
king and his partisans attempt to increase the divinity of the king, and the pop-
ular factions attempt to increase his sacralization. Stranger-kingship provides 
the deep structural foundations for a vernacular politics in which representatives 
of humanity (often literally) did battle with their gods, and sometimes prevailed.
The chief weapon in the hands of those who oppose the expansion of royal 
power might be termed “adverse sacralization”—to recognize the metahuman 
status of the monarch, to “keep the king divine” (Richards 1968), requires an 
elaborate apparatus which renders him, effectively, an abstraction, by hiding, 
containing, or effacing those aspects of his being that are seen as embodying 
his mortal nature. Kings become invisible, immaterial, sealed off from contact 
with their subjects or with the stuff and substance of the world—and hence, 
often, confined to their palaces, unable to exercise arbitrary power (or often any 
power) in any effective way. 
Royal regicide is just the ultimate form of adverse sacralization.
When popular forces win, the result can thus take the form of Frazerian sacred 
kingship, or the reduction of the monarch to ceremonial figurehead, like the 
latter-day Zhou emperor or present-day queen of England. 
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When kings definitively win (e.g., by allying with a newly emerging civil or 
military bureaucracy), a different range of conflicts ensue, largely, between the 
living and the dead. Having overcome boundaries in space, kings will regularly 
attempt to similarly overcome boundaries in time, and translate their metahu-
man status into some form of genuine immortality. Insofar as they are success-
ful, they create a series of dilemmas for their successors, whose legitimacy is 
derived from their ancestry, but who at the same time are necessarily placed in 
a position of rivalry with them. 
Anthropologists have long remarked on the phenomenon of sinking status. Over 
time, the progressive distancing of cadet persons and branches from the main 
line of succession is an endemic source of strife in royal lineages, often lead-
ing to fratricidal violence—especially among paternal half-siblings, each backed 
by their own maternal kinsmen (cf. Geertz and Geertz 1975). The succession 
chances of the junior princes of each generation become increasingly remote, 
unless they seize by force and guile the kingship to which they have diminish-
ing claim by right. Beside the violence of an interregnum, the effect is often a 
centrifugal dispersion of royals—those who withdraw or are defeated—into the 
outer reaches of the kingdom or even beyond, where they may take power in a 
lesser realm of their own. This is a major source of stranger-king formation and 
of regional configurations of core–periphery relations (galactic polities). It may 
also play a role in the formation of so-called “empires.”
This problem is complicated even further by a central contradiction between 
two forms of sinking status: horizontal and vertical. On the one hand, each col-
lateral line that breaks off from the dynastic core descends ever lower in status as 
new ones are constantly produced, unless some radical means of self-promotion 
succeed in at least temporarily reversing their decline. On the other hand, the 
central line itself is usually seen as declining steadily in status, as the current 
ruler becomes ever more distant from the founding hero, god, or stranger-king. 
As a result, the branch of the royal line identified with the highest-ranking an-
cestor (the oldest) is also the lowest-ranking branch of the royal line. 
The inevitability of sinking status over time leads to the dilemma of how to 
manage the royal dead. Deceased members of the dynasty are likely to be pre-
sent in political life through shrines, mummies, relics, tombs, or even palaces; to 
communicate their will and perspectives through mediums, oracles, or similar 
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means. The paradox of horizontal and vertical sinking status—that older ances-
tors rank higher for the same reason their descendants rank lower—becomes 
all the more acute the more active the role of the dead in contemporary politics 
becomes. This role can be very active indeed: Inca royal mummies continued 
to own the same palace, lands, and retinues of retainers they had possessed in 
life, forcing each new ruler to conquer new territories to support his own court. 
In all such systems, if things were left to their own devices for too long, living 
kings would be crowded out and overwhelmed by legions of the dead. So the 
dead had to be controlled, limited, contained—even purged. Like living kings, 
they had to be rendered more sacred, more bounded by restrictions that were 
restrictive of their power—even if those restrictions were ultimately constitutive 
of that power. 
It is a general sociological principle that the more ancestors are seen as funda-
mentally different sorts of being from present-day mortals, the more they are 
likely to be seen as a source of power; the more similar, the more they are seen 
as rivals and sources of constraint. The memory of a totemic killer whale ances-
tor, or witchetty grub, is in no sense an imposition on the living; by contrast, 
the memory of a man remembered and venerated by his many descendants is 
very much a rival for any descendant whose life project is to achieve exactly the 
same thing. Only so many ancestors can become famous. Still, there is always a 
balance here: if ancestors are entirely effaced, their descendants lose all status; if 
they have too much power, they are seen as stifling those same descendants’ self-
realization. The result is often another variant of the politics of ritual subterfuge 
so typical of dealing with life-giving gods: they must be contained, driven off, or 
even destroyed, all in the ostensible name of honoring them.
Ordinary mortals may or may not face this problem (it all depends on how they 
see themselves in time and history), but kings, whose legitimacy is based at least 
in part on descent from other kings, must always face it. To flee one’s domain 
and become a stranger-king elsewhere is in fact one way to escape the choke-
hold of the dead, but a stranger king’s descendants will begin to have the same 
problem, and it will only get worse as time goes on.
Much of the more extravagant behavior of the rulers of powerful kingdoms or 
“early states” can be seen as attempts to escape this chokehold, that is, as modes 
of competition with the dead. One might attempt to efface the dead, or become 
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the dead, but this is rarely entirely effective. One might enter into direct com-
petition in the creation of timeless monuments, in conquest, or in the ritual 
sacrifice of ever greater numbers of subjects in attempts to manifest ever greater 
arbitrary sovereign power. One might even—this is sometimes done—attempt 
to reverse the direction of history entirely, and invent a myth of progress. All of 
these expedients create new problems.
The ordinary balance of power between king and people is often maintained 
through intense emotional engagements: love, hatred, or some combination of 
the two. These often take the form of paradoxical inversions of what would 
normally be expected to be the result of those emotions: Shilluk or Swazi kings 
took on divine status at the moment people united in hatred against them; the 
nurturant love of Merina toward infantilized rulers might alternate between 
indulgence for acts that might otherwise be seen as atrocities, and harsh chas-
tisement when they were seen as overstepping bounds.
The perfection of the king, his court, palace, capital, or immediate surround-
ings, is not precisely a model of the universe; it is a model of the universe 
restored to a state of abstract Platonic perfection, one which it lacks in ordi-
nary experience. Perhaps it once had this state. Perhaps it is felt it someday 
will again. The newly founded royal city, a projection of a single human vision 
imposed on the material world, can thus be seen as the prototype for all future 
utopias: an attempt to impose an image of perfection not just onto the physical 
world but also into the lives of those mortal humans who actually lived in it. 
Ultimately, of course, this is impossible. Humans cannot be reduced to Platonic 
ideals, and the fundamental quandaries of human life, revolving as they do 
particularly around reproduction and death, cannot be legislated away; such 
states of transcendent perfection can perhaps be attained in moments of ritual 
performance, but no one can live in such a moment for their entire life, or even 
any substantial part of it. Some royal capitals try to exclude birth, infirmity, 
and (natural) death from the royal settlement entirely. Going that far is unu-
sual. But something along these lines always happens. At the very least, royal 
courts will be marked by elaborate codes of etiquette which require that even 
everyday social interaction be governed by the pretense that such things do not 
exist. These codes set standards of comportment that are then realized at ever 
greater degrees of imperfection the further one travels (socially or physically) 
from the royal court.
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In this way, where prophets foretell the total future resolution of the contradic-
tions and dilemmas of the human condition, kings embody their partial pre-
sent-day resolution.
The arbitrariness of stranger-kings is, however paradoxically, the key to their abil-
ity to establish themselves as avatars of justice. The ability to seize or destroy any-
thing, even if only very occasionally deployed, is structurally similar to the owner-
ship of everything; it is an undifferentiated relation between the monarch and 
everyone and everything else. This indifference is also impartiality, since such an 
absolute monarch has—in principle at least—no particular interest which might 
bias his judgment in disputes between his subjects. They are all the same to him. 
For this reason, kings will always claim some kind of absolute despotic power, even 
if everyone is aware such claims mean next to nothing in practice—since other-
wise, they would not be kings. At the same time, the all-encompassing nature of 
such claims renders the very power of the king potentially subversive of existing 
social arrangements. While kings will, generally, represent themselves as embodi-
ments and bastions of all existing hierarchies and structures of authority (e.g., by 
insisting that he is “Father of his People,” the monarch above all confirms the au-
thority of actual fathers over their wives, children, and dependents), the ultimately 
undifferentiated nature of their power also meant all subjects were, ultimately, the 
same—that is, equal. As the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Henry Home 
(Lord Kames) was perhaps first to point out, the difference between absolute des-
potism, where all are equal except for one man, and absolute democracy, is simply 
one man. There is thus a deep structural affinity between the contemporary notion 
that all citizens are “equal before the law” and the monarchical principle that they 
are equal as potential victims of purely arbitrary royal depredation.
In political life, this tension can take many forms. Commoners may appeal to 
the king against his “evil councilors.” Kings or emperors may frame themselves 
as popular champions against the interests of the aristocracy. Alternately, every-
one, regardless of status, can unify against the king.
As a result, even when kings are gone—even when they are deposed by popular 
uprisings—they are likely to linger in ghostly form, precisely as such a unifying 
principle. Royal spirit mediumship in much of Africa and Madagascar, and the 
modern notion of “popular sovereignty,” are both contemporary examples of 
this principle.
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Core–periphery relations (galactic polities)
Centrifugal dissemination of influential political, ritual, and material forms 
from central kingdoms often evokes a centripetal attraction and movement of 
peoples from the hinterlands. Peripheral societies have been rendered subordi-
nate culturally while still independent politically. It is probably a law of political 
science that all great kingdoms were marginal once. Originally oriented to a 
powerful center from the peripheries, they succeed by some advantage—as in 
trade or warfare—in replacing their erstwhile superiors.
Indeed, in these core–periphery configurations centered on dominant king-
doms, there are endemic impulses of “upward nobility” at every level of the 
intersocietal hierarchy. The apical kingdoms themselves are competitively coun-
terposed in a larger geopolitical field, which they seek to dominate by universal-
izing their own claims to power. On one hand, they engage in what is variously 
described in these pages as “utopian politics” or “the real-politics of the mar-
velous” by tracing their origins to world-historical heroes (such as Alexander 
the Great), legendary god-kings (such as Quetzalcoatl), fabled cities (such as 
Troy or Mecca), ancient or contemporary world powers (such as the Roman 
or Chinese empires), and/or great gods (such as Shiva). On the other hand, 
they demonstrate their universality by acquiring—through tribute, trade, or pil-
lage—and domesticating the wild, animistic powers ensouled in the exotic ob-
jects of the barbaric hinterlands. 
In a famous ethnographic case reported by Edmund Leach (1954), chiefs of the 
Kachin hill tribe of Burma have been known to “become Shan”: that is, to ally 
with and adopt the lifestyle of Shan princes. For their part, Shan princes take on 
the political and ritual trappings of Burmese or Chinese kings—some of which 
may also filter up to the hill peoples. This phenomenon of “galactic mimesis,” 
in which lesser chiefs assume the political forms of their proximate superiors, 
is a prevalent dynamic of core–periphery systems, impelled by competition 
within and between political entities throughout the intersocietal hierarchy. The 
competition takes one of two common forms. In a process of “complementary 
schismogenesis,” individuals contending for leadership in a given community, 
or communities competing for power within a larger galactic field, attempt to 
trump their local adversaries by affiliating with a superior chief; they scale up 
their own status to a higher register of the regional hierarchy. Or conversely, in 
a process of “antagonistic acculturation,” a lesser group may attempt to resist the 
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encroachment of a neighboring power by adopting the latter’s own political ap-
paratus and thus effect a stand-off—the way the Vietnamese long claimed their 
own mandate of heaven as a “southern empire” on equal basis with the Chinese 
“northern empire.” Note that in any case the elements of high political status, 
including kingship, are disseminated by a mimetic process through the region 
and on the initiative of the less powerful peoples.
Taken together with acculturative influences radiating outward from core king-
doms, galactic mimesis has the effect of creating hybrid societies whose political 
and cosmological forms are largely not of their own devising and indeed sur-
pass any possible “determination by the economic basis.” Given the pervasive-
ness of core–periphery relations the world around, even in parts of the “tribal 
zone,” this kind of hybridity or uneven development is more often the norm 
of sociocultural order than the exception. The “superstructure” exceeds the 
“infrastructure.”
THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF TRADITIONAL KINGSHIP
Kingship proprietary schemes are complex. On one hand, the country is divided 
into local properties, of which the ancestors of the inhabitants, or the indigenous 
spirits with whom the ancestors have made a pact, are the “true owners”—and 
the decisive agents of the area’s fertility. Correlatively, the local subject popula-
tion, who have ritual access to these metaperson authorities through their initi-
ated elders or priestly leaders, are themselves deemed the “owners,” the “earth,” 
the “land,” or some such designation of their founder rights to the country rela-
tive to the ruling aristocracy—especially in stranger-kingdoms, where the latter 
are foreign by origin and ethnic identity. Although possessory in relation to the 
rulers, the local people’s rights are only usufructuary in relation to the spiritual 
inhabitants, whose ultimate ownership must be duly acknowledged by the cur-
rent occupants. (Notice that these relations between the local people and the 
autochthonous spirits are themselves analogous to the larger structure of the 
stranger-kingdom.) On the other hand, the ruling aristocracy and the king—
who by tradition may have been poor and landless originally except as they were 
granted land by the native people—may also be “owners”; but here in the sense 
of lordship over large landed estates and their inhabitants, giving them tribu-
tary rights to a portion of product and manpower generated by the underlying 
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population. Whereas the subject people’s relation to the process is productive, 
by virtue of their control of the primary means, the rulers’ relation to the process 
is extractive, by virtue of their domination of the producing people. As the East 
African Nyoro people put it: “The Mukama [the king] rules the people; the 
clans rule the land” (Beattie 1971: 167).
Accordingly, the kingdom economy has a dual structure, marked by fundamen-
tal differences between the oikos economics of the underlying population and 
the specifically political economics of the palace and aristocracy, undertaken 
with an eye toward the material subsidization of their power. Devoted rather 
to a customary livelihood, the primary sector is organized by the kinship and 
community relations of the subject people. The ruling class is principally con-
cerned with the finished product of the people’s work in goods and manpower, 
on which it takes a toll that helps fund an elite sphere of wealth accumulation, 
oriented particularly to the political finalities of strengthening and extending 
its sphere of domination. Labor in this sphere is organized by corvée, slave, 
and/or client relations. Beside support of an imposing palace establishment, it 
is notably employed in the accumulation of riches from extramural sources by 
means of raid, trade, and/or tribute. Employed, then, in conspicuous consump-
tion, monumental construction, and strategic redistribution—and possibly in 
further military exploits—this wealth has subjugating effects, both directly, as 
benefiting some, and indirectly, as impressing others. Moreover, the material 
success of the king is the sign of his access to the divine sources of earthly pros-
perity, thereby doubling the political effects of his wealth by the demonstration 
of his godly powers. 
Kingship is a political economy of social subjugation rather than material coer-
cion. Kingly power does not work on proprietary control of the subject people’s 
means of existence so much as on the beneficial or awe-inspiring effects of royal 
largess, display, and prosperity. The objective of the political economy is the 
increase in the number and loyalty of subjects—as distinct from capitalist en-
terprise, which aims at the increase of capital wealth. To paraphrase a Marxian 
formula, the essential project of kingship economics is P–W–Pʹ—where the po-
litical command of people gives an accumulation of wealth that yields a greater 
command of people—by contrast to the classic capitalist formula, W–P–Wʹ—
where the proprietary control of productive wealth (capital) gives the control of 
people (labor) in the aim of increasing productive wealth. 
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One might justly say that “spirits own the means of production,” were it not 
that in the form of plants, animals, significant artifacts, and even land, and the 
natural forces of growth, these so-called “spirits,” and more properly called 
“metapersons,” are the means of production. Having their own dispositions and 
intentions, they are indeed their own persons, and, together with divinities, an-
cestors, and other such metaperson powers, they are known to be responsible 
for the success or failure of human work. Accordingly, the “means of production” 
characteristically includes ritual, especially sacrificial ritual, as an essential part 
of work—as in the famous Tikopian “work of the gods.” 
It also follows that the political benefits of material success—the rewards in 
status and influence—go to the shamans, priests, elders, lineage heads, big-men, 
chiefs, or kings, who have by ascription or achievement priority of access to 
these metahuman sources of human prosperity—but not necessarily, or only 
to a lesser extent, to the hunters, gardeners, or others who did the work. The 
alienation of the worker from his product was a general condition long before 
its notoriety in capitalism. So far as the social credit goes instead to the reign-
ing politicoreligious authorities, political power may thus have an “economic 
basis”—although the “economic basis” is not economic. 
Also by the way, cannibalism is a widespread condition, even among many so-
cieties that profess to abhor it. Cannibalism is a predicament of the animistic 
hunter or gardener, who must live by consuming animals or plants which (who) 
are essentially persons themselves. Hence the taboos and other ritual respects 
accorded to these species and their metaperson masters—again as a necessary 
condition of “production.”
ON SHOPWORN CONCEPTS THAT HAVE OUTLIVED THEIR 
USEFULNESS
“Cultural relativism,” properly understood, has not outlived its usefulness. What 
is useless is the vulgar sense of relativism to the effect that the values of any soci-
ety are as good as, if not better than, the values of any other, including our own. 
Properly understood, cultural relativism is an anthropological technique for un-
derstanding cultural differences, not a charitable way of granting moral absolu-
tion. It consists of the provisional suspension of our own moral judgments or 
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valuations of other people’s practices in order to place them as positional values 
in the cultural and historical contexts that gave rise to them. The issue is what 
these practices mean, how they came about, and what their effects are for the 
people concerned, not what they are or are worth in our terms. 
In this same relativist regard, the local people’s ontological scheme, their sense 
of what there is, must likewise be considered in itself and for itself, and not 
be distorted by analytic concepts that substitute our certainties of “reality” for 
theirs. Take the category of “myth,” for example. In standard English, to label 
a statement as “myth” means it’s not true. Hence in speaking of other people’s 
“myths,” we characteristically assert that what they know as sacred truth, and 
upon which they predicate their existence, is fictional and unbelievable—for us. 
Having thus debunked the constitutional basis of their society—as in the eth-
nological oxymoron “mythical charter”—we are given liberty to write it off as 
essentially unreal for them too: an epiphenomenal mystification of their actual 
sociopolitical practice. What is then typically left to the scientific project is a 
more or less feckless search for the “kernel of historical truth” in a narrative riven 
with irrelevant fantasy—in this way ignoring that the concepts thus devalued 
are the true history at issue. For taken in that veridical capacity by the people 
concerned, the so-called “myth” is truly organizing their historical action.
“Life, after all, is as much an imitation of art as the reverse.” So commented 
Victor Turner (1957: 153) in regard to the way Central African Ndembu villag-
ers applied principles from the traditions of Lunda kingship they had learned 
as children to their current social relations. Or again, this is how important 
political leaders likewise inform and structure their own public actions by the 
relations encoded in dynastic epics. The past is not simply prologue, but, as 
Turner says, it is “paradigm.” Historical causes in the mode of traditions have no 
temporal or physical proximity to their effects: they are inserted into the situ-
ation, but they are not of it. Embedding the present in terms of a remembered 
past, this kind of culturally instituted temporality is a fundamental mode of 
history-making, from the omnipresent Dreamtime of Australian Aboriginals 
to the state politics of Kongo kings. But then, what actually happens in a given 
situation is always constituted by cultural significations that transcend the pa-
rameters of the happening itself: Bobby Thomson didn’t simply hit the ball over 
the left-field fence, he won the pennant. The better part of history is atemporal 
and cultural: not “what actually happened,” but what it is that happened. 
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This does not mean that just because Nuer now insist they are all descended 
from a man named “Nuer” who lived ten generations ago, we must ignore docu-
mentary evidence of the existence of Nuer before 1750. It does mean that if we 
do not care what being Nuer means to Nuer, then or now, we have no business 
speaking about “Nuer” at all.
Shopworn economic concepts 
“Things,” for example. The Cartesian distinction of res cogitans and res extensa, 
subjects and objects, is not a good description of ontological schemes largely 
constituted on grounds of human attributes or personhood. As already repeat-
edly noted, in the societies at issue in this work the features of the environment 
with which people are significantly engaged, and even important productive 
artifacts of their own making, have the inner and essential qualities of human 
persons. The conventional anthropological concept of “the psychic unity of hu-
manity” has to be extended to the subjectively infused universe for many or most 
of these societies. It was a distinctive Judeo-Christian conceit that the world 
was made of nothing, that spirit or subjectivity was not immanent in it—and for 
Adam’s eating an apple humans would be condemned to wearing themselves to 
death working on obdurate matter, thorns, and thistles. For most of the world, 
economic praxis has necessarily entailed intersubjective relations with the be-
ings on which (with whom) people work and which (who) decide the outcome. 
The plants that the Achuar women of Amazonia nurture are their children, even 
as the success of their efforts is due to the goddess of cultivation. Here it is not 
simply that human skills are a necessary but not sufficient cause of the successful 
outcome, but that human skills are the signs of divinely endowed powers. Our 
own parochial economic science of a Cartesian world notwithstanding, in this 
respect there are no simple “things:” the so-called “objects” of people’s interest 
have their own desires.
Likewise “production”: the notion of a heroic individual working creatively on 
inert matter, thereby transforming it into a useful existence by his own effort 
according to his own plan, does not describe an intersubjective praxis in which 
metaperson-alters are the primary agents of the process (Descola 2013: 321ff.).
It is more accurate to say that people receive the fruits of their efforts from these 
sources than that that they create them (e.g., Harrison 1990: 47ff.). The forces 
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that make gardens grow, animals available, women fertile, pots come out intact 
from the kiln and implements from the forge—forces variously hypostasized as 
mana, semangat, hasina, nawalak, orenda, etc.—are not of human origin. Con-
ventional notions of the supposed functional effects of the relations of produc-
tion on the larger relations of society are nonstarters in regard to the many 
societies so ontologically constituted. 
Our notion of “production” is itself the secularization of a theological concept, 
but it derives from a very specific theology, in which an all-powerful God cre-
ates the universe ex nihilio (Descola 2013: 321ff.)—an idea which is maintained 
in our cosmology in multiple ways even after God has been ostensibly taken out 
of the picture. But consider the hunter, forager, or fisher. Does she “produce” an-
ything? At what point does a trapped fish or uprooted tuber stop being a “natu-
ral” phenomenon and start being a “social product”? We are speaking of acts of 
transformation, attack, propitiation, care, killing, disarticulation, and reshaping. 
But the same is ultimately true of making automobiles. It’s only if one imagines 
the factory as a black box, the way a man who doesn’t know very much about 
the full course of pregnancy might imagine a woman’s womb as “producing” 
(etymologically, “pushing out”) something fully formed through one great burst 
of “labor,” that it’s possible to say “production” is the true basis of human life.
Shopworn concepts of sociocultural order
As implied in the preceding discussion—and amplified in the body of this 
work—several conceptual dichotomies of broad application in the human sci-
ences are not receivable for the societies under consideration here, inasmuch 
as these binaries are not substantially differentiated, opposed, or otherwise on-
tologically pertinent. Typically, they are inappropriate ethnocentric projections 
onto culturally distinct others. But the peoples concerned do not distinguish:
“Humans” from “spirits.” So-called “spirits” (metapersons) have the essential 
qualities of persons.
“Material” from “spiritual.” They are largely and fundamentally alike on the 
common ground of humanity. 
“Supernatural” from “natural.” Populated and activated by embodied per-
sons, there is no subjectless “natural” world: a fortiori, no transcendent realm 
of “spirit.” 
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Hence, “this world” from an “otherworld.” Metaperson-others are in peo-
ple’s everyday—and in dreams, every night—experience. People are known 
to communicate with so-called “spirits” and have customary social relation-
ships with them, including sex and marriage.
There are no egalitarian human societies. Even hunters are ordered and domi-
nated by a host of metaperson powers-that-be, whose rule is punitively backed 
by severe sanctions. The earthly people are dependent and subordinate compo-
nents of a cosmic polity. They well know and fear higher authority—and some-
times they defy it. Society both with and against the state is virtually a human 
universal.
This does not mean the famous egalitarian ethos of so many hunting socie-
ties, and not just them, is an illusion. Just as assertions of the absolute power 
of the sovereign are also, tacitly, assertions of the absolute equality of his sub-
jects (at least in relation to him), so assertions of metahuman power are also 
ipso facto ways of asserting that mortal humans are—in all the most important 
ways—the same. The difference is that a flesh-and-blood Sun King needs an 
apparatus of rule (which almost invariably becomes the primary object of hatred 
of his subjects); if the actual sun is king, well, human beings are pretty much all 
equal compared to the sun. The first ideals of political equality— especially, the 
refusal to give and take orders between adults, so well documented among many 
societies with particularly terrifying cosmic powers—are themselves an effect 
of the cosmic polity such men and women inhabit. This no less makes them 
pioneers of human freedom.
Note the disproportions in structure and power between the cosmic polity gov-
erning the human community—including divine beings with ultimate life-and-
death powers over the people—and the organization of the human society itself. 
In both morphology and potency there is no equivalence between the human 
social order and the cosmic authors of its fate. Great gods on whom human 
life depends are known to peoples in the Arctic, the New Guinea Highlands, 
and Amazonia: as was said earlier, there are kings in heaven where there are 
not even chiefs on earth. Neither do kings on earth have the hegemonic scope 
and powers of the gods they imitate. This structural disproportion is one reason 
(among others) that the common human science of the “supernatural realm” 
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as a discursive ideological reflex of the people’s sociopolitical order, being de-
signed to functionally support it whether by mystification or replication, is a 
theoretical practice as seriously flawed as it is habitually repeated. Durkheim 
notwithstanding.
Human societies of all kinds are never alone in another sense. Engaged in re-
gional fields with societies of cultural others, they are largely formed in respect 
of one another. As noted above, even apart from imperial systems or galactic 
polities centered in dominant kingdoms, core–periphery relations are known in 
the “tribal zone”—as in the classic “culture areas” of the Native Americas, with 
their respective “cultural climaxes” (Kroeber 1947)—such that the structures 
and practices of any given society are predicated on those of other societies. Be-
sides diffusion and acculturation by domination, a variety of other intercultural 
dynamics may be in play: including complementary schismogenesis, whereby 
interacting peoples take contrary cultural forms, whether in the mode of com-
petition or interdependence; or the aforementioned galactic mimesis, whereby 
peripheral peoples take on the cosmopolitical forms of hierarchical superiors. 
The scandal is that while human societies are thus never alone, the human sci-
ences have long pretended that they are. With few exceptions, such as recent 
world system and globalization theories, all our major paradigms of cultural 
order and change imagine that societies are self-fashioning monads—autono-
mous and sui generis. Durkheimian sociology is not the only one. Likewise, 
Malinowskian functionalism; the structural functionalism of Radcliffe-Brown; 
the Marxism of base and superstructure; evolutionism from Herbert Spencer to 
Leslie White and Julian Steward; Benedictian patterns of culture; even post-
structuralist discourses and subjectivities: they all suppose that the forms and 
relations they are explicating are situated within a solitary sociocultural order 
and that the articulations and dynamics of that order are the critical matters at 
issue. The concept of culture has been unfortunately tied to a politics of nation-
alism since Johann Gottfried von Herder and his followers formulated it in that 
context.
And so, finally, we pass to that intellectual fetish whose worship today tran-
scends even that of “the nation”—that is, its twin companion, “the state.” Ask-
ing whether a kingdom is a state or not rarely tells you very much at all about 
its politics or constitution. Surely we have learned all there is to learn from the 
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endless theorizing on “the origins of the state” or “the process of state formation” 
that so dominated theoretical debates of the twentieth century. In retrospect, 
we may well discover that “the state” that consumed so much of our attention 
never existed at all, or was, at best, a fortuitous confluence of elements of entirely 
heterogeneous origins (sovereignty, administration, a competitive political field, 
etc.) that came together in certain times and places, but that, nowadays, are very 
much in the process of once again drifting apart.
chapter 1
The original political society
Marshall Sahlins
I am a Cartesian—a Hocartesian. I want to follow Hocart’s lead in freeing 
oneself from anthropological conventions by adhering to indigenous traditions. 
“How can we make any progress in the understanding of cultures, ancient or 
modern,” he said, “if we persist in dividing what people join, and in joining 
what they keep apart?” ([1952] 1970: 23). This essay is an extended commen-
tary on the Hocartesian meditation encapsulated in Kings and councillors by “the 
straightforward equivalence, king = god” ([1936] 1970: 74). I mean to capi-
talize on the more or less explicit temporality entailed in the anthropological 
master’s exegesis of this equivalence, as when he variously speaks of the king as 
the vehicle, abode, substitute, repository, or representative of the god (Hocart 
1933, [1936] 1970, [1950] 1968). The clear implication is that gods precede the 
kings who effectively replicate them—which is not exactly the common social 
science tradition of cosmology as the reflex of sociology. Consider time’s arrow 
in statements such as: “So present was this divine and celestial character to the 
Polynesian mind that they called the chiefs lani, heaven, and the same word 
marae is used of a temple and a chief ’s grave” (Hocart [1927] 1969: 11). Kings 
are human imitations of gods, rather than gods of kings.
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That was the dominant view in Christendom for a long time before the 
modern celestialization of sovereignty as an ideological expression of the real-
political order. From Augustine’s notion of the Earthly City as an imperfect 
form of the Heavenly City to Carl Schmitt’s assertion that the significant con-
cepts of the modern state are “secularized theological concepts” ([1922] 2005: 
36), human government was commonly considered to be modeled on the king-
dom of God. Based on his own view of the ritual character of kingship, however, 
Hocart’s thesis was more far-reaching culturally and historically: that human 
societies were engaged in cosmic systems of governmentality even before they 
instituted anything like a political state of their own. From the preface of Kings 
and councillors:
The machinery of government was blocked out in society long before the ap-
pearance of government as we now understand it. In other words, the func-
tions now discharged by king, prime minister, treasury, public works, are not 
the original ones; they may account for the present form of these institutions, 
but not for their original appearance. They were originally part, not of a system 
of government, but of an organization to promote life, fertility, prosperity by 
transferring life from objects abounding in it to objects dependent on it. ([1952] 
1970: 3)
In effect, Hocart speaks here of a cosmic polity, hierarchically encompassing 
human society, since the life-giving means of people’s existence were supplied 
by “supernatural” beings of extraordinary powers: a polity thus governed by so-
called “spirits”—though they had human dispositions, often took human bodily 
forms, and were present within human experience. 
The present essay is a follow-up. The project is to take the Cartesian the-
sis beyond kingship to its logical and anthropological extreme. Even the so-
called “egalitarian” or “acephalous” societies, including hunters such as the 
Inuit or Australian Aboriginals, are in structure and practice cosmic polities, 
ordered and governed by divinities, the dead, species-masters, and other such 
metapersons endowed with life-and-death powers over the human popula-
tion. There are kingly beings in heaven where there are no chiefs on earth. 
Hobbes notwithstanding, the state of nature is already something of a po-
litical state. It follows that, taken in its social totality and cultural reality, 
something like the state is the general condition of humankind. It is usually 
called “religion.”
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FOR EXAMPLE: CHEWONG AND INUIT
Let me begin with a problem in ethnographic perspective that typically leads 
to a cultural mismatch between the ancestral legacy of the anthropologist and 
her or his indigenous interlocutors. I know this is a problem, since for a long 
time I lived with the same contradiction I now see in Signe Howell’s excellent 
study of the Chewong of the Malaysian interior. Although Chewong society is 
described as classically “egalitarian,” it is in practice coercively ruled by a host of 
cosmic authorities, themselves of human character and metahuman powers. The 
Chewong are a few hundred people organized largely by kinship and subsisting 
largely by hunting. But they are hardly on their own. They are set within and 
dependent upon a greater animistic universe comprised of the persons of ani-
mals, plants, and natural features, complemented by a great variety of demonic 
figures, and presided over by several inclusive deities. Though we convention-
ally call such creatures “spirits,” Chewong respectfully regard them as “people” 
(beri)—indeed, “people like us” or “our people” (Howell 1985: 171). The obvious 
problem of perspective consists in the venerable anthropological disposition to 
banish the so-called “supernatural” to the epiphenomenal limbo of the “ideo-
logical,” the “imaginary,” or some such background of discursive insignificance 
by comparison to the hard realities of social action. Thus dividing what the 
people join, we are unable to make the conceptual leap—the reversal of the 
structural gestalt—implied in Howell’s keen observation that “the human social 
world is intrinsically part of a wider world in which boundaries between society 
and cosmos are non-existent” (2012: 139). “There is no meaningful separation,” 
she says, “between what one may term nature and culture or, indeed, between 
society and cosmos” (ibid.: 135).
So while, on one hand, Howell characterizes the Chewong as having “no 
social or political hierarchy” or “leaders of any kind,” on the other, she describes 
a human community encompassed and dominated by potent metapersons with 
powers to impose rules and render justice that would be the envy of kings. “Cos-
mic rules,” Howell calls them, I reckon both for their scope and for their origins. 
The metahuman persons who mandate these rules visit illness or other misfor-
tune, not excluding penalty of death, on Chewong who transgress them. “I can 
think of no act that is rule neutral,” Howell writes; taken together, “they refer 
not just to selected social domains or activities, but to the performance of regu-
lar living itself ” (ibid.: 140). Yet though they live by the rules, Chewong have no 
part in their enforcement, which is the exclusive function of “whatever spirit or 
26 ON KINGS
non-human personage is activated by the disregard of a particular rule” (ibid.: 
139). Something like a rule of law sustained by a monopoly of force. Among 
hunters.
When Signe Howell first visited the Chewong in 1977, she found them ob-
sessively concerned with a tragedy that happened not long before. Three people 
had been killed and two injured for violating a weighty taboo on laughing at 
animals: a prohibition that applied to all forest creatures, the breach of which 
would potentially implicate all Chewong people. The victims had ridiculed some 
millipedes that entered their lean-to; and that night a terrific thunderstorm 
uprooted a large tree, which fell upon them. Here it deserves notice that while 
the Chewong profess to abhor cannibalism, like animist hunters generally, they 
nevertheless subsist on “people like us,” their animal prey. Likewise similar to 
other hunters, they manage the contradiction by the ritual respects they accord 
wild animals: in this case, by the prohibition on ridiculing forest creatures—
which also, by positioning the animals outside familiar human relations, appar-
ently erases the cannibal implications from overt consciousness (cf. Valeri 2000: 
143). Since the forest animals are not really like us, we can beat the cannibal rap. 
The severe punishments for disrespecting forest creatures originated with 
certain immortals of the Above and the Below: the male Thunder God, Tanko, 
and the female Original Snake, whose abode is the primordial sea under the 
earth—and who is most responsible for maintaining rules of this type. There were 
never any humans the likes of Tanko and the Original Snake among Chewong 
themselves: no such human powers, whatever the conventional wisdom says 
about divinity as the mirror image of society. Tanko lives in the sky, whence the 
thunder he unleashes on taboo-violators is aptly said to be the sound of him 
laughing at the human predicament. His thunderbolts are also known to punish 
incest, causing severe joint pain and, if the behavior persists, death. On his fre-
quent visits to earth, he indulges in contrasting sexual behavior—relations with 
distantly rather than closely related women—and with beneficial rather than 
fatal results: for without his sexual exploits there could be no Chewong people. 
Tanko descends to have intercourse with all human and animal females, which 
is what makes them fertile. Menstrual blood represents the birth of children he 
has sired, children unseen and unknown to their mothers, as they ascend to the 
heavens to live with their father. The semen of human males, however, is unable 
to procreate children until Tanko has copulated with the women concerned, 
which is to say until they have menstruated—from which it follows empirically 
that the god was indeed the condition of possibility of human reproduction.
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The Original Snake is sometimes identified as the sky-wife of Tanko, a cul-
ture heroine who gave Chewong fire, tobacco, and night; but in her more usual 
form of a huge snake dwelling in chthonian waters, she is especially known for 
her malevolent powers. Knocking down trees and houses, her breath creates the 
destructive winds that punish people who violate the ordinances on the treat-
ment of animals. She may also be provoked into moving while in the subter-
ranean sea, causing an upwelling of waters that drowns the offenders—upon 
which she swallows them body and soul.1 Not that the Original Snake is the 
only man-eater among the myriad indwelling and free-ranging metahumans 
whom Chewong encounter, more often for worse than for better. Without rep-
licating the extraordinary catalogue compiled by Howell (1989), suffice it for 
present purposes to indicate the range: from female familiars who marry the 
human individuals for whom they serve as spirit guides; through various kinds 
of ghosts especially dangerous to small children and the creatures upon whose 
good will fruits bear in season; to the twenty-seven subtypes of harmful beings 
who were once human, and of whom Chewong say, “They want to eat us” (ibid.: 
105). If there is indeed no boundary between the cosmos and the socius, then it’s 
not exactly what some would call a “simple society,” let alone an egalitarian one.
I hasten to reply to the obvious objection that the potent deities of the 
Chewong reflect a long history of relationships with coastal Malay states by 
noting that basically similar cosmologies are found among basically similar 
societies situated far from such influences. For an initial example the Cen-
tral Inuit; thereafter, Highland New Guineans, Australian Aboriginals, native 
Amazonians, and other “egalitarian” peoples likewise dominated by metaper-
son-others who vastly outnumber them. 
Of the Inuit in general it is said that a person “should never push himself 
ahead of others or show the slightest ambition to control other people” (Oosten 
1976: 16), and in particular of the Netsilik of the Central Canadian Arctic that 
“there were no lineages or clans, no institutionalized chiefs or formal govern-
ment” (Balikci 1970: xv). On the other hand, of the same Netsilik, Knud Ras-
mussen (1931: 224) wrote:
1. One is reminded of the great Rainbow Serpent of Australian Aboriginals, as also 
by the Original Snake’s relation to the celestial god Tanko, thus making a pair 
like the male sky deity and the autochthonous serpent of Australian traditions (see 
below on Magalim of the Central New Guinea Min peoples and Ungud of the 
Kimberleys, Western Australia).
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The powers that rule the earth and all the animals, and the lives of mankind are 
the great spirits who live on the sea, on land, out in space, and in the Land of 
the Sky. These are many, and many kinds of spirits, but there are only three really 
great and really independent ones, and they are Nuliajuk, Narssuk, and Tatqeq. 
These three are looked upon as directly practicing spirits, and the most powerful 
of them all is Nuliajuk, the mother of animals and mistress both of the sea and 
the land. At all times she makes mankind feel how she vigilantly and mercilessly 
takes care that all souls, both animals and humankind, are shown the respect the 
ancient rules of life demand.
Ruling their respective domains—Nuliajuk or Sedna, the sea and the land; 
Tatqeq, the Moon Man, the heavens; and Narssuk or Sila, the meteorologi-
cal forces of the air—these three “great spirits” were widely known under vari-
ous names from East Greenland to the Siberian Arctic—which affords some 
confidence in their antiquity and indigeneity. While always complementary in 
territorial scope, they varied in salience in different regions: the Moon Man 
generally dominant in the Bering Strait and Sila in Greenland; whereas Sedna, 
as Franz Boas wrote, was “the supreme deity of the Central Eskimos,” holding 
“supreme sway over the destinies of mankind” (1901: 119).2
The Central Inuit and Sedna in particular will be the focus here: “The stern 
goddess of fate among the Eskimos,” as Rasmussen (1930: 123) characterized 
her. In command of the animal sources of food, light, warmth, and clothing that 
made an Inuit existence possible, Sedna played “by far the most important part 
in everyday life” (ibid.: 62). She was effectively superior to Sila and the Moon, 
who often functioned as her agents, “to see that her will is obeyed” (ibid.: 63). 
Accordingly, in his ethnography of the Iglulik, Rasmussen describes a divine 
pantheon of anthropomorphic power ruling a human society that was itself in-
nocent of institutional authority. So whenever any transgression of Sedna’s rules 
or taboos associated with hunting occurs, 
the spirit of the sea intervenes. The moon spirit helps her to see the rules of life 
are daily observed, and comes hurrying down to earth to punish any instance of 
2. On the distribution and respective powers of these great spirits among Inuit and 
Siberian peoples, see the general summaries in Weyer (1932), Oosten (1976), 
Hodgkins (1977), and Merkur (1991). On the dominance of Sedna among the 
Central Inuit, see in particular Weyer (1932: 355–56).
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neglect. And both sea spirit and moon spirit employ Sila to execute all punish-
ments in any way connected with the weather. (Rasmussen 1930: 63; cf. 78)
Scholars perennially agonize over whether to consider the likes of Sedna as 
“gods.” Too often some promising candidate is rejected for failing to closely 
match our own ideas of the Deity: an act of religious intolerance, as Daniel 
Merkur observed (1991: 37–48), with the effect of promulgating the Judeo-
Christian dogma that there is only one True God. But, “Why not call them 
gods?”; for it happens that Hocart thus posed the question in regard to a close 
analogue of Sedna among Winnebago people, a certain “immaterial being in 
control of animal species” ([1936] 1970: 149; cf. Radin 1914). More than just 
species-masters, however, Sedna, Sila, and the Moon had the divine attributes 
of immortality and universality. All three were erstwhile humans who achieved 
their high stations by breaking with their earthly kinship relations, in the event 
setting themselves apart from and over the population in general. Various ver-
sions of Sedna’s origin depict her as an orphan, as mutilated in sacrifice by her 
father, and/or as responsible for his death; the Moon Man’s divine career fea-
tured matricide and incest with his sister; Sila left the earth when his parents, 
who were giants, were killed by humans. Much of this is what Luc de Heusch 
(1962) identified as “the exploit” in traditions of stranger-kingship: the crimes 
of the dynastic founder against the people’s kinship order, by which he at once 
surpasses it and acquires the solitude necessary to rule the society as a whole, 
free from any partisan affiliation (see chapters 3 and 4). And while on the mat-
ter of kingship, there is this: as the ruling powers of earth, sea, air, and sky, all of 
the Inuit deities, in breaking from kinship, thereby become territorial overlords. 
Transcending kinship, they achieve a kind of territorial sovereignty. The pas-
sage “from kinship to territory” was an accomplished fact long before it was 
reorganized as the classic formula of state formation. This is not only to say that 
the origins of kingship and the state are discursively or spiritually prefigured in 
Inuit communities, but since, like Chewong, “the human social world is intrinsi-
cally part of a wider world in which boundaries between society and cosmos are 
non-existent,” this encompassing cosmic polity is actually inscribed in practice. 
Like the Chewong, the Inuit could pass for the model of a (so-called) “sim-
ple society” were they not actually and practically integrated in a (so-called) 
“complex society” of cosmic proportions. In the territories of the gods dwelt a 
numerous population of metahuman subjects, both of the animistic kind of per-
sons indwelling in places, objects, and animals; and disembodied free souls, as of 
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ghosts or demons. “The invisible rulers of every object are the most remarkable 
beings next to Sedna,” Boas wrote: “Everything has its inua (owner)” ([1888] 
1961: 591).3 All across the Arctic from Greenland to Siberia, people know and 
contend with these inua (pl. inuat), a term that means “person of ” the noun 
that precedes it. Or “its man,” as Waldemar Bogoras translates the Chukchee 
cognate, and which clearly implies that “a human life-spirit is supposed to live 
within the object” (1904–9: 27–29). (Could Plato have imagined the perspecti-
val response of Chukchee to the allegory of the shadows on the wall of the cave? 
“Even the shadows on the wall,” they say, “constitute definite tribes and have 
their own country where they live in huts and subsist by hunting” [ibid: 281].) 
Note the repeated report of dominion over the thing by its person—“everything 
has its owner.” Just so, as indwelling masters of their own domains, the gods 
themselves were superior inuat, endowed with something akin to proprietary 
rights over their territories and the various persons thereof. J. G. Oosten ex-
plains: “An inua was an anthropomorphic spirit that was usually connected to 
an object, place, or animal as its spiritual owner or double. The inuat of the sea, 
the moon, and the air could be considered spiritual owners of their respective 
territories” (1976: 27). Correlatively, greater spirits such as Sedna, mother of sea 
animals, had parental relations to the creatures of their realm, thus adding the 
implied godly powers of creation and protection to those of possession and do-
minion. Taken in connection with complementary powers of destruction, here 
is a preliminary conclusion that will be worth further exploration: socially and 
categorically, divinity is a high-order form of animism.
That’s how it works in Boas’ description of Sedna’s reaction to the viola-
tion of her taboos on hunting sea animals. By a well-known tradition, the sea 
animals originated from Sedna’s severed fingers; hence, a certain mutuality of 
being connected her to her animal children. For its part, the hunted seal in Boas’ 
account is endowed with greater powers than ordinary humans. It can sense 
that the hunter has had contact with a corpse by the vapor of blood or death 
he emits, breaking a taboo on hunting while in such condition. The revulsion 
of the animal is thereupon communicated to Sedna, who in the normal course 
3. The distinction between “indwelling” and “free souls” (such as ghosts) is adopted 
from Merkur (1991). Reports of the ubiquity of the former among Inuit have been 
recurrent at least since the eighteenth century. Thus, from East Greenland in 1771: 
“The Greenlanders believe that all things are souled, and also that the smallest 
implement possesses its soul. Thus an arrow, a boot, a shoe sole or a key, a drill, has 
each for itself a soul” (Glann, in Weyer 1932: 300).
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would withdraw the seals to her house under the sea, or perhaps dispatch Sila 
on punishing blizzards, thus making hunting impossible and exposing the entire 
human community to starvation. Note that in many anthropological treatments 
of animism, inasmuch as they are reduced to individualistic or phenomenologi-
cal reflections on the relations between humans and animals, these interactions 
are characterized as reciprocal, egalitarian, or horizontal; whereas often in social 
practice they are at least three-part relations, involving also the master-person of 
the species concerned, in which case they are hierarchical—with the offending 
person in the client position. Or rather, the entire Inuit community is thereby 
put in a subordinate position, since sanction also falls on the fellows of the trans-
gressor; and as the effect is likewise generalized to all the seals, the event thus 
engages a large and diverse social totality presided over by the ruling goddess.4
In the same vein, the many and intricate taboos shaping Inuit social and ma-
terial life entail submission to the metaperson-others who sanction them, wheth-
er these prohibitions are systematically honored or for whatever reason violated. 
Of course, submission to the powers is evident in punishments for transgressions. 
But the same is doubly implied when the proscriptive rule is followed, for, more 
than an act of respect, to honor a taboo has essential elements of sacrifice, involv-
ing the renunciation of some normal practice or social good in favor of the higher 
power who authorizes it (cf. Leach 1976; Valeri 2000). In this regard, the exist-
ence of the Inuit, in ways rather like the Chewong, was organized by an elaborate 
set of “rules of life,” as Rasmussen deemed them, regulating all kinds of behavior 
of all kinds of persons. For even as the main taboos concerned the hunt, the 
disposition of game, and practices associated with menstruation, childbirth, and 
treatment of the dead, the enjoined behaviors could range from how one made 
the first cut of snow in building an igloo, to whether a pregnant woman could go 
outside with her mittens on—never (Rasmussen 1930: 170). Rasmussen’s major 
work on the “intellectual culture” of the Iglulik includes a catalogue of thirty-one 
closely written pages of such injunctions (ibid.: 169–204). As, for example:
The marrow bones of an animal killed by a first-born son are never to be 
eaten with a knife, but must be crushed with stones (ibid.: 179).
4. In a comparative discussion of species-masters in lowland South America, Carlos 
Fausto (2012: 29) notes that the topic has been relatively neglected by ethnographers, 
“due to a widespread view of the South American lowlands as a realm of equality 
and symmetry.” 
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A man suffering want through ill success in hunting must, when coming to 
another village and sitting down to eat, never eat with a woman he has not 
seen before (ibid.: 182).
Persons hunting seal from a snow hut on ice may not work with soapstone 
(ibid.: 184).
Young girls present in a house when a seal is being cut up must take off 
their kamiks and remain barefooted as long as the work is in progress (ibid.: 
185).
If a woman is unfaithful to her husband while he is out hunting walrus, 
especially on drift ice, the man will dislocate his hip and have severe pains 
in the sinuses (ibid.: 186).
If a woman sees a whale she must point to it with her middle finger (ibid.: 
187).
Widows are never allowed to pluck birds (ibid.: 196).
A woman whose child has died must never drink water from melted ice, 
only from melted snow (ibid.: 198).
Commented Boas in this connection: “It is certainly difficult to find out the 
innumerable regulations connected with the religious ideas and customs of the 
Eskimo. The difficulty is even greater in regard to customs which refer to birth, 
sickness and death” ([1888] 1961: 201–2).
The greater number of these “rules of life” were considerations accorded to 
Sedna. When they were respected, the sea goddess became the source of human 
welfare, providing animals to the hunter. But when they were violated, Sedna or 
the powers under her aegis inflicted all manners of misfortune upon the Inuit, 
ranging from sicknesses and accidents to starvation and death. Punishments 
rained upon the just and the unjust alike: they might afflict not only the offender 
but also his or her associates, perhaps the entire community, though these others 
could be innocent or even unaware of the offense. As it is sometimes said that 
Sedna is also the mother of humankind, that is why she is especially dangerous 
to women and children, hence the numerous taboos relating to menstruation, 
childbirth, and the newborn. But the more general and pertinent motivation 
would be that she is the mother of animals, hence the principle involved in her 
animosity to women is an eye-for-an-eye in response to the murder of her own 
children (cf. Gardner 1987; Hamayon 1996). Again, everything follows from 
the animist predicament that people survive by killing others like themselves. 
As explained to Rasmussen: 
33THE ORIGINAL POLITICAL SOCIETY
All the creatures we have to kill and eat, all those we have to strike down and 
destroy to make clothes for ourselves, have souls like we have, souls which do not 
perish with the body, and which therefore must be propitiated lest they should 
revenge themselves on us for taking away their souls. (1930: 56)
Among Netsilik, Iglulik, Baffin Islanders, and other Central Inuit, the disem-
bodied souls of the dead, both of persons and of animals, were an omnipresent 
menace to the health and welfare of the living. “All the countless spirits of evil 
are all around, striving to bring sickness and death, bad weather, and failure 
in hunting” (Boas [1888] 1961: 602; cf. Rasmussen 1931: 239; Balikci 1970: 
200–1). In principle, it was the persons and animals whose deaths were not 
properly respected ritually who thereupon haunted the living. But in this regard, 
Rasmussen confirms what one may well have surmised from the extent and 
intricacy of the “rules of life,” namely that the gods often act in ways mysterious 
to the people:
There are never any definite rules for anything, for it may also happen that a 
deceased person may in some mysterious manner attack surviving relatives or 
friends he loves, even when they have done nothing wrong. . . . Human beings 
are thus helpless in the face of all the dangers and uncanny things that happen in 
connection with death and the dead. (1930: 108)
There is hardly a single human being who has kept the rules of life according to 
the laws laid down by the wisdom of the ancients. (1930: 58)
In a way, the reign of the metaperson powers-that-be was classically hegemonic, 
which helps explain the seeming conflict between the common travelers’ reports 
of the Inuits’ good humor and their sense that “human beings were powerless in 
the grasp of a mighty fate” (ibid.: 32)—“we don’t believe, we fear” (ibid.: 55). The 
ambivalence, I suggest, represents different aspects of the same situation of the 
people in relation to the metaperson powers-that-be. What remains unambigu-
ous and invariant is that for all their own “loosely structured” condition, they 
are systematically ordered as the dependent subjects of a cosmic system of social 
domination. Hobbes spoke of the state of nature as all that time in which “men 
lived without a common power to keep them all in awe.” Yet in Rasmussen’s ac-
counts of the Inuit, a people who might otherwise be said to approximate that 
natural state, “mankind is held in awe”—given the fear of hunger and sickness 
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inflicted by the powers governing them (1931: 124).5 If this accounts for the 
people’s anxieties, it also helps explain the reports of their stoic, composed, often 
congenial disposition. This happier subjectivity is not simply seasonal, not sim-
ply due to the fact that times are good in terms of hunting and food supply, for 
that in itself would be because the people have been observant of Sedna’s rules, 
and accordingly she makes the animals available. There is a certain comfort and 
assurance that comes from the people’s compliance with the higher authorities 
that govern their fortunes—or if you will, their compliance with the “dominant 
ideology” (cf. Robbins 2004: 212). In the upshot, it’s almost as if these polar 
inhabitants were bipolar—except that, beside the fear and composure that came 
from their respect of the god, on occasion they also knew how to oppose and 
defy her.
More precisely, if great shamans could on occasion force the god to desist 
from harming the people, it was by means of countervailing metapersons in 
their service: familiar spirits they possessed or who possessed them. Thus em-
powered, the shaman could fight or even kill Sedna, to make her liberate the 
game (upon her revival) in a time of famine (Weyer 1932: 359; Merkur 1991: 
112). More often, the dangerous journeys shamans undertake to Sedna’s un-
dersea home culminate in some manhandling of her with a view to soothing 
her anger by combing the sins of humans out of her tangled hair. Alternatively, 
Sedna was hunted like a seal from a hole in the ice in winter: she was hauled up 
from below by a noose and while in the shaman’s power told to release the ani-
mals; or she was conjured to rise by song and then harpooned to the same effect. 
The last, the attack on the god, was the dramatic moment of an important 
autumnal festival of the Netsilik, designed to put an end to this tempestuous 
season and ensure good weather for the coming winter. Again it was not just the 
stormy weather with its accompaniment of shifting and cracking ice that was 
the issue, but the “countless evil spirits” that were so manifesting themselves, 
including the dead knocking wildly at the huts “and woe to the unhappy per-
son they can lay hold of ” (Boas [1888] 1961: 603). Ruling all and the worst of 
them was Sedna, or so one may judge from the fact that when she was ritually 
5. Like the Chukchee shaman who told Bogoras:
   We are surrounded by enemies. Spirits always walk about with gaping mouths. 
We are always cringing, and distributing gifts on all sides, asking protection 
of one, giving ransom to another, and unable to obtain anything whatever 
gratuitously. (1904–9: 298)
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hunted and harpooned, the evil metahuman host were all driven away. Sedna 
dives below and in a desperate struggle manages to free herself, leaving her 
badly wounded, greatly angry, and in a mood to seize and carry off her human 
tormenters. That could result in another attack on her, however, for if a rescuing 
shaman is unable to otherwise induce her to release the victim, he may have to 
thrash her into doing so (Rasmussen 1930: 100). Although the shamans’ pow-
ers to thus oppose the god are not exactly their own, may one not surmise—as 
David Graeber develops at length in chapter 7 in this volume—there is here 
a germ of a human political society: that is, ruling humans qua metapersons 
themselves?
A word on terminology. Hereafter, I use “inua” as a general technical term 
for all animistic forms of indwelling persons, whether of creatures or things—
and whether the reference is singular or plural. I use “metaperson” preferably and 
“metahuman” alternately for all those beings usually called “spirits”: including 
gods, ghosts, ancestors, demons, inua, and so on. Aside from direct quotations, 
“spirit” will appear only as a last resort of style or legibility, and usually then in 
quotation marks—for reasons to which I now turn, by way of the life story of 
Takunaqu, an Iglulik woman:
One day I remember a party of children out at play, and wanted to run out at 
once and play with them. But my father, who understood hidden things, per-
ceived that I was playing with the souls of my dead brothers and sisters. He was 
afraid this might be dangerous, and therefore called upon his helping spirits and 
asked them about it. Through his helping spirits, my father learned .  .  . there 
was . . . something in my soul of that which had brought about the death of my 
brothers and sisters. For this reason, the dead were often about me, and I did 
not distinguish between the spirits of the dead and real live people. (Rasmussen 
1930: 24) 
WHY CALL THEM SPIRITS?
Sometime before Hocart was asking, “Why not call them gods?” Andrew Lang 
in effect asked of gods, “Why call them spirits?” Just because we have been 
taught our god is a spirit, he argued, that is no reason to believe “the earliest 
men” thought of their gods that way ([1898] 1968: 202). Of course, I cannot 
speak here of “the earliest men”—all those suggestive allusions to the state of 
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nature notwithstanding—but only of some modern peoples off the beaten track 
of state systems and their religions. For the Inuit, the Chewong, and similar 
others, Lang would have a point: our native distinction between spirits and 
human beings, together with the corollary oppositions between natural and su-
pernatural and spiritual and material, for these peoples do not apply. Neither, 
then, do they radically differentiate an “other world” from this one. Interacting 
with other souls in “a spiritual world consisting of a number of personal forces,” 
as J. G. Oosten observed, “the Inuit themselves are spiritual beings” (1976: 29). 
Fair enough, although given the personal character of those forces, it is more 
logical to call spirits “people” than to call people “spirits.” But in either case, and 
notwithstanding our own received distinctions, at ethnographic issue here is the 
straightforward equivalence, spirits = people.
The recent theoretical interest in the animist concepts of indigenous peoples 
of lowland South America, northern North America, Siberia, and Southeast 
Asia has provided broad documentation of this monist ontology of a personal-
ized universe. Kaj Århem offers a succinct summary:
As opposed to naturalism, which assumes a foundational dichotomy between 
objective nature and subjective culture, animism posits an intersubjective and 
personalized universe in which the Cartesian split between person and thing 
is dissolved and rendered spurious. In the animist cosmos, animals and plants, 
beings and things may all appear as intentional subjects and persons, capable 
of will, intention, and agency. The primacy of physical causation is replaced by 
intentional causation and social agency. (2016: 3)
It only needs be added that given the constraints of this “animist cosmos” on the 
human population, the effect is a certain “cosmo-politics” in Eduardo Viveiros 
de Castro’s sense of the term (2015). Indeed, the politics at issue here involves 
much more than animist inua, for it equally characterizes people’s relations to 
gods, disembodied souls of the dead, lineage ancestors, species-masters, demons, 
and other such intentional subjects: a large array of metapersons setting the 
terms and conditions of human existence. Taken in its unity, hierarchy, and to-
tality, this is a cosmic polity. As Déborah Danowski and Viveiros de Castro (2017: 
68–69) very recently put the matter (just as this article was going to press):
What we would call “natural world,” or “world” for short, is for Amazonian 
peoples a multiplicity of intricately connected multiplicities. Animals and other 
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spirits are conceived as so many kinds of “‘people” or “societies,” that is, as po-
litical entities. . . . Amerindians think that there are many more societies (and 
therefore, also humans) between heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our 
philosophy and anthropology. What we call “environment” is for them a society 
of societies, an international arena, a cosmopoliteia. There is, therefore, no abso-
lute difference in status between society and environment, as if the first were 
the “subject” and the second the “object.” Every object is another subject and is 
more than one.
In what follows I offer some selected ethnographic reports of the coexistence of 
humans with such metapersonal powers in the same “intersubjective and per-
sonalized universe”—just by way of illustration. But let me say here, and try to 
demonstrate in the rest of the essay, the implications are world-historical: for if 
these metaperson-others have the same nature as, and are in the same experien-
tial reality with, humans, while exerting life-and-death powers over them, then 
they are the dominant figures in what we habitually call “politics” and “econom-
ics” in all the societies so constituted. In the event, we will require a different 
anthropological science than the familiar one that separates the human world 
into ontologically distinct ideas, social relations, and things, and then seeks to 
discount the former as a dependent function of one of the latter two—as if our 
differentiated notions of things and social relations were not symbolically con-
stituted in the first place.
Not to separate, then, what peoples of the New Guinea Highlands join: 
surrounded and outnumbered above, below, and on earth by ghosts, clan ances-
tors, demons, earthquake people, sky people, and the many inua of the wild, the 
Mbowamb spend their lives “completely under the spell and in the company of 
spirits. . . . The spirits rule the life of men. . . . There is simply no profane field 
of life where they don’t find themselves surrounded by a supernatural force” 
(Vicedom and Tischner (1943–48, 2: 680–81). Yet if the “other world” is thus 
omnipresent around Mt. Hagen, it is not then an “other world.” These people, 
we are told, “do not distinguish between the purely material and purely spiritual 
aspects of life” (ibid.: 592). Nor would they have occasion to do so if, as is re-
ported of Mae Enga, they conducted lives in constant intersubjective relations 
with the so-called “spirits.” “Much of [Enga] behavior remains inexplicable to 
anyone ignorant of the pervasive belief in ghosts,” reports Mervyn Meggitt. 
“Not a day passes but someone refers publicly to the actions of ghosts” (1965: 
109–10). Or as a missionary-ethnographer recounts:
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For the Central Enga the natural world is alive and endowed with invisible pow-
er. To be seen otherwise would leave unexplained numerous events. The falling 
tree, the lingering illness, the killing frost, the haunting dream—all confirm the 
belief in a relationship between the physical world and the powers of earth, sky, 
and underworld. (Brennan1977: 11–12; cf. Feachem 1973)
Such metapersonal powers are palpably present in what is actually happening 
to people, their fortunes good and bad. Hence Fredrik Barth’s own experience 
among Baktaman in the Western Highlands: “The striking feature is . . . how 
empirical the spirits are, how they appear as very concrete observable objects in 
the world rather than ways of talking about the world” (1975: 129, emphasis 
in original). Supporting Barth’s observation from his own work among nearby 
Mianmin people, Don Gardner adds that “spirits of one kind or another are a 
basic feature of daily life. Events construed as involving ‘supernatural’ beings are 
commonly reported and discussed” (1987: 161).6
Mutatis mutandis, in the Amazonian forest, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro 
comes to a similar appreciation of the gods and dead as immanently present 
for Araweté. Listening to the nocturnal songs of shamans summoning these 
metaperson-others to the village, the ethnographer
came to perceive the presence of the gods, as the reality or source of examples, in 
every minute routine action. Most important, it was through these that I could 
discover the participation of the dead in the world of the living. (1992: 13–14)
The presence of maï [‘gods’] in daily life is astonishing: for each and every pur-
pose, they are cited as models of action, paradigms of body ornamentation, 
standards for interpreting events, and sources of news . . . . (1992: 74–75)7
The general condition of the cohabitation of humans and their metaperson-
al-alters in one “real world” is their psychic unity: their mutual and reciprocal 
6. Peter Lawrence and Meggitt speak of a general Melanesian “view of the cosmos 
(both its empirical and non-empirical parts) as a unitary physical realm with few, if 
any, transcendental attributes” (1965: 8).
7. Yet the Araweté are no more mystical in such regards than is the ethnographer. 
The affective tone of their life, Viveiros de Castro notes, does not involve what we 
consider religiosity: demonstrations of reverence, devaluation of human existence, 
and so forth. They are familiar with their gods. 
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status as anthropopsychic subjects. The venerable anthropological premise of 
“the psychic unity of mankind”has to be more generously understood. For as 
Viveiros de Castro says, “There is no way to distinguish between humans and 
what we call spirits” (ibid.: 64). In effect, the so-called “spirits” are so many 
heterogeneous species of the genus Homo: “Human beings proper (bide) are a 
species within a multiplicity of other species of human beings who form their 
own societies” (ibid.: 55).8 As is well known, the statement would hold for many 
peoples throughout lowland South America. Of the Achuar, Philippe Descola 
writes that they do not know the “supernatural as a level of reality separate from 
nature,” inasmuch as the human condition is common to “all nature’s beings. . . . 
Humans, and most plants, animals, and meteors are persons (aents) with a soul 
(wakan) and individual life” (1996: 93).
In speaking of the “own societies” of the metaperson-others as known to 
Araweté, Viveiros de Castro alludes to the “perspectivism” that his writings 
have done much to make normal anthropological science. Well documented 
from Siberia as well as Amazonia, the phenomenon offers a privileged instance 
of the coparticipation of humans with gods, ghosts, animal-persons, and others 
in the same complex society. In consequence of differences in their perceptual 
apparatus, both people and animals live unseen to each other in their own 
communities as fully human beings, bodily and culturally; even as each ap-
pears to the other as animal prey or predators. In this connection, the com-
mon ethnographic observation that because the nonhuman persons are as such 
generally invisible, they must inhabit a different, “spiritual” reality, is a cultural 
non sequitur for Araweté and other perspectivists. In Lockean terms the differ-
ences are only secondary qualities: due to perception—because of the different 
bodily means thereof—rather than to the thing thus perceived. In practice, 
moreover, the socius includes a variety of metapersonal communities: not only 
those of the animal inua, but also the villages of the gods, the dead, and perhaps 
others, all of them likewise cultural replicas of human communities. Accord-
ingly, the human groups are engaged in a sociological complexity that defies 
the normal anthropological characterizations of their simplicity. A lot of social 
intercourse goes on between humans and the metahuman persons with whom 
they share the earth, as well as with those who people the heavens and the 
8. Or else, like the various animals known to Naskapi of the Canadian Northeast, these 
other persons “constitute races and tribes among which the human is included” 
(Speck 1977: 30).
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underworld. Apart from shamans, even ordinary humans may travel to lands 
of the metaperson-others, as conversely the latter may appear among people in 
human form. Human and nonhuman persons are often known to intermarry 
or negotiate the exchange of wealth—when they are not reciprocally eating 
one another. 
SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PEOPLE AND METAPERSON-OTHERS
A woman sits in a corner of the house, whispering to a dead relative; a man ad-
dresses a clump of trees. . . . When an illness or misfortune occurs, a father or 
neighbor will break knotted strips of cordyline leaf, talking to the spirits to find 
out which one is causing trouble and why. (Keesing 1982: 33)
This passage is one of many that exemplify how Roger Keesing makes good 
on the introductory promise of his fine monograph on the Kwaio people of 
Malaita (Solomon Islands): namely, “to describe Kwaio religion in a way that 
captures the phenomenological reality of a world where one’s group includes 
the living and the dead, where conversations with spirits and signs of their pres-
ence and acts are part of everyday life” (ibid.: 2–3; cf. 33, 112–13). Likewise, the 
human world of the Lalakai of New Britain is “also a world of spirits. Human 
beings are in frequent contact with non-human others, and there is always the 
possibility of encountering them at any time” (Valentine 1965: 194). Yet beyond 
such conversations or passing encounters with metaperson-others, from many 
parts come reports of humans entering into customary social relations with 
them. 
Inuit know of many people who visited villages of animal-persons, even 
married and lived long among them, some only later and by accident discover-
ing their hosts were animal inua rather than Inuit humans (Oosten 1976: 27). 
A personal favorite is the Caribou Man of the northern Algonkians. In one of 
many similar versions, Caribou Man was a human stranger who was seduced 
by a caribou doe, went on to live with and have sons by her, and became the 
ruler of the herd (Speck 1977). French-Canadian trappers were not off the 
mark in dubbing Caribou Man “le roi des caribou,” as the story rehearses the 
archetypal stranger-king traditions of dynastic origin, down to the mediating 
role played by the native woman and her foundational marriage to the youthful 
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outsider (see chapter 3 in this volume). Besides the hierogamic experiences of 
Chewong women and the marriage of the gods with dead Araweté women, 
there are many permutations of such interspecies unions: some patrilocal and 
some matrilocal, some enduring and some ended by divorce due to home-
sickness. A Kaluli man of the New Guinea Southern Highlands may marry 
a woman of the invisible world, relates Edward Schiefflin (2005: 97); when 
the man has a child by her, he can leave his body in his sleep and visit her 
world. Reciprocally, people from that world may enter his body and through 
his mouth converse with the people present. Then there was the Mianmin man 
of the Western Highlands who, beside his human wife, formed a polygynous 
arrangement with a dead woman from a different descent group. The dead wife 
lived in a nearby mountain, but she gardened on her husband’s land and bore 
him a son (Gardner 1987: 164). 
Don Gardner also tells of the time that the Ulap clan of the Mianmin saved 
themselves from their Ivik enemies by virtue of a marital alliance with their 
own dead. The lvik clan people were bent on revenge for the death of many of 
their kinsmen at Ulap hands. Sometime before, the big-man of the Ulap and 
his counterpart among their dead, who lived inside the mountain on which the 
Ulap were settled, exchanged sisters in marriage. When the big-man of the dead 
heard the Ivik were threatening his living brother-in-law, he proposed that the 
two Ulap groups exchange the pigs they had been raising for each other and 
hold a joint feast. In the course of the festivities, the ancestral people became 
visible to the Ulap villagers, who were in turn rendered invisible to the Ivik. So 
when the Ivik enemies came, they could not find the Ulap, although three times 
they attacked the places where they distinctly heard them singing. Throughout 
the Western Mianmin area, this account, Garner assures us, has the status of a 
historical narrative.
We need not conclude that relations between humans and their metaperson 
counterparts are everywhere and normally so sympathetic. On the contrary, they 
are often hostile and to the people’s disadvantage, especially as the predicament 
noted earlier of the Inuit is broadly applicable: the animals and plants on which 
humans subsist are essentially human themselves. Although some anthropolo-
gists have been known to debate whether cannibalism even existed, it is hardly a 
rare condition—even among peoples who profess not to practice it themselves. 
As already noticed, in many societies known to anthropology, especially those 
where hunting is a mainstay, the people and their prey are involved in a system 
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of mutual cannibalism. For even as the people kill and consume “people like us,” 
these metaperson-alters retaliate more or less in kind, as eating away human 
flesh by disease or starvation. 
All over the Siberian forest, for instance,
Humans eat the meat of game animals in the same way that animal spirits feed 
on human flesh and blood. This is the reason why sickness (experienced as a 
loss of vitality) and death in the [human] community as a whole are understood 
as a just payment for its successful hunting both in the past and the future. 
(Hamayon 1996: 79)
Married to the sister or daughter of the “game-giving spirit,” an elk or reindeer, 
his brother-in-law the Siberian shaman thus enters an affinal exchange system 
of flesh—the meat of animals compensated by the withering of people—on 
behalf of the human community. Thus here again: “Being similar to the hu-
man soul in essence and on a par with hunters in alliance and exchange part-
ners, spirits are not transcendent” (ibid.: 80). It is, to reprise Århem’s expression 
above, “an intersubjective and personalized universe.”
METAPERSON POWERS-THAT-BE
The metahuman beings with whom people interact socially are often hierar-
chically structured, as where gods such as Sedna and species-masters such as 
Caribou Man encompass and protect the individual inua in their purview. These 
hierarchies are organized on two principles which in the end come down to the 
same thing: the proprietary notion of the higher being as the “owner”—and 
usually also the parent—of his or her lesser persons; and the platonic or clas-
sificatory notion of “the One over Many,” whereby the “owner” is the personified 
form of the class of which the lesser persons are particular instances. One can 
find both concepts in Viveiros de Castro’s discussion of the Araweté term for 
metahuman masters, nā:
The term connotes ideas such as leadership, control, responsibility, and owner-
ship of some resource or domain. The nā is always a human or anthropomorphic 
being. But other ideas are involved as well. The nā of something is someone who 
has this substance in abundance. Above all, the nā is defined by something of 
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which it is the master. In this last connotation, he is at the same time “the repre-
sentative of ” and the “represented by” that something. (1992: 345)9
Although, in a spasm of relativism, Pascal famously said that a shift of a few 
degrees of latitude will bring about a total change in juridical principles, you can 
go from the Amazon forests or the New Guinea Highlands to the Arctic Circle 
and Tierra del Fuego and find the same ethnographic descriptions of greater 
metapersons as the “owners”-cum-“mothers” or “fathers” of the individual meta-
personal beings in their domain. Urapmin say “that people get into trouble be-
cause ‘everything has a father,’ using father (alap) in the sense of owner. . . . In 
dealing with nature then, the Urapmin are constantly faced with the fact that 
the spirits hold competing claims to many of the resources people use” (Robbins 
1995: 214–15). (Parenthetically, this is not the first indication we have that the 
“spirits” own the means of production, an issue to which we will return.) Among 
Hageners, the Stratherns relate, all wild objects and creatures are “owned” by 
“spirits,” and can be referred to as their “pigs,” just as people hold domestic pigs 
(1968: 190). “Masters of nature,” to whom trees and many other things “belong,” 
these kor wakl spirits are “sworn enemies of mankind” because people tend to 
consume foods under their protection without proper sacrifices. “The people are 
terribly afraid of them” (Vicedom and Tischner 1943–48, 2: 608, 659).
In the Siberian Arctic, large natural domains such as forests, rivers, and lakes 
had their “special owners,” as Waldemar Bogoras calls them. The forest-master 
familiar to Russo-Yukaghir had “absolute power” over the animals there; he 
could give them away as presents, lose them at cards, or round them up and 
cause them to depart the country (Bogoras 1904–9 285). Not unusual either is 
the compounded hierarchy of metahuman owners, composed of several levels of 
inua-figures: as among Tupí-Guaraní peoples such as Tenetehara and Tapirapé, 
where species-masters are included in the domains of forest-masters, who in 
turn belong to the godly “owners” of the social territory. Similarly for Achuar, 
the individual animal inua are both subsumed by “game mothers”—who “are 
seen as exercising the same kind of control over game that mothers exercise 
over their children and domestic animals”—and also magnified forms of the 
9. These species- and place-masters are known the length and breadth of the Western 
Hemisphere. For good examples see Wagley ([1947] 1983) on Tapirapé, Wagley 
and Galvao ([1949] 1969) on Tenetahara, Huxley (1956) on Urubu, and Hallowell 
(1960) on Ojibwa. As noted, the great Inuit god-inua are also represented as 
“owners” of their domains.
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species—who, as primus inter pares, watch over the fate of the others. The latter 
especially are the social interlocutors of the Achuar hunter, but he must also 
come to respectful terms with the former (Descola 1996: 257–60). The chain of 
command in these hierarchical orders of metaperson “owners” is not necessarily 
respected in pursuing game or administering punishments to offending hunters, 
but it is quite a bureaucracy. 
As I say (and so have others), this sense of belonging to a more inclusive 
power can be read as membership in the class of which the “owner” is the per-
sonified representative—that is, a logical and theological modality of the One 
over Many. The ordering principle is philosophical realism with an anthropo-
morphic twist, where a named metaperson-owner is the type of which the sev-
eral lesser beings are tokens. In a broad survey of the concept in the South 
American lowlands, Carlos Fausto (2012) uses such pertinent descriptions of 
the species-master as “a plural singularity” and “a singular image of a collectiv-
ity.” Anthropologists will recognize classic studies to the effect: Godfrey Lien-
hardt (1961) on the totems or species-beings who subsumed the forms of the 
same kind; and Edward Evans-Pritchard (1956) on the Nuer “God” (Kwoth), 
manifested in a diminishing series of avatars. (Parenthetically, as species-mas-
ters are more widely distributed in the world than totems proper, the latter may 
be understood as a development of the former under the special influence of 
descent groups or other segmentary formations.) In his own well-known wan-
dering minstrel tour of animism—rather like the present article, composed of 
ethnographic shreds and patches—E. B. Tylor conceived a similar passage from 
“species-deities” to “higher deities” by way of Auguste Comte on the “abstrac-
tion” thus entailed and Charles de Brosses on the species archetype as a Platonic 
Ideal (1903: 241–46).10
10. This classificatory logic is evident in Hermann Strauss’ reports on the subsumption 
of the various Sky People of the Mbowamb into “He, himself, the Above.” As the 
beings who “planted” the clan communities, together with their foods and customs, 
the Sky People are “owners” of the earthly people, but generally they remain at a 
distance and are involved only in times of collective disaster or need. Exceptionally, 
however, Strauss cites a number of Mbowamb interlocutors assigning responsibility 
to “The Above” for both individual and community misfortunes. 
   If many men are killed in battle, they say “He himself, the Ogla [Above], gave 
away their heads.” . . . When a great number of children die, the Mbowamb say, 
“He himself, the Above, is taking all our children up above.” If a couple remain 
childless, everyone says “Their kona [land] lies fallow, the Above himself, as the 
root-stock man (i.e., owner) is giving them nothing.” ([1962] 1990: 38–39)
45THE ORIGINAL POLITICAL SOCIETY
That divinity originates as a kind of animism of higher taxonomic order is 
not a bad (Platonic) idea. Consider this notice of Sedna: “In popular religious 
thought, the Sea Mother is an indweller. She indwells in the sea and all of its 
animals. She is immanent in the calm of the sea, in the capes and shoals where 
the waters are treacherous, and in the sea animals and fish” (Merkur 1991: 136). 
Analogously, for the Aboriginal peoples of Northwest Australia, the cult of their 
great Rainbow Serpent, Ungud, could be epitomized as inua all the way down. 
A bisexual snake identified with the Milky Way, the autochthonous Ungud 
made the world. Les Hiatt summarized the process:
Natural species came into existence when Ungud dreamed itself into new vari-
ous shapes. In the same way Ungud created clones of itself as wonjina [local 
versions of Dreamtime ancestors], and dispatched them in various places, 
particularly waterholes. The wonjina in turn generated the human spirits that 
enter women and become babies. . . . Ungud is thus an archetype of life itself. 
(1996: 113)
In his informative account of the local Ungarinyin people, Helmut Petri speci-
fies that the numerous wonjina were transformed into “individual Ungud ser-
pents,” such that “Ungud appeared in the Aborigines’ view at one time as an 
individual entity, at another time as a multiplicity of individual beings” ([1954] 
2011: 108). This included the spirit children whom the wonjina deposited in 
the waterholes: they were given by Ungud. Hence the One over Many, down 
to individual human beings, for each person thus had an “Ungud part” (see also 
Lommel [1952] 1997).
It only needs to be added, from Nancy Munn’s revelatory study of analogous 
phenomena among Walbiri, that in participating intersubjectively in an object 
world created by and out of the Dreamtime ancestors, human beings experienc-
ing “intimations of themselves” are always already experiencing “intimations of 
others”: those Dreamtime heroes “who are superordinate to them and precede 
them in time” (1986: 75). Accordingly, violation of any part of the country is “a 
violation of the essence of moral law” (ibid.: 68). While clearly different from 
other societies considered here, these no less “egalitarian” Australian Aborigines 
are thus no less hierarchical. “It’s not our idea,” Pintupi people told Fred Myers 
in regard to the customs and morality established in perpetuity by the Dream-
time ancestors. “It’s a big Law. We have to sit down beside that Law like all the 
dead people who went before us” (Myers 1986: 58).
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THE COSMIC POLITY
By way of integration of themes presented heretofore, there follows a sketch of 
the cosmic polities of the Mountain Ok-speaking Min peoples of New Guinea.11
There was no visible or proximate political state in the center of New 
Guinea, the region of the Fly and Sepik River headwaters traditionally inhabit-
ed by the Mountain Ok or Min peoples. All the same, the Telefolmin, Urapmin, 
Feramin, Tifalmin, Mianmin, and others could be fairly described as governed 
by metahuman powers whose authority over otherwise politically fragmented 
peoples was exercised through obligatory rules effectively backed by punitive 
force. The Hocartesian question might well be, “Why not call it a state?” Or else, 
if this cosmic polity were unlike a state in that the controlling powers largely 
outnumbered the civil society of humans, their regime could be all the more 
dominating. Experientially, the people live in a condition of subjugation to a 
host of metaperson powers-that-be, whose numerous rules of order are enforced 
by the highest authorities, often through the offices of the lesser personages in 
their aegis. 
Among the Central Min peoples, where this regime achieved its most in-
tegrated form, it was dominated by the cosmocratic duo of Afek, mother of 
humans and taro, and the serpentine Magalim, who preceded her as the au-
tochthonous father of the numerous creatures of the wild ( Jorgensen 1980, 
1990a, 1998). Parents of all, Afek and Magalim were themselves children of 
none. The beginnings of their respective reigns were marked by violent breaches 
of kinship relations, giving them the independence that was the condition of 
their universality. Afek was notorious for committing incest with her brother, 
whom she later killed (and revived). Magalim was born of himself by interven-
ing in the sexual intercourse of a human couple. Emerging as a serpent, he was 
subsequently rejected by his would-be mother, swallowed his foster-father, and 
killed his father’s brothers. Magalim has been likened to the Rainbow Serpent 
11. I am especially indebted to Dan Jorgensen for his unstinting, generous, and 
informative replies to my many questions about the ethnography of the Telefolmin 
and of Min peoples in general. His knowledge and interpretations of this material, 
as of anthropology more broadly, are extraordinary—though, of course, I take 
responsibility if I have misconstrued the information he provided. I have also relied 
heavily on several of his writings, especially Jorgensen (1980, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 
1996, 1998, 2002). Also most useful have been Barth (1975, 1987), Wheatcroft 
(1976), Brumbaugh (1987, 1990), and Robbins (1995, 1999, 2004).
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figures of Aboriginal Australian traditions: among other resemblances, by his 
habitation of subterranean waters, from which he rises when irritated to cause 
destructive floods (Brumbaugh 1987). Afek adds to the analogy by her own 
resemblance to Australian Dreamtime ancestors, creating features of the land-
scape and endowing the customs of the human groups she gave rise to in the 
course of her travels. Thereafter Afek’s presence would be mediated primarily by 
the human ancestors whose cult of fertility she established, whereas Magalim as 
indwelling “boss” of the land acted through the multifarious inua of its creatures 
and features. Although in effect they thus organized complementary domains—
Afek the human sphere and Magalim its untamed environs—through their re-
spective human and metahuman subjects each extended into the jurisdiction of 
the other—often there to do harm.12
Much of Min cultural order, including the taboos that sanction it, is the 
codification of the legendary doings of Afek in the mode of mandatory custom. 
“Since that time,” Tifalmin people say, “men and women have known how to do 
things” (Wheatcroft 1976: 157–58). The precedents thus set by episodes in the 
epic of Afek’s advent include the different social and sexual roles of men and 
women and the rituals and practices of menstruation, initiation, childbirth, and 
death. Indeed, death itself was initiated by Afek along with the westward jour-
ney of the deceased on the underground road to the land of the dead—whence 
in return come life-giving shell valuables, hence Afek is also the originator of 
wealth, exchange, and long-distance trade. Afek bore the taro plant that iconi-
cally distinguishes the Min people, making a complementary schismogenesis 
of it by destroying the swamps in the Telefolmin region, thereby marking the 
contrast to lowland sago peoples. Along her journey, she established the men’s 
cult houses where the remains of the ancestors of each Min group and the as-
sociated initiation rituals would guarantee the growth of their youth and their 
taro. Afek’s ritual progress culminated in the construction of her own great cult 
house, Telefolip, in the Telefolmin village of that name.
12. As a civilizer who carved a human cultural existence out of the wild, displacing 
its “nature spirits,” Afek’s story is similar to stranger-king traditions. A further 
similarity is her union or unions with local men (or a dog). Although the Min 
peoples are generally known as “Children of Afek,” there are alternate local 
traditions of the autochthonous origins of certain groups from animal ancestors. 
The same sort of opposition between indigenous “owners” and the incoming rulers 
is in play in the domination of the area by the Telefolmin people, who arrived at 
their present location and achieved their superior positon by early military feats.
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Afek’s house became the ritual center of the Mountain Ok region, thus giv-
ing the Telefolmin people a certain precedence over the other Min groups. Rit-
uals performed in connection with the Telefolip house radiated Afek’s benefits 
in human and agricultural fertility widely among the other Min communities. 
If the house itself deteriorated, the growth of taro in the entire region would 
decline in tandem. The several Min groups of a few hundred people each were 
thus integrated in a common system of divine welfare centered on the Telefolip 
shrine. The overall effect was a core–periphery configuration of peoples in a 
tribal zone with the Telefolmin custodians of Afek’s legacy at the center. As 
described by Dan Jorgensen (1996: 193): “The common linkage to Afek locates 
Mountain Ok cults in a regional tradition. Myths concerning Afek not only 
account for the features of a particular ritual system or aspects of local cosmol-
ogy, but also place groups relative to one another in terms of descent from Afek 
(or a sibling)” (cf. Robbins 2004: 16–17). “A surprisingly ambitious ideology,” 
comments Robert Brumbaugh, “because it does not link up with any economic 
or political control from the center” (1990: 73). Here is another instance where 
the superstructure exceeds the infrastructure. What does link up with the su-
periority of Telefolmin, as Brumbaugh also says, is Afek’s continued presence:
In Telefolmin religion, Afek remains present and accessible. Taro fertility is a vis-
ible sign of her power, just as her bones are the visible signs of her presence. . . . 
Thus the Falamin, when addressing the local ancestors in ritual, consider that 
they are heard by Afek as well. When stronger reassurances are needed, the local 
ancestor is bypassed, new personnel take charge of the ritual and Afek is invoked 
directly. Groups without access to bones of Afek—it seems that not all groups 
have them—are covered by Afek’s promise to hear and respond when she is 
called upon for taro. (1990: 67)
But “Magalim always ruins Afek’s work,” Telefolmin say, breaking her “law” by 
deceiving men into killing their friends, seducing women, driving people mad, 
causing landslides and floods, and wrecking gardens ( Jorgensen 1980: 360). Ca-
pricious and malicious, Magalim is oftimes (but not always) the enemy of peo-
ple: a menace especially among the Central Min, where he is the father, owner, 
and thereby the common form in the persons of the animals, plants, rocks, riv-
ers, cliffs, and so on, that inhabit and constitute the environment—where hu-
man persons hunt, garden, and otherwise traverse with disturbing effects. “All 
things of the bush are Magalim’s children, Magalim man,” Jorgensen was told. 
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“If you finish these things, Magalim is their father and he will repay you with 
sickness, or he will send bad dreams and you will die” (ibid.: 352).
The wild has its own hierarchy: at least three levels of Magalim-persons, 
encompassed by the archetypal All-Father serpent. Jorgensen notes that cer-
tain species-masters of distinct name “look after” marsupials and wild pigs, 
even as Magalim himself looks after snakes. But all are in turn encompassed in 
Magalim, as “All these names are just names. The true thing is Magalim” (ibid.). 
Likewise for Urapmin, Joel Robbins refers to intermediate species-masters con-
trolling their particular animal-persons; these “owners” being in turn subsumed 
in the greater Magalim-Being. Certain “marsupial women” are guardians of the 
many marsupial kinds that people hunt and eat. Taking a fancy to a hunter, a 
marsupial woman may have sex with and marry him. Thereafter she comes to 
him in dreams to inform him about the whereabouts of game. But marsupial 
women have been known to become jealous of their husband’s human wife, es-
pecially if the latter is too generous in sharing marsupials with her own relatives. 
Then the hunter has accidents in the bush or falls sick, or even dies if he does 
not leave his human spouse (Robbins 2004: 210).
In any case, where Magalim reigns, the principle holds that all particular 
inua, whether of living creatures or natural features, are also forms of him. The 
individual Magalim-persons who cause Feramin people trouble may be treated 
as acting on their own or as agents of Magalim All-Father. The people may say, 
“Tell your father to stop making thunderstorms—and not to send any earth-
quakes either” (Brumbaugh 1987: 26). Magalim, however, is not always caus-
ing trouble for Feramin. Without changing his notorious disposition, he may 
turn it on strangers, whom he is reputed to dislike, and thus become protec-
tor of the local people. Indeed, he defends Feramin tribal territory as a whole. 
The Feramin were divided into four autonomous communities (“parishes”); but 
Magalim’s remains were in the care of a single elder, and when ritually invoked 
before battle, they made all Feramin warriors fierce and their arrows deadly. 
“Without subdivision by parishes,” Brumbaugh writes, “the territory of Feramin 
as a whole is considered under the influence of Magalim, who watches over its 
borders and the well-being of the traditional occupants” (ibid.: 30). 
Protector of the entire territory from an abode within it, a subterranean be-
ing who can cause earthquakes, Magalim is the indwelling inua of the land itself: 
“boss of the land,” the people now say. Indeed, if all the creatures and prominent 
natural haunts of the wild are so many aliases of Magalim, as Jorgensen puts it, 
it is because he is “identified with the earth and its power.” “Everything depends 
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on Magalim,” Jorgensen was often told, including Afek and all her people who 
“sit on the top of the ground” (1998: 104). Kinship to territory: the self-born 
Magalim, slayer of his foster-kin, becomes god of the land.
Hence add gardeners to the tragic predicament of the animist hunters. The 
Urapmin, according to Robbins, are constantly aware they are surrounded by 
“nature spirits” (motobil) who are original “owners” of almost all the resources 
they use (2004: 209–10). Consequently, “every act of hunting or gardening 
causes some risk,” even on non-taboo grounds, should it disturb the metaper-
son-owners—who would thereupon punish the person responsible “for failure 
to observe their version of the laws” (ibid.: 211). Interesting that New Guin-
eans and Australian Aborigines, although without any native juridical institu-
tions as such, have been quick to adapt the European term “law” to their own 
practices of social order. In other contexts, Robbins speaks of “the law of the 
ancestors,” apparently referring to the numerous taboos based on traditions of 
Afek that organize human social relationships. The Urapmin term here trans-
lated as “law”—awem (adj.), aweim (n.)—maps a moral domain of prohibitions 
based “on kinds of authority that transcend those produced simply by the actions 
and agreements of men” (ibid.: 211). Otherwise said, these laws are “sacredly 
grounded prohibitions aimed at shaping the realm of human freedom” (ibid.: 
184). Given the range of social relationships and practices established by Afek, 
it follows that the laws were “complex” and “left everyone laboring under the 
burdens of at least some taboo all the time” (ibid.: 210–11). Although Urapmin 
boast of having been the most taboo-ridden of all Min people, it could not 
have been by much. Among others, the Tifalmin knew taboos that were like-
wise “very powerful . . . sustaining and interpenetrating many other normative 
and ethical aspects of everyday life” (Wheatcroft 1976: 170). This could be true 
virtually by definition, inasmuch as by following Afek’s precedents, the entire 
population would be ordered by taboos marking the social differences between 
men and women and initiatory or age-grade statuses. Negative rules predicate 
positive structures—and at the same time uphold them.13
In Telefolmin, Urapmin, and probably elsewhere, violations of Afek’s ta-
boos were as a rule punished occultly, without Afek’s explicit intervention. On 
the other hand, in Tifalmin the metaperson-powers of both the village and 
the bush were actively engaged in sanctioning the many taboos of “everyday 
13. I am indebted to Dan Jorgensen for this point: which, as he observes, derives from 
observations of Lévi-Strauss.
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life.” Often punishments emanated from the prominent ancestors whose re-
mains were enshrined in Afek’s cult house. Alternatively, they were inflicted 
by the “vast congresses” of thinking and sentient animal “ghosts” (sinik), inua 
who struck down people with disease or ruined their gardens. The last sug-
gests that even people who adhere to Afek’s food taboos may thereby suffer 
the vengeance of the species-masters—that is, for killing and eating the lat-
ter’s children. As Don Gardner observed for Mianmin, since every animal has 
its “mother” or “father,” human mothers and children become vulnerable to 
an equivalent payback for what was done to the species-parent’s child. And 
among the Central Min, where the parent is an All-Father like Magalim, the 
threat is apparently constant as well as general in proportion. Brumbaugh 
writes of Magalim:
All smells connected with women and children bring danger from Magalim. He 
may make women pregnant, eat an unborn child and leave one of his own, or 
come unseen between a couple having intercourse in the bush to give his child 
instead; it will then be a contest between the power of the man and the power of 
Magalim that determines the future of the child. (Brumbaugh 1987: 27)
It follows that to the extent people are socially objectified in terms of the wild 
foods they could or could not eat, they are in double jeopardy of suffering 
harm: whether magically or indirectly from Afek, mother of humans, for eating 
wrongly; or from the mother or father of the animal for eating it at all. Here 
again are “cosmic rules” of human order, enforced throughout the social territory 
by metaperson authorities to whom it all “belongs.”
DETERMINATION BY THE RELIGIOUS BASIS
Of the South American lowland people, the Piaroa, Joanna Overing writes:
Today, Masters of land and water own the domains of water and jungle . . . both 
of whom acquired their control over these habitats at the end of mythical time. 
These two spirits guard their respective domains, protect them, make fertile their 
inhabitants, and punish those who endanger their life forces. They also cooperate 
as guardians of garden food. The relevant point is obviously that the inhabitants 
of land and water are not owned by man. (1983–84: 341)
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Since, as a general rule, the peoples under discussion have only secondary or usu-
fructuary rights to the resources “owned” by metaperson-others, it follows that 
their relations of production entail submission to these other “people like us.” 
In conventional terms, it could justifiably be said that the spirits own the means 
of production—were it not that the “spirits” so-called are real-life metapersons 
who in effect are the primary means-cum-agents of production. Fundamental 
resources—plants, animals, celestial and terrestrial features, and so on—are con-
stituted as intentional subjects, even as many useful tools are “person-artifacts.”14 
Marked thus by an intersubjective praxis, this is an “economy” without “things” 
as such. Not only are metahuman persons ensouled in the primary resources, 
they thereby govern the outcome of the productive process. As intentional be-
ings in their own right, they are the arbiters of the success or failure of hu-
man efforts. For theirs are the life-forces—which may be hypostatized as mana, 
hasina, wakan, semengat, orenda, nawalak, or the like—that make people’s gar-
dens grow, their pigs flourish, and game animals become visible and available 
to them. Some decades ago, Jonathan Friedman and Michael Rowlands put 
the matter generally for “tribal” peoples: “Economic activity in this system can 
only be understood as a relation between producers and the supernatural. This 
is because wealth and prosperity are seen as directly controlled by supernatural 
spirits” (1978: 207).
Of course we are speaking of the people’s own notions of what there is and 
how it comes to be: a culturally informed reality they share with metaperson-
others to whom they are subjected and indebted for life and livelihood. When 
faced with the assurance of Kwaio people that their prosperity is “a result of 
ancestral support,” Roger Keesing refrains from the temptation “to say that 
the sacred ancestral processes are a mystification of the real physical world,” 
for, “in a world where the ancestors are participants in and controlling forces 
of life, this conveys insights only at the cost of subjective realities” (1982: 80). 
But why, then, “subjective realities”? If the ancestors participate in and control 
the people’s everyday existence—if they are “empirical,” as Fredrik Barth might 
say—the demystification would shortchange the “objective” realities.15 Not to 
14. “In the Amerindian case . . . the possession of objects must be seen as a particular 
case of the ownership relation between subjects, and the thing-artefact as a particular 
case of the person-artefact” (Fausto 2012: 33).
15. Later in the same monograph, Keesing attempts to recuperate these “political insights” 
in favor of the conventional view that the spiritual powers are an ideological reflex 
of the Kwaio big-man system. But aside from the fact that the Kwaio spirit-world 
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worry, however: in due course, with a few pertinent ethnographic notices in 
hand, I consider what scholarly good or harm would come from crediting such 
“determination by the religious basis.” 
It is not as if the producing people had no responsibility for the economic 
outcome—even apart from their own knowledge and skill. The Inuit shaman 
explains that: “No bears have come in their season because there is no ice; and 
there is no ice because there is too much wind; and there is too much wind 
because we mortals have offended the powers” (Weyer 1932: 241). Even so, 
something then can be done. Around the world, the common recourse for this 
dependence on the metaperson agents of people’s prosperity is to pay them an 
appropriate tribute, as in sacrifice. Sacrifice becomes a fundamental relation of 
production—in the manner of taxation that secures benefits from the powers-
that-be. As Marcel Mauss once put it, since spirits “are the real owners of the 
goods and things of this world,” it is with them that exchange is most necessary 
([1925] 2016: 79). A Tifalmin man tells how it works:
When we bring secretly hunted marsupial species into the anawok [men’s cult 
house] during ceremonies, we tell the amkumiit [ancestral relics] and the pig 
bones [of feasts gone by], “you must take care of us and make our pigs grow 
fat and plentiful, and our taro immense.” As soon as we told them this, shortly 
afterwards we see the results in our gardens. They do just what we petitioned. 
(Wheatcroft 1976: 392)
For all this hubris, however, the Tifalmin are not really in control. Edmund 
Leach notably remarked of such sacrifices that the appearance of gift and reci-
procity notwithstanding, the gods don’t need gifts from the people. They could 
easily kill the animals themselves. What the gods require are “signs of submis-
sion” (Leach 1976: 82–93). What the gods and the ancestors have, and peoples 
such as the Tifalmin seek, is the life-force that makes gardens, animals, and peo-
ple grow. The metahuman powers must therefore be propitiated, solicited, com-
pensated, or otherwise respected and appeased—sometimes even tricked—as a 
necessary condition of human economic practice. Or as Hocart had it, based on 
his own ethnographic experience: “There is no religion in Fiji, only a system that 
in Europe has been split into religion and business.” He knew that in Fijian, the 
is much more complex morphologically than Kwaio society, there are no Kwaio big-
men with the life-and-death powers even of their ancestral predecessors.
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same word (cakacaka) refers indiscriminately to “work”—as in the gardens—or 
to “ritual”—as in the gardens.
So why call it “production”? How can we thus credit human agency if the 
humans are not responsible for the outcome: if it is the ancestors according 
to their own inclinations who make the taro grow; or if it is Sila Inua, the 
Air, and the bears themselves who make hunting successful? In a golden few 
pages of his recent work Beyond nature and culture (2013), Philippe Descola 
argues persuasively that our own common average native notion of “production” 
fails to adequately describe human praxis in a metahuman cosmos. Where even 
animals and plants are thinking things, the appropriate anthropology should 
be Hocartesian rather than Cartesian. Rather than a subject–object relation in 
which a heroic individual imposes form upon inert matter, making it come-to-
be according to his or her own plan, at issue here are intersubjective relations 
between humans and the metaperson-others whose dispositions will be decisive 
for the material result. Descola can conclude from his Amazonian experience 
that it is “meaningless” to talk of “agricultural production” in a society where the 
process is enacted as interspecies kinship:
Achuar women do not “produce” the plants that they cultivate: they have a per-
sonal relationship with them, speaking to each one so as to touch its soul and 
thereby win it over; and they nurture its growth and help it to survive the perils 
of life, just as a mother helps her children. (2013: 324)
Not to forget the mistress and mother of cultivated plants, Nankui, described 
by Descola elsewhere (1996: 192ff.): the goddess whose presence in the gar-
den is the source of its abundance—unless she is offended and causes some 
catastrophic destruction. Hence the necessity for “direct, harmonious, and con-
stant contact with Nankui,” as is successfully practiced by women who qualify 
as anentin, a term applied to persons with the occult knowledge and ritual skills 
to develop fruitful relations with the goddess.
The way Simon Harrison describes the agricultural process for Manambu 
of the Middle Sepik (New Guinea), people do not create the crops, they re-
ceive them from their ancestral sources. “What could pass for ‘production,’” he 
writes, “are the spells by which the totemic ancestors are called from their vil-
lages by clan magicians to make yams abundant, fish increase, and crocodiles 
available for hunting” (1990: 47). For “yams are not created by gardening,” but, 
like all cultivated and wild foods, “they came into the phenomenal world by 
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being ‘released’ from the mythical villages by means of ritual” (ibid.: 63). Note 
that this is a political economy, or, more exactly, a cosmopolitical economy, in-
asmuch as the human credit for the harvest goes to those who gained access to 
the ancestors by means of their secret knowledge—rather than the gardener 
who knew the right soils for yams. Of course, one may accurately say that, here 
as elsewhere, human technical skills, climatic conditions, and photosynthesis 
are responsible for the material outcome, for what actually happened; but also 
here as elsewhere, the decisive cultural issue, from which such specific political 
effects follow, is, rather, what it is that happened—namely, the clan magicians 
summoned the yams from the ancestral villages. Such is the human reality, the 
premises on which the people are acting—which are also the beginnings of 
anthropological wisdom.
Further ethnographic notices of the spiritual nature of the material basis are 
easy to come by. I close with a final one that has the added advantage of ad-
dressing the issue, raised in Harrison’s work, of human power in a cosmic polity. 
The site will be Melpa and their neighbors of the Hagen region. Here a variety 
of metahuman beings—Sky People deities (including their collective personifi-
cation in “Himself, the Above”); “Great Spirits” of the major cults; the human 
dead, both recently deceased kin and clan ancestors; and the numerous “nature 
spirits” or inua-owners of the wild—are the agents of human welfare:
In trade and economic affairs . . . in campaigns of war or at great festivals, any 
success is seen as the result of the help of benevolent spirits.  .  .  . Benevolent 
spirits are said to “plant our fields for us” and to “make our pigs big and fat.” . . . 
They are said to “raise the pigs.” (Strauss [1962] 1990: 148)
The functions of these metaperson-kinds are largely redundant; many are com-
petent to promote or endanger the well-being of the people. It will be sufficient 
to focus on a few critical modes of life and death from the metapersons—with 
a view also to their constitution of human, big-man power.
Whereas the Sky People originally “sent down” humans and their means 
of existence, it is the recent dead and clan ancestors who are most intimately 
and continuously responsible for the health and wealth of their descendants—
though for punishing people they usually enlist the ill-intentioned inua of the 
wild. As recipients of frequent sacrifices, the recent dead protect their kin from 
accidents, illness, and ill fortune. “They will ‘make the fields and vegetable gar-
dens for us . . . raise pigs for us, go ahead of us on journeys and trading trips, 
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grant us large numbers of children . . . stay at our side in every way” (ibid.: 272). 
So likewise, on a larger scale, as when a meeting house is built for them, will 
the clan spirits “make our fields bring forth . . . our pigs multiply, protect our 
wives, children, and pigs from plagues and illness, keep sorcery and evil spirits 
at bay” (ibid.: 279). But if the gardens are planted without proper sacrifices, “the 
owner-spirit digs up the fruits and eats them” (Vicedom and Tischner 1943–48, 
2: 677). By contrast to this constant attention, the Great Spirits of the collective 
cults are ceremonially celebrated only at intervals of years. On these occasions, 
the large number of pigs sacrificed testifies to the deities’ exceptional ability 
to multiply things themselves by promoting the people’s growth, fertility, and 
wealth. In such respects both the dead and the cult deities are particularly useful 
to big-men and would-be big-men, that is, as the critical sources of their human 
power:
We rich people [i.e., big-men] live and sacrifice to the Kor Nganap [Female 
Great Spirit]; this enables us to make many moka [pig-exchange festivals]. 
Through this spirit we become rich, create many children who remain healthy 
and alive, and stay ourselves healthy. Our gardens bear much fruit. All this the 
Kor Nganap does, and that is why we sacrifice to it. (Vicedom and Tischner 
1943–48, 2: 794)
The Stratherns relate that when a big-man goes on a journey to solicit valuables, 
he asks his clan-ancestors to come sit on his eyelids and induce his trading 
partner to part with his valuables. Big-men are also helped by the ghosts of 
close relatives, who may be enlisted by partaking of the pig backbone cooked 
especially for them. The same ancestors and ghosts are with the big-man in the 
ceremonial ground when he makes the prestations that underwrite his fame and 
status (Strathern and Strathern 1968: 192). 
In another text, Andrew Strathern notes that traditional Hagen big-men 
had “a multitude of sacred and magical appurtenances which played an impor-
tant part, from the people’s own perspective, in giving them the very access to 
wealth on which their power depended” (1993: 147). Strathern here addresses 
a range of leadership forms in a variety of Highland New Guinea societies—
including Baruya, Duna, Simbari Anga, Kuskusmin, and Maring, as well as 
Melpa—to show that the “ritual sources of power” amount to a Melanesian 
Realpolitik: the condition of possibility of human authority, as regards both the 
practices by which it is achieved and the reason it is believed. All the same, we 
57THE ORIGINAL POLITICAL SOCIETY
need not completely abandon historical materialism and put Hegel right-side 
up again, for in these big-man orders one may still speak of economic determin-
ism—provided that the determinism is not economic.
TO CONCLUDE
To conclude: we need something like a Copernican Revolution in the sciences 
of society and culture. I mean a shift in perspective from human society as the 
center of a universe onto which it projects its own forms—that is to say, from 
the received Durkheimian, Marxist, and structural-functionalist conventions—
to the ethnographic realities of people’s dependence on the encompassing meta-
person-others who rule earthly order, welfare, and existence. For Durkheim, God 
was an expression of the power of society: people felt they were constrained by 
some power, but they knew not whence it came. But if what has been said here 
has any cogency, it is better to say that God is an expression of the lack of power 
of society. Finitude is the universal human predicament: people do not control 
the essential conditions of their existence. I have made this unoriginal and banal 
argument too many times, but if I can just say it once more: if people really con-
trolled their own lives, they would not die, or fall sick. Nor do they govern the 
weather and other external forces on which their welfare depends. The life-force 
that makes plants and animals grow or women bear children is not their doing. 
And if they reify it—as mana, semengat, or the like—and attribute it to external 
authorities otherwise like themselves, this is not altogether a false conscious-
ness, though it may be an unhappy one. Vitality and mortality do come from 
elsewhere, from forces beyond human society, even as they evidently take some 
interest in our existence. They must be, as Chewong say, “people like us.”
But so far as the relation between the cosmic authorities and the human so-
cial order goes, in both morphology and potency there is no equivalence between 
them. As I have tried to show, especially by egalitarian and chiefless societies, 
neither in structure nor in practice do they match the powers above and around 
them. Among these societies there are no human authorities the likes of Sedna, 
Sila, Ungud, the Original Snake, Afek, Magalim, Nankui, or the New Guinea 
Sky People.16 What Viveiros de Castro says in this regard to the Araweté and 
16. Of the Huli equivalent of Hagener Sky People, R. M. Glasse writes: “Dama are 
gods—extremely powerful beings who control the course of nature and interfere in 
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Tupi Guarani peoples generally can be widely duplicated among the classically 
“acephalous” societies:
How to account for the coexistence of, on one hand, a “loosely structured” organ-
ization (few social categories, absence of global segmentation, weak institution-
alization of interpersonal relations, lack of differentiation between public and 
domestic spheres) with, on the other hand, an extensive taxonomy of the spirit 
world . . . an active presence of that world in daily life, and a thoroughly vertical 
“gothic” orientation of thought . . . ? Societies such as the Araweté reveal how 
utterly trivial any attempts are to establish functional consistencies or forced cor-
respondences between morphology and cosmology or between institution and 
representation. (1992: 2–3)
Even apart from the numerous malevolent, shape-shifting beings with superhu-
man powers of afflicting people with all kinds of suffering, Viveiros de Castro 
describes a society of immortal gods in heaven without equal on earth, who 
make people’s foods and devour their souls, who are capable of elevating the sky 
and resurrecting the dead, gods who are “extraordinary, splendid but also dread-
ful, weird—in a word, awesome” (ibid.: 69).17
But they do have shamans, precisely of similar powers (ibid.: 64)—as do 
many other such societies. Even where there are no chiefs, there are often some 
human authorities: big-men, great-men, guardian magicians, warriors, elders. 
Yet, given the basis of their authority, these personages are so many exceptions 
that prove the rule of domination by metaperson powers-that-be; for, like Inuit 
shamans or Hagen big-men, their own ability to command others is conveyed 
by their service to or enlistment of just such metaperson-others. Indeed, as 
Vicedom and Tischner write of Hageners: “Any manifestation of power in peo-
ple or things is ascribed to supernatural or hidden power,” whether in the form 
the affairs of men.” Notably, one Datagaliwabe, “a unique spirit whose sole concern is 
punishing breaches of kinship rules” (1965: 27)—including lying, stealing, adultery, 
murder, incest, violations of exogamic rules and of ritual taboos—inflicts sickness, 
accidents, death or wounding in war (ibid.: 37). 
17. For a similar structure of divinity in a non-Tupi setting, see Jon Christopher Crocker 
(1983: 37 et passim) on the bope spirits of the Bororo. In both cases, by conveying to 
the gods their rightful share of certain foods, the people will be blessed with fertility 
and natural plenty.
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of good harvests, many children, success in trade, or a respected position in the 
community (1943–48, 1: 43).
In insightful discussions of the Piaroa of the Orinoco region, Joanna Over-
ing (1983–84, 1989) notes that human life-giving powers were not their own, 
but were magically transmitted to individuals from the gods by tribal leaders. 
By means of powerful chants, the ruwang, the tribal leader, was uniquely able 
to travel to the lands of the gods, whence he brought the forces for productivity 
enclosed within “beads of life” and placed them in the people of his community. 
Overing points out that this is no political economy in the sense that tribal lead-
ers control the labor of others. But as they absorbed more divine powers than 
others, they were responsible for building the community: “Without the work 
of the ruwang, the community could not be created, and because of his greater 
creative power, he was also the most productive member of the community” 
(1989: 172). 
In such cultural-ontological regimes, where every variety of human social 
success is thus attributed to metapersonal powers, there are no purely secular 
authorities. Roger Keesing relates of an ambitious young Kwaio man that he 
is well on his way to big-manship, as evidenced by his staggering command of 
genealogies, his encyclopedic knowledge of traditions of the ancestors and their 
feuds, his distinction as a singer of epic chants, and his acquisition of magi-
cal powers. Accordingly, he is “not only acquiring an intellectual command of 
his culture, but powerful instruments for pursuing secular ambitions as a feast-
giver” (Keesing 1982: 208). Or for an Australian Aboriginal example: Helmut 
Petri concludes that the reason certain Ungarinyin “medicine men” and elders 
are leading and influential men of their communities is that they “are regarded 
as people in whom primeval times are especially alive, in whom the great he-
roes and culture-bringers are repeated and who maintain an inner link between 
mythical past and present” ([1954] 2011: 69). Not that those who so possess 
or are favored by divine powers are necessarily placed beyond the control of 
their fellows, for popular pressures may be put on them to use such powers be-
neficently. Here is where the famous “egalitarianism” of these peoples becomes 
relevant. Tony Swain (1993: 52) notes that the native Australian elders’ shared 
being with the land entails the obligation to make it abound with life—a duty 
the people will hold them to. Swain is careful to insist that the leaders’ access 
to ritual positions amounts to a certain control of “the means of production,” 
hence that this is not the kind of communalistic, nonhierarchical society “im-
agined by early Marxists.” But then, ordinary people, without direct access to 
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metapersonal sources of fertility, “can and do order ritual custodians to ‘work’ to 
make them food: ‘You mak’em father—I want to eat.’” All of which brings us 
back to the issue of mystification.
Earlier, I warned against too quickly writing off the human dependence on 
gods, ancestors, ghosts, or even seal-persons as so much mistaken fantasy. Well, 
nobody nowadays is going to attribute these notions to a “primitive mental-
ity.” And from all that has been said here, it cannot be claimed these beliefs 
in “spirits” amount to an ideological chimera perpetrated by the ruling class in 
the interest of maintaining their power—that is, on the Voltairean principle of 
“There is no God, but don’t tell the servants.” Here we do have gods, but no rul-
ing class. And what we also distinctively find in these societies is the coexistence 
in the same social reality of humans with metahumans who have life-giving and 
death-dealing powers over them. The implications, as I say, look to be world-
historical. As is true of big-men or shamans, access to the metaperson authori-
ties on behalf of others is the fundamental political value in all human societies 
so organized. Access on one’s own behalf is usually sorcery, but to bestow the 
life-powers of the god on others is to be a god among men. Human political 
power is the usurpation of divine power. This is also to say that claims to divine 
power, as manifest in ways varying from the successful hunter sharing food 
or the shaman curing illness, to the African king bringing rain, have been the 
raison d’être of political power throughout the greater part of human history. 
Including chiefdoms such as Kwakiutl, where,
The chiefs are the assemblers, the concentrators, and the managers of super-
natural powers. . . . The human chiefs go out to alien realms and deal with alien 
beings to accumulate nawalak [generic life-giving power], and to concentrate it 
in the ceremonial house. When they have become centers of nawalak the salmon 
come to them. The power to draw salmon is equated with the power to draw 
people. The power to attract derives from nawalak and demonstrates its posses-
sion. (Goldman 1975: 198–99)
It was not military power or economic prowess as such that generated the 
dominance of the Abelam people over the various other Sepik communities of 
New Guinea eager to adopt Abelam cultural forms; rather it was the “super-
natural power” that their successes signified. “Effectiveness in warfare and skill 
in growing yams, particularly the phallic long yams,” Anthony Forge (1990: 
162) explains, “were in local terms merely the material manifestations of a more 
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fundamental Abelam domination, that of power conceived essentially in magical 
and ritual terms.” What enabled the Abelam yams to grow larger, their gardens 
to be more productive, and their occupation of land once held by others was 
their “superior access to supernatural power.” Accordingly, the political-cum-
cultural reach of the Abelam extended beyond their actual grasp. Beyond any 
real-political or material constraints, the Abelam were admired and feared for 
their superior access to cosmic power in all its forms, and notably for its “con-
crete expression” in rituals, buildings, and a great array of objects, decorations, 
and aesthetic styles. Abelam culture was thus carried abroad by its demonstrable 
command of greater force than its own (ibid: 163ff.).
Southeast Asian “tribals” and peasants are well known for sacrificial “feasts 
of merit” in which the display and/or distribution of livestock, foods, and ritual 
valuables such as porcelain jars and imported textiles is the making of local au-
thorities. But it is not so much the economic benefits to the population at large 
that constitute this authority—as if the people were rendered dependent on the 
sponsor of the sacrificial feast for their own means of existence—as it is the priv-
ileged dependence of the feast-giver on the metahuman sources of people’s pros-
perity. As Kaj Århem comments in regard to the “ritual wealth” thus expended: 
Such ritual wealth is regarded as objectivized spirit power—an indication that 
the owner is blessed and protected by personal spirits. Spirit possession manifests 
itself in good health and a large family. The blessings of the spirits are gained by 
proper conduct—keeping the precepts of the cosmologically underpinned social 
and moral order—and, above all, by continuously hosting animal sacrifices, the 
so-called “feasts of merit.” Wealth, sacrifice, and spiritual blessing are thus linked 
in an endless, positive feedback circuit. The implied reification of spiritual poten-
cy in the form of wealth and worldly power—its acquisition and accumulation as 
well as its loss—is central to Southeast Asian cosmology and politics. (2016: 20)
Economic prowess is a metaphysical power.18 Then again, there are other well-
known ways, from the magical to the military, of demonstrating such metahu-
man potency. Even in the matter of kingship, the royal authority may have little 
or nothing to do with the accumulation and disposition of riches. In certain 
African stranger-kingships described elsewhere (see chapter 5 in this volume), 
18. Geertz (1980) was right to speak of a Balinese “theatre state.” So were those who 
criticized him for underplaying its material dimension.
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power essentially rested on the ritual functions of ensuring the population’s pros-
perity: the authority to do so being dependent on descent from exalted foreign 
sources, complemented usually by traditions of the dynastic founder’s exploits as 
a hunter and warrior in the wild. As Shilluk, Lovedu, and Alur demonstrate, in 
more than one African realm such stranger-kings “rained” but did not govern. 
For all the superior foreign origin of an Alur chiefly dynasty, its connection 
to the ancient great kingdom of Nyoro-Kitara, the Alur ruler, reported Aidan 
Southall, was revered by his indigenous subjects more for his power to stop war 
than to make it; “and the sanction to his ritual authority, which is always up-
permost in people’s minds, is his power to make or withhold rain rather than his 
power to call in overwhelming force to crush an opponent” ([1956] 2004: 246):
Rain (koth) stood for material well-being in general, and a chief ’s ability to dem-
onstrate his control over it was a crucial test of his efficacy. The chief ’s control 
of rain and weather, together with his conduct of sacrifice and worship at the 
chiefdom shrines, stood for his general and ultimate responsibility in the minds 
of his subjects for both their material and moral well-being. ([1956] 2004: 239)
You will have noticed that I have come back full circle to Hocart’s Kings and 
councillors. Government in general and kingship in particular develop as the or-
ganization of ritual. As said earlier, we scholars of a more skeptical or positivist 
bent are at liberty to demystify the apparent illusions of the Others. We can split 
up their reality in order to make society autonomous, expose the gods as fantasy, 
and reduce nature to things. To put it in Chicagoese, we may say we know bet-
ter than them. But if we do, it becomes much harder to know them better. For 
myself, I am a Hocartesian. 
A final note in this personal vein. Written by one of a certain age, this pre-
tentious article has the air of a swan song. Similarly, for its concern with disap-
pearing or disappeared cultural forms, it is something of the Owl of Minerva 
taking wing at dusk. Still, it does manage to kill those two birds with one stone.
CODA
Already copyedited, this text was on its way to the printer when by happy chance 
I discovered that in 1946 Thorkild Jacobsen had formulated the concept of a “cos-
mic state” in reference to Mesopotamian polities of the third millennium bce. 
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Jacobsen’s discussion of a universal metapersonal regime in a city-state setting 
indeed anticipates many of the attributes of “The original political society” as pre-
sented here—most fundamentally his observation that “the universe as an organ-
ized whole was a society, a state” ([1946] 1977: 149). Ruled by divine authorities, 
human society was merely a subordinate part of this larger society, together with all 
the other phenomena-cum-subjects inhabiting the cosmos, from beasts and plants 
to stones and stars: all animate beings (inua) likewise endowed with personality 
and intentionality. Jacobsen depicts this hierarchically organized world in which 
personkind was the nature of things in a number of parallel passages. For example: 
Human society was to the Mesopotamian merely a part of the larger society of 
the universe. The Mesopotamian universe—because it did not consist of dead 
matter, because every stone, every tree, every conceivable thing in it was a being 
with a will and a character of its own—was likewise founded on authority: its 
members, too, willingly and automatically obeyed orders which made them act 
as they should act. . . . So the whole universe showed the influence of the essence 
peculiar to Anu [Sky, king and father of the gods]. ([1946] 1977: 139)
By Jacobsen’s descriptions, this universal animism was classificatory—the per-
sonalities of elements of the same kind were instances of a master personality of 
the species; and the scheme was hierarchical at multiple levels—species forms 
were in turn inhabited by higher, divine forms, such that the world was gov-
erned through the indwelling being of cosmocratic gods in every existing thing. 
While the whole universe manifested the essence of Anu, the goddess Nidabe 
created and inhabited the useful reeds of the wetlands and by her presence made 
them flourish. “She was one with every reed in the sense that she penetrated 
as an animating and characterizing agent, but she did not lose her identity in 
that of the concrete phenomena and was not limited to any or all the existing 
reeds” (ibid.: 132). Note that this kind of philosophical realism, with the god as 
personification of the class of which individuals are participatory members, is 
a general logic of partibility or dividualism. The god is a partible person mani-
fest in various other beings—like the “myriad bodies” (kino lau) of Hawaiian 
gods—and at the same time exists independently of them. By the same token 
(pun intended), the several members of a divine class are at once manifestations 
of the god and (in)dividuals in their own right and kind.
Following this classificatory logic, Jacobsen achieves a description of di-
vine kingship in Mesopotamia of the kind known from classic anthropological 
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accounts in which, for all that the king is a certain god, the god is not the king. 
Nyikang is Juok, but Juok is not Nyikang; Captain Cook is Lono, but Lono is 
not Captain Cook. Just so, the Mesopotamian king is Anu, but Anu is not the 
king. Indeed, given the partibilities involved, the Mesopotamian king in various 
capacities is also Enlil, Marduk, or any and all the great gods. (Interesting that 
Hocart [(1936) 1970: 88] recounted the analogous claim of an important Fijian 
chief who, after enumerating the great gods of the chiefdom, said, “These are 
all my names.”) This type of intersubjective animism is by far the most com-
mon type of divine kingship: the king as human manifestation of the god, as an 
avatar of the god, rather than the human as the deity in his own person, such as 
the self-made Roman god, Augustus. Jacobsen also thus testifies to the principle 
that human authority is the appropriation of divine power. In the cult, the Mes-
opotamian king enacted the god and thereby controlled and acquired the god’s 
potency. By a kind of usurpation, as it were, a man could “clothe himself with 
these powers, with the identity of the gods, and through his own actions, when 
thus identified, cause the powers to act as he would have them act” ( Jacobsen 
[1946] 1977: 199). 
For the rest, Jacobsen’s text delivers on the usual ontological suspects of a 
metapersonal cosmos: no subject–object opposition, and, a fortiori, no differen-
tiation of humans from nature—or can we not say: no culture–nature opposi-
tion? (Similar observations are made in the same volume by John A. Wilson 
[(1946) 1977] on ancient Egypt and H. and H. A. Frankfort [(1946) 1977] on 
ancient civilizations in general.) Given this universal subjectivity as a matter of 
common experience, neither did the ancient Mesopotamians know a transcend-
ent, “supernatural” realm. “The Mesopotamian universe did not have ‘different 
levels of reality’” ( Jacobsen [1946] 1977: 149).
The ethnographic examples of “The original political society” were delib-
erately taken from so-called “egalitarian societies” situated far from any state 
system to avoid the possibility that the cosmic polities at issue had been diffused 
or otherwise transplanted from an already existing regime of ruling kings and 
high gods. However, comparing Jacobsen’s account with peoples such as the 
Inuit and New Guinea highlanders, something of the reverse seems more likely: 
that the ancient civilizations inherited cosmological regimes of the kind long 
established in human societies. If so, the human state was the realization of a 
political order already prefigured in the cosmos: the state came from heaven to 
earth—rather than the gods from earth to heaven.
chapter 2
The divine kingship of the Shilluk 
On violence, utopia, and the human condition
David Graeber
 God kills us.
 Malagasy proverb
“States,” I once suggested, have a peculiar dual quality: they are always at the 
same time “forms of institutionalized raiding or extortion, and utopian projects” 
(Graeber 2004: 65). In this essay I’d like to put some flesh on this assertion by 
reexamining one of the most famous cases in the history of anthropology: the 
divine kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan.1
The Shilluk have been, since at least Sir James Frazer’s time, the locus clas-
sicus for debates over the nature of divine kingship; however, the kingdom might 
seem an odd choice for an exploration of the nature of the state. The Shilluk 
kingdom was clearly not a state. The Shilluk reth, or king, lacked any sort of ad-
ministration and had little way to enforce his will. Nonetheless, I think that one 
reason anthropologists, and others, have found the Shilluk case so compelling is 
1. These words were written six years ago, and reflection on cases like this has since 
inspired me to question whether the nature of the “state” is even the most useful 
thing to ask. But I thought it best to leave the argument largely as it stood in the 
original. I should note that “Shilluk” is an Arabization of the native term, Collo or 
Chollo. Most of the king’s current subjects now use Chollo when writing in English. 
I have kept to the historical usage largely to avoid confusion. 
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not just because they seem to come so close to actually enacting Frazer’s appar-
ently whimsical fantasy about primordial god-kings who are ritually sacrificed 
when their term expired, but because they share an intuition that these appar-
ently minimal, stripped-down versions of sovereign power can tell us some-
thing profound about the nature of power more generally, and hence, ultimately, 
states. It strikes me this is especially true of the aforementioned predatory and 
utopian elements, both of which can be seen here in embryonic form.
A proviso is in order. I am not saying this because I believe the Shilluk 
political system to be in any sense “primitive,” or think that forms of sover-
eignty that were later to blossom into the modern state were only beginning to 
emerge here like some half-formed idea. That would be absurd. Anyone living, 
like the Shilluk, within a few days’ journey of ancient centers of civilization like 
Egypt, Meroe, or Ethiopia was likely to be perfectly aware of what a centralized 
government was. It is even possible (we don’t know) that Shilluk kings were 
distinctly more powerful in the past than they were when our records kick in 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But one thing is clear from exist-
ing records: if the Shilluk were organized the way they were at that time, it is 
because those elements in Shilluk society that clearly would have liked to, and 
occasionally tried to, create something similar to surrounding states and empires 
had largely failed to convince the rest of the Shilluk population to go along with 
them. As a result, the Shilluk kingdom was a system of institutionalized raiding, 
and a utopian project, and very little else. 
I am also aware that the word “utopian” might seem odd here; one might 
just as easily substitute “cosmological project.” Royal palaces, royal cities, or roy-
al courts almost invariably become microcosms, images of totality. The central 
place is imagined as a model of perfection, but at the same time, as a model of 
the universe; the kingdom, ideally, should be another reproduction of the same 
pattern on a larger level. I emphasize the word “ideally.” Royal palaces and royal 
cities always fall slightly short of heaven; kingdoms as a whole never live up 
to the ideals of the royal court. This is one reason the term “utopia” seems ap-
propriate. These are ideals that by definition can never be realized; after all, if 
the cosmos, and the kingdom, really could be brought into conformity with the 
ideal, there would be no excuse for the predatory violence. 
Perhaps the most fascinating thing about the Shilluk material is that these 
two elements are so clearly seen as linked. Sovereignty—that which makes one 
a sovereign—is defined as the ability to carry out arbitrary violence with im-
punity. Royal subjects are equal in that they are all, equally, potential victims; 
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but the king too is a victim in suspense, and in myth as well as ritual, it is at 
the moments when the people gather together to destroy the king—or at least 
to express their hatred for him—that he is mysteriously transformed into an 
eternal, transcendental being. In a cosmological system where separation is seen 
as balanced antagonism, opposition literally as at least potential hostility, the 
king inhabits a kind of tiny paradise, set apart from birth, death, and sickness; 
set apart equally from ordinary human sociality; representing exactly this sort 
of imperfect ideal. Yet his ability to do so rests on a delicate balance of relations 
of opposition and barely contained aggression—between humans and gods, be-
tween king and people, between fractions of the royal family itself—that will, 
inevitably, destroy him. 
All this will become more clear as I go on. Let me begin, though, with a very 
brief survey of theories of divine kingship and the place of the Shilluk in them. 
Then I will demonstrate how I think these pieces can be reassembled to create 
the elements for a genealogy of sovereignty. 
THEORIES OF DIVINE KINSGHIP
The Shilluk first became famous, in Europe and America, through James 
Frazer’s book The golden bough. They are so firmly identified with Frazer that 
most are unaware the Shilluk did not even appear in the book’s first two edi-
tions (1890 and 1900). Originally, in fact, Frazer drew largely on classical litera-
ture in making an argument that all religion was to some degree derived from 
fertility cults centered on the figure of a dying god, and that the first kings, 
who embodied that god, were ritually sacrificed. This idea made an enormous 
impression on anthropology students of the time (and even more, perhaps, on 
artists and intellectuals), many of whom were to fan out across the world look-
ing for traces of such institutions in the present day. The most successful was 
Charles Seligman, who discovered in the Shilluk kingdom an almost perfect 
example, in 1911 sending Frazer a description that he incorporated, almost ver-
batim, in the book’s third edition (C. G. Seligman 1911; Frazer 1911a; Fraser 
1990: 200–201). 
One reason the Shilluk seemed to fit the bill so nicely was that Frazer had 
argued that divine kingship was originally a form of spirit possession. To find 
a king whose physical health was said to be tied to the fertility and prosper-
ity of the kingdom, or even who was therefore said to be ritually killed when 
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his powers begin to wane, was not difficult. There were endless examples in 
Africa and elsewhere. But for Frazer, divine kings were literally possessed by a 
god. Frazer also felt the notion that kings were possessed by the spirits of gods 
would necessarily lead to a practical problem: How does one pass this divine 
spirit from one mortal vessel to another? Clearly, he felt, this would demand 
some sort of ceremony. But death tends to be a random and unpredictable affair. 
How could one be sure the ceremony would be conducted at the moment of the 
king’s death? Frazer concluded the only way was to arrange for the king’s death 
to occur at an appropriate moment: either after a fixed term, or, at the very least, 
when his weakened condition meant death seemed to be approaching anyway. 
And the only way to do that was of course by killing him.
All this was precisely what the Shilluk did appear to do. The Shilluk king, or 
reth, was indeed said to embody a divine being—a god, or at least a demigod—
in the person of Nyikang, the legendary founder of the Shilluk nation. Every 
king was Nyikang. The reth was not supposed to die a natural death. He might 
fall in battle with the nation’s enemies. He might be killed in single combat after 
a rival prince demanded a duel, as they had a right to do, or be suffocated by 
his own wives or retainers if he was seen to be physically failing (a state which 
was indeed seen to lead to poor harvests or natural catastrophes). On his death, 
though, Seligman emphasized, Nyikang’s spirit left him and entered a wooden 
effigy. Once a new reth was elected, the candidate had to raise an army and fight 
a mock battle against the effigy’s army in which he was first defeated and cap-
tured, then, having been possessed by the spirit of Nyikang, which passed from 
the effigy back into his body, emerged victorious again.
Frazer made the Shilluk famous, and their installation ritual has become 
one of the classic cases in anthropology—which in a way is rather odd, since 
the Shilluk are one of the few Nilotic peoples never to have been the subject of 
sustained anthropological fieldwork. Their notoreity is partly due to the fact that 
E. E. Evans-Pritchard chose the Shilluk as the case study with which to carry 
out his own ceremony of ritual regicide, directed at Frazer himself. In 1948, tak-
ing advantage of new ethnographic material provided by local colonial officials 
who had received some anthropological training, Evans-Pritchard delivered the 
first Frazer lecture on the subject (1948)—a lecture essentially designed to deal 
the death-blow to Frazer’s whole problematic. In it, he argued that there was no 
such thing as a divine king, that Shilluk kings were probably never ritually exe-
cuted, and that the installation ritual was not really about transferring a soul, but 
about resolving the tension between the office of kingship (figured as Nyikang), 
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which was set above everyone equally, and the particular individual who held it, 
with his very particular background, loyalties, and local support base:
In my view kingship everywhere and at all times has been in some degree a sa-
cred office. Rex est mixta persona cum sacerdote. This is because a king symbolizes 
a whole society and must not be identified with any part of it. He must be in the 
society and yet stand outside it and this is only possible if his office is raised to 
a mystical plane. It is the kingship, and not the king who is divine. (1948: 36)
The intricacies of Shilluk royal ceremonial, according to Evans-Pritchard, arose 
from “a contradiction between dogma and social facts” (ibid.: 38): these were a 
people sufficiently well organized to wish for a symbol of national unity, but not 
well organized enough to turn that symbol into an actual government. 
Evans-Pritchard was always a bit coy about his theoretical influences, but it’s 
hard not to detect here a distant echo the Renaissance doctrine of the “King’s 
Two Bodies,” that is, the “body politic,” or eternal office of kingship (ultimate-
ly including the community of his subjects), and “body natural,” which is the 
physical person of the individual king. This intellectual tradition was later to be 
the subject of comprehensive study by the German historian Ernst Kantorow-
icz (1957), whose student Ralph Giesey (1967), in turn, explored the way that 
during Renaissance English and French inauguration rituals, the relationship 
between the two bodies was acted out through royal effigies. Later anthropolo-
gists (Arens 1979, 1984; Schnepel 1988, 1995) recognized the similarity with 
Shilluk ritual and went on to explore the parallels (and differences) much more 
explicitly. 
Evans-Pritchard’s lecture opened the way to a whole series of debates, most 
famously over his claim that ritual king-killing was simply a matter of ideology, 
not something that ever really happened. The “Did Africans really kill their 
kings?” debate raged for years, ending, finally, with an accumulation of empiri-
cal evidence that forced a general recognition that at least in some cases—the 
Shilluk being included among them—yes, they did. 
At the same time, some of Frazer’s ideas were discovered to have been not 
been nearly so fanciful and irrelevant as Evans-Pritchard suggested. Since the 
1980s, at least, there has, indeed, been something of a Frazerian revival. 
No one has been more responsible for this revival than the Belgian anthro-
pologist Luc de Heusch—who, ironically, began his intellectual journey (1962) 
by setting out from Evans-Pritchard’s point that in order to rule, a king must 
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“stand outside” society. Essentially he asked: What are the mechanisms through 
which a king is made into an outsider? In any number of African kingdoms, at 
least, this meant that at their installations, kings were expected to make some 
kind of dramatic gesture that marked a fundamental break with “the domestic 
order” and domestic morality. Usually this consisted of performing acts—mur-
der, cannibalism, incest, the desecration of corpses—that would, had anyone else 
performed them, have been considered the most outrageous of crimes. Some-
times such “exploits” were acted out symbolically: pretending to lie next to one’s 
sister or stepping over one’s father’s body when taking the throne. At others they 
were quite literal: kings actually would marry their sisters or massacre their close 
kin. Always, such acts marked the king as a kind of “sacred monster,” a figure, 
effectively, outside of morality (de Heusch 1982a, 1982b, 2000). 
Marshall Sahlins (1981b, 1983b, 2007, this volume) has taken all this much 
further, pointing out, for one thing, that the vast majority of kings, in all times 
and places, not only try to mark themselves as exterior to society, but actually 
claim to come from someplace other than the lands they govern—or at the 
very least to derive from ancestors who do. There is a sense almost everywhere 
that “society,” however conceived, is not self-sufficient; that power, creative en-
ergy—life, even—ultimately comes from outside. On the other hand, raw power 
needs to be domesticated. In myth, this often leads to stories of wild, destruc-
tive young conquerors who arrive from far away, only to be eventually tamed on 
marriage to “daughters of the land.” In rituals, it often leads to ceremonies in 
which the king is himself conquered by the people. 
De Heusch’s concern was different. He was mainly interested in how, in 
African installation rituals, kings are effectively “torn from the everyday kinship 
order to take on the heavy responsibility of guaranteeing the equilibrium of the 
universe” (1997: 321). Kings do not begin as outsiders; they are made to “stand 
outside society.” But in contrast to Evans-Pritchard, de Heusch insisted this 
exteriority was not just a political imperative. Kings stand outside society not 
just so they can represent it to itself, but so that they can represent it before the 
powers of nature. This is why, as he repeatedly emphasized, it is possible to have 
exactly the same rituals and beliefs surrounding actual rulers, largely powerless 
kings like the Shilluk reth, and “kings” who do not even pretend to rule over 
anything at all, but are simply individuals with an “enhanced moral status,” like 
the Dinka masters of the fishing spear. 
In such matters, Frazer’s observations did indeed prove useful, especially 
because he began to map out a typology. In “The dying god” (1911a), Frazer 
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described how kings act as what de Heusch calls “fetish bodies”: that is, as magi-
cal charms manufactured by the people, “a living person whose mystical capacity 
is closely tied to the integrity of his physical being” (2005a: 26).2 And while 
Frazer might not have understood that such kings were, indeed, seen as having 
been created by the people, de Heusch insisted he was quite correct in hold-
ing that, having been so consecrated, their physical strength was tied to the 
prosperity of nature, and that’s why they could not be allowed to grow sickly, 
frail, and old. But in a later volume, The scapegoat (1911c), Frazer discovered 
another aspect: the king who absorbs the nation’s sin and pollution, and is thus 
destroyed as a way of disposing of collective evil. The two are obviously difficult 
to reconcile. Yet in a surprising number of cases (e.g., Quigley 2005) they seem 
to coexist. 
It’s the scapegoat aspect that has generated the most voluminous litera-
ture—largely because students of divine kingship soon connected it with René 
Girard’s quasi-psychoanalytic “scapegoat theory” (Makarius 1970; Scubla 2002), 
one which was gaining increasing popularity in French intellectual circles from 
the 1970s on. Girard, famously, argued that the scapegoat mechanism is really 
the secret lying behind all myth, ritual, and religion and is, indeed, what allows 
the very possibility of human sociality itself. Girard’s is one of those arguments 
that, even if so overstated it might seem self-evidently absurd, nonetheless never 
fails to find an audience because it managed to find a way of framing some-
thing we are taught to already suspect is true—that is, that society is always, 
everywhere founded on some kind of fundamental violence—in a way no one 
had ever thought to propose before. Girard does not seek to find the sources of 
that violence in some presocial nature, but quite the opposite. The story goes 
like this: We learn to desire by observing what others desire. Therefore we all 
want the same things. Therefore we are necessarily in competition. The only way 
humans can avoid thus plunging into a Hobbesian war of all against all is to 
2. I am summarizing, not assessing, theories at this point, so I will not enlarge on the 
fact that de Heusch seems to me to be working with a fundamentally mistaken 
idea of the nature of African fetishes, which are rarely embodiments of fertility but 
ordinarily embodiments of destructive forces (Graeber 2005). I think he is quite 
right and profoundly insightful when he argues that kings are often created by 
the same mechanisms as fetishes, as I have myself argued for Merina sovereigns 
(Graeber 1996a), mistaken when he goes on to claim that the key innovation here 
is that, unlike fetishes, the power of kings does not have to be constantly ritually 
maintained, as there are any number of counterexamples (e.g., Richards 1968) 
where it definitely does. 
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direct their mutual hostility outward onto a single object. This generally means 
selecting some arbitrary victim, who is first reviled as the cause of all their trou-
bles and expelled from the community, most often by killing him. Once this 
happens, though, everything suddenly turns around: the former scapegoat is 
suddenly treated as an exalted being, even a god, because he is now the em-
bodiment of society’s ability to create itself by the very act of killing him. This 
mechanism, Girard argues, is the origin of all society and culture. The logic is, in 
classic Freudian style, circular: since we cannot face the reality, we are always de-
nying it; therefore, it cannot possibly be disproved. Still, applying this model to 
the problem of divine kingship has interesting effects. Kings become, effectively, 
scapegoats in waiting (Muller 1980; Scubla 2003). Hence de Heusch’s “exploits” 
are, for Girardians, actual crimes. They ensure that the king is, by definition, a 
criminal; hence it is always legitimate to execute him, should it come to that. 
His sacred pneuma, then, is anticipatory: the reflected glow of the role the king 
might ultimately play in embodying the unity the people will achieve in finally 
destroying him.
Over the course of the ensuing debate the idea that such kings embody gods 
was gradually abandoned. De Heusch rejected the expression “divine kingship” 
entirely. And kings actually taken to be living gods are in fact surprisingly rare: 
the Egyptian Pharaoh may well have been the only entirely unambiguous ex-
ample (Frankfort 1948; cf. Brisch 2008).3 Better, he argued, to speak of “sacred 
kingship.” Sacred kings are legion. But de Heusch also emphasizes that sacred 
kings are not necessarily temporal rulers. They might be. But they might equally 
be utterly powerless. Different functions—the king as fetish, the king as scape-
goat, the king as military commander or secular leader—can either be combined 
in the same figure or be distributed across many; in any one community, any 
given one of them may or may not exist (de Heusch 1997). 
De Heusch’s ultimate conclusion is that A. M. Hocart ([1927] 1969, 1933, 
[1936] 1970) was right: kingship was originally a ritual institution. Only later 
did it become something we would think of as political—that is, concerned with 
making decisions and enforcing them through the threat of force. As with any 
such statement, though, the obvious question is: What does “originally” mean 
here? Five thousand years ago when states first emerged in Egypt and Mesopo-
tamia? And if so, why is that important? Or is the idea, instead, that whenever 
3. Though part of the problem in saying that a king is a god is that the definition of 
“god”—or even, for that matter “is”—is entirely ambiguous here. 
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states emerge, it is invariably from within ritual institutions? This seems highly 
unlikely to be true in every case. Or is de Heusch simply saying that it is pos-
sible to have kings with ritual responsibilities and no political power, but not the 
other way around? If so, it would appear to be a circular argument, since then it 
would only be those political figures who have ritual responsibilities whom the 
analyst is willing to dignify with the name of “king.” 
It seems to me that de Heusch’s real accomplishment is to demonstrate that 
what we are used to thinking of as “government” (or, maybe better, “govern-
ance”) is not a unitary phenomenon. Simon Simonse (2005: 72), for instance, 
observes that, really, all most Africans ask of their sacred kings is what most 
Europeans demand of their welfare states: health, prosperity, a certain level of 
life security, and protection from natural disasters.4 He might have added: how-
ever, most do not feel it necessary or desirable to also grant them police powers 
in order to achieve this. 
The question of governance, then, is not the same as the question of sov-
ereignty. But what is sovereignty? Probably the most elegant definition is that 
recently proposed by Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat (2005, 2006): in its 
minimal sense, sovereignty is simply the recognition of the right to exercise vio-
lence with impunity. This is probably the reason why, as these same authors note, 
those arguing about the nature of sovereignty in the contemporary world—the 
breakdown of states, the multiplications of new forms of semicriminal sover-
eignty in the margins between them—rarely find the existing anthropological 
literature on sacred kingship particularly useful.5
4. Simonse’s comment has a particularly piquant irony when one considers the current 
popularity of the notion of “biopower”: the idea that modern states claim unique 
powers over life itself because they see themselves not just ruling over subjects, or 
citizens, but as administering the health and well-being of a biological population. 
Probably the question we should be asking is how it happened that there were 
governments that did not have such concerns. This must have had something to do 
with the peculiar role of the church in the European Middle Ages.
5. I am simplifying their argument. Sovereign power for Hansen and Stepputat is 
marked not only by impunity but also by a resultant transcendence—the “crucial 
marks of sovereign power” are “indivisibility, self-reference, and transcendence” 
(2005: 8), as well as a certain “excessive” quality. In many ways their argument, 
especially when it draws on that of Georges Bataille with his reflections on 
autonomy and violence, comes close to the one that I will be developing. But it is 
also exactly in this area that it deviates the most sharply, since Bataille’s position is 
ultimately profoundly reactionary, reading authoritarian political institutions back 
into the very nature of human desire. I like to think my position is more hopeful. 
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It seems to me this need not be the case. The existing literature does contain 
elements from which a relevant analysis can be constructed. Any such analysis 
would have to begin with the notion of transcendence: that in order to become 
the constitutive principle of society, a sovereign has to stand outside it. I mean 
this is not quite in either Evans-Pritchard’s or de Heusch’s sense; what I am 
suggesting is that the various “exploits” or acts of transgression by which a king 
marks his break with ordinary morality are normally seen to make him not 
immoral, but a creature beyond morality. As such, he can be treated as the con-
stituent principle of a system of justice or morality—since, logically, no creature 
capable of creating a system of justice can itself be already bound by the system 
it creates. Let me take a famous example here. When European visitors to the 
court of King Mutesa of the Ganda kingdom tried to impress him by present-
ing him with some new state-of-the-art rifle, he would often respond by trying 
to impress them with the absolute quality of his power: testing the rifle out by 
randomly picking off one or two of his subjects on the street. Ganda kings were 
notorious for arbitrary, even random, violence against their own subjects. This, 
however, did not prevent Mutesa from also being accepted as supreme judge and 
guardian of the state’s system of justice. Instead, such random acts of violence 
confirmed in him in a status similar to that often (in much of Africa) attributed 
to God, who is seen simultaneously as an utterly random force throwing light-
ning and striking down mortals for no apparent reason, and as the very embodi-
ment of justice and protector of the weak. 
This, I would argue, is the aspect of African kingship which can legitimately 
be labeled “divine.” Creatures like Mutesa transcend all ordinary limitations. 
Whether they were said to embody a god is not the issue.6 The point is that they 
act like gods—or even God—and get away with it. 
For all that European and American observers ordinarily professed horror 
at behavior like Mutesa’s, this divine aspect of kingship is echoed in the mod-
ern nation-state. Walter Benjamin (1978) posed the dilemma quite nicely in 
his famous distinction between “law-making” and “law-maintaining” violence. 
Really it is exactly the same paradox, cast in the new language that became 
necessary once the power of kings (“sovereignty”) had been transferred, at least 
6. The Ganda kingship, for example, was almost entirely secular. Not only are we not 
dealing with a “divine king,” in the sense of one identified with supernatural beings, 
we are not even dealing with a particularly sacred one—except insofar as any king 
is, simply by virtue of hierarchical position, by definition sacred.
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in principle, to an entity referred to as “the people”—even though the exact way 
in which “the people” were to exercise sovereignty was never clear. No constitu-
tional order can constitute itself. We like to say that “no one is above the law,” 
but if this were really true, laws would not exist to begin with: even the writers 
of the United States Constitution or founders of the French Republic were, 
after all, guilty of treason according to the legal regimes under which they had 
been born. The legitimacy of any legal order therefore ultimately rests on ille-
gal acts—usually, acts of illegal violence. Whether one embraces the left solu-
tion (that “the people” periodically rise up to exercise their sovereignty through 
revolutions) or the right solution (that heads of state can exercise sovereignty 
in their ability to set the legal order aside by declaring exceptions or states of 
emergency), the paradox itself remains. In practical terms, it translates into a 
constant political dilemma: How does one distinguish “the people” from a mere 
unruly mob? How does one know if the hand suspending habeas corpus is that 
of a contemporary Lincoln or a contemporary Mussolini? 
What I am proposing here is that this paradox has always been with us. 
Obviously, any thug or bandit who finds he can regularly get away with rap-
ing, killing, and plundering at random will not, simply by that fact, come to 
be seen as a power capable of constituting a moral order or national identity.7 
The overwhelming majority of those who find themselves with the power to do 
so, and willing to act on it, never think to make such claims—except perhaps 
among their immediate henchmen. The overwhelming majority of those who 
do try fail. Yet the potential is always there. Successful thugs do become sover-
eigns, even creators of new legal and moral systems. And genuine “sovereignty” 
does always carry with it the potential for arbitrary violence. This is true even 
in contemporary welfare states: apparently this is the one aspect that, despite 
liberal hopes, can never be completely reformed away. It is precisely in this that 
sovereigns resemble gods and that kingship can properly be called “divine.”
This is not to say that Evans-Pritchard was wrong to say that kings are 
also always sacred. Rather, I think this perspective allows us to see that the 
mechanics of sacred kingship—turning the king into a fetish or a scapegoat—
often operate (whatever their immediate intentions) as a means of controlling 
the obvious dangers of rulers who feel they can act like arbitrary, petulant 
gods. Sahlins’ emphasis on the way stranger-kings must be domesticated, 
7. Benjamin himself suggested that the popular fascination with the “great criminal” 
who “makes his own law” derives from precisely this recognition.
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encompassed, and thus tamed by the people is a classic case in point. It is by 
such means that divine kings are rendered merely sacred. In the absence of 
a strong state apparatus, situations of power are often fluid and tenuous: the 
same act that at one point marks a monarch as a transcendent force beyond 
morality can, if the balance of forces shift, be reinterpreted as simple criminal-
ity. Thus can divine kings indeed be made into scapegoats. In this, at least, the 
Girardians are right.
There is every reason to believe this logic applies to the Shilluk king (or reth) 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as well. Consider the following two 
stories, preserved by the German missionary Dietrich Westermann (and bear-
ing in mind that while there is no way to know if these incidents ever actually 
happened, it doesn’t really matter, since the repetition of such stories constitutes 
the very stuff of politics):
 Story 1: One day a man named Ogam was fishing with a member of the 
royal family named Nyadwai. He caught a choice fish and the prince de-
manded he turn it over, but he refused. Later, when his fellow villagers sug-
gested this was unwise, he pointed out there were dozens of princes, and 
belittled Nyadwai: “who would ever elect him king?”
 Some years later, he learned Nyadwai had indeed been elected king. 
 Sure enough he was summoned to court but the king’s behavior ap-
peared entirely forgiving. “The king gave him cattle; built him a village; he 
married a woman, and his village became large; he had many children.” 
 Then one day, many years later, the King destroyed the village and 
killed them all. (Westermann 1912: 141)
Here, we have an example of a king trying to play god in every sense of the 
term. Such a king appears arbitrary, vindictive, all-powerful in an almost bibli-
cal sense. If one examines it in the context of Shilluk institutions, however, it 
begins to look rather different. Ordinarily, Shilluk kings did not even have the 
power to appoint or remove village chiefs. In the complete absence of any sort 
of administrative apparatus, their power was almost entirely personal: Nyadwai 
created and destroyed Ogam’s village using his own personal resources, his own 
herd of cattle, his own personal band of retainers. If he had tried to exterminate 
the lineage of a real village chief, not one he had made up, he would likely have 
found himself in very serious trouble. What’s more, a reth’s power in fact was 
almost entirely dependent on his physical presence. 
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Here’s another story, about the death of that same bad king Nyadwai, here 
seen as having getting his commeupance for taking such high-handed behavior 
altogether too far:
 Story 2: There was once a cruel king, who killed many of his subjects, “he 
even killed women.” His subjects were terrified of him. One day, to demon-
strate that his subjects were so afraid they would do anything he asked, he 
assembled the Shilluk chiefs and ordered them to wall him up inside a house 
with a young girl. Then he ordered them to let him out again. They didn’t. So 
he died. (Westermann 1912: 175; cf. P. P. Howell n.d. SAD 69/2/57)8
The story might even serve as a story of the origin of ritual regicide, though it 
isn’t explicitly presented as such, since this was precisely the way kings were said 
to have originally been put to death. They were walled in a hut with a young 
maiden.9 
Stories like these help explain a peculiar confusion in the literature on Shilluk 
kingship. Nineteenth-century travelers, and many twentieth-century observers, 
insisted the reth was an absolute despot wielding complete and arbitrary power 
over his subjects. Others—most famously Evans-Pritchard (1948)—insisted 
that he was for most effective purposes a mere symbolic figurehead who “reigned 
but did not govern,” and had almost no systematic way to impose his will on 
ordinary Shilluk. Both were right. As divine king, reths were expected to make 
displays of absolute, arbitrary violence, but the means they had at their disposal 
were extremely limited. Above all, they found themselves checked and stymied 
whenever they tried to transform those displays into anything more systematic. 
True, as elsewhere, these displays of arbitrariness were, however paradoxically, 
seen as closely tied to the reth’s ability to dispense justice: nineteenth-century 
reths could spend days on end hearing legal cases, even if, under ordinary cir-
cumstances, they were lacking in the means to enforce decisions and appear to 
have acted primarily as mediators.
8. Though we should probably make note of the denouement, at least according to 
Westermann: they elected a new king, who promptly accused them of murder and 
killed them all. It’s only Howell’s notebook that gives his name.
9. The custom was discontinued, it was said, when once the maiden died first, and the 
king complained so loudly about the stink that they agreed from then on to switch 
to suffocation (C. G. Seligman 1911: 222; C. G. Seligman and B. Z. Seligman 
1932: 91–92; Westermann 1912: 136; Hofmayr 1925: 300).
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Evans-Pritchard was writing in the 1940s, at a time when displays of arbi-
trary violence on the part of a reth would have been treated as crimes by colonial 
police, and when the royal office had become the focus of Shilluk national iden-
tity and resistance. So he had every reason to downplay such stories of brutali-
ty.10 Indeed, in his lecture, they are simply ignored. Nonetheless, they are crucial; 
not only for the reasons already mentioned, but also because, under ordinary 
circumstances, the arbitrary violence of the king was central in constituting that 
very sense of national identity. To understand how this can be, though, we must 
turn to another part of Sudan during a more recent period during which the 
police have largely ceased to function.
The Shilluk as seen from Equatoria
Here let me turn to the work of Dutch anthropologist Simon Simonse on rain-
makers among a belt of peoples (the Bari, Pari, Lulubo, Lotuho, Lokoya, et al.) 
in the furthest South Sudan. Rainmakers are important figures throughout the 
area, but their status varies considerably. Some have (at one time or another) 
managed to make themselves into powerful rulers; others remain marginal fig-
ures. All of them are liable to be held accountable in the event that (as often 
happens in the southern Sudan) rain does not fall. In fact, Simonse, and his 
colleague, Japanese anthropologist Eisei Kurimoto, are perhaps unique among 
anthropologists in being in the vicinity when these events actually happened.11
What Simonse describes (reviewing over two dozen case studies of histori-
cally documented king-killings) is a kind of tragic drama, in which the rain-
maker and people come to gradually define themselves against each other. If 
10. In a broader sense, he was doubtless aware that the colonial perception of Africa 
as a place of arbitrary violence and savagery had done much greater violence to 
Africans—that is, justified much worse atrocities—than any African king had ever 
done. This is the reason most contemporary Africanists also tend to avoid these 
stories. But it seems to me there’s nothing to be gained by covering things up: 
especially since the actual arbitrary violence performed by most African kings was 
in fact negligible or even completely imaginary (what mattered were the stories), 
and even those who even came close to living up to Euro-American stereotypes, 
like Shaka or Mutesa, killed far fewer of their own subjects than most European 
kings during the period before they became figureheads.
11. If nothing else, one can say the question “Do they really kill their kings?” can now 
be said to be definitively resolved; though, at the same time, it is also clear that it is 
the least powerful of these figures who are the most likely to fall victim. 
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rains are delayed, the people, led by the chief warrior age grade, will petition 
the rainmaker, make gifts, rebuild his residence, or reinstate taxes or customs 
that have fallen into abeyance so as to win back his favor. If the rain contin-
ues not to fall, things become tense. The rainmaker is increasingly assumed to 
be withholding the rains, and perhaps unleashing other natural disasters, out 
of spite. The rainmaker will attempt stalling techniques (blaming others, sac-
rificial rituals, false confessions); if he is also a powerful ruler, the young men’s 
age-set will begin to rally more and more constituencies against him to the 
point where, finally, he must either flee or confront a community entirely united 
against him. The methods of killing kings, Simonse notes, tend to take on the 
gruesome forms they do—beatings to death, burials alive—because these are 
ways in which everyone could be said to have been equally responsible. It is the 
community as a whole that must kill the king. Indeed, it only becomes a unified 
community—“the people,” properly speaking—in doing so: since the creation 
and dispatching of rainmakers is about the only form of collective action in 
which everyone participates. All this is, perhaps, what a Girardian would pre-
dict, except that, far from being the solemn sacrificial rituals with willing victims 
that Girard imagines, king-killings more resembled lynch mobs, and rainmak-
ers fought back with every means at their disposal. This was especially true if 
they held political power. Often one hears of a single lonely, armed rainmaker 
holding off an entire incensed population. During a famine between 1855 and 
1859, for instance, one Bari king who had acquired a rifle (no one else had one) 
used it on three separate occasions to disperse crowds assembled to kill him. In 
1860, one of his subjects told a French traveler:
We asked Nyiggilo to give us rain. He made promises and demanded cattle 
as a payment. Despite his spells the rain did not come. So we got angry. Then 
Nyiggilo took his rifle and threatened to kill everybody. We had to leave him be. 
Last year the same thing happened for a third time: then we lost patience. We 
slit Nyiggilo’s stomach open and threw him into the river: he will no longer make 
fun of us. (Simonse 1992: 204)
It is easy to see why rainmakers in this context might wish to acquire a monop-
oly on firearms, or to develop a loyal personal entourage. In fact, Simonse argues 
that, throughout the region, when state-like forms did emerge, it was typically 
when rainmakers, caught in an endless and very dangerous game of bluffing and 
brinksmanship with their constituents, successfully sought means to reinforce 
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their position: by intermarrying with neighboring kings, allying themselves with 
foreign traders, establishing trade and craft monopolies, building up a perma-
nent armed following, and so on—all in way of ensuring that, when things next 
came to a showdown, they would be more likely to survive (2005: 94–97).
In such polities, “the people,” insofar as such an entity could be said to have 
existed, was seen essentially as the king’s collective enemy. Simonse (1992: 193–
95) records several striking instances of European explorers encountering kings 
in the region who urged them to open fire into crowds or to carry out raids 
against enemy villages, only to discover that the “enemies” in question were re-
ally their own subjects. In other words, kings often really would take on the role 
attributed to them in rain dramas: of spitefully unleashing arbitrary destruction 
on the people they were supposed to protect. 
Simonse compares the opposition between king and people with the seg-
mentary opposition between lineages or clans described by Evans-Pritchard 
among the Nuer (ibid.: 27–30), where each side exists only through defining 
itself against the other. This opposition too is necessarily expressed by at least the 
potential for violence. It might seem strange to propose a segmentary opposition 
between one person and everybody else, but if one returns to Evans-Pritchard’s 
actual analysis of how the Nuer segmentary system works, it makes a certain 
degree of sense. Evans-Pritchard (1940) stressed that in a feud, when clan or lin-
eage A sought to avenge itself on clan or lineage B, any member of lineage B was 
fair game. They were treated, for political purposes, as identical. In fact, this was 
Evans-Pritchard’s definition of a “political” group—one whose members were 
treated as interchangeable in relation to outsiders.12 If so, the arbitrary violence of 
divine kings—firing randomly into crowds, bringing down natural disasters—is 
the perfect concrete expression of what makes a people a people—an undifferen-
tiated, therefore political, group. All of these peoples—Bari, Pari, Lolubo, etc.—
became peoples only in relation to some particularly powerful rainmaker; and 
owing to the rise and fall of reputations, political boundaries were always in flux.
Simonse’s analysis strikes me as important. True, in the end, he does appear 
to fall into a Girardian framework (this may well be unavoidable, considering the 
nature of his material), seeing scapegoat dramas as the primordial truth behind 
12. So today, an American citizen might be so little regarded by her own government 
that she is kicked out of hospitals while seriously ill or left to starve on the street; 
if, however, she then goes on to be killed by the agent of a foreign government, an 
American has been killed and it will be considered cause for war. 
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all politics. So he can say that ritual king-killing of the Shilluk variety can be best 
seen a kind of compromise, an attempt to head off the constant, unstable drama 
between king and people by institutionalizing the practice,13 while the state, with 
its monopoly on force, is an attempt to eliminate the drama entirely (Simonse 
2005). Myself, I would prefer to see the kind of violence he describes not as some 
kind of revelation of the essential nature of society, but as a revelation of the es-
sential nature of a certain form of political power with cosmic pretensions—one 
by no means inevitable, but which is very much still with us today. 
Three propositions
The core of my argument in this essay boils down to three propositions. It might 
be best to lay them out at this point, before returning to the Shilluk material in 
more detail. The first I have already outlined; the second is broadly inspired by 
Marshall Sahlins; the third is my own extrapolation from Simonse:
1. Divine kingship, insofar as the term can be made meaningful, refers not to 
the identification of rulers with supernatural beings (a surprisingly rare 
phenomenon),14 but to kings who make themselves the equivalent of gods—ar-
bitrary, all-powerful beings beyond human morality—through the use of arbi-
trary violence. The institutions of sacred kingship, whatever their origins, have 
typically been used to head off or control the danger of such forms of power, 
from which a direct line can be traced to contemporary forms of sovereignty. 
2. Sacred kingship can also be conceived as offering a kind of (tentative, im-
perfect) resolution for the elementary problematic of human existence pro-
posed in creation narratives. It is in this sense that Pierre Clastres (1977) was 
right when he said that state authority must have emerged from prophets 
13. It’s also important to note here that, as Schnepel emphasizes (1991: 58), the Shilluk 
king was not himself a rainmaker; rather, he interceded on the part of his subjects 
with Nyikang, who was responsible for the rains. 
14. As I mentioned earlier, the Egyptian Pharaoh is one of the few unambiguous 
examples. Another is the Nepali king. But the latter case makes clear that 
identification with a deity is not is in itself, necessarily, an indicator of divine 
kingship in my sense of the term. The Nepali king is identified with Vishnu, but this 
identification either originated or only came to be emphasized in the nineteenth 
century when the king lost most of his power to the prime ministers; it was, in fact, 
the token of what I’ve been calling sacred kingship, in which the king became too 
“set apart” from the world to actually govern.
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rather than chiefs, from the desire to find a “land without evil” and undo 
death; it is in this sense, too, that it can be said that Christ (the Redeemer) 
was a king, or kings could so easily model themselves on Christ, despite his 
lack of martial qualities. Here, in embryo, can we observe what I have called 
the utopian element of the state.
3. Violence, and more specifically antagonism, plays a crucial role here. It is a 
peculiar quality of violence that it simplifies things, draws clear lines where 
otherwise one might see only complex and overlapping networks of human 
relationship. It is the particular quality of sovereign power that it defines its 
subjects as a single people. This is, in the case of kingdoms, actually prior to 
the friend/enemy distinction proposed by Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005). Or, 
to be more specific, one’s ability to constitute oneself as a single people in a 
potential relation of war with other peoples is premised on a prior but usu-
ally hidden state of war between the sovereign and the people.
The Shilluk case, then, seems to be especially revealing, not, as I say, because it 
represents some primordial form of monarchy, but because—in the attempt to 
build something like a state in the absence of any real administrative appara-
tus—these mechanisms are unusually transparent. I suspect the reality behind 
divine kingship is also unusually easy to make out here because of the particular 
nature of Nilotic cosmology, and, most notably, Nilotic conceptions of God, 
who manifests himself in mortal life almost exclusively through disaster. One 
consequence is a peculiar relation between the transcendent and utopian ele-
ments, where it is the hostility of the people that makes the king a transcendent 
being capable of offering a kind of resolution to the dilemmas of mortal life.15
A BRIEF OUTLINE OF SHILLUK HISTORY
The Shilluk are something of an anomaly among Nilotic people. Most Nilotes 
have long been seminomadic pastoralists, for whom agriculture was very much 
15. Though, as we shall see in the last chapter, the scenario where kings vanish and 
become immortal gods at precisely the moment when their subjects betray or 
express hostility to them traces back at least to Semiramis, the mythic queen of 
Assyria, and is commonplace throughout East Africa. One theme of this volume—
my own contributions to it anyway—is precisely the relation between antagonism 
and transcendence, which appears to be structural. 
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a secondary occupation. Famed for their fierce egalitarianism, their social life 
revolves largely around their herds. The Shilluk are not entirely different—like 
Nuer and Dinka, they tend to see their lives as revolving around cattle—but 
in practice they have, for the last several centuries at least, become far more 
sedentary, having been fortunate enough to find themselves a particularly fertile 
stretch of the White Nile that has allowed intensive cultivation of durra, a local 
grain. The result was a population of extraordinary density. By the early nine-
teenth century there were estimated to be around two hundred thousand Shil-
luk, living in some hundred settlements arranged so densely along the Nile that 
foreigners often described the 200 miles of the heart of Shilluk territory as if it 
consisted of one continuous village. Many remarked it appeared to be the most 
densely settled part of Africa outside of Egypt itself (Mercer 1971; Wall 1975). 
“Fortunate,” though, might seem an ill-chosen word here, since, owing to 
the density of population, a bad harvest could lead to devastating famine. One 
solution was theft. Lacking significant trade-goods, the Shilluk soon became 
notorious raiders, attacking camps and villages for hundreds of miles in all di-
rections and hauling off cattle and grain and other spoils. By the seventeenth 
century, the 300-mile stretch of the Nile north of the Shilluk country, unsuit-
able for agriculture, was already known as their “raiding country,” where small 
fleets of Shilluk canoes would prey on caravans and cattle camps. Raids were 
normally organized by settlement chiefs. The Shilluk reth appears to have been 
just one player in this predatory economy, effectively one bandit chief among 
many, and not even necessarily the most important, since while he received the 
largest share of booty, his base was in the south, closer to the pastoral Dinka 
rather than to the richer prey to the north (Mercer 1971: 416). Nonetheless, the 
reth acquired a great deal of cattle and used it to maintain a personal entourage 
of Bang Reth, or “king’s men,” who were his principal retainers, warriors, and 
henchmen.
Actually, it’s not clear if there was a single figure called the “reth” at all in 
the early seventeenth century, or whether the royal genealogies that have come 
down to us just patched together a series of particularly prominent warriors.16 
The institutions of “divine kingship” that have made the Shilluk famous appear 
to have been created by the reths listed on most royal genealogies as number 
16. Frost (1974: 187–88) suggests the institution might ultimately derive from military 
leaders referred to as bany, who, at least among the neighboring Dinka, also have 
rainmaking responsibilities.
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nine and ten: Tokot (c. 1670–90), famous for his conquests among the Nuba 
and Dinka, and, even more, his son Tugo (c. 1690–1710), who lived at a time 
when Shilluk successes had been reversed and the heartland itself was under 
attack by the Dinka. Tugo is said to have been the first to create a permanent 
royal capital, at Fashoda,17 and to create its shrines and famous rituals of in-
stallation (Ogot 1964; Mercer 1971; Frost 1974; Wall 1975; Schnepel 1990: 
114). Ogot was the first to suggest that Tugo effectively invented the sacred 
kingship, fastening on the figure of Nyikang—probably at that time just the 
mythic ancestor of local chiefly lines—and transforming him into a legendary 
hero around which to rally a Shilluk nation that was, effectively, created by 
his doing so. Most contemporary historians have now come around to Ogot’s 
position.
There is another way to look at these events. What happened might well be 
considered a gender revolution. In most Nilotic societies, matters of war (hence 
politics) are organized through male age-sets. By the time we have ethnograph-
ic information, Shilluk age-sets seem to have long since been marginalized (P. P. 
Howell 1941: 56–66).18 Instead, political life had come to be organized around 
the reth in Fashoda, and Fashoda, in turn, was a city composed almost entirely 
of women. 
How did this happen? We do not precisely know. But we do know that at 
the time Fashoda was founded, the status of women in politics was under open 
contestation. Tugo’s reign appears to have been proceeded by that of a queen, 
Abudok, Tokot’s sister.19 According to one version of the story (Westermann 
17. The name is an Arabization of its real name, Pachod. It is, incidentally, not the same 
as the “Fashoda” of the famous “Fashoda crisis” that almost brought war between 
Britain and France in 1898, since “Fashoda” in this case is—however confusingly—
an Arabization of the name of a rather desultory mercantile town called Kodok 
outside Shilluk territory to the north. 
18. Among the eastern Nilotic societies considered by Simonse, the chief warrior 
age-set was also responsible for representing the people against, and ultimately, if 
necessary, killing, the king. Among the Shilluk, this role seems to have been passed 
to royal women.
19. Actually, it is not entirely clear when Abudok ruled. Some genealogies leave her 
out entirely. Hofmayr places her before Tokot, and this has become the generally 
accepted version. Westermann (1912: 149–50) is ambiguous but appears to agree; 
however, his version also seems to make her the founder of Fashoda, which should 
place her closer to the time of Tugo, and elsewhere, in his list of kings (ibid.: 135), 
he places Abudok after Tokot. Crazzolara (1950: 136, n. 4) insists that she ruled 
after Tokot, as regent while Tugo was still a child. Howell’s unpublished notes call 
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1912: 149–50), after Abudok had reigned for some years, the settlement chiefs 
informed her she would have to step down because they did not wish to be ruled 
by a woman; she responded by naming a young man in her care—Tugo—as her 
successor, and then, proceeded to the site of Fashoda with a bag of lily seeds to 
warn that henceforth the royal lineage would grow larger and larger until it en-
gulfed the country entirely. This is usually interpreted as a spiteful prophecy, but 
it could just as easily be read as a story about the foundation of Fashoda itself 
(an act usually attributed to her former ward Tugo) and a sober assessment of 
the likely results of the institutions that developed there.
Later oral traditions (P. P. Howell n.d.: SAD 69/2/53–55) claim that Queen 
Abudok was responsible for “most of the Shilluk laws and customs” relating to 
the creation of reths.20 Could it be that the entire institution of what came to be 
known as “divine kingship” was really her creation, a compromise worked out 
when she placed Tugo on the throne? We cannot know. But certainly the com-
mon wisdom of contemporary historians that these institutions were simply 
the brainchild of Tugo cannot be correct: it is very difficult to imagine a ruler 
who decided entirely on his own accord to deny himself the right to name his 
own successor, or to grant his own wives the right to have him executed. What 
emerged could only have been some a kind of political compromise, one that 
ensured no woman ever again attempted to take the highest office (none did) 
but otherwise, granted an extraordinary degree of power to royal women.
Here is a list, in fact, of such powers:
1. Where most African kings lived surrounded by a hierarchy of male officials, 
these were entirely absent from Fashoda. The reth lived surrounded only 
by his wives, who could number as many as a hundred, each with her own 
dwelling. No other men were allowed to set foot in the settlement after 
nightfall (Riad 1959: 197). Since members of the royal clan could not marry 
each other (this would be incest), these wives were uniformly commoners.
2. The king’s senior wife seems to have acted as his chief minister, and had the 
power to hold court and decide legal cases in the reth’s absence (Driberg 
her Tokot’s sister, who took over on his death, but hid the identity of his male 
offspring (she dressed them up as girls—P. P. Howell n.d.: SAD 69/2/54–55).
20. This from an unpublished manuscript in the Howell papers; the customs listed 
specifically center on rituals surrounding the “discovery” and creation of the effigies 
of Nyikang and Dak. 
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1932: 420). She was also responsible for recruiting and supervising second-
ary wives.
3. In the absence of any administrative apparatus, royal women also appear to 
have become the key intermediaries between Fashoda and other communi-
ties. Essentially they played all the roles that court officials would otherwise 
play.
a. Royal wives who became pregnant returned in their sixth month to their 
natal villages, where their children were born and raised. They were, as the 
saying goes, “planted out” and allied themselves with a local commoner 
chief (Pumphrey 1941: 11), who became the patron of the young prince 
or princess. Those sons who were not eventually either elected to the 
throne or killed in internecine strife went on to found their own branches 
of the royal lineage, whose numbers, as Queen Abudok predicted, have 
tended to continually increase over the course of Shilluk history. 
b. Royal daughters remained in their mothers’ villages. They were referred 
to as “Little Queen” and “their counsel sought on all matters of impor-
tance” (Driberg 1932: 420). They were not supposed to marry or have 
children, but, in historical times at least, they became notorious for tak-
ing lovers as they wished—then, if they became pregnant, demanding 
hefty payments in cattle from those same lovers to hush the matter up 
(P. P. Howell 1953b: 107–8).21 
c. Princesses might also be appointed as governors over local districts 
(Hofmayr 1925: 71; Jackson in Frost 1974: 133–34), particularly if their 
brothers became king.
4. Royal wives who had borne three children, and royal widows, would retire 
to their natal villages to become bareth, or guardians of royal shrines (C. G. 
Seligman and B. Z. Seligman 1932: 77–78). It was through these shrines 
that the “cult of Nyikang” was disseminated.22 
5. While, as noted above, it was considered quite outrageous for a king to kill a 
woman, royal wives were expected to ultimately order the death of the king. 
21. They, not the fathers, remained in control of the offspring of such unions. Colonial 
sources (C. G. Seligman 1911: 218; Howell 1953b: 107–8) insisted that in the past, 
princesses who bore children would be executed along with the child’s father.
22. Another key medium for the spread of the cult of Nyikang appears to have 
been mediums loosely attached to the shrines, who had usually had no previous 
attachment to the court. According to Oyler (1918b: 288), these too were mainly 
women.
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A reth was said to be put to death when his physical powers began to fade—
purportedly, when his wives announced that he was no longer capable of sat-
isfying them sexually (C. G. Seligman 1911: 222; P. P. Howell and Thomson 
1946: 10). In some accounts (e.g., Westermann 1912: 136), the execution is 
carried out by the royal wives themselves.23 One may argue about the degree 
to which this whole scenario is simply an ideological façade, but it clearly 
happened sometimes: Hofmayr, for instance, writes of one king’s affection 
for his mother, “who had killed his father with a blow from a brass-ring” 
(1925: 127, in Frost 1974: 82).
I should emphasize here that Shilluk society was in no sense a matriarchy. 
While women held extraordinary power within the royal apparatus, that ap-
paratus was not in itself particularly powerful. The fact that the queen could 
render judicial judgments, for instance, is less impressive when one knows royal 
judgments were not usually enforced. Governance of day-to-day affairs seems 
to have rested firmly in the hands of male settlement chiefs, who were also in 
charge of electing a new king when the old one died. Village women also elected 
their own leaders, but these were much less important.24 Property passed in the 
male line. The reth himself continued to exercise predatory and sometimes brutal 
power through his personal retainers, occasionally raiding his own people as a 
mode of intervening in local politics. Nonetheless, that (divine, arbitrary) power 
seems to have been increasingly contained within a ritual apparatus where royal 
women played the central political role. 
Insofar as royal power became more than a sporadic phenomenon, insofar 
as it came to embed itself in everyday life, it was, apparently, largely through 
the agency of the bareth and their network of royal shrines, spread throughout 
Shillukland. Here, though, the effects could hardly be overestimated. The figure 
of Nyikang, the mythic founder of the nation, came to dominate every aspect of 
ritual life—and to become the very ground of Shilluk social being. Where other 
Nilotic societies are famous for their theological speculation, and sacrifice—the 
23. Charles and Brenda Seligman (1932: 91) say there were two versions of how this 
happens: in one, the wives strangle the king themselves; in the other, they lay a 
white cloth across his face and knees as he lies asleep in the afternoon to indicate 
their judgment to the male Ororo who actually kill him. They believed the latter to 
be older.
24. Oyler says they acted as “magistrates,” but their jurisdiction was limited to disputes 
between women (1926: 65–66).
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primary ritual—is there dedicated to God and cosmic spirits, here everything 
came to be centered on the “cult of Nyikang.” This was true to such a degree that 
by the time Seligman was writing (1911; C. G. Seligman and B. Z. Seligman 
1932), outside observers found it difficult to establish what Shilluk ideas about 
God or lineage ancestors even were. To give some sense of the “cult’s” perva-
siveness: while Nuer and Dinka who fell ill typically attributed their condition 
to attack by “air spirits,” and sought cures from mediums possessed by such 
spirits, most Shilluk appear to have assumed they were being attacked by for-
mer kings—most often, Nyikang’s aggressive son Dak—and sought the aid of 
mediums possessed by Nyikang himself (C. G. Seligman and B. Z. Seligman 
1932: 101–2). While most ordinary Shilluk, as we shall see, assiduously avoided 
the affairs of living royalty, dead ones soon came to intervene in almost every 
aspect of their daily lives.
The obvious historical question is how long it took for this to happen. Here, 
information is simply unavailable. All we know is that the figure of Nyikang did 
gradually come to dominate every aspect of Shilluk life. The political situation 
in turn appears to have stabilized by 1700 and remained stable for at least a 
century. By the 1820s, however, the Ottoman state began attempting to estab-
lish its authority in the region, and this coincided with a sharp increase in the 
demand for ivory on the world market. Arab merchants and political refugees 
began to establish themselves in the north of the country. Nyidok (reth from 
1845 to 1863) refused to receive official Ottoman envoys, but he kept up the 
Shilluk tradition of guaranteeing the safety of foreigners. Before long there were 
thousands of the latter, living in a cluster of communities around Kaka in the far 
north. Reths responded by creating new trade monopolies, imposing systematic 
taxes, and trying to create a royal monopoly on firearms.25 They do not appear 
to have been entirely unsuccessful. Foreign visitors at the time certainly came 
away under the impression they had been dealing with a bona fide monarch, 
with at least an embryonic administration. At the same time, some also reported 
northerners openly complaining it would be better to live without a reth at all 
(Mercer 1971: 423–24). 
The situation ended catastrophically. As the ivory trade was replaced by the 
slave trade, northern Shilluk increasingly signed up as auxiliaries in Arab raids 
25. Already in the 1840s, foreign sources begin speaking of an annual tribute in 
cattle and grain, sometimes estimated at 10 percent (Frost 1974: 176). This seems, 
however, to have only been an early- to mid-nineteenth-century phenomenon.
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on the Dinka; by 1861, a foreign freebooter named Mohammed Kheir thus 
managed to spark a civil war that allowed them to sack Fashoda and carry out 
devastating slave raids against the Shilluk heartland (Kapteijns and Spauding 
1982: 43–46; Udal 1998: 474–82). There followed some forty years of almost 
continual warfare. The north battled the south; first the Ottoman regime, then 
the Mahdist regime in Khartoum, then finally the British intervened, trying 
to establish client governments; several reths were executed as rebels against 
one side or the other; Shilluk herds were decimated and the overall population 
fell by almost half. In 1899 British rule was established, Shilluk territory was 
restricted and those outside it were resettled, and the reth was reduced to the 
usual tax-collector and administer of local justice under a system of indirect 
colonial rule. At the same time, the royal installation ritual, which had fallen 
into abeyance during the civil wars, was revived and probably reinvented, and 
royal institutions, along with the figure of Nyikang, became, if anything, even 
more important as symbols of national identity—as, indeed, they remain to the 
present day. 
Today, the position of the reth remains, but, like the Shilluk themselves, just 
barely. The tiny Shilluk kingdom is unfortunate enough to be located precisely 
on the front-lines of a civil war between largely Nuer and Dinka rebels and 
government-supported militias. Ordinary Shilluk have been victims of massa-
cres, famines, massive out-migration, and forced assimilation, to the extent that 
at times some (e.g., Nyaba 2006) have argued there is a real danger of cultural 
or even physical extinction. 
MYTHO-HISTORY
A word on Nilotic cosmologies
In order to understand the famous Shilluk installation rituals, we must first 
examine their mythic framework. This is somewhat difficult, since, as almost all 
early observers point out, their Shilluk informants—much unlike their Nuer 
and Dinka equivalents—were not much given to cosmological speculation. In-
stead, everything was transposed onto the level of historical epic. Still, in either 
case, it would appear the same themes were working themselves out, so it seems 
best to begin by looking at Nilotic cosmologies more generally.
Nilotic societies normally treat God as a force profoundly distant and re-
moved from the human world. Divinity itself is rendered little or no cult, at 
90 ON KINGS
least not directly. Instead Divinity is usually seen to be “refracted” through the 
cosmos, immanent particularly in storms, totemic spirits, numinous objects, or 
anything inexplicable and extraordinary. In one sense, then, God is everywhere. 
In another, he is profoundly absent. Creation stories almost invariably begin 
with a traumatic separation. Here is one typical, Dinka version.26 
Divinity (and the sky) and men (and the earth) were originally contiguous; the 
sky then lay just above the earth. They were connected by a rope. . . . By means of 
this rope men could clamber at will to Divinity. At this time there was no death. 
Divinity granted one grain of millet a day to the first man and woman, and thus 
satisfied their needs. They were forbidden to grow or pound more.
 The first human beings, usually called Garang and Abuk, living on earth 
had to take care when they were doing their little planting or pounding, lest a 
hoe or pestle should strike Divinity, but one day the woman “because she was 
greedy” (in this context any Dinka would view her “greed” indulgently) decided 
to plant (or pound) more than the permitted grain of millet. In order to do so she 
took one of the long-handled hoes (or pestles) which the Dinka now use. In rais-
ing this pole to pound or cultivate, she struck Divinity who withdrew, offended, 
to his present great distance from the earth, and sent a small blue bird (the colour 
of the sky) called atoc to sever the rope which had previously given men access to 
the sky and to him. Since that time the country has been “spoilt”, for men have to 
labour for the food they need, and are often hungry. They can no longer as before 
freely reach Divinity, and they suffer sickness and death, which thus accompany 
their abrupt separation from Divinity. (Lienhardt 1961: 33–34)
In some versions, human reproduction and death are introduced simultane-
ously: the woman needs to pound more grain specifically because she bears 
children and needs to feed her growing family. Always, the story begins with 
the rupture of an original unity. Once, heaven and earth were right next to each 
other; humans could move back and forth between them. Or: there was a rope, 
or tree, or vine, or some other means of passage between the two. As a result, 
people lived without misery, work, or death. God gave us what we needed. Then 
the connection was destroyed. 
26. One anomalous element has been eliminated: in this version, the cord ran parallel 
to the earth; in most, it is arranged vertically.
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Stories like this can be termed “Hesiodic” because, like Hesiod’s Prometheus 
story (or, for that matter, the story of the Garden of Eden), they begin with 
blissful dependency—humans being supplied whatever they need from a benev-
olent creator—to an unhappy autonomy, in which human beings eventually win 
for themselves everything they will need to grow and cook food, bear and raise 
children, and otherwise reproduce their own existence, but at a terrible cost. It 
does not take a lot of imagination to see these, first and foremost, as metaphors 
of birth; the loss of the blissful dependency of the womb, which the cutting of 
the cord, in the Nilotic versions, simply makes unusually explicit. 
The problem is that once separation is introduced into the world, conjunction 
can only mean catastrophe. Now, when Divinity, as absolute, universal principle, 
manifests itself in worldly life, it can only take the form of floods, plagues, light-
ning, locusts, and other catastrophes. Natural disasters are, after all, indiscrimi-
nate; they affect everyone; thus, like the indiscriminate violence of divine kings, 
they can represent the principle of universality. But if God is the annihilation of 
difference, sacrifice—in Nilotic society the archetypal ritual—is its re-creation. 
The slaughter and division of an animal becomes a reenactment of the primal 
act of creation through separation; it becomes a way of expelling the divine 
element from some disastrous entanglement in human affairs by reestablishing 
everything in its proper sphere.27 This was accomplished through violence: or to 
be more explicit, through killing, blood, heat, fire, and the division of flesh. 
There is one way that Divinity enters the world that is not disastrous. This is 
rain. Rain—and water more generally—seen as a nurturant, essentially feminine 
principle, is often also treated as the only element through which humans can 
still experience some approximation of that primal unity. This is quite explicit 
in the southeastern societies studied by Simonse. The ancestors of rainmaking 
lines were often said to have emerged from rivers, only to be discovered by 
children minding cattle on the shore; in rituals, they re-created the vines that 
originally connected heaven and earth; they embody peace, coolness, fertilizing 
water (Simonse 1992: 409–11). Hence during important rainmaking rituals, 
communities must maintain a state of “peace” (edwar). Physical violence, drum-
ming, shouting, drunkenness, dancing, are all forbidden; even animals sacrificed 
27. So too, incidentally, with Vedic sacrifice, which reproduces the original creation of 
the world through the division of the body of a primordial being, or Greek sacrifice, 
which constantly re-created the divisions between gods, animals, and mortals. All 
these religious traditions appear to be historically related. 
92 ON KINGS
in rain ceremonies had to be smothered so no blood was spilled, and they had 
to be imagined to go to their deaths voluntarily, without resistance. The state 
was ended with a bloody sacrifice at the end of the agricultural season. Edwar, 
though, was simply an exaggerated version of the normal mode of peaceable, so-
ciable comportment with the community—within human, social space—since 
even ordinarily, hot, bloody, violent activity was exiled to the surrounding wil-
derness. This was true of hunting and war, but it was also true of childbirth (the 
paradigm of traumatic separation): women in labor were expected to resort to 
the bush, and, like returning hunters or warriors, had to be purified from the 
blood spilled before returning to their communities (ibid.: 412–16).
The legend of Nyikang
The human condition, then, is one of irreparable loss and separation. We have 
gained the ability to grow our own food, but at the expense of hunger; we have 
discovered sex and reproduction, but at the cost of death. We are being pun-
ished, but our punishment seems utterly disproportionate to our crimes. This is 
another element stressed by Godfrey Lienhardt, and another way in which the 
Nilotic material resonates with the Abrahamic tradition. None of Lienhardt’s 
informants claimed to understand why wishing to have a little more food was 
such a terrible crime. It is our fate as humans to have no real comprehension of 
our situation. If God is just, at the very least we do not understand in what way; 
if it all makes sense, we cannot grasp how. It’s possible that, ultimately, there 
simply is no justice. When God is invoked, in Nilotic languages—including 
Shilluk—it is ordinarily as an exclamation, “Why, God?,” above all when a loved 
one falls sick, with the assumption that no answer will be forthcoming.
Now, the Shilluk appear to be one of the few Nilotic peoples for whom such 
creation myths are not particularly important. The Shilluk past begins, instead, 
with a historical event: the exile of Nyikang from his original home. Still, one 
story is quite clearly a transposition of the other. Nyikang himself is the son 
of a king whose father descended from heaven.28 His mother Nyakaya was a 
crocodile, or perhaps part-crocodile: she continues to be revered as a divinity 
inhabiting the Nile.29 He is sometimes referred to as “child of the river.” 
28. In other versions, he traces back to a white or grey cow, created by God in the Nile.
29. Charles and Brenda Seligman (1932: 87–88) describe her as the embodiment of 
the totality of riverine creatures and phenomena, and notes that the priestesses who 
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Originally, Nyikang and his brother Duwat lived in a faraway land by a great 
lake or river in the south.
They speak of it as the end of the earth, or some call it the head of the earth. . . . 
In that land death was not known. When a person became feeble through great 
age, he was thrown out in the cattle yard, or in the road near it, and the cows 
would trample him until he had been reduced to the size of an infant, and then 
he would grow to manhood again. (Oyler 1918a: 107)
Other versions gloss over this element—probably because the story that follows 
turns on a dispute over royal succession, and it is difficult to understand how 
this would come up if no one ever died. In some versions, the people are divided 
over whom to elect. In others, Nyikang is passed over in favor of his half-brother 
Duwat; he seizes some royal regalia and flees with his son Cal and a number of 
followers. Duwat follows in pursuit. In the end the two confront each other on 
either side of a great river. In some versions (Hofmayr 1925: 328), Duwat curses 
his brother to die, thus bringing death into the world. In others, he simply curs-
es him never to return. Always, though, the confrontation ends when Duwat 
throws a digging stick at his brother and tells him he can use it to dig the graves 
of his followers. Nyikang accepts it, but defiantly, announces he will use it as an 
agricultural implement, to give life, and that his people will thus reproduce to 
overcome the ravages of death (ibid.; Oyler 1918a: 107–8; Westermann 1912: 
167; Lienhardt 1979: 223; P. P. Howell n.d.: SAD 69/2/41–42). 
Obviously, this is just another version of the creation story: the loss of a 
blissful deathless paradise where people were nonetheless permanently infanti-
lized by their dependence on higher powers (in this version, arguing over suc-
cession to the kingship when the king in fact will never die). Even the dig-
ging stick reappears. This is a story of loss, but—as in so many versions of this 
myth—also a defiant declaration of independence. Nyikang’s followers create a 
kind of autonomy by acquiring the means to reproduce their own life. Turning 
the symbol of death into an instrument of production is thus a perfect metaphor 
for what is happening.
maintain royal shrines also maintain her cult. Offerings to her are left on the banks 
of the Nile. She is also the goddess of birth. When river creatures act in unusual 
ways, they are assumed to be acting as her vehicle; when land ones do the same, they 
are assumed to be vehicles of Nyikang.
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Nyikang’s first sojourn is at a place called Turra, where he marries the 
daughter of the local ruler Dimo and has a son, the rambunctious and unruly 
Dak. Conflicts soon develop, and there are a series of magical battles between 
Nyikang and his father-in-law, which Nyikang always wins. Dak grows up to 
become a scourge of the community, attacking and pillaging at will. Finally, the 
entire community joins together to kill him. They decide they will sneak up on 
him while he’s relaxing outside playing his harp. According to Riad’s informant, 
“They were very afraid that Nyikang would avenge his son’s death if only a few 
people murdered Dak, so they decided that all of them would spear him and 
his blood would be distributed upon all of them” (1959: 145). In other words, 
having been victims of arbitrary predatory violence, they adopt the same logic 
Simonse describes in the killing of sacred kings. “The people” as a whole must 
kill him. In this case, however, they do not succeed. Nyikang (or in some ver-
sions Dak) receives advance warning, and comes up with the idea of substituting 
an effigy made of a very light wood called ambatch, which he places in Dak’s 
stead. The people come and one by one spear what they take to be the sleeping 
Dak. The next day, when the real, live Dak appears at what is supposed to be 
his own funeral, everyone panics and runs away (Westermann 1912: 159; Oyler 
1918a: 109; Hofmayr 1925: 16; Crazzolara 1951: 123–27; P. P. Howell n.d.: 
SAD 69/2/47). 
This is a crucial episode. While neither Nyikang nor Dak is, at this point, a 
king (they are both later to become kings), the story is clearly a reference to the 
logic described by Simonse: that both king and people come into being through 
the arbitrary violence of the former, and the final, unified retaliation of the lat-
ter. At the same time it introduces the theme of effigies. Nyikang and Dak are, 
indeed, immortalized by effigies made of ambatch wood, kept in a famous shrine 
called Akurwa, north of Fashoda. These play a central role in the installation of a 
new reth, and, since Evans-Pritchard at least, have been seen as representing the 
eternity of the royal office, as opposed to the ephemeral nature of any particu-
lar human embodiment. Here the first effigy is created literally as an attempt 
to cheat death. Even more, as we’ll see, it seems to reflect a common theme 
whereby the people’s anger and hostility—however paradoxically—becomes the 
immediate cause of the king’s transcendence of mortal status.
To return to the story: Nyikang, Dak, and their small band of followers de-
cide the time has come to move on and seek more amenable pastures. They have 
various adventures along the way. During their travels, Dak serves as Nyikang’s 
advance guard and general, often getting himself in scrapes from which Nyikang 
95THE DIVINE KINGSHIP OF THE SHILLUK
then has to rescue him. The most famous is his battle with the Sun, in which 
Nyikang again confirms his aquatic character. Dak is the first to pick a fight 
with the Sun, and at first, he and his father’s followers are scorched by the Sun’s 
terrible heat, forcing Nyikang to revive many by sprinkling water over them. In 
the end Nyikang manages to best the enemy by using water-soaked reeds to 
slash—and thus “burn”—the legs of the Sun, who is thereby forced to retreat 
(Westermann 1912: 161, 166; Oyler 1918a: 113–14; Hofmayr 1925: 18, 55; see 
Lienhardt 1952: 149; Schnepel 1988: 448). Finally, he enters Shillukland, settles 
his followers, brings over existing inhabitants, even—in many stories—discov-
ering humans masquerading as animals and revealing their true nature, and 
turning them into Shilluk clans. 
The latter is actually a curious element in the story. Godfrey Lienhardt 
(1952) insisted that, unlike Nuer or Dinka heroes, who, as ancestors, created 
their people as the fruit of their loins, Nyikang creates the Shilluk as an “intel-
lectual” project. He discovers, transforms, gives names, grants roles and privileg-
es, establishes boundaries, gathers together a diverse group of unrelated people 
and animals, and renders them equal parts of a single social order. This is true, 
though putting it this way rather downplays the fact that he does so through 
right of conquest: that is, that he appears amidst a population of strangers who 
have never done anything to hurt him and threatens to kill them if they do 
not do his will.30 It is not as if this sort of behavior was considered acceptable 
conduct by ordinary people under ordinary circumstances. In most stories, the 
figure of Nyikang is saved from too close an association with unprovoked ag-
gression by effectively being redoubled. He plays the largely intellectual role, 
solving problems, wielding magic, devising rules and status, while the sheer ar-
bitrary violence is largely pushed off onto his son and alter ego, Dak. In the 
Shilluk heartland, especially, Nyikang is always described as “finding” people 
who fell from the skies or were living in the country or fishing in the river, and 
30. I will return to this point later. Of course, one could argue that this sort of behavior 
was considered legitimate in dealing with strangers: Shilluk were notorious raiders, 
and were in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries apparently not above acts of 
treachery when dealing with Arabs or other foreigners in the “raiding country”—for 
instance, offering to ferry caravans across the Nile and then attacking, robbing, or 
even massacring them. (At the same time, foreigners who entered Shillukland itself 
were treated with scrupulous courtesy and guaranteed the safety of their persons 
and property.) Still, as we will see, ordinary Shilluk tended to rankle most of all at 
attempts to turn predatory violence into systematic power, which is exactly what 
Nyikang was doing here.
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assigning them a place and a ritual task (to help build the some house or shrine, 
to herd Nyikang’s sacred cattle, to supply the king with certain delicacies, etc.). 
Only in the case of people who transform themselves into animals—fish, turtles, 
fireflies, et al.—does he usually have to call in Dak, to net or spear or otherwise 
defeat them, whereon they ordinarily turn back into human beings and submit 
themselves. Submission is what renders people Shilluk (the actual word, Chollo, 
merely means subjects of the reth).31 Though in a larger sense, intellectual under-
standing and physical conquest are conflated here; the stories of shape-shifters 
are paradigmatic: one can only tell what they really are by successfully defeating, 
even skewering them—by literally pinning them down. 
For all this, Nyikang’s conquest of Shillukland, however, remains curiously 
unfinished. The myths specify that he managed to subdue the southern half 
of the country, up to about where the capital is now. After this things stalled, 
as the people, tired of war, begin to murmur and, increasingly, openly protest 
Nyikang’s leadership. Finally, at a feast held at the village of Akurwa (what is 
later to become his temple in Fashoda), Nyikang chides his followers, instructs 
them on how to maintain his shrine and effigy, and vanishes in a whirlwind of 
his own creation. 
Nyikang, all Shilluk insist, did not and could never die. He has become the 
wind, manifest in animals who behave in strange and uncharacteristic ways, 
birds that settle among crowds of people; he periodically comes, invisible, to 
inhabit one or another of his many shrines (C. G. Seligman 1911: 220–26; 
1934; Westermann 1912: xlii; Oyler 1918b; Hofmayr 1925: 307; P. P. Howell 
and Thomson 1946: 23–24). Above all, he remains immanent in his effigies, 
and in the sacred person of the king. Yet in the story, his transcendence of 
the bonds of mortal existence follows his rejection by the people. Neither is 
this mere mumbling and discontent: some versions make clear there was at 
least the threat of actual rebellion. In one (Crazzolara 1951: 126), Nyikang 
is speared in the chest by an angry follower, though he survives. He then as-
sembles his people to announce his ascent. In every version, he is replaced by 
an effigy of ambatch, and remains as the vehicle of the prayers of his people, 
31. Westermann (1912: 127–34) summarizes the origins of seventy-four different 
clans. If one discounts the three royal lineages included, and the six for whom no 
origin is given, we find that forty-nine were descended from “servants” of Nyikang, 
six from “servants” of Dak, six of Odak, one of Tokot, and, most surprisingly, three 
from servants of Queen Abudok, the last royal figure to play this role—another 
testimony to her one-time importance. 
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as their intercessor before God. It is through Nyikang, for example, that the 
king appeals to God for rain (Schnepel 1991: 58–59). Though even here the 
relationship of animosity does not disappear. Unlike more familiar gods, who, 
by definition, can do no wrong, the hero continues to be the object of periodic 
anger and recrimination:
Their veneration of Nikawng does not blind their eyes to his faults. When a 
prayer has been offered to Nikawng, and the answer is not given, as had been 
hoped, the disappointed one curses Nikawng. That is true especially in the case of 
death. When death is approaching, they sacrifice to Nikawng and God, and pray 
that death may be averted. If the death occurs, the bereaved ones curse Nikawng, 
because he did not exert himself in their behalf. (Oyler 1918a: 285) 
This passage gains all the more power when one remembers that illness itself 
was often assumed to be caused by the attacks of royal spirits—most often, 
Dak—and that mediums possessed by the spirit of Nyikang were the most 
common curers. Yet in the end we must die, as Nyikang did not; his transcend-
ence of death resulted from, and perpetuates, a relation of permanent at least 
potential antagonism. 
In fact, it was not just Nyikang. None of the first four kings of Shillukland 
died like normal human beings. Each vanished, their bodies never recovered; all 
but the last were then replaced by an effigy. Nyikang was replaced by his timid 
elder son Cal, who disappeared in circumstances unknown; then by the impetu-
ous Dak, who vanished in yet another fit of frustration with popular grumbling 
over his endless wars of conquest; then, finally, by Dak’s son Nyidoro. 
Nyidoro, however, marks a point of transition. He vanished, but only after 
death. He was, in fact, murdered by his younger brother Odak, whereon his 
body magically disappeared. As a result, there was some debate over whether 
he merited a shrine and effigy at all, but in the end it was decided that he did.32 
32. An alternative version from Howell’s notes: 
   In the past Shilluk kings never died but flew in the air. Now then Odak flew 
in the air trying to go away (die), then one man saw him flying. He shouted 
“there he goes!” Odak came down and said to the people, from this date no one 
of your kings will go away again. They have to be buried, and this is the last 
chance of your king. Odak is the person who started the burial of Shilluk king. 





The Ororo The Royal Line
Duwat
Figure 1. The mythic origins of the Ororo and the Royal line.  
N.B.: solid arrows refer to rulers who, rather than dying, vanished and were replaced by 
effigies; the broken arrow refers to rulers who died but whose body vanished and was 
not replaced by an effigy.
If Nyidoro was the first king to die, his killer and successor, Odak, was the first 
to be ritually killed. This, however, was a consequence not of internal conflict (as 
in the case of his own usurpation), but of external warfare: Odak was defeated 
in a battle with the Dinka and the Fung. After witnessing the death of all of his 
sons except one, he threw Nyikang’s sacred spears in the river in a gesture of de-
spair, crying “Now all my sons are dead!” As one might imagine this greatly hurt 
the feelings of the one son who remained alive. This young man, named Duwat, 
had been often belittled by his father in the past, but this was the final straw. 
After promising his father he would degrade all those sons’ children to com-
moners, Duwat snatched one of the spears from the river and single-handedly 
routed the enemy (Hofmayr 1925: 66–68, 260–62). 
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Apparently, Odak was discreetly finished off soon afterwards, and when 
Duwat became king, one of his first acts was to degrade the descendants of his 
brothers to a lower status than the royal clan. They became the Ororo, excluded 
from succession, but who nonetheless play a key role in royal ritual.
The story began with a Duwat, and with this second Duwat, one might say 
the first round of the mythic cycle comes to an end. It begins with stories mod-
eled on birth and ends with stories of death: first, the nondeaths of Nyikang 
and Dak, rejected by their subjects; then, establishing the two typical modes of 
putting an end to a particular holder of the royal office, that is, either through 
internal revolt (challenge by an ambitious prince) or being ritually put to death. 
The role of the Ororo is crucial. This is a class who represent a veritable insti-
tutionalization of this constitutive relation of hostility, and potential violence, on 
which the eternity of the kingdom is founded. Generally, the descendants of any 
prince who is not elected, should they grow numerous, become a named lineage 
within the royal clan, and the tomb of their princely ancestor becomes their line-
age shrine. All members of such lineages are considered royals. In theory, the king 
can degrade any of these branches to Ororo status by attempting to sneak into 
their lineage shrine at night and performing certain secret rites, but the shrines are 
guarded, and if the king in question is caught, the attempt is considered to have 
failed. Some (e.g., Crazzolara 1951: 139) suggest that one reason a king might 
wish to demote a royal lineage in this fashion is that, since marriage is forbidden 
between royals, it is only by reducing a branch to Ororo status that a king can 
then take one of its daughters for his wife.33 One reth (Fadiet) is remembered for 
having tried to reduce the descendants of Nyadwai—the famous bad king—to 
Ororo status in this way, but he got caught and the lineage remained royal; it’s not 
clear if any king—that is, other than Duwat—has ever been successful (Hofmayr 
1925: 66; Pumphrey 1941: 12–13; P. P. Howell 1953a: 202). Most sources suggest 
none have—another dramatic reflection on the limited power of Shilluk kings.
Moreover, it is precisely this degraded nobility whose role it is to preside 
over the death of kings. Male members of the caste who accompany the king 
during ceremonies are sometimes referred to as the “royal executioners,” but 
here meaning not that they execute others on the king’s orders, but rather 
that it is they who are in charge of presiding over the execution of the king. 
A reth would always have a certain number of Ororo wives; it is they who are 
33. However, Charles and Brenda Seligman (1932: 48) say kings would only take 
Ororo wives if they were “unusually attractive,” since no child of an Ororo could 
ever become king. 
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expected to announce when he is sick or failing in his sexual powers; as we’ve 
seen, according to some, it is they who actually suffocate the king after the 
announcement (C. G. Seligman 1911: 222). In other versions, it is the male 
Ororo bodyguards, who also preside over his burial.34 All sources stress it is 
difficult to know anything for sure about such matters, about which discreet 
people knew better than to much inquire, and, doubtless, practices varied. The 
one thing all agreed, though, was it was critical that the king was constantly 
surrounded by those he had originally degraded, and who were eventually to 
kill him.
At this point we have reached historical times, which begin with the long 
and prosperous reign of King Bwoc, immediately followed by Tokot, Queen 
Abudok, and the historical creation of the sacred kingship at the end of the 
seventeenth century. Of this, we have already spoken.
* * *
Still, there is one last story worth telling before moving on. This is the story of 
the mar. The mar was some kind of talisman or element of royal regalia that had 
originally belonged to Nyikang. By the early twentieth century, no one quite 
remembered what it had been: a jewel of some kind, or perhaps a crystal, or a 
silver pot. According to some, it was a magical charm capable of assuring victory 
in war. According to others, it was a general token of prosperity and royal power 
(Hofmayr 1925: 72–75; Paul 1952). 
According to Dietrich Westermann (1912: 143–44), the mar was a silver 
pot that, waved in front of one’s enemies, caused them to flee the field of bat-
tle. Tokot employed it in many successful wars against the Shilluk’s neighbors, 
many of whom he incorporated into Shillukland, but eventually—a familiar 
scenario now—his followers grew tired of fighting far from their wives and 
families, and began to protest and refuse his orders. In a fit of pique, Tokot 
threw the mar into the Nile. Here the story fast-forwards about a half-century 
to the reign of Atwot (c. 1825–35), who is elected as a warrior-king on the 
behest of a cluster of settlements plagued by Dinka raiders. Atwot attempts to 
drive off the invaders but is defeated. So, in a bold move, he decides to retrieve 
34. In some versions, the Ororo men are responsible for killing the king “by surprise” if 
he is wounded in battle or grievously ill (Hofmayr 1925:178–80); the women kill 
him otherwise.
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the talisman. The king consults with the descendants of Tokot’s wives at his lin-
eage shrine, and, defying widespread skepticism, rows out with his companions 
to the place where the mar was lost, sacrificing three cows along the way, and 
dives to the bottom of the river. He remains underwater so long his companions 
think he has surely drowned, but after many hours, he returns with the genuine 
article. Atwot proceeds to raise an army, repels and then conquers the Dinka, 
and is victorious against all who stand in his path. However, before long, the 
same thing begins to happen. He is carried from conquest to conquest, but his 
warriors begin protesting the incessant wars, and finally Atwot too throws the 
pot back in the river in frustration. There have been no subsequent attempts to 
retrieve the mar.35 
The story seems to be about why the Shilluk kingdom never became an 
empire. It as if every time kings move beyond defending the home territory 
or conducting raids beyond its borders, every time they attempt to levy armies 
and begin outright schemes of conquest, they find themselves stymied by pro-
tests and passive resistance. To this the kings respond with passive aggression: 
vanishing in a huff, throwing precious heirlooms into the river. As we’ll soon 
see, the scene of the king sacrificing cows and then diving down into the river 
to find a lost object appears to be a reference to a stage in the inauguration 
ceremonies in which the candidate must find a piece of wood that will be made 
into new body of Nyikang. Yet here, instead of an image of eternity, the river 
becomes an image of loss. According to one source (Paul 1952), the mar was 
“the luck of the Shilluk,” now forever lost. It seems likely the debate over the 
nature of the mar reflected a more profound debate about whether military 
good fortune was always luck for the Shilluk as a whole—a question on which 
royal and popular perspectives are likely often to have differed sharply. And the 
fact that such arguments were said to be going on in the time of Tokot, in the 
generation immediately before the creation of the institutions of sacred king-
ship, once again underlines how much debate there was at that time about the 
very purposes of royal power.
35. This sort of behavior was occasionally noted even in colonial times. According to 
P. P. Howell and W. P. G. Thomson (1946: 76), there used to be ceremonial drums 
kept in Fashoda for royal funerals with special guardians, until reth Fafiti, annoyed 




At this point we can return to those institutions themselves.
First of all, a word about the role of violence. Godfrey Lienhardt (1952) in-
sists Nyikang (and, hence, the king) has to be seen only as a continuation of the 
Shilluk conception of God. God is ordinarily seen as neither good nor evil; any-
thing extraordinary contains a spark of the divine; above all, God is the source of 
life, strength, and intelligence in the universe. Similarly, according to Lienhardt, 
Nyikang is the source of Shilluk custom, but not, necessarily, of a system of eth-
ics; and kings—who are referred to as “children of God”—were admired above 
all for their cleverness, and for the ruthless ingenuity with which they played 
the game of power.36 Royals regularly slaughtered their brothers and cousins in 
preemptive strikes; assassination and betrayal was normal and expected; suc-
cessful conspirators were admired. Lienhardt concludes that intelligence and 
success (the latter typically reflected in prosperity) are the main social values: 
“Kings, and all others inspired by juok [divinity], are sacred because they mani-
fest divine energy and knowledge, and they do so by being strong, cunning, and 
successful, as well as appearing to be in closer touch with the superhuman than 
ordinary men” (1952: 160; so too Schnepel 1988: 449). 
All of these ideas are definitely there in the source material, but taken in 
isolation this is a bit deceptive. The situation appears to have been rather more 
complicated. God was also spoken of as the source of justice, the last resort of 
the poor and unfortunate. The king of course dispensed justice as well. The ap-
parent paradox is, as I’ve emphasized, typical of divine kingship: the king, like 
God, stands outside any moral order in order to be able to bring one into being. 
Still, while a prince who successfully lured potential rivals to a feast and then 
massacred them all might be admired for his cunning, this was hardly the way 
ordinary people were expected to behave. Nothing in the literature suggests that 
if a commoner, or even a member of the royal clan who was not a prince, decided 
to act in a similar fashion to head off later quarrels over his father’s cattle, this 
would be regarded as anything but reprehensible—by the king (if the matter 
was brought before him) or by anybody else. It was, rather, as if ruthlessness 
36. Schnepel (1991) seems to agree with Lienhardt when he argues that the ingenious 
application of violence was valued in itself—or, at least, valued insofar as it was seen 
to contribute to the “vitality” of the Shilluk nation as a whole.
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of this sort was to be limited to the royal sphere, and the royal sphere carefully 
contained and delimited from ordinary life—in part for that very reason. 
Father Crazzolara, for instance, insists that this was precisely what the com-
moner chiefs (called Jago) who elected the king wanted: to ensure that every-
thing surrounding kings and princes remained shrouded in mystery, so that it 
had no effect on ordinary life. 
Disputes and intrigues among members of the royal family were known to exist 
and were shared by the great Jagos and their councilors, but seldom affected the 
people at large. . . . Strifes and murders in the higher social ranks were settled 
among the great men, in great secrecy, and could never imperil the unity of the 
country. (Crazzolara 1951: 129)
Indeed, he observed, most ordinary Shilluk would never have dreamed of ap-
proaching the royal residence at Fashoda, and when the king did set out on a 
journey, “most people used to go into hiding or keep out of his path; girls espe-
cially do so” (ibid.: 139). 
At the same time, the organization of the kingship those chiefs upheld, with 
no fixed rule of succession, but, rather, a year-long interregnum during which 
dozens of potential candidates were expected to jockey for position, plot and in-
trigue against each other, more or less guaranteed that only very clever, and very 
ruthless, men could have much chance of becoming reth. It also guaranteed that 
the violence on which the royal office was founded on always remained explicit, 
that reths were never too far removed from the simple bandit-kings from which 
they were presumably descended. 
Everything is happening as if the reth’s subjects were resisting both the in-
stitutionalization of power, and the euphemization of power that seems to in-
evitably accompany it. Power remained predatory. Take, for example, the matter 
of tribute. The king’s immediate power was based in the Bang Reth, his personal 
retainers, a collection of men cut off from their own communities: orphans, 
criminals, madmen, prisoners taken in war. He provided them with cattle from 
his herds, along with ornaments and other booty; they minded his cattle, ac-
companied royal children, acted as spies, and accompanied him on raids against 
Arab or Dinka neighbors. They did not, however, collect tribute. According to 
one colonial source, there was no regular system for exacting tribute at all. In-
stead, the king would intervene in feuds between communities that had resisted 
his attempts at mediation:
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The Reths .  .  . were extremely rich in cattle. They acquired these largely in the 
following way. Whenever one settlement waged unjustified war upon another 
or refused repeatedly to obey his order, the Reth would raise as a “royal levy” 
the adjacent settlements, who would go and drive off the malefactors’ cattle and 
burn their villages. The strength of the levy would vary with the readily calculat-
able strength of the opposition but a good margin of safety would be allowed to 
ensure that the levy would win. It is said that such levies were in fact seldom re-
sisted, the victim being glad to save their skins at the cost of most of their cattle. 
The participants in the levy got a percentage of the cattle taken but the majority 
went to the Reth. (Pumphrey 1941: 12; cf. Evans-Pritchard 1948: 15–16)
Significantly, it was precisely in the 1840s, when Shilluk kings, emboldened by 
an alliance with foreign merchants, began trying to move beyond raiding and 
create a systematic apparatus for the extraction of tribute, that many ordinary 
Shilluk began to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the institution of kingship 
entirely, and to throw in their lot with a different set of predatory freebooters 
(Mercer 1971: 423–24). As it turned out, the results were catastrophic. The Arab 
slave-traders with whom they aligned themselves turned out to be far more 
ruthless and destructive than anything they had previously encountered. But 
the pattern remains clear. As in the stories about the mar, popular resistance 
appeared at exactly the point where royal power tried to move beyond mere 
predatory raiding, and to formally institutionalize itself. 
The kings’ rather unsavory retainers lived at the margins of Fashoda. Its 
center was composed of his own compound, and the houses of his wives. All 
sorts of dark rumors surrounded the place. According to Seligman’s account, 
quoted near-verbatim in The golden bough:
During the day the king surrounded himself with his friends and bodyguards, 
and an aspirant to the throne could hardly hope to cut his way through them 
and strike home. It was otherwise at night. For then the guards were dismissed 
and the king was alone in his enclosure with his favourite wives, and there was 
no man near to defend him except a few herdsmen, whose huts stood a little way 
off. The hours of darkness were therefore the season of peril for the king. It is 
said that he used to pass them in constant watchfulness, prowling round his huts 
fully armed, peeping into the blackest shadows, or himself standing silent and 
alert, like a sentinel on duty, in some dark corner. When at last his rival appeared, 
the fight would take place in grim silence, broken only by the clash of spears and 
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shields, for it was a point of honour with the king not to call the herdsmen to his 
assistance. (Frazer 1911a: 22; Fraser 1990: 200–201)
This was to become one of Frazer’s more famous romantic images, but in the 
original edition, it was immediately followed by a footnote explaining that 
Seligman also emphasized that “in the present day and perhaps for the whole 
of the historical period” succession by ritual combat “has been superseded by 
the ceremonial killing of the king” (Frazer 1911a: 22 n. 1). This would suggest 
we are not dealing with a Victorian fantasy here—or not only that—but with a 
Shilluk one, a legend about the ancient past.37 Even here things are confusing: 
Seligman also contradicts himself by simultaneously insisting (i.e., 1911: 222; 
also Hofmayr 1925: 175) that even in his own day, reths did tend to sleep during 
the day and keep armed vigil at night, and that the drowsy behavior of the reth, 
the one time he did meet one, would appear to confirm this. In fact, such stories 
seem to be typical of the mysteries surrounding royalty. Very few people knew 
what really went on at Fashoda, and everything concerning kings was tinged 
with doubt and peril.38 
All evidence suggests that, except perhaps during periods of civil unrest 
or when the reth had concrete evidence of some particular conspiracy, life in 
Fashoda was distinctly more relaxed. True, many observers do remark on the 
eerie quiet of the place, much in contrast with other Shilluk settlements. But 
this is for an entirely different reason: Fashoda was entirely lacking in children 
(e.g., Riad 1959: 197). As the reader will recall, not only was the settlement oc-
cupied almost entirely by women, the king’s wives were sent back to their natal 
37. Curiously, Evans-Pritchard (1948) ended up arguing exactly the opposite: that 
stories of ritual king-killing were the myth, and that in most cases one was really 
dealing with assassinations or rebellions. Mohammed Riad (1959: 171–77), 
however, went through all existing historical information and could only find two 
examples of important rebellions in all Shilluk history, only one of which was fully 
successful. Of twenty-six historical kings, he noted, fifteen “surely met their death 
in the ceremonial way” (ibid.: 176). Of the others, two were killed in war, three 
executed by the government in Khartoum, and six died of causes unknown. On 
the other hand, he includes the four known cases of murder by rival princes as 
ceremonial deaths, which does rather muddy the picture. At least it makes clear this 
did happen, but only rarely. 
38. On both sides: Hofmayr writes “at night he [the Reth] is awake and walks heavily 
armed around the village. His hand is full of spears and rifles. Whoever comes close 
to him is doomed” (1925: 175, in Schnepel 1991: 50).
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villages in order to give birth, and royal children were not raised in Fashoda. It 
was a place where there was sex, but no biological reproduction, no nursing, no 
child-rearing—but also, no old age, grave illness or natural death, since the king 
was not allowed to grow frail and pass away in the normal fashion, and his wives 
normally returned to their parents’ settlements before they grew very old. 
All of this very much recalls the villages described by Simonse further to the 
south, where birth and killing—or anything involving the spilling of blood—
were considered “hot,” violent, dangerous activities which should be kept en-
tirely outside the confines of inhabited space. Even sacrificed animals had to be, 
like the Shilluk reth, smothered so that no blood was spilled. These restrictions 
were especially severe during the agricultural season, since they were the key to 
ensuring rain. Rain, in turn, was the temporary restoration of that happy con-
junction of heaven and earth that was severed in the beginning of time. It seems 
hardly coincidental, then, that almost all of the reth’s ritual responsibilities in-
volved either presiding over ceremonies appealing to Nyikang to send the rains, 
or conducting harvest rituals (Oyler 1918b: 285–86; C. G. Seligman and B. Z. 
Seligman 1932: 80–82)—or even, that it was considered a matter of principle 
that the king and his wives did work at least a few symbolic fields, and followed 
the same agricultural cycles as everybody else (Riad 1959: 196).39 
These, at any rate, were the things that an ordinary Shilluk was likely to 
actually know about Fashoda. The overall picture seems clear. Fashoda was a 
little image of heaven. It was the closest one could come, in these latter days, 
to a restoration of the primal unity which preceded the separation of the earth 
and heaven. It was a place whose inhabitants experience neither birth nor death, 
although they do enjoy the pleasures of the flesh, ease and abundance (there 
was rumored to be a storehouse of plundered wealth and certain clans were 
charged with periodically bringing the reth tasty morsels), and also engaged in 
39. I might add here that many of the more exotic-seeming practices of the capital 
seem to be adopted from ordinary Shilluk practice. All women, for example, were 
expected to leave their husbands and return to their natal villages in the sixth month 
of pregnancy (C. G. Seligman and B. Z. Seligman 1932: 69)—though in the case of 
nonroyals, they returned with their baby shortly after giving birth—and old people 
deemed to be suffering unduly from incurable conditions were often “helped to die” 
(Hofmayr 1925: 299). According to Howell, even the effigies had a kind of demotic 
precedent, since if someone dies far from home, her kin can hold a ceremony to pass 
her soul to a stick of ambatch, which is also the wood used to make effigies, so that 
it can be buried in her stead (P. P. Howell 1952a: 159; see also Oyler 1918b: 291).
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agricultural production—if, like the original couple, Garang and Abuk, only just 
a little bit. 
Fashoda is, then, an undoing of the dilemma of the human condition. Obvi-
ously, it could only be a partial, provisional one. The Shilluk reth was, as Burkhard 
Schnepel aptly put it (1995), “temporarily immortal.” He was Nyikang, but he 
was also not Nyikang; Nyikang was God, but Nyikang was also not God. And 
even this limited degree of perfection could only be brought about by a complex 
play of balanced antagonism that would inevitably engulf him in the end. 
THE INSTALLATION RITUAL: DESCRIPTION
All of this, I think, gives us the tools with which to interpret the famous Shilluk 
installation ceremonies. 
One must bear in mind here that this ritual was one of the few occasions 
during which an ordinary Shilluk was likely to actually see a reth (the others 
were while he was administering justice, and, possibly, during raids or war). 
Almost every clan played some role in the proceedings, whether in the prepara-
tion of rebuilding of royal dwellings beforehand, by bringing sacrificial animals 
or regalia, or by presiding over certain stages of the rituals themselves. It was in 
this sense the only real “national” ritual. The sense of popular participation was 
made all the more lively since, the rituals being so endlessly complicated and 
there usually having been such a long a time since they had last been performed, 
each step would tend to be accompanied by animated debate by all concerned as 
to what the correct procedure was.
When a king dies, he is not said to have died but to have “vanished,” or to 
have “gone across the river”—much as was said of Nyikang. Normally, Nyikang 
is immanent both in the person of the king and in an effigy kept in a temple in 
the settlement of Akurwa, north of Fashoda. This effigy too is destroyed after a 
king’s death. The reth’s body is conveyed to a sealed hut and left there for about 
a year, or at least until it is certain that nothing remains but bones; at that point, 
the Ororo will convey the skeleton to its permanent tomb in the reth’s natal 
village, and conduct a public funeral dance. It is only afterwards that a new reth 
can be installed.
This interim period, while the king’s body lies decomposing and Nyikang’s 
effigy is gone, is considered a period of interregnum. It is always represented 
as a time of chaos and disorder, a “year of fear.” According to P. P. Howell and 
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W. P. G. Thomson, who wrote the most detailed account of the rituals, mes-
sengers send out word that, “There is no land—the Shilluk country has ceased 
to be” (1946: 18). Others speak of the land as “spoiled” or “ruined,” the same 
language used in Dinka and Nuer songs to describe the state of the world since 
the separation of heaven and earth (P. P. Howell 1952a: 159–60). At any rate, it 
is clear that with the rupture in the center, the image of perfection on earth and 
thus guarantor of the kingdom, everything is thrown into disarray. During this 
time, all important matters are put on hold, other than the frantic politicking 
surrounding the election of the new reth. There were usually at least a dozen 
potential candidates. Settlement chiefs lobbied for their favorites, princesses 
offered bribes, royals conspired and plotted, and there was a real fear that eve-
rything would descend into civil war. As the chief of Debalo explained in 1975:
It is the period when we fear each other. I fear you and you fear me. If we meet 
away from the village, we can kill each other and no one will prevent us. So the 
meaning of wang yomo [year of fear] is that we are all afraid and keep to our own 
homes, because there is no king. (Singer in Schnepel 1988: 443)
This sounds very much like a Hobbesian war of all against all. Still, when the 
chief suggests that the chaos is the result of the mere absence of the king’s pow-
er to impose justice, one must bear in mind that this is a local official who grew 
up in a time of strong state authority, during which the reth was subordinated 
to, but also supported by, Sudanese police. In earlier centuries, as we’ve seen, 
the reth did not play this role. Rather, it would seem that the interregnum was 
the time when royal politics—ordinarily kept at a safe distance from ordinary 
people’s lives—really did spill over into society as a whole, and that, as a result, 
anyone became a potential enemy.
Traditionally, the interregnum lasted roughly a year, and ended during the 
“cool months” after the harvest in January and February, when the new election 
would be held so that the reth could be installed. It was considered important 
the installation be completed in time to allow the new reth to preside over rain-
making ceremonies in April. 
Neither was the election itself, conducted by twenty major chiefs or Jagos, 
presided over by the chief of Debalo, definitive. As Schnepel (1988: 444) notes, 
the college of electors did not so much select the king as identify the candidate 
the chiefs felt most likely to be able to successfully endure the series of tests 
and crises that make up the ritual. Every step was a kind of ordeal and, thus, 
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another judgment. Candidates often feared assassination at critical points of 
the ceremony; it was said if they were so much as injured in the course of them, 
they would be declared unfit and disqualified. (For commoner participants, the 
rituals were also tinged with fear, but at the same time, enormously entertain-
ing. The effigies of Nyikang and Dak, according to most sources, were seen as 
particularly amusing.) 
Let me lay out the events, in abbreviated form, in roughly their order of 
occurrence.40
Once the electoral college, presided over by chiefs of the northern and 
southern halves of the country, had reached a decision, word was sent to the 
prince, who could be expected to be lingering nearby:
The method of summoning the reth was interesting.  .  .  . The chief of Gol 
Nyikang41 sent his son by night to get him. Whether or not there was a mock 
fight between the selected candidate and the messengers I do not know, but the 
traditional form of the words announcing the choice was told to me. It is an 
interesting example of Shilluk “understatement” when talking of the reth—“You 
are our Dinka slave, we want to kill you” which means, “You are our chosen reth, 
we want to install you in Fashoda.” (Thomson 1948: 154)
(Only at this point is it possible to finally proceed with the final burial of the old 
king and the initiation of his shrine—this, unlike the election, which is primar-
ily an affair of commoners, is presided over strictly by royals.42)
40. Schnepel (1988) provides the best published blow-by-blow summary. What follows 
is drawn from my own reading of the standard primary sources (Munro 1918; 
Oyler 1918b; Hofmayr 1925; P. P. Howell and Thomson 1946; Thomson 1948; P. P. 
Howell 1952a, 1952b, 1953a; Anon. 1956; but also Riad 1959, which adds some 
telling details). All these seem to be derived from three ceremonies: the installations 
of Fafiti (1917), Anei (1944), and Dak (1946).
41. The name given the northern half of the country during the ritual, the south being 
Ghol Dhiang. It is interesting of course that the northern half should be named 
after Nyikang, since this is the portion of the country Nyikang is said not to have 
conquered, but it is also where his effigy normally resides. 
42. There is some confusion over when this ceremony takes place. Schnepel (1988) 
follows Howell and Thomson (1946) in placing it immediately after the election, 
but Riad (1959: 182) suggests the latter were describing an exceptional circumstance 
and that the funeral normally occurred well after the new reth’s installation. 
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The candidate-elect is now summoned, shaved and washed by Ororo wom-
en, and placed in seclusion. Immediately thereafter, select detachments of men 
from the northern and southern halves of the country set out on expeditions to 
acquire materials needed in the ritual, and, particularly, with which to remake 
the effigy of Nyikang.
This effigy is so important, and so famous, that it is fitting to offer a full 
description. Actually, Nyikang’s effigy is one of three: in addition to his, there 
is also an effigy of his rambunctious son Dak, and, finally, one of his older, but 
timid, son Cal. The first two almost always appear together; the effigy of Cal is 
much less important, only appearing at the very last day of the ceremony. The 
body of Nyikang’s effigy consists of a five-and-half-foot trunk of ambatch wood, 
adorned with cloth and bamboo, and topped with a crown of ostrich feathers. 
Dak is similar in composition but his body is much smaller; however, unlike 
Nyikang, his effigy is normally carried atop an eight-foot-tall bamboo pole. 
(The effigy of Cal consists primarily of rope.) Ordinarily, all three are kept in 
Nyikang’s most famous shrine in the village of Akurwa—said to be the very 
place where Nyikang vanished into the whirlwind. Their traditional keepers are 
a clan called Kwa Nyikwom (“Children of the Stool”), inhabitants of the place: 
These effigies are not merely symbols. They may “become active” at any time, and 
when active they are Nyikang and Dak. The effigy of Nyikang is rarely taken on a 
journey in normal times, though it is often brought out to dance during religious 
festivals at Akurwa itself. The effigy of Dak makes periodical excursions through 
the country. Both effigies have an important part to play in the ceremonies of 
installation. The soul of Nyikang is manifest in the effigy for the occasion, and he 
must march from Akurwa to Fashoda to test the qualities of the new successor 
and to install him in the capital. (P. P. Howell and Thomson 1946: 40)
Before this can be done, however, the effigy of Nyikang—destroyed after the death 
of the former reth—has to be entirely recreated, and that of Dak, refurbished. 
All the expeditions that set out of the country to gather materials are organ-
ized like war parties, and some of them—such as those sent into the “raiding 
country” to acquire ivory, silver, and cloth—originally were expected to acquire 
them by ambushing villages or caravans. In more recent times, those sent out 
have been obliged instead to buy them in markets to the north of Shillukland 
(P. P. Howell n.d.: SAD 69/2/1–13). However, whether they were sent outside 
the country to hunt ostriches or antelopes, or to gather rope or bamboo, all these 
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parties are clearly seen as seizing goods by force, and little distinction is made 
between Shilluk and foreigners, since along the way “they are given, or take, what 
they want from Shilluk as they pass” (P. P. Howell and Thomson 1946: 38).43 
All of these expeditions also seem to be under the broad aegis of Dak, whose 
effigy remains in the temple during the whole of the interregnum, except when 
leading occasional expeditions outside.44 The “raiding country” to the north of 
Shillukland is seen as his particular domain.
The most important of these expeditions by far is the one dispatched to 
find the new body of Nyikang. It is led by the effigy of Dak, accompanied by 
his keepers from among the Children of the Stool, along with some men from 
the settlement of Mwuomo in the far north of the Shilluk country, who act as 
divers. After sacrificing a cow so that its blood runs into the river, they set out 
from Akurwa in canoes to an island in the midst of the “raiding country” called 
“the island of Nyikang.” A drum is beaten; Dak scours the waters of the Nile; 
when a white bird appears to indicate the right spot, ornaments are cast into the 
water as an offering, along with a sacrificial ram, and a diver descends to search 
for an ambatch trunk of roughly the right size to make the new body of Nyikang 
(P. P. Howell 1953a: 194). If he finds one, the body is wrapped in a white cloth 
and carried back to Akurwa, where both Nyikang and Dak are outfitted with 
their newly acquired cloth, feathers, and bamboo. But luck was not guaranteed. 
Riad’s informants emphasized that Nyikang himself has specifically instructed 
his descendants to observe this custom as an “ordeal,” to test the reth-elect, 
since, although the latter does not participate in the ceremony, Nyikang will not 
appear if he disapproves of the electors’ choice. In fact, they emphasized that if 
the trunk could not be found, the entire ceremony would have to be conducted 
again, starting from Akurwa, and that after ten failures, the reth-elect would be 
killed and another candidate chosen in his place (Riad 1959: 189–90)—though, 
as with most of the dire warnings of the ceremony’s dangers, no one could re-
member a specific occasion when anything like this had actually occurred. 
43. The Ororo who carry the king’s skeleton to its final resting place have a similar right 
to “seize small gifts and ransom from those unfortunate enough to cross their path” 
(P. P. Howell 1952a: 160) and even those villages preparing gear for the ritual can 
do the same from anyone passing by at the time (Anon. 1956: 99). But, as we’ll see, 
it is the effigies of Nyikang and Dak especially who are famous for this sort of thing.
44. For example, two months before the ceremonies begin, the effigy of Dak presides 
over an expedition to Fanyikang to obtain certain sacred ropes (P. P. Howell and 
Thomson 1946: 38).
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Once Nyikang has been brought to life again in the form of an effigy, he and 
Dak march to the northern border of the country and begin to assemble an army, 
drawn from the men of the northern half. It is said that they retrace the steps of 
his original conquest of the country. The effigies are carried, and surrounded, by 
the Children of the Stool, many armed with whips to frighten away those who 
come too close, followed by a retinue carrying his drums, pots, shields, spears, 
and bed. No one is allowed to carry weapons in the effigies’ presence, so when 
they stay overnight at village shrines, their hosts, who would ordinarily be carry-
ing spears, carry millet stalks instead. During this time, Nyikang usually retires, 
and Dak comes out to dance with, and bless, the assembled crowds. Everyone 
comes out to see the show, and to ask for cattle, sheep, spears, and so on. But 
they also hide their chickens:
It is usual for gifts of a sheep or a goat to be presented or exacted by Nyikang, and 
it was noticeable how all small stock or fowl were either shut up or driven away 
from the vicinity of Nyikang, for Nyikang has the right to anything he fancies. 
As Nyikang proceeds with Dak his son beside him, the escort chants the songs 
of Nyikang and Dak recounting their exploits of conquest. From time to time 
Nyikang turns round and dances back as if to threaten those following. When 
he does this, Dak rushes ahead, carried in a charging position, his body held 
horizontally pointed like a spear . . . . (P. P. Howell and Thomson 1946: 41–42)
Occasionally, though things could also get out of hand:
It is accepted custom among the Shilluk that Nyikang and his followers may 
seize cattle, sheep or goats which cross their path (most Shilluk are wise enough 
to keep them out of the way) or to demand them as offerings together with 
other smaller gifts from the occupants of the villages through which they pass. 
This licensed plundering, which is often abused beyond the bounds of piety by 
Nyikang’s retinue, is treated by the Shilluk with admirable tolerance . . . . At one 
point on the march at Moro, however, their demands were thought to be exces-
sive and were resisted, a demonstration which nearly ended in armed conflict and 
which delayed the party for a while. (P. P. Howell 1953a: 195)
At the same time, the whole procedure is considered something of a farce. How-
ell remarks that “the effigies are treated by the Shilluk with a mixture of hilarity 
and dread: mixed emotions that are always apparent” (ibid.: 192). 
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It’s clear enough what’s happening. The effigies, assembled from pieces 
drawn from outside the country, descend on Shillukland like an alien, preda-
tory force. On one level, what they are doing is all in good fun; on another, they 
represent forces that are quite real, and the consequences are potentially serious.
Nyikang and Dak proceed from settlement to settlement, gathering their 
forces, retracing, it is said, their original path of conquest. Often members of 
new communities will at first oppose them, then, energized, rally to their side. 
Finally, they approach Fashoda.
The king has all this time been in seclusion in the capital, but on hearing 
of Nyikang’s passage through Golbainy, the capital of the northern half of the 
country, he flees at night to take refuge in Debalo, the capital of the southern 
half. During that night, all fires are put out in both villages. The chief of Debalo 
challenges the reth-elect, asking his business. He replies, “I am the man sent by 
God to rule the land of the Shilluk” (Hofmayr 1925: 145). Unimpressed, the 
chief has his men try to block his party from entering, leading to mock bat-
tles, where, after being repelled three times, the reth-elect finally enters. At this 
point the fires are relit, using fire-sticks. According to Riad, three are lit in front 
of the king’s hut: one from the royal family, one from the Ororo, and one from 
the people. “These fires, one of the symbols of royalty, are never put out as long 
as the king lives, and are transported to Fashoda when the king moves to the 
capital” (Riad 1959: 190).45 
Once in Debalo, the reth-elect gathers his own followers. At some times, he 
is surrounded by men seeking forgiveness for sexual misdemeanors: he grants 
this in exchange for gifts of sheep and goats. At others, he is himself treated 
“like a small boy,” belittled and humiliated by the chief, made to sleep in a 
rude hut and to herd sheep or cattle. He is formally betrothed to an eight- to 
ten-year-old girl, called the nyakwer or “girl of the ceremonies,” who will be 
his almost constant companion from them on. Gradually, the southern chiefs 
all arrive with their warriors, to match Nyikang’s army of the north. Both sides 
45. Actually, Riad claims these fires are traditionally lit at the same time as the water 
ordeal—but in order to make the claim, he has to also argue that in former times, 
the king used to move back and forth between Fashoda and Debalo during his 
seclusion. Whether or not this is the case, the parallel that he or more likely his 
informants are trying to draw here—between water in the north and fire in the 
south—is significant. Charles Seligman (1934: 9) adds that one of the three fires is 
transported to Fashoda as the “life token” of the king.
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prepare for a ritual battle which is always fought along the banks of a river that 
represents the official border between the two divisions of the country. 
The candidate marches up, surrounded by the Ororo, who are his body-
guards but at the same time the symbols of his mortality. He proceeds north 
toward Fashoda sitting backward on an ox, which is led by its tail, and alongside 
a heifer, also walking backward. Nyikang dispatches messengers to mock him. 
Before crossing the river, he and the girl step over a sheep, then a black bull, 
before crossing the river, thus consecrating them for sacrifice. It is said in earlier 
days he used to step over an old man who was then trampled by the people after 
him, usually, to death. The two forces proceed to do battle, each side unleash-
ing a volley of millet stalks in lieu of spears. Nyikang’s followers, however, are 
also armed with whips, reputed to be so powerful that a direct blow could cause 
madness. As a result, the southern forces are put to rout, and at the height of 
the battle, the bearers of Nyikang and Dak sweep forward and surround the 
reth-elect, carrying him off as prisoner to Fashoda, together with the “girl of the 
ceremonies.” 
On their arrival, the heifer is ritually sacrificed.
Once in the capital, however, the two figures begin to fuse. Nyikang’s sacred 
stool is taken from his shrine; a white canopy is arranged around it, and the ef-
figies and their captives are brought inside. First, Nyikang is first placed on the 
throne, then removed and replaced with the reth-elect. He begins to tremble, 
and exhibit signs of possession—the soul of Nyikang, it is said, has left the effigy 
and entered the king. He’s doused with cold water. At this point the effigies re-
treat to their shrine, and the reth is revealed to the assembled people, as his wives 
(newly transferred from the harem of the previous king) warm water for a ritual 
bath while he sits “like a graven image on the chair” (Munro 1918: 546), himself 
now an effigy, and later is led out before the assembled people. In one case, at 
least, observers remarked he seemed visibly in trance. After the sacrifice of an 
ox, he is led to a temporary “camp” just opposite the shrine, where he is bathed 
in great secrecy, with water alternately warm and cool, to express the desire that 
he “rule with an even temper” and avoid extremes (P. P. Howell and Thomson 
1946: 64). This bath is part of a broader process of communion with the spirit of 
Nyikang, which was considered arcane knowledge about which outsiders should 
know little, but according to some, the reth spent many hours of contemplation 
as the soul passed fully into him.
The transfer of Nyikang’s soul marks the new reth’s last public appearance 
for at least three days. Afterwards, the king remains in seclusion, guarded only 
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by some Ororo and a few of his own retainers. Once again, he is treated like a 
boy, expected to tend a small herd of cattle, and accompanied only by his be-
trothed child bride. At some point, though, adult sexuality intervenes. An Ororo 
woman (in some versions, there are three of them) lures the king away to the 
shrines on the mound of Aturwic in Fashoda and seduces him;46 while he is thus 
distracted, Nyikang steals out from another of the shrines and kidnaps the “girl 
of the ceremonies.” On the king’s return, he discovers her gone and, pretending 
outrage, begins searching everywhere. On finally realizing what’s happened, he 
confronts the chief of Kwa Nyikwom (who is acting as Nyikang’s spokesman), 
explaining that the girl had been properly betrothed by a payment in cattle, and 
Nyikang had no right to her. The chief, however, insists that the herds used—
which are, after all, the old reth’s herds—are really Nyikang’s. 
Finally it comes down to another contest of arms. Both sides marshal their 
forces in Fashoda. This time, Nyikang is accompanied not only by the ferocious 
Dak, but also by his hapless son Cal. A smaller mock battle ensues, but this time 
the northerners’ whips prove ineffective. The reth sweeps in and recaptures the 
girl from Nyikang; finally, the effigies have to fight their way back into their 
own shrines, and negotiate their effective surrender. The girl remains with the 
king, who has, in his victory, demonstrated that he and not the effigy is the true 
embodiment of Nyikang. At this point the effigies disappear, and do not return 
for the remainder of the ceremonies.
At this point, too, the drama is also effectively over. The new reth spends 
the next day on his throne at Aturwic, holding court amidst an assembly of the 
nation’s chiefs. Each places his spear head down in the ground and delivers a 
speech urging the new ruler to respect elders and tradition, protect the weak, 
preserve the nation, and similar sage advice. Drums salute their words; the king 
is invested in two silver bracelets that serve as marks of office; an ox is speared. 
Finally, the king is given a tour of the capital. Everything is back in place. The 
newly installed reth sends cattle for sacrifice to each of the shrines of Nyikang 
scattered throughout the country. Some weeks later he is ready to preside over 
his first major ritual, a series of sacrifices calling on Nyikang to call on God to 
send the rain. Once the first rains fall, the effigies leave Fashoda and return to 
their shrine in Akurwa, and do not return until the new king dies.
46. According to certain other versions, he now commits incest with a half-sister, a very 
outrageous act. This is incidentally the closest the reth comes to committing one of 
de Heusch’s “exploits,” and most sources do not even mention it.
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Since the drama began with the people’s representatives announcing, “eu-
phemistically,” that they wish to kill the candidate-elect, it might be best to 
end it by noting that even here, in the reth’s most benevolent function, there 
were similar, darker possibilities. While one would imagine a newly inaugurated 
reth would have nothing but enthusiasm for his role as rainmaker, this was not 
always assumed to be the case. 
The king is the only authorized person to refuse or permit sacrifices at the impor-
tant ritual ceremonies. The act of sacrificing animals to appease Juok, the highest 
spirit, and Nyikang, the demi-god, cannot be correctly undertaken without the 
king’s sanction. Without sacrifices the people’s wishes cannot be granted. It fol-
lows that the king is the real power in religious matters, and sometimes he with-
holds his beneficial powers if he feels the disloyalty of his subjects or their hatred 
towards him. (Riad 1959: 205, citing Hofmayr 1925: 152 n. 1) 
In other words, while the reth (unlike Simonse’s rainmaking kings) was not 
personally responsible for bringing down rain through magical means, his role 
was, at least potentially, not so very different. A drought might well be blamed 
on royal spite—and, presumably, begin to spur a political crisis, even if it was 
unlikely to end with an actual lynch mob.
THE INSTALLATION RITUAL: ANALYSIS
To some degree, the symbolic structure of the ritual is quite transparent. There is 
a constant juxtaposition of north and south, the former the division of Nyikang, 
the latter, of the king. The north is identified with the eternal, universal “king-
ship”; the south, with the particular, mortal king. Hence as Evans-Pritchard 
put it, in the ritual, “the kingship captures the king” (1948: 27). Having been 
defeated as a human, the reth-elect becomes Nyikang, and is thus able to defeat 
the effigy and banish it back to its shrine.
Another explicit element is the opposition of fire and water. At the same 
time as the image of Nyikang emerges from the river far to the north, new 
fires are lit in Debalo, the capital of the south, that will burn for the rest of 
the king’s reign and be put out when he dies. Water here is eternity. It doesn’t 
even “represent” eternity, it is eternity; the Nile will always be there, and always 
the same. With the rains, it is the permanent source of fecundity and life. It is 
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therefore utterly appropriate that Nyikang, whose mother was a crocodile and 
who is called “child of the river,” should emerge from its waters.47 Fire, on the 
other hand, is, like blood, the stuff of worldly transformation. In this case, the 
fires correspond to the mortal life of the individual king; they will exist exactly 
as long as he lives. It is thus equally appropriate that when the synthesis of 
Nyikang and reth, between the eternal principle and mortal office-holder, oc-
curs, it should be accompanying by putting a fire to water. The “bath” during 
which the king becomes fully one with the demigod also unites the two elemen-
tal principles. Fire meets water as mortal man meets god.48 
All these elements are, as I say, relatively straightforward. Other elements 
are less so. The most puzzling is the role of Nyikang’s son Dak. Existing analy-
ses—even those that have a great deal to say about the effigies (Evans-Pritchard 
1946; Arens 1984; Schnepel 1988)—focus almost exclusively on Nyikang, who 
is always assumed to represent the timeless nature of the royal office. They rarely 
have anything to say about Dak. But in many ways Dak seems even more im-
portant than Nyikang: if nothing else, because (just as in the legends he is the 
first to transcend death through the means of an effigy) his is the only effigy 
that was genuinely eternal. When the king dies, Nyikang returns to his mother 
in the river. Dak remains. Dak’s effigy then presides over the re-creation of 
Nyikang’s. What is one to make of this?
It might help here to return to the overall cosmological framework. The 
reader will recall that the Shilluk Creator is rarely invoked directly, but largely 
approached through Nyikang.
The all-powerful being who exists in the minds of the Shilluk as a remote and 
amoral deity is called Juok. Juok is the Shilluk conception of God and is present 
to a greater and lesser degree in all things. Juok is the explanation of the unknown, 
the reassuring justification of all the supernatural phenomena, good and bad, of 
which life is made up. The principal medium through whom Juok is approached 
is Nyikang. The distinction between them is not clear. Nyikang is Juok, but Juok is 
not Nyikang. . . . Further the soul of Nyikang is reincarnate in every Shilluk reth, 
47. All this is actually quite explicit: “As soon as the king dies, the spirit of Nyikang 
goes to his mother Nyikaya in the river, and the people will have to go to the river 
and bring him, and they will have to beg him to accept” (Singer in Schnepel 1988: 
449).
48. One might also point out that this appears to be the ritual inversion of Nyikang’s 
mythic battle with the Sun, where the hero used water to “burn” him. 
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and thus exists both in the past and the present. Nyikang is the reth, but the reth 
is not Nyikang. The paradox of the unity yet separation is not easy to define. The 
Shilluk themselves would find it difficult to explain. Juok, Nyikang, and the reth 
represent the line through whom divinity runs . . . . The reth is clearly himself the 
medium through which both Nyikang and, more vaguely, Juok are approached, 
and is the human intercessor with God. (P. P. Howell and Thomson 1946: 8)
After many years of contemplation and debate, scholars of Nilotic religions have 
learned to read such paradoxical phrases (e.g., “God is the sky, but the sky is not 
God”) as statements about refraction and encompassment: Nyikang is an aspect 
of God, but God is in no way limited to that aspect.49 We are presented, as in a 





The reth intercedes for the people and asks Nyikang to intercede with God 
to bring the rains. If the rain comes, it temporarily joins everything together. 
However, as we’ve seen, at every point there is potential antagonism. The people 
may hate the reth or wish to kill him; they may curse Nyikang; the reth may 
withhold the rains out of resentment of the people; the king and Nyikang raise 
armies and do battle with each other. Only God seems to stand outside this, but 
only because God is so distant: in Nuer and Dinka cosmologies, where Divinity 
is a more immediate concern, we learn that the human condition was first cre-
ated because of God’s (apparently unjustified) anger against humans, and there 
are even stories of defiant humans trying to make war on God and on the rain 
49. Though in this case made even more confusing by reversing the order in the second 
example. If this is not simply a mistake on the author’s part, it could be taken as a 
telling sign of the reversibility of some of these hierarchies.
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(Lienhardt 1961: 43–4). Antagonism here appears to be the very principle of 
separation. Insofar as the reth is not Nyikang, it is first of all because the two 
sometimes stand in a relation of mutual hostility. 
This, too, is fairly straightforward. Certainly, there are ambiguities—for in-
stance, about how and whether the people themselves could be said to partake 
of divinity, since divinity is, after all, said to be present in everything—but these 
are the ambiguities typical of any such hierarchical system of encompassment. 
Things get a little more complicated when one examines prayers offered 
directly to God. Here is one in Westermann, pronounced during a sacrifice to 
cure someone who is sick:
There is no one above thee, thou God. Though becamest the grandfather of 
Nyikango; it is thou (Nyikango) who walkest with God; thou becamest the 
grandfather (of man), and thy son Dak. If famine comes, is it not given by thee? 
So as this cow stands here, is it not thus: if she dies, does her blood not go to 
thee? Thou God, and thou who becamest Nyikango, and thy son Dak! But the 
soul (of man), is it not thine own? (1912: 171; also in Lienhardt 1952: 156)50 
Here we have the same sort of hierarchical participation (God became Nyikang 





Dak’s presence might not be entirely surprising here because it is most often 
his attacks that make people to sick to begin with. If so Dak, however much 
50. Actually, Westermann claims this is the only prayer offered directly to God, but 
Hofmayr (1925: 197–201) and Oyler (1918b: 283) both produce other ones 
(namely, C. G. Seligman 1934: 5).
120 ON KINGS
subordinated, also represents the active principle that sets everything off. This 
often seems to be his function.
Certainly, Dak is nothing if not active. This is especially obvious when he 
is paired with Nyikang, which he normally is. Nyikang’s effigy is larger and 
heavier; it is clearly meant to embody the gravitas and dignity of authority. His 
image thus tends to stay near the center of things. In ordinary times, the effigy 
remains in the temple at Akurwa even when Dak’s effigy leaves it to tour the 
country; when the two do travel together, it is always Dak who moves about, in-
teracts, while Nyikang takes on a more “statesmanlike” reserve (Schnepel 1988: 
437). True, one could argue this is simply a consequence of Dak’s subordinate 
status: Nyikang is the authoritative center, Dak his worldly representative, his 
errand-boy. But even here there are ambiguities. Most strikingly, while Dak is 
smaller than Nyikang, he towers above him, always being carried atop an eight-
foot pole. Nyikang, in contrast, stays close to the ground; in fact his effigy is 
often held parallel to the ground, while Dak’s is ordinarily vertical. Similar am-
biguities appear in stories about the two heroes’ lives. Sometimes, especially in 
his youth, it is Dak who is always getting himself in trouble and Nyikang with 
his magical power who must step in to save him. But later, during the conquest 
of Shillukland, it is more likely to be the other way around: Nyikang is foiled 
by some problem, and Dak proves more ingenious, or more resourceful with a 
spear, and manages to solve it. 
There is also the peculiar feature of Cal, Nyikang’s feckless older son, who 
never accomplishes anything and whose image appears only when the effigies’ 
forces lose. Dak and Cal seem to represent opposites: pure aggression versus 
absolute passivity, with Nyikang again defining the center. Yet in what way is 
Nyikang superior if he is more like the useless Cal?
What I would suggest is that this is not just a dilemma of interpretation for 
the outside analyst; it reflects a fundamental dilemma about the nature of politi-
cal power that Shilluk tend to find as intractable as anyone else. Rituals can be 
interpreted as ways of puzzling out such problems, even as, simultaneously, they 
are ways of making concrete political change in the world. 
Critical here is the role of the interregnum, the “year of fear.” Wherever 
there are kings, interregna tend to be seen as periods of chaos and violence, 
times when the very cosmological order is thrown into disarray. But as Burkhard 
Schnepel (1988: 450) justly points out, this is the reason most monarchies try 
to keep them as brief as possible. There is no particular reason why those organ-
izing the Shilluk installation ceremonies could not have declared, say, a three- to 
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five-day period of chaos and terror—in fact, by the 1970s, that’s exactly what 
they decided to do, abandoning the year-long interregnum entirely (ibid.: 443). 
If for centuries before they didn’t, it indicates, if nothing else, that this year of 
fear was fundamentally important in some way. 
Its importance, I think, is the key to understanding the importance of Dak 
as well. During the interregnum, royal politics, ordinarily bottled up in the fig-
ure of the reth, overflows into society at large. The result is constant peril. Dur-
ing this period, Nyikang is gone, and Dak alone remains. The return to normalcy 
begins with the stage of “preparations,” conducted under Dak’s general aegis, 
and often under his direct supervision. Expeditions set out to appropriate the 
materials with which to reconstruct the royal office, starting with the effigies. 
They uproot plants, they hunt and kill animals, they ambush and plunder camps 
and caravans. Nor do they limit their depredations to foreigners. They “take 
what they like” from Shilluk communities as well. 
Dak’s expeditions, then, represent indiscriminate predatory violence di-
rected at every aspect of creation: vegetable, animal, every sort of human being. 
As I have pointed out, “indiscriminate” in this context also means “universal.” 
Ordinarily, when one is in the presence of a power that can rain destruction 
equally on anyone and everyone, that is what Shilluk refer to as Juok, or God.51 
This is not to say that Dak is God (or, to be more precise, it is to say: God 
is Dak, but Dak is not God). Dak is the human capacity to act like God, to 
mimic his capricious, predatory destructiveness. In the stories, this is how he 
first appears: raining death and disaster arbitrarily. From his own perspective, 
“taking what he likes.” From the perspective of his victims, playing God. Dur-
ing the interregnum, then, it is not just royal politics that spills over into society 
at large; it is divine power itself—the violent, arbitrary divine power that is, 
51. God seems particularly immanent in violence or destruction. The above-cited 
prayer says “spear-thrusts are of Juok,” and one of the few ways that God is regularly 
invoked in common speech is, as noted above, when people call out “Why, God?” 
when someone falls seriously ill. Among related Nilotic speakers in Uganda, 
“anything to do with killing must have juok in it” (Mogenson 2002: 424). On the 
other hand, in formal speech, God, so absent from the everyday life of ordinary 
Shilluk, pervades every aspect of royal existence. When speaking with members 
of the royal clan, one can never speak of their going someplace, or getting up, or 
staying someplace, or entering a house; instead they are “taken by God” to that 
place, “lifted by God,” “nursed by God,” “stuffed in the house by God,” and so on 
(Pumphrey 1936). 
122 ON KINGS
as Shilluk institutions ensured no one could ever forget, the real essence and 
origin of royalty.
Of course, God ( Juok) is not simply a force of destruction; he is also, origi-
nally, the creator of everything—and it is probably worth noting that this is 
also the only point in the ceremonies where anyone really makes or fashions 
anything. Still, this is not what’s emphasized. What is emphasized is appropria-
tion, which is perhaps the most distinctly human form of activity. Through a 
combination of appropriation and creation, Dak’s people thus fashion Nyikang. 
Once they have done so, and Nyikang returns, he (unlike Dak) limits his depre-
dations to his own Shilluk nation, retracing his original journey of conquest. But 
there seems to be a calculated ambiguity here. Do the Shilluk become Shilluk—
Nyikang’s subjects—because they collectively construct Nyikang (the classic 
fetish king, created by his people) or because he then goes on to conquer them 
(the classic divine king, raining disaster or the threat of disaster equally on all)? 
The interregnum, then, is a time when divine power suffuses everything. 
This is what makes the creation of society possible. It’s also what makes the 
creation of society necessary, since it results in an undifferentiated state of chaos 
and at least potential violence of all against all. Social order—like cosmic or-
der—comes of separation, and the resultant creation of a relatively balanced, 
stable set of antagonisms. That one is, in fact, dealing with divine power here 
is confirmed by stories about the nature of the election itself. The electoral col-
lege is made up primarily of commoners, with a few royal representatives, but 
many insisted that “in former times” a delegation from the Nuba kingdom, the 
ancient allies of Nyikang, performed a ritual, a “fire ordeal,” involving throw-
ing either sticks or pebbles in a fire, that ensured that the new reth was chosen 
directly by God (Westermann 1912: 122; Hofmayr 1925: 451). Even in cur-
rent times, the election is taken to represent God’s choice: this is what allows 
the reth to tell the chief of Debalo that he is the man “sent by God to rule the 
land of the Shilluk” (Lienhardt 1952: 157).52 The people and God are here 
interchangeable. 
With Nyikang’s return, God leaves the picture, and Dak is again reduced 
to his father’s deputy. Divinity begins to be properly bottled up. Nyikang may 
52. The presence of foreigners here—even if legendary—seems to be a reminder of 
the universality of the divine principle. Note, too, the opposition between this “fire 
ordeal,” in which the candidate is chosen by God, and the “water ordeal,” in which 
he is confirmed by Nyikang.
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continue Dak’s predatory ways, looting and pillaging as he reenacts his con-
quests, but it has all become something of a burlesque.
Over the course of the ceremonies, Nyikang’s spirit, having been coaxed out 
of the river, is transferred first into the effigy, then, just as reluctantly, into the 
body of the reth-elect. In doing so, Nyikang is also moving forward in history: 
from his birth from the river in mythic times, to his heroic exploits in the begin-
ning of Shilluk history, to his current incarnation in the body of a contemporary 
king. If one looks at what is happening in the south, surrounding the candi-
date, however, we see a very different kind of drama. I have already mentioned 
the contrast between the water symbolism surrounding Nyikang and the fire 
symbolism surrounding the king. This is also a juxtaposition between mortality 
and eternity. Nyikang might be constructed, but he is constructed of eternal 
materials. (There will always be a river, just as there will always be ostriches and 
bamboo.) He then moves from the generic—and thus timeless—to the increas-
ingly particular, and hence historic. But he will never actually die, just disappear 
and begin the cycle all over again. The king, on the other hand, is from the start 
surrounded by reminders of his own mortality. 
If the fires are the most obvious of these reminders, the most important 
are surely the Ororo. The Ororo preside over every aspect of the king’s mortal-
ity. As degraded nobility, their very existence is a reminder that royal status 
is not eternal: that kings have children, that most of them will not be kings, 
that eventually, royal status itself can pass away. In royal ritual, Ororo have a 
jurisdiction over everything that pertains to sexuality and death. They are the 
men who carry out the sacrifices for the king by spearing and roasting animals, 
they are the women who wash, shave, and seduce the king; they will provide his 
highest-ranking wives; they protect but eventually kill him; they officiate over 
the decomposition and burial of his corpse. Throughout the ceremonies, the 
reth-elect is surrounded by Ororo. When he is defeated and seized by Nyikang, 
he is plucked from amidst his own mortality. 
This is not to say that the reth is ever more than “temporarily” immortal. 
Even after his capture, the Ororo soon return. 
This theme plays itself out throughout the ceremony. If the drama in the 
north is about the gradual containment of arbitrary, divine power, the drama 
in the south is about human vulnerability. The reth-to-be is mocked, treated as 
a child, forced to ride backward on an ox. His followers never wield arbitrary 
power over humans. Unlike Dak and Nyikang, they do not loot or plunder or 
hold passers-by for ransom. They do, however, constantly offer animals up for 
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sacrifice. Just about every significant action of the king is marked by his step-
ping over (thus, consecrating) some animal, which is later ritually killed.53 In 
one sense what the king does is the exact opposite of what Nyikang and Dak 
are doing. Sacrificial meat is redistributed,54 so instead of stealing live beasts, he 
is distributing the flesh of dead ones. This is especially significant since, when 
presiding over sacrifices meant to resolve feuds, Shilluk kings have been known 
to state quite explicitly that the flesh and blood of the animal they sacrifice 
should be considered as their own (Oyler 1920a: 298). Since in ordinary Shilluk 
sacrifices the life and blood of the creature (unlike the flesh) are said to “go up 
to God”—and to Nyikang—it would seem the king is here playing the part of 
humanity as a whole, placing himself in a willfully subordinate position to the 
cosmic powers that will ultimately take hold of him.
In a larger sense, sacrifice—in all Nilotic religions the paradigmatic ritu-
al—is about the reestablishment of boundaries.55 Divinity has entered into the 
world, the ordinary divisions of the cosmos (e.g., between humans, animals, 
and gods) have become confused; the result is illness or catastrophe. So while 
sacrifice is, here as everywhere, a way of entering into communication with the 
Divine, it is ultimately a way of putting Divinity back in its proper place. If the 
interregnum, the reign of Dak, is a time of indiscriminate violence against every 
aspect of creation, sacrifice is about restoring discriminations: respect (thek), to 
use the Nuer/Dinka phrase;56 separation, appropriate distance. In this sense, the 
entire installation ceremony is a kind of sacrifice, or at least does the same thing 
that a sacrifice is ordinarily meant to do. It restores a world of separations. 
Of course, if the ritual is a kind of sacrifice, it is reasonable to ask: Who is 
the victim? The reth-elect? A case could be made. The ceremony begins with the 
53. It happens so often that most such examples I actually purged from my account, 
above, to avoid monotony.
54. This is not to say that Nyikang’s passage does not include some acts of sacrifice, since 
otherwise there could be no feasts; only that this is not a particularly important 
aspect of what he does. With the king it is clearly otherwise.
55. In the absence of any detailed published material on Shilluk sacrifice, I am drawing 
here on Evans-Pritchard (1954, 1956) on the Nuer, but even more Lienhardt’s 
work on the Dinka (1961) and Beidelman’s (1966a, 1981) reinterpretations of this 
material. 
56. On thek, see Beidelman (1981). The Shilluk cognate appears to be pak, usually 
translated “praise,” which also refers to specialized formal language used within and 
between clans (see Crazzolara 1951: 140–42). As usual, though, there isn’t enough 
material on Shilluk custom to make a sustained comparison.
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people informing the candidate that they wish to kill him. During his time in 
Debalo, he is treated very much like an ox being prepared for sacrifice: sacrificial 
oxen, too, are secluded, manhandled, and mocked—even while those who mock 
them also confess their sins (Lienhardt 1961: 292–95).57 Then in the end the 
ox’s death becomes a token of a newly created community, its unity brought into 
concrete being in the sharing of the animal’s flesh. Here one could almost see 
the humiliated princely candidate in a messianic role, giving of himself to man 
and god, sacrificing himself in the name of Shilluk unity. But if so, the obvious 
objection is that he doesn’t seem to be sacrificing very much. To the contrary: the 
ceremonies end with the new king happily installed in Fashoda, accepting the al-
legiance of his subjects, inspecting the buildings, reassembling a harem; perhaps, 
if so inclined, plotting bloody revenge on anyone who has ever insulted him. 
Still, all this is temporary. The king is, ultimately, destined to die a ritual 
death. 
So, is the king to be considered a sacrificial victim on temporary reprieve? In 
a certain sense, I would say yes. Every act of sacrifice does, after all, contain its 
utopian moment. Here, it’s as if the king is suspended inside that utopian mo-
ment indefinitely—or at least, so long as his strength holds out. 
Let me explain what I mean by this. Normally, what I’m calling the utopian 
moment in sacrifice is experienced first and foremost in the feast, after the ani-
mal is dead, when the entire community is brought together for the collective 
enjoyment of its flesh. Often this is a community that has been created, patched 
together from previously unrelated or even hostile factions, by the ceremony 
itself. Even if that is not the case, they must put aside any prior differences. Ac-
cording to Lienhardt, for Dinka, such moments of communal harmony are the 
closest one can come to the direct experience of God—or, to be more exact, to 
Divinity in its aspect of benevolent universality:
In Divinity the Dinka image their experience of the ways in which human be-
ings everywhere resemble each other, and in a sense form a single community 
with one original ancestor created by one Creator. . . . When, therefore, a prophet 
like Arianhdit shows that he is able to make peace between normally exclusive 
57. Admittedly, I am relying here on Lienhardt’s detailed description and analysis of 
Dinka sacrifice, supplemented by Evans-Pritchard’s Nuer ethnography, but this 
is, as I say, because no parallel Shilluk account exists. For what it’s worth, Evans-
Pritchard (1954: 28) felt it appropriate to use Shilluk statements to throw light on 
Nuer practices.
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and hostile communities, to persuade them to observe between them the peace-
ful conventions which they had previously observed only internally, and to unite 
people of different origins in a single community, he proves that he is a “man of 
Divinity.” . . . A man is recognized as a powerful “man of Divinity” because he 
creates for people the experience of peace between men and of the uniting of 
forces which are normally opposed to each other, of which Divinity is under-
stood to be the grounds. (1961: 157)
It’s in this sense that God “also represents truth, justice, honesty, uprightness,” 
and so on (ibid.: 158). It is not because God, as a conscious entity, is just. In fact, 
like most Nilotic peoples, Dinka seem haunted by the strong suspicion that he 
isn’t. It is because truth, justice, and so on, are the necessary grounds for “order 
and peace in human relations,” and therefore, truth, justice, and so on, are God. 
The point of sacrificial ritual, then, is to move from one manifestation of the di-
vine to the other: from God as confusion and disaster to God as unity and peace. 
Normally it is the feast which seems to act as the primary experience of God, 
but often the divine element takes even more concrete form in the undigested 
grass extracted from the cow’s stomach. It seems significant that the one Shilluk 
sacrifice for which we have any sort of description—other than those meant to 
bring the rain—is aimed at creating peace between two parties to a feud (Oyler 
1920a). The reth here plays the part of the Dinka prophet. After he emphasizes 
that the ox’s flesh and blood are really his own, the animal is speared, and the 
chyme, the half-digested grass in question, is used to anoint the former feuding 
parties. “That was done to show their united condition” (ibid.: 299).58 Nuer insist 
that chyme, like the blood and more generally the “life,” is the part of the sacri-
ficed animal that belongs to God (Evans-Pritchard 1956: 212; Evens 1989: 338). 
Generally speaking, in Nilotic ritual, chyme59 is treated as the stuff of pure poten-
tial: it is grass in the process of becoming flesh; undifferentiated substance in the 
way of creative transformation. As such it is itself the pure embodiment of life. 
It seems to me that this is the utopian moment in which the reth is suspend-
ed. Not only is he, as reth, the ground for “order and peace in human relations,” 
58. “The thought was that the animal eats a bit here and there, but in the stomach it all 
becomes one mass. Even so the individuals of the two factions were to become one” 
(Oyler 1920a: 299).
59. And also chyle, which is the further digested grass in the animal’s second stomach. 
This is the stuff even more closely identified with life, but I thought I would spare 
the reader all the niceties of bovine digestive anatomy.
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of unity and hence of justice, he is the person actually responsible for mediating 
and resolving disputes. Peace and justice, then, is the social equivalent of rain, 
and chyme, like falling water, is the very physical substance of the divine in its 
most benevolent aspect. All this is stated almost explicitly in the peace sacrifice: 
the king is the ox, he is God, he is peace, he is the unity of all his subjects. This, 
too, is how the reth can be both sacrificial victim in suspense, and living in a kind 
of small version of paradise. 
The installation ritual begins with a nightmare vision of a world infused with 
divine power, in which no separations exist, and all human relations are therefore 
tinged with potential violence. It is the worst kind of unity of God and world. It 
ends with the restoration of the best kind. In this sense, it is the transformation 
of divine king into sacred king. Dak, in his untrammeled form, embodies the 
former. The proceedings seem to be based on the assumption that the primor-
dial truth of power—that it is arbitrary violence—has to be acknowledged so it 
can then be contained. One might argue the two main forms of sacred kingship 
identified by Luc de Heusch are the two principal strategies for doing this. Each 
plays itself out in a different division of the country. In the north, divine power 
is reduced to a fetish—literally, an effigy—which is constructed by, and hence 
to some degree therefore manageable by, ordinary humans. In the south, we 
see the making of a classic scapegoat king. Ultimately the two become one: the 
king not only becomes Nyikang, he also, at least momentarily, becomes an effigy. 
Ordered, hierarchical relations (God–Nyikang–king–people) are restored. The 
new king is (as Dak was originally) in a sense all of them at once, even as he is 
also the means to keep them apart, suspended in a kind of balanced antagonism. 
As such he is a victim himself suspended, temporarily, in a miniature version of 
the original unity of heaven and earth, in a strange village with sex but without 
childbirth, a place of ease and pleasure, devoid of hunger, sickness, and death.
The paradise, however, is temporary, and the solution always provisional, in-
complete. Arbitrary violence can never be entirely eliminated. Heaven and earth 
cannot really be brought together, except during momentary thundershowers. 
And even the simulation of paradise is bought at a terrible price.
SOME WORDS IN WAY OF A CONCLUSION
I have framed my argument in cosmological terms because I believe one can-
not understand political institutions without understanding the people who 
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create them, what they believe the world to be like, how they imagine the hu-
man situation within it, and what they believe it is possible or legitimate to want 
from it. This is true everywhere, even though cosmological formulations them-
selves can vary enormously. Still, anyone coming at the Shilluk material from 
a background in Judaism, Christianity, or Islam is unlikely to feel on entirely 
here. There is a reason early anthropologists often saw Nilotic peoples as the 
closest living cousins of the biblical patriarchs: not only are Semitic and Nilotic 
languages distantly connected; in each case we are dealing with seminomadic 
pastoralists with a lineage-based form of organization, monotheists whose ritual 
life was dominated by sacrifice to a distant and arbitrary God. Actually, I suspect 
this affinity is true, in a more attenuated sense, for Africa more generally. It is 
easy to get the sense, reading African myths, that the basic dilemmas of human 
existence they explore—the reasons for suffering, the justice of God—are much 
the same as those grappled with in the Abrahamic tradition; if nothing else, 
certainly far more familiar to someone raised on the tradition of the Bible and 
Greek myths than equivalent stories from, say, Amazonia or Polynesia—or even 
ancient Ireland.
Though to some degree, too, they deal with issues that are universal.
It would have to be so, or it would not be possible to make cross-cultural 
generalizations about “divine kingship,” “sacred kingship,” or “scapegoats” to be-
gin with. This essay is really founded on two such generalizations. The first is 
that it is one of the misfortunes of humanity that we share a tendency to see the 
successful prosecution of arbitrary violence as in some sense divine—or, anyway, 
to identify it with some kind of transcendental power. It is not entirely clear why 
this should be. Perhaps it has something to do with the utterly disproportion-
ate quality of violence, the enormous gap between action and effect. It takes 
decades to bring forth and shape a human being; a few seconds to bring all that 
to nothing by driving a spear into his chest. It takes very little effort to drop a 
bomb; unimaginable effort to have to learn to get about without legs for the rest 
of one’s life because they’ve been blown off by one. Even more, acts of arbitrary 
violence are acts which for the victims and their families must necessarily have 
enormous significance, but have no intrinsic meaning. Meaning, after all, im-
plies intentionality. But the definition of “arbitrary” is that there is no particular 
reason why one person was shot or blown up and another wasn’t; such acts are 
therefore by definition meaningless, in that they do not embody a conscious or 
even unconscious intention. This is just what allows arbitrary acts of weather to 
be referred to as “acts of God.” Meaning abhors a vacuum. Particularly when we 
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are dealing with actions or events of enormous significance, it is hard to resist 
the tendency to ascribe some kind of transcendental meaning, or at least to as-
sume that one exists even though we can’t know what it is. It is in this absolute 
absence of meaning that we encounter the Divine. 
Of course, this is only a tendency. As I remarked earlier, it’s not as if any 
bandit who finds himself in a position to wreak random violence with impunity 
is therefore going to be treated as a god (except perhaps in his immediate pres-
ence). But some are. It is also clear that the apparatus of sacred kingship is a very 
effective way of managing those who are treated in this way.
Here I introduce my second cross-cultural generalization. The sacred, every-
where, is seen as something that is or should be set apart. As much as an object 
becomes the embodiment of a transcendental principle or abstraction, so much 
is it to be kept apart from the muck and mire of ordinary human life, and sur-
rounded, therefore, with restrictions. These are the kind of principles of separa-
tion that Nuer and Dinka, at least, refer to with the word thek, usually translated 
“respect.” Violent men almost invariably insist on tokens of respect, but tokens 
of respect taken to the cosmological level—“not to touch the earth,”, “not to 
see the sun”—tend to become severe limits on one’s freedom to act violently. If 
nothing else, the violence can, as in the Shilluk case, be bottled up, limited to 
a specific royal sphere which is under ordinary circumstances scrupulously set 
apart from ordinary daily affairs. 
We will never know the exact circumstances under which Shilluk royal in-
stitutions came into being, but the broad outlines can be reconstructed. The an-
cestors of the Shilluk were likely in most essentials barely distinguishable from 
their Nuer or Dinka neighbors—fiercely egalitarian pastoralists who settled 
along an unusually fertile stretch of the Nile. There they became more seden-
tary, more populous, but also began regularly raiding their neighbors for cattle, 
wealth, and food. To some degree this appears to have been born of necessity; 
to some degree, it no doubt became a matter of glory and adventure. An incipi-
ent class of war chieftains emerged who assembled wealth in the form of cattle, 
women, and retainers. These became the ancestors of Shilluk royalty. However, 
the royal clan itself only appears to have developed, at least in the form in which 
anthropologists came to know it, after a prolonged struggle over the nature of 
the emerging political order, the role of women, and the power and jurisdiction 
of commoner chiefs. A compromise eventually emerged, which has come to be 
known as “the divine kingship of the Shilluuk.” This compromised formula-
tion appears to have been brilliantly successful in creating and maintaining a 
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sense of a unified nation, capable of defending itself and usually dominating 
the surrounding territories, without ever giving the royals with their fractious 
politics much chance to play havoc with local affairs. It was sustained by popular 
vigilance. Ordinary Shilluk appear to have resisted the emergence of anything 
resembling an administrative system. Communications between Fashoda and 
other settlements were maintained not by officials, but principally by relations 
with and between royal sisters, wives, and daughters. Any attempt at creating 
systematic tribute relations, at home or abroad, appears to have been met with 
such immediate and widespread protest that the very legitimacy of the king-
ship was soon called into question. As a result, the royal treasury, such as it 
was, consisted almost entirely of wealth that had been stolen—seized in raids 
either against foreigners, or against Shilluk communities that resisted attempts 
to mediate disputes. The playful raiding during installation rituals was simply 
a reminder of what everyone already knew: that predatory violence was and 
would always remain the essence of sovereignty. Above all, there seemed to be 
an at least implicit understanding that such matters ought not be in any way 
obfuscated—that the euphemization of power was essential to any project of its 
permanent institutionalization, and this was precisely what most people did not 
wish to see.
My use of the term “utopia” is somewhat unconventional in this context. I 
am defining “utopia,” in the fairly colloquial sense, as any place that represents 
an unattainable ideal, particularly if that ideal involves an impossible resolution 
of what are otherwise taken to be the fundamental dilemmas of human exist-
ence—however those might be conceived. Utopia is the place where contradic-
tions are resolved.60 Part of my inspiration here is Pierre Clastres’ argument 
(1962, 1977) that among the Amazonian societies he knew, states could never 
have developed out of existing political institutions. Those political institutions, 
he insisted, appeared to be designed to prevent arbitrary coercive authority 
from ever developing. If states ever could emerge in this environment (and it 
seems apparent now that, in certain periods of history, they did), it could only 
be through figures like the Tupí-Guraní prophets, who called on their followers 
to abandon their existing customs and communities to embark on a quest for a 
“land without evil,” an imaginary utopia where all would become as gods free 
of birth and death, the earth would yield its bounty without labor, and all social 
60. Or, better put, the place where existential dilemmas are reduced to mere 
contradictions, so that they can be resolved. 
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restrictions could therefore be set aside (H. Clastres 1995). The state can only 
arise from such absolutist claims, and, above all, from an explicit break with the 
world of kinship. Luc de Heusch’s original insight on African kingship, which 
came out in the same year as Clastres’ original essay (1962), makes a similar 
argument: kingship must always mark an explicit break with the domestic order. 
Perhaps this is not surprising as both emerge from the mutual confluence of 
revolutionary politics and structuralist theory.61 Obviously, de Heusch was later 
to take it in what might seem a very different direction. But how different is it 
really? 
Certainly, Shilluk kings do share certain qualities with Nuer and Dinka 
prophets, even if, unlike them, they don’t predict the coming of a new world 
where all human dilemmas will be resolved.62 Certainly, the organization of 
the royal capital did represent a kind of partial unraveling of the dilemmas of 
the human condition. But we can also consider de Heusch’s idea of the “body-
fetish.”  The reader will recall that the basic idea here is that rituals of installa-
tion turn the king’s own physical person into the equivalent of a magical charm; 
he is the kingdom, its milk and its grain, and any danger to the king’s bodily 
integrity is thus a threat to the safety and prosperity of the kingdom as a whole. 
If he grows old and sickly, defeats, crop failures, and natural disasters are likely 
to result. Hence the principle, so common in Africa, that kings ought not to die 
a natural death. 
For this reason, the king “must keep himself in a state of ritual purity,” as 
Evans-Pritchard stressed, and also “a state of physical perfection” (1948: 20). All 
sources agree on this latter point, and it is a common feature of sacred king-
ship. A legitimate candidate to the throne must not only be strong and healthy, 
61. Before becoming an anthropologist and conducting fieldwork in the then-
Belgian Congo, Luc de Heusch was known as a radical film-maker and part of 
the revolutionary art collective the CoBrA group, now remembered largely as the 
ancestor of the Situationist International. Clastres was famously an anarchist who 
became the main source for almost all of Deleuze and Guattari’s anthropological 
interventions (the evolutionary stages in anti-Oedipus, the “war machine,” etc). 
De Heusch’s later work shows no obvious traces of revolutionary theory but this 
context must have influenced his initial framing of his problem.
62. Specifically, kings were like prophets seen as being possessed by divine spirits 
(Shilluk prophets, when they appeared, were often possessed by Nyikang), mediated 
disputes on a national level that local authorities could not deal with, and relied on 
a following of young men who were themselves cut off from the ordinary domestic 
order because, having no access to cattle, they could not ordinarily expect to marry.
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he must have no scars, blemishes, missing teeth, asymmetrical features, unde-
scended testicles, deformities, and so forth. What’s more, his bodily integrity 
must be fastidiously maintained, particularly at ritual moments: we are told that 
if during the installation ceremonies the reth is injured in any way, “even if the 
king is only punched and blood appears” (Singer in Schnepel 1988: 444), he is 
immediately disqualified for office. For this reason, some sources insist kings 
could not even fight in war, but were rather borne along as a kind of standard 
while others were fighting; historical narratives suggest this was not always the 
case, but certainly, if the king were seriously injured, this could not be allowed 
to stand, and he would be discreetly dispatched. 
The very idea of physical perfection is strangely paradoxical if you really 
think about it. What does it mean to say someone is physically perfect? Presum-
ably that they correspond to some idealized model of what a human being is 
supposed to be like. But how do we even know what humans are supposed to be 
like? There is only one way: by observing actual human beings. But actual hu-
man beings are never physically perfect; in fact, when compared with the model 
of a generic human we have in our heads, most seem at least slightly misshapen. 
This is partly because, when moving from tokens to types, we wipe out change 
and process: real humans grow, age, and so on; generic humans are, first of all, 
caught forever at some idealized moment of their lives. But it’s also an effect of 
the process of generalization itself: in moving from tokens to types, we always 
seem to generate something which we find more proper or appealing than the 
tokens—or at least the overwhelming majority of them. In this sense, the king 
is indeed an abstraction or transcendental principle: the ideal-typical human, 
though here I am using the phrase not in Weber’s sense, but rather from the 
understanding that, like Leonardo da Vinci, when we try to imagine the typi-
cal, we usually end up generating the ideal.63 Insofar as the reth is the embodi-
ment of the nation, and of humanity as a whole before the divine powers, he 
is a generic human; insofar as he is the generic human, he must be the perfect 
human; insofar as he is an image of humanity removed from time and process, 
he must be preserved from any harmful transformation until the point where, 
when this becomes impossible, he must be simply destroyed and put away. In 
the sense, the king’s body is less a fetish than itself a kind of microutopia, an 
impossible ideal.
63. This is, of course, what “ideal” actually means: it is the idea lying behind some 
category.
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There is always, I think, a certain utopian element in the sacred. That which 
is sacred is not only set apart from the mundane world, it is set apart particularly 
from the world of time and process, of birth, growth, decay, and also simple 
bodily functions—ways in which the body is continuous with the world. I have 
explored this phenomenon in great detail elsewhere (Graeber 1997). What is 
most striking in the case of sacred kingship is that this is reflected above all in 
an urge to deny the king’s mortality; and this denial is almost invariably effected 
by killing people. 
Rulers of early states—Egyptian and Mesoamerican pyramid-builders be-
ing only the most famous examples—had a notorious tendency to develop ob-
sessions with their own mortality. In a way, this is not hard to understand; like 
Gilgamesh, having conquered every other enemy they could imagine, they were 
left to confront the one that they could never ultimately defeat. Killing others, 
in turn, does seem one of the few ways to achieve some sort of immortality. 
That is to say, most kings are aware that there are rulers remembered for reigns 
of peace, justice, and prosperity, but they are rarely the ones remembered for 
all time. If history will accord them permanent significance, it will most likely 
be for either one or two things: vast building projects (which often themselves 
entail the death of thousands) or wars of conquest. There is an almost literal 
vampirism here: ten thousand young Assyrians or Frenchmen must be wiped 
from existence, their own future histories aborted, so the name of Assurbanipal 
or Napoleon can live on. 
Shilluk refused to allow their reths to engage in this sort of behavior, but in 
the institutions of Frazerian sacred kingship we encounter the same relation in 
a far more subtle way. The connection is so subtle, in fact, that it has gone largely 
unnoticed. But it comes especially clearly into focus if one compares the Shilluk 
kingdom with its most notoriously brutal cousin: the kingdom of Buganda lo-
cated on the shores of Lake Victoria a few hundred miles to the south. In many 
ways, the similarities between the two are quite remarkable. Ganda legends, too, 
trace the kingship back to a cosmic dilemma about the origins of death; here, 
too, the first king did not die but mysteriously vanished in the face of popular 
discontent; here, too, the next three kings vanished as well; here, too, there were 
elaborate installation rituals with mock battles, the lighting of ritual fires, and 
a chaotic year-long interregnum. Yet in other ways the Ganda kingship is an 
exact inversion. 
Much of the difference turned on the status of women. In Buganda, women 
did almost all subsistence labor, while having no autonomous organizations of 
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their own; men formed a largely parasitical stratum, the young ones organized 
into militarized bands, older ones into an endlessly elaborate administrative ap-
paratus that seemed to function largely to keep the younger ones under control, 
or distracted in endless wars of conquest. The result was, by any definition, a 
bona fide state. It was also one of those rare cases when bureaucratization did 
not in any sense lead to any significant euphemization. While the king was not 
identified with any divine being, he remained very much a divine king in our 
sense of the term: a dispatcher of arbitrary violence, and higher justice, both at 
the same time. However, where the Shilluk king was surrounded by execution-
ers whose role was eventually to kill him, the Ganda king was surrounded by 
executioners whose role was to kill everybody else. Thousands might be slaugh-
tered during royal funerals, installations, or when the king periodically decided 
there were too many young men on the roads surrounding the capital, and it 
was time to round a few hundred up and hold a mass execution. Kings might 
be killed in rebellions, but none were ritually put to death. As Gillian Feeley-
Harnik (1985: 277) aptly put it, regicide, here, seems to have been replaced by 
civicide.64 When David Livingstone asked why the king killed so many people, 
he was told that if he didn’t, everyone would assume that he was dead. 
Benjamin Ray remarks that the capital was, as so often in such states, “a 
microcosm of the kingdom, laid out so that it reflected the administrative order 
of Buganda as a whole” (1991: 203); the king was the linchpin of the social 
cosmos, distributor of titles and spoils, and, hence, the ultimate arbiter of all 
forms of value. His was a secular court, with few of the formal trappings of sa-
cral kingship. Even his close relatives insisted he just a man like any other. Still, 
the person of the king is always sacred, and the very fact that this was a regime 
based almost solely on force meant that the ritual surrounding the person of the 
king took on a unique ferocity. The kabaka, as he was called, did not leave the 
palace except when carried by bearers, and the punishment for gazing directly 
at him was death. 
The rules of courtly etiquette, such as the prohibition against sneezing or cough-
ing in the king’s presence . . . were considered as important as the laws of the state, 
64. Probably literally: Christopher Wrigley, the grand old man of Ganda studies, makes 
a plausible case that what we are dealing with here is a very old and probably fairly 
typical institution of sacred kinship suddenly transformed, a few generations before, 
into a state (1996: 246). A bureaucracy was superimposed with disastrous results. 
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for behavior towards the king’s person was regarded as an expression of one’s al-
legiance to the throne he represented. Thus Mutesa sometimes condemned his 
wives to death because they coughed while he was eating. (Ray 1991: 172)
Foreign observers like Speke and Livingstone wrote in horror of even well-born 
princesses being dragged off to execution for the slightest physical infraction.65 
This might seem about as far as one can get from the Shilluk court, where 
women were sacrosanct and it was the king who was eventually executed. But 
in fact it is a precise inversion, a mirror image, and hence, on a deeper level, pre-
cisely the same thing. The constant element is the illusion of physical perfection 
at the center, which brings with it the need to suppress whatever are taken to be 
the most significant signs of bodily weakness, illness, or lack of physical control, 
and, above all, the fact that this illusion was ultimately enforced by threat of 
death. The difference is simply that the direction of the violence is reversed. It is, 
perhaps, a simple matter of balance of forces. In the war between sovereign and 
people, the reth was at a constant disadvantage. The kabaka, in contrast, held all 
the cards. One might even say that, for the moment at least, he had definitively 
won. His ability to rain arbitrary destruction was unlimited not just in principle, 
but largely in practice, and the bodies of royal women were simply the most 
dramatic means of its display. 
Granted, the situation was not ultimately viable. Such victories can never 
be sustained. Even in the nineteenth century, it was assumed that every kabaka, 
driven mad by power, would eventually go too far, and be destroyed—if not by 
real flesh-and-blood rebels, then at least by the angry ghosts of his victims. By 
the end of the century, the entire system was overthrown and mass executions 
were abolished. What I really want to draw attention to here, though, is, first of 
all, the intimate connection between the otherworldly perfection of royal courts 
and their violence—to the fact that such utopias do, always, rest on what we 
euphemistically call “force.” The second point is that the violence always cuts 
both ways. This is the truth that is being acknowledged in the Shilluk stories 
that show how Dak’s effigy—which represents human capacities to become a 
god through violence—was created when the people as a whole set out to kill 
Dak, or how Nyikang vanished and became a god when everybody hated him. 
65. No doubt some of this was simply to impress foreigners with the absoluteness of 
royal power; but such customs aren’t improvised whole cloth. 
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What I would suggest is that this has remained the hidden logic of sover-
eignty. What we call “the social peace” is really just a truce in a constitutive war 
between sovereign power and “the people” or “nation”—both of whom come 
into existence, as political entities, in their struggle against each other. Further-
more, this elemental war is prior to wars between nations. 
To call this a “war” is to fly in the face of almost all existing political theory, 
which—whether it be a matter of Carl Schmitt’s argument that the first gesture 
of sovereignty is declaring the division of friend and enemy, or Max Weber’s 
monopoly of legitimate use of force within a territory, or the assertion in African 
political systems (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940) that states are entities that 
resolve conflict internally through law, and externally, through war—assumes 
there is a fundamental distinction between inside and outside, and particularly 
between violence inside and violence outside—that, in fact, this is constitutive 
of the very nature of politics. As a result, just about everyone (with the pos-
sible exception of anthropologists) who wishes to discuss the nature of “war” 
starts with examples of armed conflicts between two clearly defined political 
and territorial entities, usually assumed to be nation-states or something almost 
exactly like them, involving a clash of armies that ends either with conquest or 
some sort of negotiated peace.66 In fact, even the most cursory glance at history 
shows that only a tiny percentage of armed conflicts have taken such a form. In 
reality, there is almost never a clear line between what we’d now call “war” and 
what we’d now call “banditry,” “terrorism,” “raids,” “massacres,” “duels,” “insur-
rections,” or “police actions.” Yet somehow in order to be able to talk about war 
in the abstract we have to imagine an idealized situation that only rarely actually 
occurs. True, during the heyday of European colonialism, from roughly 1648 to 
1950, European states did attempt to set up a clear system of rules to order wars 
between nation-states, and in this period one does find a fair number of wars 
that do fit this abstract model; but these rules applied only within Europe, a tiny 
corner of the globe. Outside it, the same European powers became notorious 
for disrespecting solemn agreements and their willingness to engage in every 
sort of indiscriminate violence. Since 1950, the rest of the globe has come to 
be included in the system of nation-states, but as a result, since that time, no 
wars have been formally declared, and despite hundreds of military conflicts, 
66. Or sometimes they skip from description of monkeys, other sorts of animal 
behavior, or speculations about early hominids to wars between fully constituted 
nation-states. But generally there is nothing in between.
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there have been only a handful that have involved the clash of armies between 
nation-states. 
Obviously, the conceptual apparatus—the way we imagine war—is impor-
tant. But it seems to me it is mainly important in occluding that more funda-
mental truth that the Nilotic material brings so clearly into focus. As those 
European travelers discovered, when asked by Nilotic kings to conduct raids or 
rain random gunfire on “enemy villages” that actually turned out to be inhabited 
by the king’s own subjects, there is no fundamental difference in the relation 
between a sovereign and his people, and a sovereign and his enemies. Inside and 
outside are both constituted through at least the possibility of indiscriminate 
violence. What differentiates the two—at least, when the differences are clear 
enough to bear noticing—is that the insiders share a commitment to a certain 
common notion of utopia. Their war with the sovereign becomes the ground of 
their being, and thus, paradoxically, the ground of a certain notion of perfec-
tion—even peace. 
Any more realistic exploration of the nature of sovereignty, I believe, should 
proceed from examination of the nature of this basic constitutive war. Unlike 
wars between states, the war between sovereign and people is a war that the 
sovereign can never, truly, win. Yet states seem to have an obsession with creat-
ing such permanent, unwinnable wars: as the United States has passed over the 
last half-century from the War on Poverty to the War on Crime to the War on 
Drugs (the first to be internationalized) and, now, to the War on Terror. The 
scale changes but the essential logic remains the same. This is the logic of the 
assertion of sovereignty. Of course, no war is (as Clausewitz falsely claimed) 
simply a contest of untrammeled force. Any sustained conflict, especially one 
between state and people, will have elaborately developed rules of engagement. 
Still, behind those rules of engagement always lies at least the threat—and usu-
ally, periodically, the practice—of random, arbitrary, indiscriminate destruction. 
It is only in this sense that the state is, as Thomas Hobbes so famously put it, a 
“mortall god.”
I don’t think there is anything inevitable about all this. The will to sover-
eignty is not, as reactionaries always want us to believe, something inherent in 
the nature of human desire—as if the desire for autonomy was always also nec-
essarily the desire to dominate and destroy. Neither, however, does the historical 
emergence of forms of sovereignty mark some kind of remarkable intellectual 
or organizational breakthrough. Actually, taken simply as an idea, sovereignty, 
like monotheism, is an extraordinarily simple concept that almost anyone could 
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have thought of. The problem is it’s not simply an idea: it is better seen, I think, 
as proclivity, a tendency of interpretation immanent in certain sorts of social 
and material circumstances, but one which nonetheless can be, and often is, 
resisted. As Luc de Heusch makes clear, it is not even essential to the nature of 
government. Only by putting sovereignty in its place, it seems to me, can we can 
begin to look realistically at the full range of human possibilities.
chapter 3
The atemporal dimensions of history 
In the old Kongo kingdom, for example 
Marshall Sahlins
INTRODUCTION: PARADIGMATIC HISTORIES
“There’s something particular to Muslims. When I read I feel the behavior of people 
who lived a glorious past—in our consciousness, not in our experience—so we feel it 
keenly,” he said. “And now in a quest to find that honor, there is a voraciousness to find 
it again and seize it once more.”
 Fathi Ben Haj Yahia, in The New York Times International: August 8, 2015
We are going to take the marvelous seriously: for we intend to reconstruct the mytho-
logical universe within which Bantu historical thought has developed.
 Luc de Heusch, The drunken king, or The origin of the state
The ancient Greeks had good reason to deify Memory. Commenting on cos-
mogonic myths in Hesiod and Homer, Jean-Pierre Vernant noted that “the 
past thus revealed represents much more than the time prior to the present; 
it is its very source” (2006: 119). The observation has radical implications for 
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historiography, insofar as it stipulates that historical causes in the mode of 
memory have no temporal or physical proximity to their effects; in that respect, 
they are not “historical realities” as commonly understood in normal historical 
science. They are inserted into the situation but they are not of it. On the other 
hand, anthropologists have come upon many institutional forms of a temporal-
ity that thus embeds the present in the terms of a remembered past, whether 
that past is “mythical” or more proximately ancestral or experiential. Such is the 
historicity of the omnipresent Dreamtime of the totemic ancestors organizing 
the world of Native Australians; of Maori chiefs who recount the deeds of their 
heroic ancestors in the first-person singular and consciously rehearse them in 
their own doings; of the installation rituals in which the king-elect of the Shil-
luk “becomes Nyikang,” the immigrant founder of the dynasty (see chapter 2, 
this volume); of the positional succession and perpetual kinship relations among 
the chiefs of the Tongan Islands; or of Captain Cook, for example, greeted by 
Hawaiians at Kealakekua in 1779 as an avatar of Lono, the ancient god who 
returns annually at the New Year to fertilize the land. Here history is made 
analogically rather than sequentially—or what are traditions for? 
A collective immortal in the form of tradition, Memory, mother of the 
Muses, indeed has the divine power of ordering human existence by revealing 
“what has been and what will be” (Vernant 2006: 120). Note that insofar as we 
are dealing with “myths” (so-called), as of the Dreamtime, the antecedents of 
events are rendered doubly disengaged from “historical realities”: they are not 
even “true” by our ontological lights, let alone copresent with their effects. All 
the same, as Fred Myers reports in his excellent ethnography of Pintupi: “The 
Dreaming is experienced as the essential foundation to which human beings 
must conform” (1986: 245–46). Realized in the features of the landscape as well 
as current human action, “making first things continuous with last” (ibid.: 53), 
the Dreaming is a transhistorical condition of social action. Pintupi say, “from 
the Dreaming, it becomes real” (ibid.: 49). Myers explains: “The Pintupi see 
themselves as following the Dreaming. As the invisible framework of this 
world, the Dreaming is the cosmic prototype” (ibid.). 
Myers, incidentally, is not the only one who, in writing of Pintupi “ontology,” 
was far in advance of the soi-disant “ontological turn” in anthropology, as intro-
duced with so much hoopla in the early twenty-first century. Irving Hallowell 
had already published a foundational article, “Ojibwa ontology, behavior, and 
world view,” in 1960. The present essay could be viewed as an extended se-
quitur to Hallowell’s essential point that “what we call myth” is not only for 
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the people concerned “a true account of events in the past,” but a current ac-
count “of the manner in which their phenomenal field is culturally constituted 
and cognitively apprehended” (ibid.: 27). Similar observations are features of 
the ethnographic record the world around. As, for example, the New Guinea 
Highlands: “For the Mbowamb myths are the truth, historical facts handed 
down. The forces which they describe and represent are not of the type which 
occur only once but are continuously effective, actually existing” (Vicedom and 
Tischner 1943–48: 729). 
Perhaps nothing better epitomizes the historiographic problem at issue as 
that what we deem to be “myth,” hence fictional, the peoples concerned hold 
sacred and by that token unquestionably true, “what actually happened.” Yet 
as Maori say, “the problems of other lands are their own”; and for their part 
they are proven masters in making current actualities out of collective memories 
( Johansen 1954). Consider, for example, John White’s (1874) reconstruction of 
a scene from daily life of the Ngapuhi tribe of the North Island. The speaker, 
Rou, a man of some prominence in the community, has lost a son in battle and 
now protests the decision of the tribal chiefs that the enemies recently taken in 
revenge be buried instead of eaten, as even the gods were wont to do. His disa-
greement with the chiefs thus begins at the origin of the world, with a reference 
to the famous Maori cosmogonic narrative of the Sons of Rangi: a tradition 
which among other precedents includes the origin of cannibalism on the part 
of the god Tu, the ancestor and patron of man as warrior. Tu defeated and ate 
his elder brothers, themselves ancestors of birds, trees, fish, cultivated and wild 
foods, and thereby gained the ability to consume their offspring. “If the gods eat 
each other,” Rou says, “and they were brothers . . . why am I not allowed to eat 
those who killed my child?” He concludes by citing another well-known tradi-
tion, this on the divine origin of witchcraft, which explains how evil came into 
the hearts of men, including his own; and finally two proverbs which likewise 
justify his personal project of cannibal revenge (ibid.: 185–93). Given this kind 
of historicity, we can understand the perplexing problems of governmentality 
confronting Sir George Grey as Governor of the New Zealand colony in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Sir George soon discovered that he could not negotiate 
critical issues of war and peace without a knowledge of Maori mythology and 
poetry. “To my surprise,” he wrote, “I found these chiefs in their speeches to me 
or in their letters frequently quoted, in explanation of their views and intentions, 
fragments of ancient poems and proverbs, or made allusions which rested on an 
ancient system of mythology; and . . . it was clear that the most important parts 
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of their communications were embodied in these figurative forms (1956: n.p.).1 
“The Maori,” as Prytz Johansen put it, “find themselves in history” (1954: 163; 
cf. Sahlins 1985: 54ff.).
As Valerio Valeri (2015) observed and demonstrated at length in the con-
nection with the ascension of the great Kamehameha to royal power in Hawai‘i, 
the past here functions paradigmatically as well as syntagmatically. And, one 
might add, consciously so—although it may otherwise transpire in the unre-
marked way traditions are realized in the normal course of cultural practice. 
The event at issue was a usurpation of the Hawai‘i kingship by Kamehameha, 
who as a cadet brother of the royal heir had been entrusted with the war god 
as his legacy from the late king. Everything thus happened in the same way 
as the succession struggle of the great chief Umi-a-Liloa some generations 
previously, a well-known tradition that effectively served as the charter of the 
kingship. And it was again repeated in historic times, if with a different result, 
when Kamehameha’s son and heir, King Liholiho, defeated the challenge of his 
younger brother, Kekuaokalani, who had inherited the war god and revolted 
against the ruler’s turn to Christianity. The different outcome in this last itera-
tion underscores Valeri’s reminder that analogy is not identity, but always entails 
some difference: in particular, the contingent circumstances of the conjuncture, 
which are not foreseen in the paradigmatic precedent, but represent the syntag-
matic dimension of what actually happened. Nor is the selection of historical 
antecedents in such cases given or predetermined, considering the complexities 
of tradition and the opportunities for the play of choice and interest. What 
remains, however, is that the course of events will unfold in cultural terms that 
are preposed to the current situation. Indeed, if anthropologists on the whole 
have been more sensitive than other human scientists to paradigmatic histories, 
it is because the appropriation of current events by already-existing traditions 
is, after all, what they have long known as the work of culture. Culture is what 
happens when something happened. 
Another, similar instance of the deployment of dynastic traditions to cur-
rent situations, this one close to the narrative of Kongo kingship which will 
be the focus of this essay, is provided by Victor Turner’s (1957) comments 
on the Luba origins of the Lunda kingship among Central African Ndembu 
and other peoples. This classic stranger-king formation was the subject of a 
1. Sir George found that his translators rarely if ever could explain the historical 
allusions, probably because they were British, or if Maori, not of relevant tribes.
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well-known structural analysis by Luc de Heusch (1982b). In the essential 
incidents, a Lunda king, Yala Mwaku, unseemly drunk, is insulted and badly 
beaten by two of his sons, and then nursed back to health by his daughter, 
Lweji Ankonde. In gratitude, he passes on to Lweji the palladium of the king-
dom—the royal bracelet made of human genitalia that maintains the fertility 
of the realm—thus making her his successor and dispossessing his sons. Lweji 
later meets and marries a handsome young hunter, Chibinda, who turns out to 
be the youngest son of a great Luba chief; and when she gives him the bracelet 
because she must go into seclusion during menstruation, he becomes king of 
the Lunda. Chagrined, Lweti’s brothers leave to found their own kingdoms, 
and their descendants spread Lunda rule far and wide among many other peo-
ples, including the indigenous Ndembu population. But the events did not end 
there. Turner writes:
Life, after all, is as much an imitation of art as the reverse. Those who, as children 
in Ndembu society, have listened to innumerable stories about Yala Mwaku and 
Lweji Ankonde know all about inaugural motifs. . . . When these same Ndembu, 
now full-grown, wish to provoke a breach or claim that some party has crucially 
disturbed the placid social order, they have a frame available to “inaugurate” a 
social drama. . . . The story itself still makes important points about family rela-
tionships, about the stresses between sex and age roles . . . so the story does feed 
back into the social process, providing it with a rhetoric, a mode of emplotment, 
and a meaning. Some genres, particularly the epic, serve as paradigms which 
inform the action of important political leaders . . . giving them style, direction, 
and sometimes compelling them subliminally to follow in major public crises a 
certain course of action, thus emplotting their lives. (1957: 153)
In the many instances of successive foreign dynasties in the same society, or se-
rial stranger-kingship, where the advent of the later regime is clearly emplotted 
on a legendary original, the overall “course of action” takes the form of a histori-
cal metaphor of a mythical reality. For where the ancient regime is known by 
oral tradition and its recent successor is fully historical and archival, it would 
indeed appear that life imitates art. The West African realm of ancient memory 
established by the conquering hero Tsoede in the country of his Nupe maternal 
kin was essentially duplicated by the nineteenth-century Fulani conquest, as 
ruled by one Masaba—whose maternal kin, among whom he was raised, were 
likewise Nupe. The ethnographer S. F. Nadel explains:
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In the tradition of Tsoede, that “mythical charter” of the Nupe kingdom, the 
essence of the Nupe state is already clearly expressed, structured, almost sancti-
fied, by that paramount authority that attaches to prehistoric events: it outlines 
a system of political domination, growing by conquest and expansion, and gov-
erned by a group detached in origin and status from the rest of the population 
. . . . The twofold process of expansion over alien groups and cultures, combined 
with cultural assimilation and absorption, is reflected in both, in the ideological 
history of the Tsoede myth as well as the “real” history of the Fulani kingdom. 
In one there is Tsoede, who conquers Nupe with the help of alien magic, who 
brings into Nupe the insignia of alien rulership and culture, but who, himself half 
Nupe by [maternal] descent, creates a new, independent, and united Nupe. On 
the other, there is this remarkable piece of empire-policy when Masaba claims 
succession to the Nupe throne on the grounds of his being half-Nupe by birth 
and full Nupe by education. (1942: 87)
The Nupe, as Nadel says, are a historically minded people: “The highest, con-
stantly invoked authority for things existing is, to the Nupe, the account of 
things past” (ibid.: 72). But then the common distinction Nadel draws between 
“ideology” and “real history” would have no value for Nupe, inasmuch as the 
“ideological”-cum-“mythical” status of the Tsoede tradition is, on exactly that 
basis, “real history”—proven source of what has been and what will be. Hence 
the credibility, too, of the observation commonly attributed to Mark Twain: 
“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”
AFRICAN STRANGER-KINGDOMS
Stranger-kingdoms the likes of Lunda, Ndembu, and Nupe in Africa comprise 
the dominant form of premodern state the world around, on every continent.2 
They have developed in a great variety of environments and in combination with 
a considerable range of economic regimes: commercial, piratical, agricultural 
(both rainfall and hydraulic), slave-raiding, cattle-raising, and most commonly 
some form of mixed economy. These are distinctively dual societies: divided in 
privileges, powers, and functions between rulers who are foreign by origin and 
identity—perpetually so, as the condition of the possibility of their authority—
2. See summary accounts in Sahlins (1981b, 2008, 2010, 2011a, 2014).
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and the underlying indigenous people—who are characteristically the “owners” 
of the land and the ritual masters of its fertility. Not that the phenomenon is 
exclusively associated with kingship, let alone Africa, as it is also known among 
a number of tribal chiefdoms. “The chiefs come from overseas,” a Fijian from 
the Lau Islands told A. M. Hocart (1929: 27), “it is so in all countries in Fiji.” 
The same could be said for the Trobriand Islands and Tikopia, sites of classi-
cal ethnographic studies by Bronislaw Malinowski (1948) and Raymond Firth 
(1971), respectively. Stranger-kingship has also played significantly in famous 
colonial encounters: besides Captain Cook in Hawai‘i and among others, there 
was James Brooke, “the White Rajah of Sarawak,” whom local Iban considered 
the son or lover of their primordial goddess Keling; and Cortés, greeted by 
Moctezuma as Quetzalcoatl, the returning king and culture hero of the legend-
ary Toltec city of Tollan. While the veracity and supposed historical effects of 
Moctezuma’s purported identification of Cortés with Quetzalcoatl have been 
contested by a number of scholars, the Mexica king’s own claim of descent from 
Quetzalcoatl and the Toltecs—by contrast to the common Mexica traditions of 
a “barbarian” Chichimec origin—does not come in for much notice (see chapter 
4, this volume). Nor was Moctezuma unusual in this respect. Stranger-kings 
were the rule in Mesoamerican and Andean city-states and empires, including 
the classic and postclassic Maya, as well as the Inka and other South American 
states. Moreover, as is true of the phenomenon elsewhere, at least some of these 
kingdoms, the Mexica included, have constituted their historic order on the 
repetition of legendary events that never happened.
In several earlier publications, I have discussed stranger-kingdoms in their 
planetary extent and general characteristics; here the focus will be on the African 
forms, particularly the old Kongo kingdom of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, as these offer especially useful examples of histories that follow from 
(so-called) “mythical” precedents. Indeed, the apparent absence of verification 
in the archival sources has led some modern scholars to deconstruct the people’s 
traditions of stranger-king origins on grounds they never really happened and 
thereby dissolve the basic structure of the society in an acid bath of Western 
positivism. 
In an article on “The origin and early history of the kingdom of Kongo, c. 
1350–1550,” John Thornton (2001) makes the foreign status of the dynasty 
disappear for lack of confirmation in what he considers primary sources. In-
stead of this “myth,” he prefers to invent his own origin story, according to 
which the Kongo kingdom was an internal political development among an 
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ethnically homogeneous population. It is difficult to say what kind of con-
firmation Thornton expected for the arrival of the stranger-prince Ntinu 
Wene of Vungu, among a people without writing some six kings before the 
Portuguese arrived. What is most relevant for the course of history and clearly 
documented, however, is that the foundation of the kingdom from across the 
Congo River by Ntinu Wene (aka Lukeni lua Nimi) was the official doctrine 
of Kongo kings of the seventeenth century—and judging by certain chronicles, 
the widely known charter tradition of their rule. The kingdom was established 
by one “Motinu Wene,” youngest son of the king of “Bungo,” according to the 
anonymous author of the Historia do Reino Congo, written in the first quarter 
of the seventeenth century: “In Bungo, there are still kings that communicate 
with the Kings of the Congo, sending gifts to each other. In that way, they rec-
ognize themselves as kinsmen, descended from one and the same family tree” 
(in Sousa 1999: 509–11). Nevertheless, in writing of the origin of the kingdom, 
Thornton does not recount the Ntinu Wene narrative, except for certain inci-
dents that are written off as “mythical,” “ideological,” or “cosmological”—which 
is to say, unbelievable. On the same grounds, the Australian Dreamtime, the 
annual visit of the god Lono at the New Year in Hawai‘i, the doings of the 
gods and the ancestors by which Maori know themselves and emplot their 
own deeds—in brief all such foundational traditions, which indeed would be 
hard to prove actually happened, all these precedents of action and principles of 
structure, could now be omitted from the histories of the peoples in question. 
By conflating a paradigmatic history with a syntagmatic one, thus reducing the 
template of historical action to the issue of whether it was “the literal truth” 
(Thornton 2001: 108), the historian now bases his history of a nonliterate so-
ciety on whether certain events referring to a remote past can be documented 
from primary sources. 
For too many anthropologists and historians both, an axiomatic opposition 
between “myth” and “historical reality,” although quite the reverse of their es-
sential identity in the societies concerned, has been an epistemological ground 
of their study. Fictional by the Standard Average European understanding of 
the term, “myth” becomes doubly implausible when it is functionally explained 
away as a mystification of a stratified political order serving as its legitimation—
for then it could hardly reflect “historical reality,” since it is meant to conceal 
it. In their otherwise valuable survey of sub-Saharan African history, Robert O. 
Collins and James M. Burns (2007: 117) warn that the oral traditions of royal 
courts in Interlacustrine East Africa, insofar as they are often shrouded in myth, 
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given to hagiography, or enlisted in current political interests, would “obscure 
historical reality.” From this it follows that we should discount the historical 
relevance of the ubiquitous stranger-king traditions of the region: 
Virtually all the oral traditions of the kingdoms of the Lake Plateau attribute 
their founding to the arrival of itinerant heroes from far away .  .  .  . African 
dynasties throughout the continent have claimed external origins, justifiably or 
not, to legitimate their claims to authority. Scholars have been somewhat re-
luctant to accept the necessity to have the appearance of “the great warrior” or 
“hunter-stranger from afar” to explain state formation in Africa. Its very simplic-
ity obscures what was probably a more complex process, and the story of warrior-
pastoralists stimulating political centralization is reminiscent of the discredited 
Hamitic myth of John Hanning Speke . . . .
 Like Bunyoro and many other states of the Lake Plateau, the oral tradi-
tions emphasized the role of northern migrants in the founding of their king-
doms. Such traditions should be viewed skeptically, however, since they reflect 
the living memories of rulers, not subjects, and are devoted to insuring their 
legitimacy. (2007: 123)
That the foreign origin of the ruling dynasty would promote its legitimacy 
seems counterintuitive on the face of it, but it becomes all the more so in the 
case of Bunyoro, since the Nilotic founders of the historic dynasty were by their 
own traditions a rude and unsophisticated lot compared to the Bantu rulers of 
the fabled Kitara empire they replaced (Beattie 1971). The same would be true 
of the relatively crude or obscure foreign ancestors of the kings of Kongo, Mossi, 
certain Swahili cities, and a number of other such realms established by upstarts 
from the galactic peripheries. Whether the foreign origins of the kingship are 
lowly or godly, however, we shall see that there are profound structural reasons 
for their existence. In any case, the traditions of stranger-kingship—which are 
much more complex than this formulaic reduction to the advent of a great hunt-
er or warrior would allow—are typically as well known to the subject peoples as 
they are to the rulers, if in certain contexts either may relate rather self-serving 
versions.3 Yet most regrettably and ironically, the effect of all such reductions 
3. See above on the wide knowledge and relevance for social action of the Ndembu 
royal tradition among ordinary villagers. For an example of differing commoner and 
chiefly versions: the Shambala commoners emphasize their voluntary acceptance of 
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of stranger-kingship traditions to speculative political functions is precisely to 
ignore their historical reality, not only as presence but as cause—their own his-
toricity. For inasmuch as these charter narratives lay down the fundamental 
relations between rulers and ruled, inasmuch as they are constantly rehearsed in 
rituals and continuously practiced economically as well as politically, to dismiss 
them as “mythical” or “ideological” is to efface their profound influence on the 
course of events. Inscribed in memories and practiced as habitus, the tradition 
lives on as a historical force—often for centuries. 
Not to deny that “what actually happened” is important to know. In the 
many actual cases of a stranger-kingship structure without an event, that is, of 
native kings who become strangers rather than strangers who become native 
kings, this is important to know, since here history consists precisely in such 
inventions—however seemingly without material, formal, or efficient cause. In 
this connection, the claim of the rulers of the West African realms of Kanem-
Bornu, the Hausa Emirates, the Yoruba states, and others that they descended 
from exalted personages of Mecca or Baghdad—or else, as in the instance of 
Borgu kings, that they come from one Kisra, the reputed enemy of Muham-
mad—reminds us of what is always implied in stranger-king formations: that 
the societies in question exist in larger, hierarchically ordered fields of intercul-
tural relations. It follows that stranger-kingships are generated neither by inter-
nal conditions nor by external relations alone, but in a dialogue between them. 
Africa probably deserves the title of the locus classicus of stranger-kingship. 
Of the many hundreds of African kingdoms large and small known to anthro-
pology and history, it would be hard to find any that are not ruled by a dynasty 
of foreign derivation. Constituted in charter traditions, rehearsed in periodic 
rituals, and practiced in everyday social and economic relations, the dual divi-
sion of society into indigenous subjects and rulers of external origins is here the 
normal if not the universal form of state. From traditions recorded in European 
travelers’ accounts to the detailed reports of modern ethnographers—notably 
Aidan Southall on the Alur, Ian Cunnison on the Kazembe kingdom of the 
Luapulu, Michel Izard on the Yatenga Mossi, Jacques Lombard and Marjorie 
Stewart on Borgu kingdoms, among many others—sociopolitical formations of 
this description dominate the literature from every quarter of the continent. The 
the chief, given his juridical functions and spiritual powers, while maintaining he 
holds power on their sufferance; while the chiefs emphasize or justify their coercive 
authority (Winans 1962: 77).
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precolonial states ruled by stranger-kings noted in Lucy Mair’s African king-
doms (1977; not a long book) include Oyo and other Yoruba kingdoms, Luba, 
Lunda, Kongo, Benin, Zande, Alur, Dahomey, Asante, Borgu, Malawi, Ngoni, 
Ndembu, Nyoro, Ganda, Rwanda, Nyakyusa, Sotho, and a good number more. 
Whole regions of the continent—such as the Lake Plateau just men-
tioned—have been identified as realms of stranger-kingship (cf. Southall [1956] 
2004: 229). Similarly, Kajsa Ekholm (1978: 121) observes of Central Africa: “In 
fact most of the ideology of Central African societies is marked by a dualism in 
which it is imagined that the population consists of two groups, the conquer-
ors and the vanquished original inhabitants. The conquerors are ‘men’ and their 
subjects ‘owners.’” What is mostly imagined is the “conquest,” not the dualism of 
alien rulers and native subjects as such, which is not only ethnographically real 
but, according to Luc de Heusch, structurally intelligible. Referring broadly to 
West and Central Africa, de Heusch (1982b: 26–27) makes the critical obser-
vation that kingship does not develop organically and internally from lineage-
ordered societies. In effect, he contradicts all those who since classical times 
have supposed the state evolves naturally from the extended family through the 
intermediate form of village or lineage systems. In a golden passage which is key 
to the understanding of stranger-kingship in general, de Heusch writes: 
Everything happens as if the very structure of a lineage-based society is not ca-
pable of engendering dialectical developments on the political plane without the 
intervention of a new symbolic structure. It is not by chance that so many mythi-
cal traditions in West Africa as in Central Africa present the founder of the 
kingship as a foreign hunter, the holder of a more efficacious magic. Whatever 
the historical origin of this politico-symbolic institution, mythical diachrony al-
ways involves an intervention of exterior events, whether or not the sound of 
arms accompanies them. Royalty thus appears as an ideological revolution, the 
instigator of which ancient history does not ignore .  .  .  . The sovereignty, the 
magical source of power, always comes from elsewhere, from a claimed original 
place, exterior to society. (1982b: 26–27)
Speaking of Africa generally, Jan Vansina (1992: 61) observes that “elite migra-
tion” is a favored theme of traditions of state formation. Coming alone or with 
a few followers, the dynastic founder is a foreigner, often a hunter; and though 
the numbers of the newcomers are small, the sociopolitical consequences of 
their advent are “spectacular.” In the same vein, while noting the analogous 
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pattern of kingdom origins among the Mossi and related West African peoples, 
Dominique Zahan (1961: 6n) writes: “The traditions of African states on both 
sides of the equator practically without exception speak of the two social com-
ponents: the aboriginal and the foreign or the invader. Nearly always they thus 
explain the origin of the state among these peoples.” 
In an extended essay on “The internal African frontier,” Igor Kopytoff 
(1989: 60), recounting “the standard myth of the founding of most African 
polities,” tells of the founders leaving their place of origin, entering a frontier, 
confronting the local population, “and instituting a new political order that 
was the origin of the society currently in being.” In what is effectively a notice 
of the residual sovereignty marking the native people’s status in these socie-
ties, Kopytoff observes that from their perspective, “the polity had issued out 
of the acceptance by the subjects of the ruler, and it continued to exist because 
of it. The rulers were intruders, outsiders, aliens, late comers” (ibid.). This also 
implies that stranger-king formations are basically contractual—for all the 
usual talk of conquest. A few pages on, Kopytoff observes that the alien rulers 
institute a new political era by taking on the local trappings and symbols of 
legitimacy. Hence “the crucial point in Africa” is that by way of the “compact” 
entailed in his ritual incorporation, the stranger-king is legitimated by the 
indigenous people. “In the constitutional perspective of the subjects,” Kopy-
toff writes, “the people existed before the rulership existed since they were 
the grantors of authority; this was congruent with the subjects’ paradigmatic 
myth of their precedence” (ibid.: 64–65). Consider, then, that the structure is 
inherently temporal as well as hierarchical, and that the encompassment of the 
native people in the rule of the stranger is effected through the encompass-
ment of the stranger by the native people—all of which will be illustrated 
shortly. For now notice that in Kopytoff ’s own wording this history was made 
paradigmatically. 
Recent research thus confirms what Lucy Mair (1977: 1) wrote on this ac-
count decades ago: “As the prehistory of Africa is reconstructed, it seems often 
possible to trace the imposition of chiefly authority by outsiders on ‘tribes with-
out rulers.’” Even tribes which are sometimes supposed to be without rulers, 
such as Tallensi—so classified and described by Meyer Fortes in the influential 
tome African political systems (1940)—turn out to in fact have them: in this case 
in the persons of immigrant Namoo chiefs from the Mamprusi kingdom peace-
fully settled upon the native Tale, who by ancestral right remain the “owners” 
of Taleland. As late as the mid-twentieth century, the Namoo chiefs were still 
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appointed by a representative of the Mamprusi king. What Fortes had encoun-
tered was a marginal chiefdom in a regional galaxy of interdependent polities 
in northern Nigeria, including the substantial kingdoms of Dagomba and the 
Mossi, all of whom traced common descent to Mamprusi ancestors. Perhaps the 
peripheral position of the Tallensi accounts for their rather basic dual system 
in which the ethnically distinguished Namoo of aristocratic external origins—
their main ancestor in most tellings was a disenfranchised and exiled son of a 
Mamprusi king—effectively divided power with important Tale lineage leaders 
presiding over the productivity of the land as Priests of the Earth. In Fortes’ de-
scription, this “fundamental cleavage” in Tale society, headed respectively by the 
chiefs (naam) and the earth priests (tenda’ana), reads like an elementary form of 
African stranger-kingship:
The complementary functions of chiefship and tenda’ana-ship are rooted di-
rectly in social structures but as also validated by myths of origin and backed 
by the most powerful religious sanctions of the ancestor cult and the cult of 
the Earth. The Namoos are believed to be descendants of immigrant Mamprusi 
who fled from [the capital] Mamprugu many generations ago. Hence, they claim 
remote kinship with the ruling aristocracy of Mampurugu. Their chiefship is 
derived from that of the Paramount Chief of the Mamprusi, and this is the ulti-
mate sanction of its politico-religious status in Tale society. The Talis and other 
clans that have the tenda’ana-ship claim to be the aboriginal inhabitants of the 
country, and the ritual sanctions of their office are derived from the Earth cult. 
([1949] 1969: 3–4). 
One is constantly reminded of the cleavage between Namoos and non-Namoos 
. . . for they are continually contrasting themselves. (1945: 25) 
One might add that the Tale priests of the earth, like their counterparts 
throughout the continent, are known as the successors of the leaders of the 
aboriginal people, which helps explain their own sometimes-appearance as fig-
ures of chiefly authority. Indeed, the priests may represent the aristocracy of 
a former stranger-king regime, as in the cognate structures of Mossi states—
whose priestly order notably interested Sir James Frazer (1918: 85–87). Citing 
an account of Louis Tauxier, Frazer observed that the Mossi rulers, as strangers 
in the land, were not entitled to minister to the local sprits, the divinities of the 
bearing earth:
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It was only the vanquished, the ancient owners of the soil, with which they [the 
rulers] continued in good relations, who were qualified for that. Hence the po-
litical head of the aborigines was bound to become a religious chief under the 
rule of the Mossi. Thus . . . the king (Moro-Naba) never himself offers the sac-
rifices to Earth at Wagadugu, nor does he allow such sacrifices to be offered by 
his minister of religion, the Gande-Naba. He lays the duty on the king of Waga-
dugu (Wagadugu-Naba), the grandson of the aborigines, who as such is viewed 
favourably by the local divinities. (Tauxier in Frazer 1918: 86)
Note also Fortes’ observation of the functional complementarity between the 
Namoo chiefs and the earth-priest leaders of the indigenous Talis, even as “one 
is constantly reminded of the cleavage” between the groups. Here as in many 
similar dual regimes, there is an oppositional tension in the relationship be-
tween the native people and their foreign-derived (and -identified) ruler: a ten-
sion that, among other expressions, is often a feature of royal installation rituals. 
But as will become apparent in the following discussion, the native and foreign 
components of the chiefdom or kingdom are each functionally incomplete with-
out the other: whereas together they make a social, material, and cosmological 
totality. Hence their enduring coexistence—on the condition of their difference. 
ON THE WAY TO THE KINGDOM
Charter narratives of the advent of the African stranger-hero consistently fea-
ture a number of themes that prefigure fundamental attributes of his future 
kingship. Three that are especially pertinent to the old Kongo regime are singled 
out here. First, to borrow from Aidan Southall ([1956] 2004) on the Alur, the 
topos of the “turbulent prince” or the “troublesome son”: the hero is an ambitious 
offspring of the king in his own land, destined to rule by nature but condemned 
to exile for some fault or by losing out in a conflict royal with other pretenders 
to the kingship. Second, what Luc de Heusch (1958, 1962) called “the exploit”: 
the hero commits a crime against kinship and common morality—incest, frat-
ricide, parricide, murder of a close kinsman, adultery with a wife of his father, 
etc.—on the journey to his kingdom; perhaps it was the reason for his exile. 
Third, the theme Jane Guyer (1993: 257) refers to as “capture”: the hero in the 
course of his migration demonstrates his prowess as a great hunter and/or a 
great warrior, thus proving his ability to control the vital and mortal powers of 
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the wild—and thereby, provided such powers are properly domesticated, dem-
onstrating his capacity to rule people. 
The diaspora of turbulent princes is a main source of stranger-king for-
mation. The succession struggles that give rise to it often go beyond fraternal 
rivalries, engaging a larger network of interested royal kin and loyal followers. 
For besides the force of ascribed rank or customary rules of succession which 
in principle disqualify princely candidates who nonetheless may have kingly 
ambitions, certain structural conditions function to expand and intensify these 
conflicts. In the common case of royal polygyny, many of the sons of the king 
who compete to succeed him are paternal half-brothers; and as each is backed 
by his own maternal kinsmen, their interpersonal contention becomes a multi-
party conflict among collective factions. As, for example, in Ankole succession 
struggles, where, “even in a quite recent epoch, the primary heirs . . . each aided 
by their maternal kin, entered into a bloody conflict that lasted several months” 
(de Heusch 1966: 28). Or as Marjorie Stewart wrote of the Borgu kingdoms: 
“When the throne became vacant and competition for its possession became 
intense among the princes, matrilineal relatives of each prince played an im-
portant role” (1993: 92). Hence the well-known interregna of many African 
kingdoms, notable for their duration and carnage. 
The princes not only menace one another, they may well be a threat to the 
general peace and even the life of the king. “For all those princes aspiring to the 
throne,” writes Father Crazzolara of the Shilluk, “the main obstacle is the ruling 
Yeth [the king], Therefore they bide expectantly for his demise; and many a spear 
has been flung by royal hands in the past against the Yeth” (1951: 134). Azande, 
Shilluk, Ganda, Alur, and Borgu kings, among others, dispatched such unruly 
sons to peripheral provinces, often to the areas of their maternal kin, where they 
became semi-independent stranger-rulers themselves and potentially the found-
ers of autonomous kingdoms. The effect is what Audrey Richards described for 
the Interlacustrine region as “multi-kingdom tribes”: “Throughout the whole In-
terlacustrine area,“ she wrote, “the sons who became princes over subdistricts 
showed a tendency to assert their independence and even rebel against their fa-
thers, forming separate states in what are called multi-kingdom tribes” (1960: 34).
A like effect may follow from the phenomenon that Hildred and Clifford 
Geertz (1975) identified as “sinking status” in Balinese royal lineages internal-
ly ranked by seniority of descent—often also found in African aristocracies.4 
4. See p. 431, where this diagram is reproduced and discussed by Graeber.
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Owing to the growth of the senior line, the collateral kinsmen will be pro-
gressively distanced in status and disqualified for office over time—unless they 
can muster the means to take by cunning or force what they can no longer 
claim by right. Alternatively, they can move out as would-be kings in search 
of a chosen people. It is relevant in this connection that many of the ruling 
aristocracy of African states, inasmuch as they are possessed of marvelous pow-
ers by divine gift and entitled to rule by ancestry, have been known to exhibit a 
certain libido dominandi. “The vocation of every Mossi,” writes Michel Izard in 
reference to the ruling group, “is to exercise power (naam) and thus to be a chief 
(naaba), to command (so) and thus to have a command (solem)” (1985: 20). Of 
the Shambala of Tanganyika, Edgar Winans (1962: 91) noted: “As all royal clan 
members consider themselves rulers, an attitude which is reinforced by most or 
all of their subjects, and as only a few hold regular and legitimate chiefship, then 
tension in the system gives rise to the expansion of the state.” According to the 
robust Kongo tradition, Ntinu Wene’s insatiable desires of rule were likewise 
frustrated by his junior status among the sons of the king of Vungu—a modest 
realm north of the Congo River—which was what moved him to cross the river 
into the territory he would organize as the kingdom of Kongo, In general, the 
centrifugal political impetus generated by the turbulent princes is probably the 
most important source of stranger-king formation on the continent.
Having broken with their own kinsmen, stranger-heroes such as Ntinu 
Wene then dialectically negate the kinship order they are on their way to 
subdue by “exploits” that signify their power to do so. Here are the crimes of 
fratricide, parricide, incest, and the like, which break through the limits that, 
as Luc de Heusch observed, represent the inability of lineage systems to au-
tonomously transcend their own structure and give rise to a kingly state.5 De 
Heusch himself offered pertinent examples taken from the usual practice in 
royal installation rituals of rehearsing the dominant tradition of the origin of 
the kingship. Re-creating in this way the original stranger-hero, the Lunda 
king (Mwata Kombana) of a number of Pende groups in Zaïre ritually unites 
with his sister upon acceding to power; and several of his close kinsmen are also 
secretly killed so that their ghosts may serve him (de Heusch 1982b: 19). In the 
more complex case of the Luba king, he reproduces the “shameful legacy” of 
5. Credit to E. E. Evans-Pritchard too, who thus understood the imposition of the 
rule of the Sanusi brethren over the segmentary lineage order of the Bedouin of 
Cyrenaica (1949).
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the founder of an earlier stranger-king regime—who was also the brother of his 
maternal ancestress—by uniting with his mothers and sisters at his investiture; 
and his own daughters and brothers’ daughters become his wives. In this way, 
de Heusch observes, the king combines the incestuous qualities of the ancient 
regime with the superior culture of his own; and most importantly, “the Luba 
king finds himself projected into a zone of absolute solitude, beyond and above 
the profane cultural order” (1982a: 32). The founder-hero of the Nupe, Tsoede, 
effectively did the same when he introduced human sacrifice by making his 
mother’s brother the first victim (Nadel 1942: 74). In still other traditions, the 
crime against kinship had occurred in the turbulent prince’s own homeland and 
was the cause of his banishment. The ancestor of Shambala rulers, Mbegha, 
was deprived of the kingship in his natal country as a result of a demonstrable 
blemish of his person that mystically killed his relations: “because as an infant 
he had cut his upper teeth first, his presence was causing his kinsmen to die” 
(Feierman 1974: 43). The willingness of the youngest son of the Kerekere “con-
queror” of the Zambezi Valley to commit “the forbidden act” of incest with his 
own sister when his older brothers refused is indeed what made him the heir 
to his father’s rule (Lan 1985: 86). Sovereign exceptionalism: Schmitt avant 
la lettre.
Just so, when Ntinu Wene killed his pregnant “aunt” because she refused to 
pay the proper toll for crossing the Congo River, the crime not only initiated 
his departure from Vungu, but defined him as a “king” (ntinu) and prefigured 
his rule of Kongo. The report of this tradition from the Capuchin mission-
ary Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi de Montecuccolo (in Kongo in 1664–65) re-
lates that the woman was Ntinu Wene’s father’s sister—a paternal affine in the 
BaKongo matrilineal order—and that the deed infuriated his royal father, Nimi 
a Nzima, who wished to punish him (Sousa 1999). But this crime against kin-
ship—and perhaps lèse majesté to boot—was the mark of Ntinu Wene’s royal 
nature, for the exploit moved his henchmen to proclaim him “king” (ntinu). In-
deed his following increased rapidly in the aftermath, upon which he led them 
across the Congo River, and embarked on a career of conquest and diplomacy 
that appended the state of Kongo to the kingly title he had already manifested. 
(Note that by tradition the conquest was not the origin of Wene’s kingship but 
rather the other way around: his kingship was a precondition of his martial 
success.) Reflecting on this narrative, Georges Balandier underscored the same 
break with tribal society and the same manifestation of the power to create a 
new and greater order that Luc de Heusch had perceived:
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By killing his “kin,” Ntinu Wene acquires the state of solitude necessary for the 
domination of men and the consecration of power .  .  .  . The defiance of the 
fundamental principles of society is the mark of an exceptional being . . . . He 
has denied the ancient order; he has acquired an autonomy which can only be 
explained by the possession of extraordinary powers. . . . It is on the basis of these 
powers that he will construct outside the prevailing form a new society subject to 
his law only. (Balandier 1968: 37, emphasis in the original)
Instructive, you could say, is the contrast between the take of the anthropolo-
gists Balandier and de Heusch on such feats of royal exceptionalism and the 
interpretation of the Ntinu Wene episode by the historian John Thornton. 
Thornton finds the charter traditions of the Kongo kingship as a rule defective 
because of “the difficult problem of linking the secondary elements of tradi-
tion, like the narrative origin story, to documented reality” (2001: 96). This is 
like saying that for lack of any link to documented reality, we should have to 
eliminate the crucifixion of Jesus, let alone his resurrection, from an account of 
the nature and history of Christianity. Ironically, the particular fault Thornton 
finds with Kongo narratives, namely that they are only “interpretive histories” 
incorporating “secondary explanatory narrative,” is a good description of how he 
provides alternative interpretations that purportedly reveal the historical reali-
ties by means of his own native commonsense explanations. The effect is rather 
to substitute ethnocentric banalities for ethnographic realities.
Although with regard to Ntinu Wene’s murderous exploit, Cavazzi had 
commented that the BaKongo admired such bloodthirstiness, Thornton coun-
tered by a feckless analogy to the well-known story of the most Christian Kon-
go king Afonso (r. 1506–1543), who had his idolatrous mother buried alive “for 
the sake of the faith.” Despite repeated remonstration by the king, she refused 
to part with a traditional amulet. In what amounts to a “secondary explanatory 
narrative” with the added defect of substituting his own commonsensical motive 
for a deed infused with Kongo meanings of kinship horror and royal violence, 
Thornton opines that both kingly exploits were legitimating signs of a “ruler 
who upholds the law”—which is rather the opposite of what they were doing. 
In any case, neither story could be true, he concludes, and the Ntinu Wene 
tradition in particular “is a tale we must not take too seriously, given its ideologi-
cal significance” (ibid.: 109). Not take too seriously? Historiographic positivism 
would thus doubly distance itself from a historical anthropology: for in inviting 
us to commit the ethnological cardinal sin of not taking something too seriously 
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because the people concerned do so take it, Thornton thereupon assigns what 
they take seriously to the louche status of “ideology.” In the end, the truth value 
of the tradition for BaKongo having been ignored, so also is its effectiveness as 
a paradigmatic tradition thereafter neglected.
In any case, there is evidence early and late that exploits of kinship-killing 
are distinctive marks of Kongo kingship. Beside the stories of such deaths in 
royal installation rituals, Msgr. Cuvelier (1946: 288–89) tells of a certain clan 
device (other than the one vaunting King Afonso’s pious murder) that claims: 
“Nlaza Ntotela [King Nlaza] killed his mother (ngudi) in the public square of 
Mbanza Kongo [the capital], without anyone questioning him for it.” “This is 
a device,” Cuvelier adds, “adopted by certain clans that reigned in Kongo.” Nor 
were BaKongo kings the only rulers in the region who were renowned for so 
disposing of their mothers. Tired of his mother’s foretelling that a rival would 
usurp his power, Nkongolo, first divine king of the Luba, “dug a ditch with his 
own hands and buried his mother alive in it” (de Heusch 1962: 17). Indeed, 
according to the master ethnographer Wyatt MacGaffey, the ability to kill a 
near kinsman still signified chiefliness for Congolese people in the twentieth 
century:
Ideally the chief is a benevolent despot whose authentic relation to the ances-
tors is assured by some ordeal or test, such as a successful hunt for a particular 
kind of animal, or some other demonstration of the power to kill. Modern in-
formants said, “If we choose someone to be chief, we would require him to kill 
one of his nephews. If he could not, we would have to find someone else to be 
chief.” (1986: 176)
MacGaffey cites some legendary incidents in point, including one from the 
Yombe people in which the son who killed his brother at his father’s command 
secured the latter’s chiefly position and others of the family had to obey him. 
It is unlikely that these killings actually occurred; it is more likely they indicate 
that events which never happened can continue to have historic effects. Tradi-
tions need not have actually happened in order to then actually happen.
Resuming the journey of the stranger-prince: in the liminal period between 
leaving his own kingdom and establishing another, the hero proves his sacred 
violence is also a creative and beneficent power by controlling the ungoverned 
forces that everywhere pervade the African wild—and threaten to fatally pene-
trate the settled human communities. As Randall Packard reports for the Bashu 
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of eastern Zaïre, their world is divided between the opposing spheres of the 
regulated human “homestead” and an untamed “bush” (kisoki) that surrounds 
and perpetually menaces it with “wild animals and plants, dangerous spirits, 
powerful medicines, and climatic elements” (1981: 26). Erratic and/or violent 
in their natural state, these presences are the usual sources of illness, death, and 
dearth in the homestead. So even as elements of the bush are essential for hu-
man existence—raw materials, foods (especially meat), sunshine and rain—peo-
ple are in need of protection from many of them. Hence the distinctive figure 
of the hunter-king, who may also or alternatively be a warrior-king, and carry a 
reputation for capture or conquest even had his indigenous subjects voluntarily 
submitted to him (cf. Lombard 1965; Winans 1962). “Sacred violence” is the 
other side of a civilizing mission, as Balandier says of the advent of Ntinu Wene 
in Kongo. 
If his own Vungu people knew Ntinu Wene was a king because he killed 
his aunt, upon which he forsook his homeland for a career of foreign conquests, 
the native Shambala people were moved to make the foreign hunter Mbegha 
their king because he had killed a lion—indeed because he was a lion. Mbegha 
was the disinherited son of the king of Kilinde in the Usambari mountains who 
became a great hunter when forced into the wild. One night he killed a lion that 
was menacing Shambala people—which motivated them to make him king the 
next morning. “The man has killed a lion,” the people exclaimed, “The man is a 
lion” (Winans 1962: 80). Just so, on his way to the kingship, Mbegha lived the 
life of an animal, sheltering in rude camps and caves, and hunting wild pigs—a 
prized food that is also dangerous, whose capture would thus be a felicitous sign 
of kingly powers. Mbegha had occult knowledge of hunting and healing medi-
cines; and after he fled his native land, he acquired a packet of magic that al-
lowed him to control the clouds and the rain (thus agricultural fertility), and to 
foretell future events (ibid.). As Steven Feierman observed, however, the hero’s 
life-giving powers were the obverse side of his destructive magic:
The justification for the king’s right to destroy is that of a rain magician: a ma-
gician of the fertility of the land must possess and dominate the entire land in 
order to be effective . . . . So if the king is a lion, if he eats the wealth of the whole 
countryside, then the land will be fertile. (1974: 59)
In everyday conversation in Shambaai one often hears that rain magic, the key to 
fertility, began with Mbegha. His magical powers, which were the powers to kill, 
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and which derived from his wildness, were also the powers to bring fertility to 
Shambaai . . . . When all Shambaai became his possession, he was transformed 
from a killer to one whose power led to an increase of life. (1974: 62)
As such metahuman powers of life and death come from the outside, so do the 
human rulers who will instantiate them inside. (Ergo, Frazer cogitates.) And 
given such cosmic powers, one can see why a foreign identity is an enduring 
attribute of the ruling aristocracy: an ethnic distinction that may well survive 
their cultural assimilation by the aboriginal people—as the recurrent historic 
expression of a paradigmatic “myth.” To follow the argument of Aidan South-
all ([1956] 2004: 230), another such historical metaphor of a mythical reality 
was the early success of stranger-colonial rule in Africa, based likewise on the 
Europeans’ apparent control of marvelous potencies: in this case as evidenced by 
their extraordinary wealth and terrifying firearms—that is to say, powers of life 
and death. “These things,” writes Southall, 
gave the quality of a unique marvel to their first appearance among any African 
people. To the latter, the newcomers appeared to have a complete mastery over 
the material world, and a degree of control over life and death through their med-
icines and their firearms which was generally terrifying. Even after the first shock 
wore off, the indelible expression of a mastery of fantastic forces of unknown 
extent remained. This induced many African peoples to submit to the establish-
ment of European administration with little opposition . . . . ([1956] 2004: 232)
Only that, when the realities of European rule set in, frustration and resistance 
ensued in proportion to the extent that people’s initial expectations had been 
deceived. 
To return to the precolonial marvels, Mbegha was hardly the only African 
king identified with great beasts of the bush. The Dahomey ruling line famously 
descended from a leopard, as did the Igala kings by one well-known history—
by other, subdominant versions, they were immigrant princes from Jukun or 
Yoruba royalty. All this helps explain why King Joao II of Kongo (r. 1688–post 
1716) was pleased to style himself the one who “tramples the lion in the king-
dom of his mother” (Thornton 2001: 98). Indeed, the phrase distills the whole 
process of stranger-king formation to its essence: the synthesis of an outsider 
endowed of transcendent powers with the indigenous masters of the bearing 
earth through his union with an esteemed daughter of the latter, thus giving rise 
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to a dynasty that in its paternal and maternal ancestry combines the fundamen-
tal sources of life—and death. 
ADVENT OF THE STRANGER-KING
Considering the process of kingdom formation as described in the historical 
traditions of rulers and ruled alike, conquest is too often invoked as the origin of 
sovereign power, the ferocious attributes of the stranger culture-hero notwith-
standing. In this connection, with the Alur and other African peoples in mind, 
probably conquest has been overrated in Western scholarly traditions since 
Ludwig Gumplowicz (1899) mistakenly assumed that the ubiquity of an ethnic 
distinction between rulers and ruled in Africa and elsewhere was evidence that 
the state must have so originated. But Mbegha the hunter and lion-killer domi-
nated the Shambala more by gifts of meat than by force; and in any case, the 
native people themselves claim to have initiated the process: “Whether or not it 
is true in an historical sense, nearly all commoners claimed that their ancestors 
voluntarily asked for chiefs, and, similarly, chiefs do not claim to rule by right 
of conquest” (Winans 1962: 76). Besides the gifts of meat, Mbegha’s kingship 
owed more to making love than making war, for it was established when various 
villages, competing with each other by seeking a powerful ruler of their own, of-
fered women to him and took the son born from the alliance for their chief. The 
elements of this process as narrated by Shambala are frequently repeated around 
the continent; the stranger-prince is peacefully accepted by the indigenous peo-
ple, sometimes even solicited by them from some prestigious foreign king. 
The kingship narrative of the Ekie of southern Zaïre is almost identical to 
the Shambala’s: a great hunter of noble Luba origins kills a leopard menacing 
the main native village; he is invited to settle, given a wife, and their son be-
comes the first ruler of a united Ekie kingdom (Fairley 1987). Again, from West 
Africa, “Igala myths describing the origin of the kingship and the subsequent 
emergence of the state imply harmony and co-operation in the fusion of indig-
enous and immigrant elements; the transfer of sovereignty to the royal clan was 
made voluntarily and the indigenous clans were incorporated with their basic 
structure unchanged” (Boston 1968: 198). And East Africa: 
The oral traditions of the Fipa suggest that what happened was a peaceful takeo-
ver rather than a violent conquest. The newcomers did not dispel the chief of 
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Milansi, the ancient center of authority in Ufipa, but allowed him and his suc-
cessors to remain in Milansi as chiefs of that village and the country for a few 
miles about, and to be the senior pries of all Ufipa. (Willis in Roberts 1968: 85) 
So were alien dynasties also peacefully founded in great kingdoms such as Benin 
in West Africa or Bunyoro-Kitara in East Africa, among others, as well as in 
lesser realms such as Acholi, Sogo, Bashu, Tallensi, or Alur, among numerous 
others. In some instances, what passes for “conquest” is the usurpation of a pre-
vious regime, as Audrey Richards remarked for certain Interlacustrine societies. 
It appears that more often than not, according to the broadly accepted tradi-
tions, the foreign rule was imposed without violence. There may be continuing 
tensions between the native people and their foreign-derived rulers, but usually 
sooner than later, the differences are synthesized in a unified kingdom of ritually 
and otherwise complementary components. So the question becomes: What 
makes the alien dominance legitimate?
In Aidan Southall’s ethnographic experience, the Alur stranger-chief was 
more revered for his ability to stop war than to raise war, and more to bring or 
withhold rain than to muster punitive force. “Had his position depended on the 
command of force or on personal prowess in war it appears that many units of 
Alur domination of other peoples would never have come into existence, for no 
irresistible force was brought to bear in their establishment” ([1956] 2004: 246). 
Moreover, Southall was prepared to generalize the phenomenon: “The achieve-
ment of the Alur, in building up a new society out of diverse ethnic elements 
submitting to Luo domination, seems to represent a type of largely peaceful 
development which has been important elsewhere in the region, and which has 
so far received little attention in African studies” (ibid.: 234). Or as he wrote in 
another context: 
It is very hard in this secular age, even in imagination, to conceive of one ethnic 
group submitting and accepting subordination to another without some kind of 
coercive force or solid material inducement, simply under the impact of belief 
in more potent supernatural power. But such occurences evidently did occur in 
many parts of the world, over and again, even if forceful conquest was more 
common. (1988: 55)
There is no doubt that the currency of arguments in the human sciences pitting 
“society against the state,” with their emphasis on the “weapons of the weak” 
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wielded against draconian state power, has empirical as well as moral warrant, 
but it is not always or often pertinent to the kind of state formation at issue 
here. In regard to the too common scholarly claim that stranger-king narratives 
are fundamentally “ideological,” having been perpetrated by the ruling class 
to legitimate their dominance, it should not be overlooked that agency in the 
matter also comes from the native subjects. In the same way as the Israelites 
petitioned Samuel for “a king like the other nations,” the indigenous peoples 
may well have their own good reasons for acquiring a ruler. “It appears,” writes 
Southall, “that many groups entered the Alur system to escape from factors op-
erating within, not outside, their own societies” ([1956] 2004: 234). The spread 
of Alur lineages that occurred in almost every generation owing to the hiving off 
of the paramount’s sons was not only attributable to their ambitions; it was also 
significantly abetted by “the fact that the chief ’s sons were a desirable element 
in any preexisting settlement” (ibid.: 54). Accordingly, Alur have traditions and 
rituals of chiefly installation which are rather the opposite of a foreign conquest: 
it is the native Lendu or Madi communities who sometimes literally and oft-
times ceremonially “kidnap” the son of an Alur ruler—to have a chief like other 
native groups (ibid.: 182ff.). 
Yet if the agency in stranger-king formation may well come from inside the 
indigenous community, it necessarily involves an engagement in a larger politi-
cal field composed of more and less powerful societies. The peoples concerned 
have been well aware of these gradients of power and sophistication—can we 
not say, these differences of “civilization”?—and they importantly influence 
movements of persons, groups, and cultural forms between the differences. No-
tions of cultural evolution were not the first invented by nineteenth-century 
anthropologists. 
Virtually by definition, certainly as a rule, stranger-kingdoms were situated 
in regional, hierarchically ordered fields of interacting societies: core–periph-
ery configurations such as Stanley Tambiah (1976, 1985, 1987) described for 
Southeast Asia as “galactic polities.” Here is an almost ideal-typical description, 
very much like the regional Southeast Asian galactic orders, in this case regard-
ing the Goba kingdoms of the Zambezi:
Even petty Goba kings had appointees serving as palace guards, warriors, officials, 
and henchmen who bolstered their power at the center. They also had territorial 
subchiefs similar to those in East African Interlacustrine kingdoms. . . . These 
subchiefs exercised essentially the same kinds of power that the king formally 
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exercised over the entire territory, and each maintaned a more modest version 
of the king’s staff.  .  .  . The kingdom’s sovereignty was relative, altenating [sic] 
through a series of zones of declining central power. There was so little control 
over the peripheries that some of them, in practice, joined other power chains 
that linked them one and sometimes several neighboring kingdoms. (Lancaster 
1989: 108)
Just so, the galactic polity comprises a number of kingdoms and chiefdoms in 
varying degrees of subjugation to a dominant central state, the administrative, 
tributary, and cultural reach of which generally declines in proportion to dis-
tance from the capital. The peripheral realms often continue to function un-
der their traditional rulers, provided they maintain their tributary obligations. 
Southall (1988) described the like as a “segmentary state,” adding that the ex-
alted magical status of the central ruler typically extends further than his actual 
authority. This is also to say that marginal societies, being thus dominated cul-
turally before they are in fact, are in significant measure attracted to the center.
Reporting on the satellite Pabir sultanate of the Bornu “empire” (in present-
day northeastern Nigeria), Ronald Cohen (1976, 1981)offers an exemplary de-
scription of the intercultural transactions in galactic polities, including the for-
mation of stranger-kingships and chiefdoms in the outlying sectors. The central 
Bornu kingdom of Kanuri-speaking people was founded in the late fifteenth/
early sixteenth century amidst great turmoil, forcing the local peoples to adapt 
to or otherwise flee from the developing predatory state. In the event, a ring of 
highly organized secondary kingdoms were formed along the southern edge 
of Bornu, including the Bura-speaking realm studied by Cohen. Here an im-
migrant ruling aristocracy from Bornu was established among the local Bura 
peasantry. As the tradition goes,
A small group of migrants under Yamta-ra-walla, the hero-founder of the royal 
clan who came from the Borno [Bornu] capital where he had failed in the 
succession to the throne [sic]. These adventurers subdued many of the locals, 
married Bura women, and settled down. They are said to have learned the local 
language and customs, but retained their own methods of warfare, the con-
cept of political centrism, and a sense of superiority to the local population. 
These, then, according to legend were the original Pabir, and from them stems 
that peculiar variant [polity] that resembles the more complex cultures to the 
north. (Cohen 1976: 200)
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From the sixteenth century, the Sultans of the Bura realm became subordinates 
of the Bornu rulers, tributary to them materially as well as culturally. Like the 
Bornu potentates, these Pabir were not only Muslim—by contrast to Bura peas-
ants, who later were largely Christianized—but they also adopted Kanuri titles 
from Bornu, as well as dress styles, house styles, and Kanuri speech, among 
many other items. They even adopted Kanuri cross-cousin terms and marriage, 
in order to marry endogamously, unlike the exogamous Bura clans. The Bura, 
however, remained “owners” and priestly masters of the country, where their 
original ancestors had made covenants with the local spirits.6
In their actual-historical situation, galactic polities in various states of de-
velopment or decline exhibit a variety of regional patterns: from centralized 
“empires” like the old Bunyoro-Kitara realm, or the Bornu and Lunda “empires,” 
through multiple kingdom orders like Azande, to a series of greater and lesser 
domains acknowledging the spiritual authority of a quondam galactic center 
that has become politically decentralized like the Borgu kingdoms—and ap-
parently Kongo before the Ntinu Wene regime (see below). Historians tell that 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Bunyoro, centered in a territory 
ranging south from Lake Albert, was ringed by a variety of smaller tributary 
kingdoms and chiefdoms, beyond which “other small stayed usually independ-
ent of Nyoro armies: Buganda on the east . . . and Rwanda on the south . . . are 
examples” (Alpers and Ehret 1975: 472). Moreover, Buganda, which was des-
tined to largely displace Bunyoro as the core state of its own “empire,” illustrates 
how great stranger-kingdoms may be developed from the galactic margins by 
smaller states—again, like the takeover of Kongo from Vungu across the Con-
go—as well as extended from the center by powerful armies or the migrations 
of turbulent princes.7
Another development on the northern borders of Bunyoro, leading to the 
creation of the Acholi chiefdoms under Luo domination, is an instructive ex-
ample at once of stranger-king formation in the context of galactic-political 
6. See chapters 4 and 6 for a fuller discussion of galactic polities.
7. The takeover of Bantu polities by marginal Luo immigrants, followed by the cultural 
assimilation of the latter by the former, was a common process in the Interlacustrine 
area. Alpers and Ehret (1975: 455) write: “over most of northern Busoga, the 
assimilation of Luo elements by the Bantu speakers preceded in accordance with 
the Interlacustrine pattern of immediately preceding centuries—immigrants 
acculturating to local language and customs but being able to move into positions 
of chiefly authority.”
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conditions and of the advantages accruing therefrom to the indigenous popula-
tion—especially to its leaders (ibid.: 478; Atkinson 1989; Girling 1960). The 
process began in the late seventeenth century and in the usual fashion when two 
Paluo groups which had supported the losing side in a Nyoro succession strug-
gle were forced to emigrate. Moving northward, they were able to set them-
selves up as rulers—complete with the paraphernalia and concepts of Nyoro 
kingship—over several clans in what became the nucleus of Acholiland. Their 
success stimulated other Luo parties to follow suit, until the former complex 
of independent indigenous communities, usually composed of one clan, “had 
become centrally-organized chiefdoms controlling an average of eight to ten 
clans” (Alpers and Ehret 1975: 478). The centralization was often literal: the 
village of the paramount, the Rwot, was encircled by a protective screen of sub-
ordinate native communities. In the usual dual pattern of stranger-kingship, the 
Rwot had an indigenous counterpart in the figure of the “father of the soil,” the 
elder of the first lineage encountered by the Luo founding chief. F. K. Girling 
notes that the “soil” (won ngom) in question referred to its aspect as the source 
of food, for again the indigenous leader was ritually in charge of the productivity 
of the land as well the fertility of the people: “The ‘father of the soil’ symbolized 
in his person the mysterious forces of jok [spirits] which are responsible for the 
fertility of the land and of human beings, and which also controlled hunting in 
the area” (1960: 122). But if the indigenous authority instantiated the bearing 
powers of the local earth and its inhabitants, the Rwot remained connected to 
his foreign origins, and not only through the assumption of Nyoro trappings of 
rule. “Frequently, disputes about the succession in Acholi domains were taken to 
the kings of Bunyoro-Kitara for settlement” (ibid.: 8). Although they had long 
since left Bunyoro, the Acholi paramounts still considered themselves under the 
sway of Nyoro kings.
Meanwhile the native lineage heads of the Acholi chiefdoms were able en-
hance to their own powers and privileges under the sway of the Luo rulers. 
Ronald Atkinson (1989: 24ff.) penned a detailed and persuasive argument to 
the effect that the establishment of the Luo stranger-chiefdoms offered ad-
vantages to the local people not achievable under the previous lineage regime. 
(One is reminded of Lucy Mair’s observation of the African principle that it is 
uncivilized to be without a king.) Socially and politically, the native headmen 
not only continued to manage their own lineage affairs, “they also functioned 
as the main advisors and councilors to the Rwot and as major spokesmen for 
and representatives of their lineages within the polity as a whole.” Economically, 
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they collected tributes for the Rwot, and perhaps retained a small portion. Reli-
giously, they were “collectively the main ritual figures within the chiefdom” and, 
evidently referring to the father of the soil, “at least one lineage head—usually 
from the group acknowledged as the oldest in the area—became the primary 
ritual figure for the chiefdom as a whole.” In the pages that follow it will be seen 
that these Acholi developments are hardly unique: at least some native authori-
ties enhance their standing and powers under the aegis of stranger-kings. Given 
these benefits, it is not surprising that an important impetus for the formation 
of the stranger-kingdom may well come from the internal politics of the indig-
enous communities.
Engaged in their own rivalries, indigenous leaders and would-be leaders 
have been known to look upon the advent of a powerful stranger as a politi-
cal resource, most useful for the prosecution of their own parochial ambitions. 
Competing for the leadership of the native community or region, one or anoth-
er of the rivals will go outside the field and enlist a potent foreign ally—what-
ever the cost in submission and tribute his people would now pay to the latter. 
Or it may be the conflicts between local communities as such that lead one to 
enlist outside support—upon which the others will probably do the same. The 
competition in either case is of the form Gregory Bateson (1935, 1958) called 
“symmetrical schismogenesis,” here involving the tactic of trumping the opposi-
tion by engaging an external political power beyond any that could be mustered 
within the arena of the contest.8 Lloyd Fallers (1965: 145) recounts how the 
endemic struggles over succession in Soga states made them much more vul-
nerable to the penetration of powerful outsiders by invitation than by invasion: 
“Rulers and princes were constantly on the lookout for powerful allies, and both 
the Ganda and the Europeans were ready to supply such aid in exchange for 
overall control.” In the same way the Soga had viewed the Buganda king, they 
saw the Europeans “as a powerful patron with whom they might ally themselves 
in the traditional manner.” Similarly, among the Acholi in relation to outside 
Luo chiefs: 
Commoner households sought the protection of the Rwot for a variety of rea-
sons and contracted affinal ties with him directly or with one of the branches 
of his agnatic lineage. Through the enjoyment of the ruler’s favor, some of the 
8. Symmetrical and complementary schismogenesis, à la Gregory Bateson, are 
discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 6.
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household heads became the founders of separate commoner village lineages. 
(Girling 1960: 84) 
Soga, Alur, and others also illustrate the cascading effect that the acquisition of 
an outside chief by one community can have on the aspirations of others. Speak-
ing of Mbegha’s accession to power among Shambala, Feierman (1974: 85) notes 
of the two densely populated regions of Vugha and Bumbuli: “Bumbuli could 
not accept the leadership of Vugha; Vugha would not be ruled by Bumbuli. But 
both made alliances with a powerful outsider.” It is not only by the dispersion 
of turbulent princes or by conquest that galactic regimes are formed; they are 
also built up by certain impulses of “upward nobility” arising in the peripheries. 
Indeed, beyond the native leaders, there may be substantial benefits of stran-
ger-kingship for the underlying population in general. The advantages would in-
clude: greater political security; judicial means of resolving disputes and curbing 
feuds; a wider range of exchanges, notably by the establishment of markets where 
peace is enforced by regional authorities; a wider social range of intermarriage; 
and dividends from the ruler’s distributions of wealth. Not to forget the latter’s 
magical powers of prosperity: “To believe in the chief,” writes Richards of Bemba 
(1961: 355), “is to cultivate in the hope and assurance that the land is sure to yield 
its utmost.” The benefits of Alur chieftainship for the underlying population are 
summed up in his provision of “rain,” the one blessing standing for “his general 
and ultimate responsibility in the minds of his subjects for both their mate-
rial and moral well-being” (Southall [1956] 2004: 239). Indeed, like the Lovedu 
queen and the Shilluk king, the Alur paramount can be counted among African 
rulers who rain but do not govern. Just as the landed native people as wife-givers 
are to the immigrant stranger-princes as feminine is to masculine, so their capac-
ity to make the earth bear fruit is protected and realized through the encompass-
ing powers of the stranger-king over the natural conditions of human prosperity. 
Providing prosperity is an aspect of the stranger-king’s civilizing benefits, as 
usually acknowledged by all parties. His advent is frequently said to have raised 
the native people from a rudimentary state by bringing them cattle, crops, iron 
(tools and weapons)—even fire and cooking, hence a move from nature to cul-
ture. The Nyakyusa tell the story of the civilizing mission of the kingship—as 
well as the powers retained by the native villagers:
All are agreed that chiefs and commoners belong to different stocks; the com-
moners being descended from the original occupants of the country while the 
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chiefs trace their descent to a line of invaders from the Livingstone Mountains 
eight generations ago . . . . Moreover, while the most sacred persons in the coun-
try were “divine kings,” descendants of the original heroes, chosen each genera-
tion to become their living representatives, to take their name, and to sacrifice at 
their graves, it was the commoners who chose them and . . . put them to death 
when it was expedient for the good of the people . . . . The invaders were sup-
posed to have brought into the country fire, cattle, crops, and iron; they were 
creators, the guarantors and preservers of fertility; and it was to foster and in-
crease fertility that men sacrificed and worshipped at the graves of the mythical 
heroes. The aborigines, on the other hand, without fire, without iron, and feeding 
on raw meat as the myth depicts them, possessed one weapon of terrible potency, 
witchcraft, which no chief, not even a priest of the chief ’s lineage, could with-
stand or would dare to challenge. (M. Wilson 1959a: 1–3)
Once more: an enduring complementarity coupled to a residual hostility. 
To return to the stranger-king effects of the competition between groups 
in galactic fields, the same kind of schismogenesis when it involves competi-
tion between the most powerful states can generate a politics of the marvelous, 
leading great kingdoms to conjure ancestors of universal renown from exalted 
realms of ancient memory.9 In the upshot, world-historical figures appear as the 
founder of dynasties with whom they had no connection and progenitors of 
rulers to whom they had no relation: Alexander the Great, for example, who in 
his Islamic incarnation as Iskandar D’zul Karnain became the apical ancestor 
of fifteenth-century sultans in Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. The historic 
dynasty of Benin was founded by the son of the Yoruba ruler of fabled Ile Ife, 
Oduduwa, who had been solicited from his father by the representatives of the 
autochthonous Edo people. The latter, the Uzama elders, were reportedly dissat-
isfied with the unkingly behavior of their existing ruler (Bradbury 1957, 1967, 
1973). Following a pattern we have already noted more than once, the Yoruba 
prince Oduduwa thereupon married a local woman, and their son, combining 
the Edo and Yoruba identities and powers, became the first king of the new or-
der. By a popular Yoruba narrative, however, the dynasty would have even more 
fabulous antecedents: “The Yorubas are said to have sprung from Lamurudu, 
one of the kings of Mecca whose offspring were: Oduduwa, the ancestor of the 
9. See the extended discussion of this phenomenon in chapter 6 and the related 
discussion of utopian politics in chapter 2.
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Yorubas, and the founding kings of Gogohiri and the Kukuwa, two tribes in 
Hausa country” ( Johnson [1921] 2006: 3). In the context of the dynamic West 
African Muslim states, a number of such dynasties competitively traced their 
origins to legendary Middle East ancestors: whether to purported enemies of 
the Prophet, such as the aforementioned Kisra of the Borgu kingdoms, or to 
prominent Muslims such as Bayajidda of Baghdad, whose sons by a local prin-
cess founded the Hausa sultanates. Thus, a real-politics of the marvelous.
As the tradition goes, the power of the historic Kongo dynasty was abet-
ted by a similar conflict among the notables of the interior kingdom of Mba-
ta, which issued in the inclusion of that rich realm and its satellites in Ntinu 
Wene’s regime. Mbata appears in Duarte Lopes’ late-sixteenth-century account 
as a great and powerful kingdom that submitted voluntarily and without battle 
to the oncoming Ntinu Wene owing to certain dissensions among its ruling 
chiefs (Pigafetta [1591] 1988: 61). In the outcome, the victor was one Nsaku 
Lau, the maternal uncle of the Kongo founding hero Ntinu Wene; he thus 
became the ruler of Mbata, the Mani Mbata, within Ntinu Wene’s kingdom. 
Following the usual pattern of the union of the stranger-prince with a daughter 
or sister of the native leader, Ntinu Wene married a daughter of Nsaku Lau. 
Thenceforth it was enjoined on Ntinu Wene’s royal successors to take a daugh-
ter of the Mbata rulers to wife, in principle as mother of the royal heir: her title 
ne mbanda, referring apparently to “authority” or “tributary rights,” signified the 
conveyance of sovereignty entailed in the union. In the event, the Mani Mbata 
and his successors became the maternal “grandfather” of the kingship, a superior 
kinship status consistent with his bestowal of legitimacy on the alien rulers as 
well his continuing presence in the new order, including an important role as 
kingmaker. The old regime was folded into the new.
NATURALIZING THE STRANGER-KING
The marriage of the foreign prince with a daughter of the native leader is the 
final, contractual aspect of the critical process in which the stranger comes out 
of the wild to be domesticated by the native people, and thus become eligible 
to assume the rule of them. It is in this reining in of the king-to-be that op-
positional tensions between native subjects and foreign rulers are particularly 
expressed. Ritual reenactments of the accession of the stranger-king have put 
social anthropologists in mind of “rituals of rebellion.” But then, as Michel Izard 
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observed for the realm of the Yatenga Mossi kings, the autochthonous “people 
of the earth,” as the first to settle the region, were already practiced in trans-
forming the wild into cultivated land, the dangerous into docile elements, the 
dead into benevolent ancestors (1985: 18).10 Some or all of these transforma-
tions indeed have their counterparts in the installation rites of stranger-kings, 
which are always (as far as I can determine) under the control of leaders of the 
native people. But if indigenous leaders thereby confer legitimacy on their ar-
riviste ruler, they may have to kill him first.
In discussing such an event among the Ndembu of Zambia, where the para-
mount chief of Lunda extraction, the Kanongesha, is installed under the aegis of 
the Kafwana, the senior headmen of the autochthonous Mbwela people, Victor 
Turner speaks of these protagonists as representing “a distinction between the po-
litically or militarily strong [rulers] and the subdued autochthonous people, who 
are nevertheless ritually potent” ([1969] 2008: 99). What is then described is a rite 
in which an enduring precedence of the native Mbwela people is demonstrated by 
subduing the Lunda chief who would rule them. For in the critical period of the 
ritual drama, the chief-elect together with his senior wife or a slave representing 
the sacred regalia of Lunda rule, all clad only in ragged waist-cloths, are secluded 
on a hut named from the verb “to die” and decorated with symbols of death—“for 
it is here that the chief-elect dies” (ibid.: 100).11 Here too the Kanongesha-to-be 
will be revived when washed with medicines mixed with water from the river 
crossed by the original Lunda conqueror when he entered Ndembu territory. Such 
waters are maternal-cum-autochthonous sources of life elsewhere in Africa, as 
we shall see shortly; but in any case it is clear that the death of the Kanongesha 
chief-elect as an outsider is followed by his rebirth as an insider through the offices 
of the Kafwana native headmen, one of whose titles is indeed “Mother of Kanon-
gesha” (ibid.: 98). The headman then undertakes the new chief ’s maturation, as 
it were, by instructing him in the morality of the native society, while forcefully 
admonishing him to leave off the antisocial behavior of his previous existence—
behavior characteristic of an unruly hunter living by and for himself in the wild:
10. “By the Mossi kingdoms is meant . . . composite socio-political formations resulting 
from conquest by warriors called Mossi of the Whie Volta Basin. However, the 
process of intermarriage and also infiltration by settlement carried out by Mossi 
peasants was certainly more decisive than military conquest” (Zahan 1967: 177).
11. Turner says he “dies from his commoner state,” but as he is of Lunda origin, he 
would be no simple commoner, and it is rather from this external state that he dies 
and is transformed, naturalized (ibid.: 100). 
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You are a mean and selfish fool, one who is bad-tempered . . . . But today you 
are born as a new chief. . . . If you were mean, and used to eat your cassava mush 
alone, or your meat alone, today you are in the chieftainship. You must give up 
your selfish ways, you must welcome everyone, you are the chief ! You must stop 
being adulterous and quarrelsome. ([1969] 2008: 101)
The foreign hunter-conqueror living outside the rules and relations of human 
society is domesticated by being put to death, reborn, and then socialized by the 
leader of the indigenous people. Not that his transcendent powers are elimi-
nated, any more than his foreign identity is forgotten, but they are sublimated 
and put at the service of the society he will now dominate.
Hence if conquest there is, it is reciprocal. The Ndembu are hardly the 
only African people who integrate their foreign-derived ruler by a humiliat-
ing ritual death and rebirth in the seclusion of a specially constructed hut 
of sinister décor or location. The Acholi, Mamprusi, and Shilluk are among 
others who are reported to do the like—the Shilluk adding the repetition of 
a royal exploit when the king-elect also has incestuous relations there with 
a paternal half-sister. Some form of public humiliation of the royal heir fol-
lowed by seclusion is even more frequently reported than what ensues in the 
clandestine rituals. However, what is often no secret in the periodic mock 
battles that ritually reenact the origins of the kingship is that the ruler and his 
party are defeated by priestly leaders and warriors of the indigenous stock—
which defeat is what allows the king to then claim his realm. Rehearsing the 
kingship origins in the annual New Year ceremonies, the Yatenga Mossi king 
is bested in mock battle three times before he is allowed to enter his palace. In 
the Shilluk installation, the party of the king-elect is twice beaten by the host 
of the original king Nyikang in ritual battles whose prize was the “girl of the 
ceremonies”: provided by a certain autochthonous clan—hence, again, at stake 
was the appropriation of the life of the land through a union with a marked 
daughter of the aboriginal population. Nyikang’s victories were also initiated 
by crossing a certain stream outside the capital of Fashoda, and were followed 
by a reconciliation of this original king with his successor, in the course of 
which the latter gained the girl.12 
12. The Shilluk installation involved a certain permutation of the confrontation of the 
foreign prince and the native authorities. Here the superseded kingly groups (the 
Ororo) led by Nyikang and his son Dak represented the ancient regime against an 
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The Mamprusi offer a clear example of subduing the stranger-king in the 
critical episode of the New Year ceremonies, where he was not only defeated by 
the priest-chiefs and elders of the previous regime, but also symbolically killed 
(Drucker-Brown 1975: 95–96). Marked by successive foreign-derived dynasties, 
the Mamprusi comprise a good example too of serial stranger-kingship wherein 
the priest-chiefs, the heirs of the former rulers, take the part of the kingdom’s 
native element. In the rite in question, a group of drummers and dancers led by 
two of these great priests of the earth, war spears in hand, confronted a party of 
the king and his supporters in the enclosure in front of his house. At a certain 
moment, the dancers, also armed with spears, with the priest-chiefs apparently 
in their lead, moved toward the king with loud cries, “as if they were going to 
war.” One prince, attempting to make light of the affair, told Susan Drucker-
Brown, the ethnographer, that the menacing shouts of the priest chiefs were 
merely a “blood-dance.” Nearing the king, the dancers raised their spears as if 
to hurl them at him, and then gently lowered them and stopped dancing. The 
king now wept “Just for the moment,” explained a young royal, “tears come 
down from his eyes. That is the most essential part of the Damba [the New Year 
rites].” A commoner elder expressing the view of the subject people in general 
on their relationship to the king provided what Drucker-Brown deemed “per-
haps the most accurate analysis of the ceremony: ‘They (the priest chiefs) are 
saying “we own you” to the king. For that is how it is. We own the king and he 
owns us’” (ibid.: 96).
Just so, the stranger-kingdom is marked by the reciprocal encompassment 
of the indigenous subjects by the foreigner king and the king by his indigenous 
subjects. Even as the king instantiates the totality of the polity and the ruling 
aristocracy unifies the diverse native communities, the native leaders, by repre-
sentation or in combination, naturalize and integrate their foreign royalty to the 
extent that in most African stranger-kingdoms, great “empires” partially except-
ed, the dominant identity, language, and customs of the society as a whole are 
those of the native “owners” rather than the immigrant rulers. The ethnic identi-
ties of both may have been developed in the course of the kingdom’s formation, 
but that of the indigenous “owners” typically serves as the identity of the totality. 
Moreover, as perennial kingmakers, these native authorities not only legitimate 
upstart king-elect who, coming from the south, would in effect reproduce Nyikang’s 
original conquest—as indeed the new king famously became Nyikang in these rites. 
(See also chapter 2, this volume.)
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the authority of the kings of foreign origin, they thereby demonstrate their own 
residual sovereignty—in many African kingdoms they are the designated re-
gents during the extended interregnum that follows the death of the king. Nor 
do they ever surrender their “ownership” of the earth of the kingdom—with 
which they share an existential identity.
The kings of the old Kongo state were no exception to traditions and ritu-
als of their sublimation and integration by an older aristocracy, especially those 
functioning as priest-chiefs (kitomi) of the kingdom and its several provinces. Ac-
cording to the dominant charter tradition, an important priest-chief (Nsaku ne 
Vunda) mediated the advent of Ntinu Wene, founder of the historic dynasty, as 
we shall see; and thereafter, no prince could be invested in the kingship without 
the endorsement of the titular successors of this priest. I am unaware of any de-
tailed text on what happened in the eight-day seclusion of the king-elect during 
the Kongo installation rites, although a report from 1668 tells that the assembled 
people threw dust upon him as he was being escorted to the place of confinement 
(Dapper [1868] 1970). It is also reported that the installations of pre-Christian 
kings included draconian breaches of kinship on their part: they are said to have 
killed one or more junior kinsmen of their own clan and also had intercourse with 
a clanswoman. But we do have a revelatory notice of the installation rites of the 
“governor” or “duke” of the important Nsundi province in 1651 from the journal 
of the Capuchin father Giroloma da Montesarchio (Bouveignes and Cuvelier 
1951: 97–101). Nsundi was the particular patrimony of Kongo kings, reputedly 
because it was the first realm subdued by the dynastic founder, Ntinu Wene, and 
the governorship was accordingly reserved for the designated heir to the kingship.
Before he could take office at the Nsundi capital, however, the prince, to-
gether with his wife and entourage, was obliged to travel to the village of the 
major priest-chief (kitomi) of the province, a personage “who was venerated as if 
he were the god of the country.” Montesarchio continues:
This Chitomi [Kitomi] was so esteemed that it was if it depended on him that 
one acquired the power and authority to rule the province. The Duke was con-
vinced that if he did not go through the process at the Chitomi’s, he would have 
no power over the people, who would accord him neither submission nor tribute, 
and indeed his life would be cut short. (Bouveignes and Cuvelier 1951: 98)
The encounter of the duke and the kitomi took place across a certain stream, 
apparently at the border of the village. On one side the duke, his wife, and 
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party, arrayed as though for battle, faced the kitomi, his wife, and their people 
on the other. There followed a mock combat with bows and straw arrows, in 
which the stranger-prince was subdued: “The duke and duchess were obliged 
to acknowledge themselves defeated.” But the defeat allowed them to cross the 
stream into the territory they would rule. For the kitomi then gave the duke 
a hand across, and his wife did the same for the duke’s consort. Comments 
Montesarchio: “Without that ceremony, the duke would not be able to cross 
the stream” (ibid.). 
The following day featured something of a reversal of the stranger-prince’s 
defeat in what appears to have been the symbolic form of a sexual conquest: 
“The next morning, the duke and his wife lay down on the ground before the 
door of the Kitomi’s house. The Kitomi and his wife came out of their house, 
took off their clothes so as to ostentatiously display their genitals, then dropped 
their clothes and trampled them underfoot.” In the sequel, the priest-chief 
poured some water on the earth to make a muddy mixture with which, “as if it 
were blessed earth,” he daubed the duke and his wife. The latter pair thereupon 
gave all their clothes to the priest-chief and his wife. The kitomi followed by 
entrusting the duke with several “objects of superstition” which had to be kept in 
the house of the duke’s wife, “to be worshipped there as if they were sacred relics, 
if not more” (ibid.). He also gave him a certain firebrand from which “everyone” 
would light their fire; it had to be taken to the Nsundi capital, distant some six 
days’ march. The firebrand also had to be kept in the house of the duke’s wife. 
Thus ends the account of the ceremonies.
To comment only on the obvious: the stranger-prince is able to gain the 
rule solely on the condition of his own submission to the native priest-chief, 
god of the country, owner of the earth. There will be reason to suppose from 
comparable notices elsewhere that the remoteness of the kitomi’s village from 
Mbanza Nsundi, the capital, indicates that it is an old cultic center, the foyer 
of some of the earliest inhabitants of Nsundi. In any case, it is in this capac-
ity that the kitomi and his spouse—the protagonists are conjugal pairs, as if to 
signify the reproductive aspects of the rites—offer themselves sexually as “wife” 
to the princely couple. Anointing the latter with earth mixed with water, the 
iconic patrimony of the autochthonous people, the kitomi,at once naturalizes 
the foreign royals, conveys the territory to them—and perhaps humiliates them. 
We are not told whether the clothes given by the princely pair to the kitomi and 
wife had special value. In any event, the firebrand the stranger king then receives 
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from the kitomi, by which he will rekindle the hearths of the Nsundi people, 
implies he has become an inseminating source of their fertility of the land, 
analogously to his union with their priestly representative. Speaking of notices 
of such priest-chiefs in early missionary texts, Anne Hilton writes: “The kitomi 
also maintained one or two fires, which were closely associated with fertility, and 
sold firebrands to supplicants” (1985: 25).
Hilton also comments on this ritual by reference to another, more general-
ized seventeenth-century account in which “the kitomi was said to tread the 
governor under his feet ‘to demonstrate he must be subject’ and the governor 
swore perpetual obedience” (ibid.: 47). In essence, the ritual consists of a transfer 
of sovereignty in the course of which the stranger-prince is appropriated by the 
native owners of the land, and vice versa. This recursive theme of royal ceremony 
and collective memory is not false historical consciousness, but rather, to bor-
row a phrase from Clifford Geertz, it is “a model of and for” cultural order and 
historical action. 
ON CROSSING THE RIVER AND MARRYING THE LAND
Not to forget a fundamental episode in the installation of the Duke of Nsundi 
in the role of stranger-prince: the crossing of the river. Crossing the river to 
take possession of the land is rather like marriage of the stranger-prince with a 
ranking woman of the native people that engenders the ruling chief. Symboli-
cally, the crossing and the marriage are versions of one another. The similarities 
are cosmological at the same time they are political. For such very reasons, some 
Western scholars think they are not historical. They can’t be real.
The genealogy of the founder of the Shilluk kingdom, Nyikang, leads back 
to the heavens and God ( Juok) on the paternal side, and on the maternal, to 
earthly rivers. “His mother Nyikaya is associated with all riverine phenomena 
and beings, first and foremost with the crocodile, and she is associated with 
fertility and childbirth” (Schnepel 1988: 448). Nyikang is searched for in the 
White Nile at the beginning of the Shilluk installation rites, in the course of 
which he will be instantiated in the king. One of Nyikang’s titles is in fact 
“Son of the River.” Another is “The Crosser of the River,” referring to Nyikang’s 
initial traverse of the Bahr-el-Ghazal into the territory he then conquered 
and organized as the Shilluk (Col) kingdom. As we already know from several 
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stranger-king narratives, including the Kongo in some detail, terrestrial waters 
as well as the bearing earth are the inalienable domain of the indigenous-cum-
maternal component of the stranger-kingdom.13
These associations can be found even in nascent tribal forms of stranger-
kingship. As reported by Godfrey Lienhardt (1961), for example, in Dinka 
charter traditions, cognate to the Shilluk’s, Aiwel, first son of the God and an-
cestor of the priestly masters of the fishing spears, emerged at birth from a river. 
These masters of the fishing spears will marry off their sisters to the arriviste 
warrior chiefs, become the mothers’ brothers of the latter, and thereby unite the 
dual ruling components of Dinka society. Lienhardt reports that rivers have in-
fluence on and are influenced by pregnant women: “The association to which we 
point . . . is between the river as a source of life for the Dinka, women as sources 
of life, and the prototype of sisters of masters of the fishing spear as dispensers 
of ‘life’” (ibid.: 203). 
As distant in space and language as the Bantu BaKongo are from the Nilotic 
Dinka, crossing the river has very similar implications for them. MacGaffey 
distills the sexual and reproductive symbolism from various legendary episodes:
This concern with fertility is represented in the legends by the magical elements 
associated with the crossing of the river, in which sexual imagery is explicit: 
planting the staff that burgeoned . . .; the sister who insulted her brother by sug-
gesting incest; the awl in the navel; hollowing a canoe; splitting a rock, where 
“the knife in the rock” is still a current sexual metaphor; or parting the water as 
did the chief Ma Kaba . . . by tying from shore to shore a woman’s tumpline . . . 
a symbol of her reproductive capacity. (1986: 92)
The motif of crossing the river is a Rubicon moment in a goodly number of 
African dynastic traditions, the fateful move that will set an ambitious immi-
grant prince on a course to his kingship and introduce a new order among the 
native people of the land. “Indeed,” writes Aidan Southall, “it was the crossing 
of the Nile and the process of incorporation of other groups that constituted the 
emergence of a new, composite society, called ‘Alur’” (1989: 188). It is pertinent 
to add that the generic ethnonym, “Alur,” referred originally to the indigenous 
Sudanic populations of the region: an identity that subsequently included their 
13. For further details on the Shilluk installation, see David Graeber’s account in 
chapter 2.
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late-coming Nilotic chiefs, who for their part, however, preferred to vaunt their 
kinship with the Bito rulers of the once great Kitara-Nyoro kingdom. For more 
stranger-king ironies that have nothing to do with history except to create it, 
the Nilotic Bito, however, have long adopted the Bantu speech of their dynastic 
predecessors. Not coincidently, the Bito crossed the Nile on their way to the 
Kitara kingship. Again and generally: “the migration of the eponymous ancestor 
of the Bambara dynasties contains the theme of river crossing that is found in so 
many legends of origin in Africa” (Izard and Ki-zerbo 1992: 330). 
Perhaps, then, we can up the symbolic ante on the meanings of narratives 
such as that of the installation of the Duke of Nsundi. In crossing the river 
and marrying the land, the stranger-hero effects a cultural synthesis of cosmic 
dimensions, as between the celestial and the terrestrial, masculine and feminine, 
the wild and the sown, foreign mobile riches and produce of the local earth, war 
and peace; in brief, the fundamental conditions of human order and welfare—
the powers and sources of which are ultimately beyond society itself (cf. Sahlins 
2014). Indeed, MacGaffey has emphasized that the motif of crossing the river 
takes its meaning from the Kongo conception of the universe as an upperworld 
of humanity separated by water from an underworld of the dead inhabited by 
the spiritual beings in control of the human fate. (Alternatively, the model is tri-
adic, adding an upperworld of divine beings to the earthly plane and underworld 
of the dead.) Accordingly, in a text there will be occasion to revisit, MacGaffey 
says of the prescriptive crossing of the river in Kongo origin traditions, “the 
elsewhere from which the king comes is a land of spirits (Bupemba, Mpemba, 
Upemba), although it may be identified with a geographical location” (2003: 11).
The externality of the kingship is essential because power itself, the spiritual 
sources of human vitality, mortality, and prosperity, comes from beyond society: 
Bakongo see the ability to survive in the universe as a function of the play of 
power. The terms for “ordinary people” who lack kindoki or kundu (witchcraft 
power) are derogatory. People who have power obtain it directly or indirectly 
from the otherworld. They are relatively successful: they live longer and have 
more children and more wealth (both mbongo). Power obtained from the other-
world can be used for personal or for public benefit, with productive or destruc-
tive effect. (MacGaffey 1986: 190) 
Considering the recent anthropological interest in cosmologies and ontologies 
as the relative cultural grounds of what there is and how such things came to 
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be—not to mention the ethnographic evidence of the potency of alterity—it 
seems curious that the historian John Thornton should dismiss the longstanding 
Kongo traditions that the founder of the kingdom, Ntinu Wene, embarked on 
his kingly project by crossing the Congo River as merely a “cosmological neces-
sity” surrounded by “ideological stories.” In his important work on “The origin 
and early history of the kingdom of Kongo, c. 1350–1550,” Thornton writes:
The story of the first king crossing the Kongo from Vungu to conquer Mpemba 
Kasi, the first province of Kongo, may not have any basis, however; as Wyatt 
MacGaffey pointed out in his study of nineteenth-century tradition, the idea of 
a river crossing, surrounded by ideological stories, may be more of a cosmologi-
cal necessity than a statement of literal truth. While there is little doubt that the 
seventeenth-century Kongo elite believed that their dynasty had originated in 
Vungu, or at least across the Congo River, this is not supported by earlier tradi-
tion. According to Lopes, Kongo began not across the Congo River, but in the 
province of Mpemba and annexed other provinces from that core. (2001: 108)
This search for “literal truth” becomes doubly curious by virtue of Thornton’s 
methods for rewriting the documentary evidence in order to arrive at it. For 
one, there is his singular reliance on the 1591 text of the Italian humanist Fil-
lipo Pigafetta—based on a manuscript penned by Duarte Lopes—for his own 
reconstruction of Kongo kingship origins, although this work says very little 
about it, and Thornton takes the liberty of boldly revising what it does say about 
it. A merchant who served as Kongo’s ambassador to Rome, Lopes wrote “the 
first explicitly historical description of Kongo in 1588” (ibid.: 102). Thornton 
allows that, in fact, Lopes says little about the kingship origins, because “it was 
intended to convince Vatican authorities that Kongo was a Christian kingdom 
of good standing and thus worthy of having its own bishop, and did not deal 
very much with the pre-Christian period” (ibid.). (The pre-Christian period 
would be c. 1350–1500.) But at least equally important, apart from a few snip-
pets of local traditions, Lopes does not even discuss the earlier kings because, for 
all he knew, the Congolese had no memory of them: “They preserve no history 
of the ancient kings, nor any memorial of past ages, not knowing how to write” 
(Pigafetta [1591] 1881: 111). Not a good start.14 
14. Msgr. Cuvelier and Louis Jadin did not have good things to say about Duarte 
Lopes’ reportage. Was it because he was a descendant of Jewish converts—which 
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they did not fail to mention? He was a trader, they said, neither explorer, voyager, 
nor historian. He seems not to have traveled beyond Loango and San Salvador. “His 
historical reports are without any exactitude. The errors and gaps in the Relation are 
numerous” (1954: 110). 
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Thornton will rely significantly on Montesarchio as well as Lopes for his his-
toriographic project, which involves the deconstruction of the foreign origin 
of the historic Kongo kingship in favor of a reconstructed truer history of its 
endogenous beginnings immediately south of the Zaïre River in the region 
known as Mpemba Kasi (aka Mpemba Nkazi, etc.) (fig. 1). Not only did the 
dynasty really originate within Kongo, Thornton argues, but the founding hero 
and first king was not really Ntinu Wene from Vungu, as commonly believed, 
but his father, Nimi a Nzima of Mpemba Kasi. An important piece of evidence 
was a passage from Montesarchio’s journal describing his visit to Mpemba Kasi 
in 1650 or 1651, which reads in part, “I went to Mpemba Casi, governed by a 
chiefess having authority over several villages who held the title of Mother of 
the King of Congo” (Bouveignes and Cuvelier 1951: 70)—to which Thornton 
suggestively adds, “the KiKongo word ‘ngudi’ means ‘mother’ but might also 
mean ‘origin’ or ‘source’” (2001: 108). So the text might also indicate she was, or 
rather her ancestress was, the origin of the kingship. Possibly true, but to the op-
posite effect than Thornton supposes, as it rather implies an archetypal marriage 
of the stranger-hero with a daughter of the autochthonous people, upon which 
she will become the mother of the king and maternal ancestress of the dynasty. 
(Like Joao II, who “tramples the lion in the kingdom of his mother.”) Indeed, 
the documentary evidence early and late makes it clear that the reference to 
the “Mother of the King of Congo” recalled a hypergamous union of a native 
woman of rank with a stranger-king from across the Congo River. So reads the 
relevant passage of Montesarchio’s journal, when taken in its entirety—includ-
ing what Thornton left out:
I went to Mpemba Casi, governed by a chiefess having authority over several 
villages who held the title of Mother of the King of Congo. Here is the reason: 
When the first king, the one who established his sovereignty over the Congo, 
left Coimba, crossed the Congo, and began to be Lord of Congo, it was at the 
village of Mpemba Casi that he began to reign. (Bouveignes and Cuvelier 1951: 
70–71)15
Some centuries later, MacGaffey could provide a confirming report from his 
own ethnographic study of the same area:
15. Thornton later quotes the second part of this text about crossing the river, but 
separately and in a different context (2001: 107).
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The likelihood is that Nkazi a Kongo has dominated Mbanza Nkazi [capital 
center of the region] continuously for five hundred years. The name is a title 
implying that the owners had the right to provide the king, Ne Kongo, with 
his official wife at the time of the coronation. This woman was probably his 
classificatory Father or Grandfather [by lineage . . .] and she would be known 
as Mpemba Nkazi, which is the first recorded name of the Manteke region. 
Probably this is what father Jerome de Montesarchio referred to when he gave 
the title of the chief he met in Mbanza Nkazi in 1650 as “Mother of the king of 
Kongo.” (1970: 83)
A corollary problem with Thornton’s thesis that Kongo began in Mpemba Kasi 
is that his primary documentary source, the Duarte Lopes text as transmitted 
by Pigafetta, distinctly says otherwise. It says that the cradle of the kingship was 
in the province of Mpemba, which is in the center of the Kongo kingdom—not 
to be confused with Mpemba Kasi in the north—where is located the capi-
tal Mbanza Kongo (later San Salvador). According to the Lopes’ account as 
translated by Thornton, Mpemba was “the center of the state of Congo and 
the origin of the Ancient Kings and the land where they were born”—to which 
Thornton adds, “thus the original territory to which the other provinces were 
added” (2001: 104). The well-known tradition to which Thornton alludes, how-
ever, recounts how Ntinu Wene culminated his conquest of Kongo from Vungu 
north of the Congo by distributing the land to his followers from a mountain 
in Mpemba near the capital he would subsequently establish at Mbanza Kongo 
(Cuvelier 1946). Mbanza Kongo—another old name of which was Mbanza 
Wene—remained the royal seat of the Kongo state into the Christian era: which 
is not inconsistent with Lopes’ statement that it was the center of the kingdom 
and the origin and birthplace of ancient kings—whose traditions were largely 
unknown to him. However, on the basis of his own choice of kingdom origins 
at Mpemba Kasi, Thornton simply asserts that Lopes (or Pigafetta) had gotten 
mixed up: that in describing Mpemba as the origin of the ancient kings, the 
author must have really meant Mpemba Kasi in the north. “What seems likely,” 
to Thornton, “is that Lopes or Pigafetta conflated Mpemba, the large southern 
province, with Mpemba Kasi, the smaller northern province, thus putting both 
Lopes and the later Capuchins in agreement over the original core of Kongo” 
(2001: 108). How could this be? The Lopes text (Pigafetta [1591] 1881: 62–70) 
is perfectly clear about the location of—and unmistakably detailed in its de-
scription of—Mpemba province and its capital Mbanza Kongo. In this case, 
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Lopes must have known what he was talking about: he lived in Mbanza Kongo 
for some years, and he was the ambassador of Mbanza Kongo to the Vatican. As 
for the later Capuchins purportedly in agreement that Mpemba Kasi was “the 
original core of Kongo,” besides Montesarchio, Thornton is invoking the 1687 
text of Cavazzi—who was in the region in the mid-1660s—in which the found-
er of the kingdom came from across the Kwango River (rather than the Congo) 
and Mpemba Kasi was the first place in Kongo he had conquered (Cuvelier 
1946; Sousa 1999).16 In sum, Thornton’s rewriting of the primary sources is 
perfectly arbitrary, except as it is motivated by his own empirically challenged, 
secondary interpretation purporting to be what actually happened. 
In an earlier work (1983: 15ff.), Thornton had already sought to deconstruct 
the Kongo stranger-king tradition by asserting that “the supposed ethnic dis-
tinction” between the subject peoples generically known as Ambundu and the 
ruling elite, the Ashikongo (or Essikongo, etc.), was not really a difference be-
tween native inhabitants and immigrant rulers. The reputed ethnic distinction 
was merely an ideological supposition (on the part of the Congolese people), 
a mirage based on a more fundamental difference between the social systems 
of the countryside and the town as constituted in the seventeenth century. As 
we know, Thornton is not the only student of African societies who, by posit-
ing that stranger-king traditions are functional (cum-superstructural) reflexes of 
the real-political or real-economic structures at a given moment, consider that 
they have no real-historical value and can thenceforth be ignored. Since these 
traditions are time-bound, secondary rationalizations, and not “literally true” so 
far as the historian is concerned—it helps if they are called “myths”—they are 
supposed to have no real effect on the destiny of the people who continue to 
hold and practice them as timeless truths—transhistorical memories of what 
has been and will be.
In this matter of the confinement of the stranger-kingship of Kongo to 
the dustbin of real history, Thornton offers a quasi-Marxist explanation of the 
distinction between Ambundu subjects and Essikongo rulers as a “reflection” 
of differences in modes of production: the Ambundu social formation based 
on agriculture as organized by relations of kinship, and the Essikongo, based 
on tribute, slave labor, and foreign wealth obtained by levies on trade and war. 
16. Not to mention the early documents, such as the 1620 H. R. C. and CIII of Paiva, 
which situated the founder of the kingdom respectively at Bungo and Bango 
(Vungu), north of the river (in Cuvelier 1946). 
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“More than just dialect or supposed ethnic origin,” he writes, “. . . this distinc-
tion was a social and economic one, a reflection of the way Kongo’s production 
system and social relations were organized in the seventeenth century” (ibid.: 
15–16).17 But if stranger-kingship apparently mirrors the relations of produc-
tion, is it not because the image has indeed been reversed: not that the distinc-
tions of stranger-kingship reflect the relations of production, but that produc-
tion is organized by the relations of stranger-kingship? The “ownership” and 
control of the means of production in the primary, agricultural sector by the 
underlying people is sequitur to the broad cultural distinctions of autochthony 
and alterity. It is the opposition between the descendants of first-settlers exis-
tentially connected by ancestry to the spiritual sources of the earth’s fertility, and 
the dominating late-comers of foreign derivation and violent disposition ruling 
by tributes and foreign wealth acquired by trade, warfare, and so on. Clearly, 
the relations of production are structured in the terms and forms of stranger-
kingship as such, but the terms and forms of stranger-kingship are not those of 
production as such.
In any event, the distinction between the immigrant Essikongo nobility and 
the indigenous Ambundu peoples was structurally pertinent in the old Kongo 
kingdom, and it could not be so simply characterized as a difference between 
the denizens of the towns and countryside. In the beginning of his long reign 
(1506–43), King Afonso styled himself simply as “King of Kongo and Lord of 
the Ambundu,” a title that was repeated by his successor King Diego in 1647 
(Cuvelier 1946: 339). In later years, Afonso—as also Afonso II in a document 
of 1652—while naming all the principalities he claimed to rule (in European 
imperial style), added that he was “Sovereign Lord of all the Ambundu” (ibid.). 
Very likely the formation of the kingdom itself entailed the process of ethno-
genesis by which these broad identities developed—each of them, and especially 
“Ambundu,” including a considerable diversity of groups of different origins. 
The province of Nsundi alone “counted ten different tribes” (ibid.: 247).18 The 
complementary formation of an Essikongo superstructure, moreover, involved 
the spread of the immigrant nobility into countryside settlements as ruling 
17. As will be discussed presently, Wyatt MacGaffey takes a similar but more nuanced 
position on the determination of Kongo stranger-king traditions by the relations 
of production and social reproduction and their nonpertinence as history or for 
history.
18. Ravenstein (1901) writes—apparently from the dominant, Essikingo view—that 
“ambundu” meant “slaves,” and ”the conquered.” 
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chiefs (cum-tribute collectors) in the provincial and district centers; even as 
the lower levels of this hierarchy were expanded by the bestowal of heritable 
titles—together with the distinctive bonnets signifying noble status—on local 
big-men and clan leaders who were prepared to pay the substantial qualifying 
fee. Probably, the question of the ethnicity of the town-dwelling rulers in the 
ancient Kongo was similar to what Nadel described for Fulani in Nupeland:
The Fulani conquerors of Nupe, numerically an insignificant minority, were ab-
sorbed completely by the culture of the people whom they had subjugated . . . . 
Yet they remain a separate social group, conscious of its alien origin, and still dis-
tinguished by a special tribal name: they call themselves, and are called by their 
subjects, goizi, a name which distinguishes these settled, “town Fulanu” from the 
nomadic cattle people who are known as bororozi, never Nupe. They are a “rep-
resentative” group in a different sense—the small elite of conquerors and rulers. 
The historical memory of their alien origin—for it is only this today—buttresses 
their detached social position. (1942: 71)
To take stock, then, in Thornton’s notional reconstruction of “historical real-
ity”: Vungu was not the homeland of the kingship, notwithstanding that even 
seventeenth-century kings claimed that it was; Mpemba Kazi within Kongo 
was where the kingship originated, notwithstanding all tradition and documen-
tation indicating it was the place the immigrant founder Ntinu Wene first con-
quered after crossing the Congo River; Ntinu Wene did not cross the Congo 
River, hence we can ignore the merely cosmological significance of that Rubicon 
moment and its presence in operative versions of the kingship traditions; any-
how, Ntinu Wene was not the founder of the Kongo kingdom, his father Nimi 
a Nzima was; and the dual society of indigenous Ambundu subjects ruled by 
a foreign-derived Ashikongo aristocracy was not really a distinction of histori-
cal origins and ethnic identities but an ideological reflex of the socioeconomic 
differences between rural peasants and the town elites. In sum, the Kongo state 
was not a stranger-kingdom. 
But to return to the paradigmatic traditions of stranger-kingship that, “lit-
erally true” or not, are resources of real history: the ultimate integration of the 
foreign prince is his marriage to the daughter of the native ruler. This recurrent 
episode in narratives of the origins of stranger-kingship amounts to the contract 
of the new society, not only by allying its dual components but also by giving 
rise to a dynasty that encompasses the totality. The ubiquity of this foundational 
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synthesis of foreign rulers and native owners is already evident in preceding 
paragraphs. Such unions or their symbolic equivalents are virtually universal 
conditions of stranger-kingship formations—around the world as well as in 
Africa. What Marjorie Stewart writes of the Borgu kingdoms in this regard 
could easily be duplicated from accounts of stranger-kingship origins anywhere: 
“It was common practice . . . when a powerful prince arrived in another chief ’s 
territory for the incumbent chief to offer his daughter in marriage to the new-
comer to establish bonds of friendship and thereby acknowledge the latter’s 
superior political power” (1993: 252).
More than “friendship,” however, the two components of the kingdom are 
united by an ancestral and perpetual kinship. The chiefs of the old regime and 
their successors are related to the ruling kings as maternal “grandfathers” to their 
“grandsons” (Kongo) or “mothers’ brothers” to their “sisters’ sons” (Mossi); or 
else more generally, as in Borgu, “the [native] chief of the Earth becomes more 
intimately associated with political power and becomes for all the young princes 
the very incarnation of their maternal ancestor” (Lombard 1965: 186). Again, 
in another mode of generalizing the initial kinship connection, local indigenous 
headmen may be related to royals settled in their villages or districts as “wives” 
to their chiefly “husbands” (Luba, Tallensi, Nyakyusa). Note also that the status 
of the native chiefs as priests of the stranger-king realm is consistent with their 
maternal relation to the kingship insofar as it parallels Edmund Leach’s classic 
formulation of the opposition between the “consubstantiality” of the own people 
(here, royals) and the “metaphysical influence” of the affines (here, natives). Af-
fines of the kingship by origin, the indigenous priests are everywhere the sacrifi-
cers, the ritual intermediaries with divinity, even in some cases officiating at the 
sacrifices to the royal ancestors—though it be on behalf of the king as sacrifier. 
On the other hand, by thus integrating the sacred powers of the autoch-
thonous people with the violent potency of his own origins, the ruler himself 
becomes something of a divinity. Not only does he encompass the social totality 
in his own person, but he is endowed with the powers to create it. At least such 
are the attributes of the offspring of the original union. The immigrant prince 
himself may disappear, leaving behind a son by a native woman to become the 
first ruler and true founder of the kingdom—which he may then expand by 
conquest as well as enrich by civilizing gifts. This is the story in the kingships of 
Benin, Luba, Lunda, and, by implication, Kongo. 
Not to forget that the native peoples have their own reasons for entering 
into an alliance with a powerful outsider, and accordingly they may have their 
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own agency in the matter. Such was the experience more than once of the good 
Capuchin Montesarchio during his evangelizing travels around Kongo in the 
mid-seventeenth century. At one village in Mbata, he found the chief exces-
sively attentive; for, “He wished at any cost to give me his own daughter for 
a wife” (Bouveignes and Cuvelier 1951: 151). A similar incident at the large 
principality of Congobella on the upper Congo River—apparently independent 
and rarely if ever visited by Europeans—gives some idea why the missionary 
was in such great demand: “They said I was a ‘Banchita,’ which is nearly saying 
that I was a man returned from the other world” (ibid.: 115). Here again, “The 
Congobella king wanted to give me one of his daughters in marriage, and many 
others wished to give a daughter or a sister to have descendants of a priest of 
the Pope” (ibid.: 116). Some people also expressed a desire to have his relics, 
never mind that he was still alive, and they offered him native cloth of the best 
quality for locks of his hair (ibid.: 117). A being returned from the otherworld 
to whom the native ruler proffers his daughter in marriage: Can one doubt the 
“historical reality” of stranger-kingship in the Kongo region, even the possibility 
of its peaceful establishment? 
In the official tradition, the Kongo hero Ntinu Wene was himself the off-
spring of a union between the king, Nimi a Nzima, from Vungu across the 
Zaïre, and a sister of the Mbata ruler Nsaku Lau. It may be that Nimi had 
already threatened a decentralized galactic system from its margins and in the 
usual stranger-king pattern married an indigenous princess.19 Hilton (1985) has 
argued this incursion actually happened; and as we know, Thornton (2001) takes 
the argument beyond its logical and empirical extreme to the conclusion that 
Nimi was of endogenous BaKongo stock and he rather than his son Ntinu 
Wene was the real founder and first king of Kongo. In this connection, both 
Hilton and Thornton stress the economic basis of Kongo kingship origins, espe-
cially its development at the intersection of long-distance trade routes, although 
neither (so far as I know) has addressed the dissenting scholarly opinions. 
19. Alternatively, the Mbata ruler may have accorded the subordinate Vungu ruler a 
junior sister or daughter as a secondary wife of the latter. This would actually be 
consistent with the subdominant version of the tradition of Ntinu Wene’s crossing 
of the Zaïre, wherein he takes on the ambition to become a conquering king 
when his mother, who had refused to pay the toll, was insultingly asked, “Who 
do you think you are, the mother of the king?” It would also be consistent with 
the recurrent motif to the effect that Ntinu Wene had no chance to succeed to the 
Vungu kingship.
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Early on, David Birmingham (1975: 544–55) asserted there is no indication 
that Kongo before the Portuguese owed its wealth to monetary sources or any 
marketable product; it was essentially a prosperous farming regime, working 
through a tributary and redistributive political economy. Likewise, Luc de Heu-
sch questions whether “the ‘economist’ hypothesis of Anne Hilton could not be 
reversed. Would it not be the very existence of the Kongo kingdom that struc-
tured the commercial development?” (2000: 69). 
In any case, if Ntinu Wene’s father was the original king of Kongo, one 
would have to draw a distinction between what actually happened and what 
became the historical reality. For inasmuch as the Congolese people have made 
their own history in tradition and in action, they have privileged the offspring 
of the foreign king and the native woman, Ntinu Wene, as the primary agent, 
founding hero, and original king of the historic dynasty. There is a difference 
between a happening and a historical event, rather on the order of the differ-
ence between fact and value, which is to say that nothing happens except as it 
is meaningfully appropriated and disseminated. Hence Wene, of mixed foreign 
and domestic descent, is the effective founder of the kingdom. As Balandier 
observes, by this synthesis of the foreign warrior with the sacred ancestral pow-
ers of the autochthonous people, the Kongo kingship derives “the means of 
converting into durable superiority what was merely vulnerable coercion, trans-
forming into a permanent order what was merely a disorder favorable to in-
novation” (1968: 38).
THE DUAL SOCIETY
In a chapter on “Religion as a political system,” Wyatt MacGaffey reviews an 
ethnographic report by Nestor van Everbroeck (1961) on the Bolia people liv-
ing in the vicinity of LacMai Ndomba (former Lake Leopold II, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo), of whom MacGaffey says, “their ideology and social 
structure .  .  . are closely comparable to the BaKongo” (1986: 182). In Mac-
Gaffey’s summary:
The legendary first occupants of Bolia territory were the Nsese, forest dwellers 
and cannibals . . . . Every Bolia village has a political chief and an owner of the 
soil. These positions belong to clans described in the legends as invaders and 
autochthons respectively . . . . Traditions relating to occupation and ownership 
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of land resemble those of Kongo and are evidently political rather than historical 
material . . . . The political chief has the power of life and death and is responsible 
(with a committee of three assistants, as in the classical Kongo government) for 
justice, foreign relations, and war. The owner of the soil is responsible for the 
growth and well-being of the village. (1986: 182)
More than the resemblances to “classical Kongo government,” however, the 
Bolia ethnography is classical stranger-kingship. Immigrant chiefs from the 
northeast, the Bolia took over the villages of the indigenous “owners of the 
soil,” forming a series of chiefdoms in each of which the ruler was the collective 
“husband” of his native-subject “wives.” For example: the charter tradition of 
the most important chiefdom in the area of the Sengele people, one of several 
indigenous groups, is quintessential stranger-king stuff (Van Everbroeck 1961: 
31ff.). The advent of the arrogant Bolia hero Kengulu was initially conflictual 
but in the end peaceful. Kengulu appears as a hunter accompanied by his war-
riors who trail a wounded wild pig to its death in the forest near the Sengele 
village of Ngongo. Pleased by the location, Kengulu brings his people there to 
clear the forest for a settlement. As is often recounted in such charter narratives, 
the contact with the native population is made through a female relative of the 
native leader, in this case the wife of Yanganga, the “possessor of the land” of 
Ngongo and its environs. Hearing of the strangers through his wife, Yanganga 
confronts Kengulu with the demand of a thigh of the wild pig as his due as 
“possessor of the land.” Kengulu refuses, and the native Yanganga not only backs 
down in light of the number of Kengulu’s warriors, but returns the next day with 
a welcoming gift of a packet of vegetables, a chicken, and the shoulder of a wild 
pig (the chiefly portion?). Moreover, a few days later, having killed a leopard and 
desiring to remain on good terms, Yanganga sends a shoulder to Kengulu, who, 
standing on his chiefly dignity demands also the skin, teeth, claws, and thigh of 
the beast. Enraged, Yanganga, as the “legitimate owner of the soil,” declares he 
would not submit to the domination of the strangers. Kengulu thereupon enters 
Ngongo with his warriors and demands damages. When the villagers advise ap-
peasing the stranger-chief, Yangenga departs with his family, leaving only two 
sons at the village. In his absence, however, the victory of Kengulu soon turns 
to dust: the earth becomes sterile, and day after day fishing fails and the hunt-
ers return empty-handed. His advisors tell Kengulu he has acted badly toward 
Yanganga, and “for our life to return to normal, there is only one remedy: solicit 
the intervention of the owners of the soil.” Upon the chief ’s request Yanganga’s 
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sons seek him out and ask him to return. Arriving at the village, Yanganga, first 
remonstrates with strangers for stealing his domain, and then agrees to restore 
its vitality—but only on three conditions: first, that Kengulu and his descend-
ants shall give Yanganga and his descendants the thigh of every animal killed 
on his territory; second that each newly installed chief shall pay the owners a fee 
of four hundred pieces of the indigenous money; and finally that the strangers 
shall agree to give up their name and adopt the customs and identity of the na-
tive Sengele—particularly that they shall no longer mark their children with the 
Bolia tattoo, and they shall cease eating snakes and instead adopt the Sengele 
diet of frogs, cicadas, and winged ants. In the sequel, although life returned to 
normal when Kengulu agreed to these terms, some time later three of his sister’s 
sons died shortly upon acceding to the paramount chieftainship. The fourth and 
youngest, suspecting Yanganga was the cause of his brothers’ deaths and in order 
to avoid his own, demanded six wives from the native Sengele and had eleven 
children by them. One day, on assembling the notables of the Bolia and Sengele, 
he told them he could now die in peace, since Yanganga could no longer kill off 
his descendants: for his children, if Bolia by their father, were Sengele by their 
mother. He commanded the descendants of each of his six sons to take the 
chieftainship in turn. Such is the origin of the six clans that now succeed each 
other in power. 
The story is ideal-typical down to the assimilation of the strangers by the 
native people, thus producing a cultural unity marked by the enduring tra-
dition of an ethnic difference. But since such narratives among BaKongo as 
well as BaSengele “are evidently political not historical material,” MacGaffey 
would dismiss the stranger-kingship thus described, not necessarily as untrue, 
but as historically irrelevant. The arguments differ from those of Thornton but 
they come to a similar banishment of stranger-kingship to a historical limbo 
of something like false consciousness; or more precisely their resolution to a 
redundant expression in discourse of other realities, even if disguised. For Mac-
Gaffey, what is substantially and logically at issue in the Bolia case is political: 
it is not historical content and should not be considered as such, but a useful or 
interested way that the people talk politics. Not that MacGaffey, as an excep-
tional ethnographer, is unaware of the enduring temporality, hence continuing 
historical effects, of charter traditions. He certainly recognizes this historicity, 
although he does not theorize it, and particularly in the matter of stranger-
kingship, he effectively dismisses it. In the matter of the origin traditions of 
Kongo clans, however, MacGaffey writes:
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Because the narratives and related representations discussed so far refer to the 
“past” history of the clans, it may be thought that the way of thinking they em-
body belongs to “the past” in the European sense, to tradition rather than to the 
present. Kongo conceptions of relations between European[s] and Africa show 
the same structure in contemporary thought and action, however, and discon-
certingly incorporate elements of “the past,” that is, of events that European 
thought considers over and done with. (1986: 61–62)
Add BaKongo to the peoples who find themselves in history. There will be occa-
sion to again consider MacGaffey’s position in these matters in the concluding 
section of this essay. Suffice here to notice that since the foreign origin of the 
Kongo dynasty has no existential standing of its own, the complex of relation-
ships that are structurally entailed in stranger-kingship get lost to the cultural 
order at the same time they are denied historical force. Although MacGaffey 
(n.d.) freely allows that stranger-kingships could possibly have happened, he is 
at some pains to doubt it. He cites the ubiquity of stranger-king origin legends 
in Central Africa, and the fact that the Kongo version of the conflicts among 
royals that lead to the founding of the dynasty are the matrilineal inverse of the 
patrilineal Luba version, as if these were loose tales that easily diffused around. 
Aside from the fact that being commonplace is not necessarily evidence of trivi-
ality, structural transformations of this kind among interacting societies—the 
dialectic processes usually described as “symmetrical inversions” or “comple-
mentary schismogenesis”—are well-known modes of cultural production.20
In any event, what MacGaffey writes in another context about the re-
semblances of Kongo and Luba stranger-king traditions and rituals suggests 
that considerably more is at stake than a complementary contrast in dynas-
tic politics—although again, “these stories are not historical but sociological” 
(2003: 11). This discussion is focused on the Rubicon moment, the crossing of 
the river by the founding hero, initiating a new sociopolitical order. MacGaffey 
is primarily comparing Kongo clan traditions of such crossings to Luba royal 
traditions, thus little things to big things, but all the same the new order intro-
duced in either case is culturally total and spiritually empowered: 
Stories on the grand scale describe transitions, often across a river, leading to 
the settlement of a new country. These stories are not historical but sociological, 
20. See Bateson (1935, 1958) and Lévi-Strauss (1995).
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sketching an ideally ordered society . . . . All this closely resembles, though not 
on an epic scale, the stories among Luba-related peoples in eastern Congo of 
heroes who come from across the river to introduce civilization as right marriage, 
right eating and right government [de Heusch 1982a]. In both east and west, the 
elsewhere from which the king comes is a land of spirits (Bupemba, Mpemba, 
Upemba), although it may be identified with a geographical location. It is a place 
visible to diviners in the reflecting surface of the water; in the form of a cemetery, 
a cave, a grove or a pool, it is a place of testing and investiture for chiefs and 
other persons whose special powers are signified by white kaolin clay, mpemba. 
The initiation rituals of chiefs retrace and recapitulate the migration stories of 
the myths. In much more detail than it is possible to recount here, Kongo [clan] 
chiefship rituals read like a reduced or provincial version of those found among 
Luba. (2003: 11)
Once across the river, the stranger-hero creates a dual cosmopolitical order of 
rulers and subjects whose respective identifications with outside transcendent 
powers and those of the local earth is existential, a difference of being. For Igala, 
J. S. Boston (1968: 15) speaks of a system of dual sovereignty:
In this political system rights of political sovereignty, in the widest geographical 
sense, are vested in large-scale clans of high rank, whilst rights of local sover-
eignty are vested in small-scale localized clans who are often regarded as being 
the “landowners” of the areas in which they are settled. The myth represents the 
basic division of functions and attributes in origin to the introduction of notions 
of aristocratic rank from other kingdoms with whom the Igala have been in 
historic contact. 
Directly or indirectly, the indigenous people have an ancestral identification 
with the land: usually because their ancestors first occupied it and in death still 
do, being buried there; or else because their ancestors, having made a bond with 
the original spirits, continue to intercede with these ancient sources of fertility. 
As we have seen, whether the new order is established by conquest, peacefully, 
or by a combination of the two, the foreign rulers invariably forbear from ap-
propriating the land as such, pretending neither to a proprietary claim to the 
soil nor to a spiritual relation to the ancestral sources of its fertility. Indeed it 
is reported of Mossi that their concept of elite power was foreign to that of 
work: “Their power is defined as the element of completion which achieves the 
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construction of society after the world has been transformed by work” (Izard 
1985: 14). 
This cosmopolitical order is at the same time a dual system of political econ-
omy integrated by the dominant foreign aristocracy—whose constitution of the 
totality is founded on the occupation and work of their native predecessors. 
Even in the greater galactic polities such as the “empire” of the Luba, however, 
the foreign aristocracy’s unification and dominance of the whole left consider-
able economic autonomy to the indigenous parts. “The political authority, as 
instituted by the leading family from the east, was a kind of superstructure, 
uniting and fusing the scattered groups living between the Lomani and Lualaba 
[Rivers]. The first occupants of the country remained the real owners of the soil” 
(Theuws 1983: 9). Accordingly, for all the tributary claims of Luba chiefs over 
the underlying population, they yielded precedence in the control of resources 
to the local earth priests:
In this way they are acknowledging a fundamental problem: the Empire’s politi-
cal regime did not control village land. Only the village earth-priest could lay 
direct claim on the produce of village land, because he was the descendant of 
the village’s founding ancestral spirit, who protected the land. (Reefe 1981: 46)
The dual economy was at the same time a division of spiritual labors. In an 
article entitled “The king comes from elsewhere,” Luc de Heusch (1991:113), 
commenting on Alfred Adler’s (1982) excellent ethnography of the Mundang 
of Chad, observes that the ruler alone can “assume command of the universe for 
the benefit of the group as a whole.” A descendant of a royal immigrant from a 
former kingdom on the Benue, a great hunter who came in from the wild as a 
“sacred monster,” the Mundang king “controls fecundity and fertility through 
the power he exercises over the sky” (ibid.: 114). Accordingly, the sovereign 
deploys his authority “in a space outside the jurisdiction of the [native] clans 
where, with the help of his men, he secures wealth by violence without interfer-
ing in the affairs of the clans” (ibid.). However, no one has such extensive powers 
over the earth, which belongs in severalty and on an equal basis to the autoch-
thonous clans, each of whom has made a pact with the spirits of the area. Or as 
the Tale elder said to Rattray (1932, 2: 344), “We were once owners of the lands; 
since the scorpion Europeans came we have entered into holes. You have burned 
our bows and arrows; we once were keepers of the moons [i.e., custodians of the 
festival calendar for prospering the land].”
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Linked to the ancestral sources of the earth’s fertility, and often, by the same 
ancestral token, to human fertility, the autochthonous people’s claims to the 
land had survived intact through the centuries of domination by rulers of for-
eign origin before European invaders changed the conditions of colonization. 
So do the typical narratives of kingship origins say—to which the normal rela-
tions of power, production, property, and piety correspond. In a well-known 
tradition of the Ouagadougou Mossi as recounted by Elliott Skinner (1964: 15), 
the conquest of the native Ninise villagers by a Mossi hero consisted of inducing 
or forcing them back to their villages from the forest into which they had fled, 
in order to resume the sacrifices to the local earth. As a corollary, many of the 
Mossi ruling lineages, the nakombse, are land-poor. Similarly, Jacques Lombard 
relates that the seminomadic Wasangari “conquerors” of the Bariba peoples of 
Borgu had little interest in land, as distinct from pillaging or otherwise ex-
acting its fruits from the indigenous producers. What Lombard writes of the 
system of powers established in the formation of the Borgu states, the contrast 
he describes between the Wasangari control of the native people and the native 
people’s control of the land, is typical of the political economics of stranger-
kingship: “The conquest brought no impairment of the aboriginal rights over 
their land. The ruling aristocracy leaves the power of disposition to the Masters 
of the Soil, with all the prerogatives pertaining thereto . . . . The principle was 
that power should be exercised directly over men but not over land” (1965: 185). 
Lombard goes on to say, however, that considering the toll the Wasangari ex-
acted on the people’s output, they might as well have owned the land. 
Maybe so, but that is not an intrinsic condition of stranger-king systems. 
Highly mobile ruling groups such as the Avongara of the Azande kingdoms 
exacted minimal tributes from the various peoples they subdued—one is re-
minded of Owen Lattimore’s well-known observation that “the pure nomad is 
the poor nomad”—as is also true of small-scale stranger-kingships such as Alur 
(Evans-Pritchard 1971: 33; Southall [1956] 2004). What is invariant, rather, 
is the principle as succinctly enunciated by Nyoro people: “The Mukama [the 
King] rules the people, the clans rule the land” (Beattie 1971: 167). Referring 
to the Namoo chiefs of the Tallensi, R. S. Rattray writes: “‘The people belong 
to me, the land belongs to the Tendaana [the Tale earth priest].’ Is a statement 
I have repeatedly heard made” (1932, 1: xv). Likewise, it is said of Bemba chiefs 
that they count their wealth in people, not in land (Richards 1961: 245). In 
Loango, neighboring kingdom and quondam tributary of Kongo, the king does 
not possess the land and cannot dispossess anyone else. Divided into diverse 
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territories, the land is the property of the spirits of nature. The king gets his au-
thority from their representatives, dwarfs and albinos, and from the high priest 
of the realm (de Heusch 2000: 54). Michel Izard provides an exemplary sum-
mary of such dualism in relation to the Yatenga Mossi:
The bipartition of the society of the kingdom . . . between “people of power” (the 
descendants of the Mossi conquerors) and “people of the land” (the autochthons) 
corresponds to two regimes of authority, the first which concerns men, the sec-
ond which concerns land. One of the most fundamental functions of the king is 
to be the guarantor of the “alliance” between the power and the land. (1990: 71)
These economic distinctions are spiritual endowments, amounting to a com-
plementary relation between the transcendent powers introduced by the stran-
ger-king and the local powers of the earth inherited by the native people, as 
integrated by the former through his domestication by the latter. Where the 
native people mediate relations to the local earth through the ancestral sources 
of its productivity—or else to the earth spirits through their ancestors—the rul-
ing aristocracy mediates the relations to the encompassing realm of natural and 
cultural resources, from which it derives material benefits by virtue of its own 
foreign identity and marvelous powers. Randall Packard provides a fine example 
in his ethnography of the East African Bashu: 
Of particular importance to the well-being of the land are the ancestors who 
first cleared the land of forest, for in so doing they established an important 
bond with the land. Their cooperation, obtained through the invocations of their 
descendants, is critical for the performance of any action involving land . . . . The 
Bantu view chieftainship, bwami, within the context of [a] wider view of man’s 
relation to nature. The chief, mwami w’ambita, is the primary mediator between 
the world of the homestead and the world of the bush. Through the mwami, 
the mediating role of rainmakers, healers of the land, priests of earth spirits and 
ancestors are correlated and the forces of nature domesticated. The mwami is also 
ultimately responsible for separating the uncontrolled and dangerous forces of 
the bush from the world of the homestead. (1981: 29–30)
Motivated by their respective natures and powers, the native-descended subjects 
and their foreign-derived rulers are engaged in distinct and complementary 
economic spheres, coordinated largely through the distributive activities of the 
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latter as funded largely by the productive activities of the former. Insofar as the 
ruling aristocracy “achieves the construction of society after the world has been 
transformed by work,” the indigenous people are pretty much the working class 
in stranger-kingdoms, particularly in the primary sectors of agriculture, fishing, 
and hunting, as well as most craft production (the magical art of blacksmithing 
usually excepted). But then, “the clans rule the land”: as the “owners” of the land 
by ancestral right, the subjugated working class of the stranger-kingdom have a 
monopoly control of the primary means of production. Moreover, as organized 
primarily through kin relationships, their production is oriented principally to 
their own domestic consumption. But where the indigenous people’s relations 
to the land are proprietary and productive, those of the ruling aristocracy are 
tributary and extractive. The ruling class appear on the scene of production post 
messem, after the harvest, to levy a toll on its output, both in the products and 
in manpower they would put to their own uses. Their own uses have to do with 
the accumulation, strategic redistribution, and conspicuous consumption of cir-
culating wealth with the aim of enhancing their power by the direct domination 
of people—rather than by control of people’s means of existence. They are con-
cerned with exchange and distribution more than production; with riches and 
sumptuary values rather than means of subsistence; with the returns of tribute 
and trade, and the booty of war rather than agriculture. The mobile wealth of 
this sphere—monies, luxury cloth, salt, metals, ivory, cattle, slaves, etc.—is gen-
erally of foreign or wild origins and ensouled with the vital potencies of these 
otherworlds, just as are the rulers who manifest such powers by acquiring and 
distributing them (Helms 1993; Sahlins 2014). As Beti-Fang people say: “We 
made war in order to have wealth, to have wives and slaves.” Here “the very idea 
of power .  .  . involved the acquisition of the magical force of another person 
through warfare, that is, through capture” (Guyer 1993: 257). Considering that 
the native people receive their harvests by one or another form of spiritual be-
stowal, while the ruling elite appropriate their wealth by one or another form of 
predation, then our notion of “production” hardly applies at all to these societies 
(see chapter 1).
In any case, it need not be supposed that stranger-kingship as such repre-
sents a “determination by the economic basis.” Not only because the subordinate 
class controls the primary means of production, but because, as Southall put it 
for Alur, the economic powers of ruling chiefs are insufficient to account for the 
concept of their authority. “Nothing more strikingly reveals the binding force 
of the concept of chiefship,” he wrote ([1956] 2004: 190), “than the inability 
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of the requisite material basis to confer its real essence.” Besides Alur, there 
are stranger-chiefdoms and kingdoms large and not so large where the struc-
tural differentiation between the alien rulers and their autochthonous subjects 
is disproportionate to their minimal powers of economic domination and ex-
ploitation. Azande again, as well as Anuak, Lovedu, Shilluk, Tallensi, Nyakyusa, 
Moundang: all come to mind as instances of a radical differentiation of the su-
perstructure unsupported by the inequalities of the infrastructure. Still, if Marx 
doesn’t quite work here, Georg Simmel’s classic essay on the “The stranger” is 
a fair description not only of the dualism of stranger-kingship, but also of the 
structural constraints that distinguish the localized native owners, connected in 
substance to soil, from the mobile stranger-traders and traffickers operating in 
an encompassing sphere:
The stranger is by nature no “owner of the soil”—soil not only in the physi-
cal, but also in the figurative sense of a life-substance which is fixed, if not in 
a point of space, at least in an ideal point of the social environment. Although 
in more intimate relations [like marriage with the daughter of the natives], he 
may develop all kinds of charm and significance, he is not an “owner of the soil.” 
Reduction to intermediate trade, and often (as though sublimated from it) to 
pure finance, gives him the specific character of mobility. If mobility takes place 
with a closed group, it embodies that synthesis of nearness and distance which 
constitutes the formal position of the stranger. For the fundamentally mobile 
person comes in contact, at one time or another, with every individual, but is not 
organically connected, through established ties of kinship, loyalty and occupa-
tion, with any single one [—he is encompassing and transcendent]. (Wolff 1950: 
403–4, original emphasis)
SERIAL STRANGER-KINGSHIP
I uncovered an increasing number of first occupants and former chiefs, to the point that 
it began to appear that there were as many first occupants among the Bashu as there were 
New Englanders who claim came over on the Mayflower, and as many chiefs as subjects. 
Randall M. Packard, Chiefship and cosmology
Probably the majority of precolonial African states, including Kongo, have 
known serial-kingship histories, sometimes involving several successive foreign 
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dynasties. For the most part they were nevertheless organized in the classic 
binary terms of “native” and “stranger”: that is, by recursively categorizing all 
earlier regimes, their rulers and subjects alike, as native “owners” relative to the 
latest foreign dynasts. The historical complexities were systematically recuper-
ated by the master dualism of native owners and foreign rulers—if not without 
some residues of contradiction. For insofar as the latest dualism did not cancel 
the earlier ones, the effect was a polity structured as a series of encompassing 
iterations of the same structural duality. 
To this effect, Michel Izard writes of the Yatenga Mossi: “The duality Mossi/
People of the Earth can be interpreted as the last of a series of homologous dis-
tinctions of the type conquerors/autochthons” (1985: 18). The Mossi conquerors 
had deposed of the Fulse rulers of the earlier stranger-kingdom centered in Lu-
rum, from which the realm took its name; whereupon the Fulse became “People 
of the Earth” or “Sons of the Soil” in the kingdom of their successors. Moreover, 
the Fulse leaders took on the functions of “Priests of the Earth” or “Masters of 
the Earth” throughout the Mossi realm, those of highest rank becoming the 
head priests of the Mossi state—a recurrent pattern in stranger-kingships, as 
will be seen. The Fulse rulers of the ancient regime are said to have imposed 
themselves on a still earlier population of Dogon, who, as original inhabitants, 
were ”Masters of the Earth” relative to their Fulse overlords. This original dual-
ity was for the most part unrecognized by the Mossi, who would reduce both 
the old Fulse rulers and their Dogon subjects to the generic identity of native 
“Fulse” or “Ninise.” Yet the Dogon did not entirely lose their identity or prestige 
as indigenous earth priests in the new Mossi order. In the areas they shared with 
Fulse, they still functioned in that capacity relative to the old Fulse nobility, and 
as the original occupants of the land, they maintained a reputation for great 
spiritual powers throughout the Mossi kingdom.
In his rich works on the Kazembe kingdom in the Luapulu Valley, Ian 
Cunnison (1951, 1957, 1959) describes a somewhat more complex history of 
successive dynasties similarly folded into the binary opposition of native sub-
jects and foreign rulers. When the latest “conquerors” led by the Lunda hero 
Kazembe took over the country, the erstwhile Shilla rulers of Bemba derivation 
together with their own original subjects, the Bwilile people of Luba derivation, 
collectively became the indigenous “owners” of the land, at least from the king-
dom-wide perspective of Lunda. The Bwilile had displaced the original pygmy 
population in the hunting and fishing heartland of Kilwe Island, and they be-
came “owners” when the Bemba under their chief Nkuba took over the country. 
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Indeed, in a process of ethnogenesis typical of stranger-king formations, they 
became “Bwilie” under the Bemba occupation, even as the Bemba were now 
known as “Shilla.” When the Lunda arrived, the Bemba/Shilla leader, titled 
Nkuba by positional succession, was made the “chief wife” of the conqueror, 
Kazembe, as well as the paramount “owner” of the kingdom land. However, this 
did not erase the earlier historical distinction between Shilla rulers and native 
Bwilile owners, which continued to function within the areas occupied by these 
peoples. So while Shilla together with Bwilile were owners relative to the Lunda 
chiefs, Shilla were chiefs relative to Bwilile owners. The master dualism thus 
accommodated a triad of ethnic groups, which, moreover, were broadly distin-
guished in function: the Lunda as rulers, the Shilla as fishers, and the Bwilile 
as ritual experts. “The first of the annual ceremonies to ‘unlock the fish’ in many 
of the lagoons shows that there are Bwilile about” (Cunnison 1959: 202). But 
then the Bwilie’s ritual knowledge had come from their autochthonous pygmy 
predecessors. The overall effect is a complex polity constituted by the interplay 
of complementary and opposed relations of precedence: complementary in re-
gard to the control of land and people, but opposed in regard to the virtues of 
autochthony and alterity. In the event, the rule over society as a whole in serial 
stranger-kingdoms passes to the later and greater of the several peoples, while 
the ritual authority over the land devolves upon the earlier and lesser of these 
peoples. Paradigmatic history. 
Also relevant to Kongo, when one important stranger-kingdom replaces an-
other of similar magnitude, the earlier realm leaves certain residual marks on 
the organization of its successor. For insofar as the quondam rulers are now the 
dominant owners and priest-chiefs of the new order—the way the Shilla un-
der Nkuba became the primary owners under the Lunda kingship of Kazembe 
while remaining secondary rulers, as it were, of the enduring older regime —the 
subject population is more broadly and centrally organized than the congeries 
of small-scale, autonomous communities that make up the indigenous stratum 
of an elementary stranger-kingdom. Serial stranger-kingship structures do vary, 
depending on more or less contingent conditions: whether the immigrant rul-
ers come with their own native subjects, like the Ambonu complement of the 
Avongara rulers of Azande kingdoms or the Bakabilo priests of the Bemba, 
for example; or whether the latest dynasty is centered in the same capital as 
the ancient one, as in the successive dynastic occupations of Mbanza Kongo or 
the West African kingdom of Bussa in Borgu (Nigeria). For that matter, Borgu 
itself, as a multikingdom region of six major principalities, rather resembles the 
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regional configuration of polities referenced in the narratives of Ntinu Wene’s 
advent (Lombard 1965; Stewart 1993). A brief aperçu of the Bussa kingdom 
offers further clues to the Kongo.
The Borgu peoples are collectively known as “Bariba,” itself apparently a 
generic term for the various Voltaic speakers who comprised the principal na-
tive chiefs of the earth in the latest precolonial regimes. Together with Yoruba, 
Mandingo, and other custodians of the earth, the Bariba are said to have arrived 
in Borgu as hunters and to have once ruled in various areas. The historic kings 
who displaced them were descendants of the legendary Kisra, the enemy of the 
prophet in Arabia, who himself (or else his son) led the mounted warrior aris-
tocracy known as Wasangari (or Wangara) westward into Borgu from Bornu. 
The Wasangari kings first settled at Bussa, whence certain of their descendants 
dispersed to found their own domains—among which Bussa remains superior 
for its antiquity, although surpassed in size and power by others, particularly 
Nikki. The complex hierarchy at Bussa of priestly owners-cum-former rulers is 
indicative of the process by which the recursive deployment of these identities 
in serial stranger-kingdoms generates native officials of wide authority in the 
state, the latest owners especially exercising temporal functions as well as acting 
as major priests of the realm. As Marjorie Stewart explained:
Even in an earlier era the same processes had been unfolding. Before the arrival 
of the Kisra rulers, the priests of the earth or owners of the land, when they 
belonged to a group coming from elsewhere, also acquired a greater degree of 
political power and control over a larger territory than had previously been the 
case of earlier priests. (1993: 127)
The most important officials at Bussa were the kingmakers, who, apart from the 
addition of the Imam in recent years, consisted of the custodians of the land 
and priests of the earth, whose ancestors ruled over the area in pre-Kisra times. 
(1993: 176)
Since these prominent priest-chiefs ministered to the divine dead rulers effec-
tively in the same way they ministered to the sacred living king, there is in fact 
little point in differentiating their temporal from their spiritual functions. The 
four greatest priests and owners of the earth at Bussa had various duties and 
privileges in relation to the kingship: they acted as counselors to the ruler; elec-
tors and installers of his heir; stewards of the king’s household; keepers of the 
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royal regalia; officiants at royal sacrifices; and, not least, they were in charge of 
what may be called the “second installation,” the royal funerary rites, whereupon 
they repeated their earthly role as priests in relation to the entombed kings. 
Of these native custodians, “the principal chief of the earth at Bussa” was the 
Bakarabunde—whose title appropriately translates as “The Old Man Who Was 
There”—with powers such as to evoke notices of him as the “prime minister” 
of the kingdom. Mandingo by origin, his ancestors were the previous rulers of 
Bussa, the ones who gave Kisra permission to settle and thereupon assumed 
the status of native owners. The priest-chiefs subordinate to the Bakarabunde 
evidently represent several successive ethnic regimes, and whereas they appear 
to be ranked according to how recently they arrived, they are notably associ-
ated with the cults of the earliest gods, particularly the pre-Kisra great god 
Lashi. Thus. second to the Bakaraburde was the head priest of the earth, the 
Badaburde, who, besides being in charge of the burial of the king, offered the 
sacrifices in times of general crises to Lashi. Likewise, for the third of these 
priest-chiefs, the Beresoni: described as the priest to the owners of the land, in 
a sense priest to the priests, he officiates at an ancient shrine of Lashi and other 
pre-Kisra spirits at Dogon Gari. The god Lashi and this shrine in particular—to 
which the Bussa king also sends an annual sacrifice—are linked to certain of the 
oldest ethnic groups of the kingdom, notably the Kamberi people, who speak 
a Yoruba dialect, and also certain Dogon clans. As this is a shrine of the native 
owners dedicated to the ancient god, what is characteristically at stake in the 
annual sacrifice is the fecundity of the earth; for until the Bussa king’s sacrificial 
ram is offered, the chief of Dogon Gari did not send the season’s yam crop. 
Stewart (ibid.: 75) observes: “Many of the ancient shrines and spiritual places 
in Borgu are associated with the Kamberi and it is believed as other groups set-
tled in the area, the last to arrive submitted to the sacred rituals of the earliest 
inhabitants.” This helps account for the report (ibid.: 194) that the pre-Kisra re-
gime was actually dominated by two “families”: not only the Bakarabundi at old 
Bussa, but in the outlying village of Monai, the group headed by one Bamoide, 
who, though of Kamberi origin, was known as the “brother” of the Bakarbundi 
(of Mandingo origin). Accordingly, the prominence of the Kamberi and Lashi, 
representing the autochthonous people and their own earthly powers, is another 
form of the tendency to reduce the complexities of serial kingship orders to the 
master dichotomy of foreign rulers and native owners—which is also to say, to 
the structural chiasmus formed by the interaction of the complementary and 
opposed values of autochthony and alterity. 
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ORIGINS OF THE KONGO KINGDOM 
The structures and traditions of serial stranger-kingship in the Kongo region 
were much like those of Borgu, although, so far as I am aware, they have largely 
gone unremarked as such by the early chroniclers and the later scholars alike. The 
issue of the integration of successive foreign dynasties has been foreclosed nota-
bly as it is presented as a discrepancy between competing versions of Kongo his-
tory, rather than a temporal sequence synthesized as a structural palimpsest. The 
reports of an original BaKongo migration from the interior, beyond the Kwango 
River, are generally taken as disposable exceptions to the dominant tradition of 
Ntinu Wene’s coming from beyond the Congo. Or else the serial kingship is rec-
ognized but not conceptualized, as though it were of no particular significance 
that Ntinu Wene incorporated several older kingdoms in the course of the epic 
journey to his own. In the climactic episode of this charter tradition, also often 
widely noted and little theorized, Ntinu Wene submits to and is installed by a 
Chief-Priest of the Earth, Nsaku ne Vunda, in the ancient capital of Mbanza 
Kongo—the characteristic function of the native owner whose own ancestors 
were once the rulers. For the most part, however, everything happens in the 
Europeans’ accounts as if they were content to follow the authoritative discourse 
of the latest Kongo powers-that-be in reducing the perduring structures of suc-
cessive stranger-kingdoms to the master dichotomy of immigrant rulers and 
autochthonous subjects by conflating all previous regimes in the latter category. 
As, for example, the early eighteenth-century account by Bernardo de Gallo:
It is necessary to know that there are two peoples in this kingdom. One arriv-
ing as immigrants and the other truly of the land, the latter composed of those 
who submitted or subjugated and the other the dominant ones. The dominant 
ones came with king Lukeni [aka Ntinu Wene] and they were called Essikongo 
or Congolese nobles, inhabitants of the royal city. The others, the subjects, are 
those who are found in the lands and provinces of the kingdom, and those called 
Akkata, Alumba or peasants and rustics. (Cited in Randles 1968: 57)
Some years earlier, the Capuchin missionary Cavazzi noted a similar distinc-
tion, also observing that the BaKongo did no productive work, leaving that to 
slaves; although rather than completing society, they passed their days smoking 
(ibid.: 57, 59). In any event, the countryside at that time also had some aristo-
cratic inhabitants, including those from previous regimes as well as Essikongo 
202 ON KINGS
bearing the graded titles of European nobility in charge of various districts. 
Taken together with the ethnic diversity of the underlying population, the col-
lapse of this complexity into the binary opposition of immigrant rulers and 
native subjects is the structural condensation I am talking about. Among the 
anthropologists, Balandier (1968) alone takes note of two distinct incursions 
of immigrant rulers and suggests they refer to different historical periods, but 
otherwise the general scholarly opinion follows the dualist model—which is no 
doubt the ethnographic reality. “The conqueror [Ntinu Wene] created a new 
system when he founded the kingdom of Kongo,” writes Kajsa Ekholm, “but 
he remained a foreigner. The land did not belong to his forefathers and for that 
reason he was dependent on the first occupants and primarily on their repre-
sentative, Nsaku ne Vunda” (1972: 155; cf. Vansina 1992; de Heusch 2000).
By contrast, a number of chroniclers of Kongo charter traditions since the 
seventeenth century have been reporting one or another of two fundamentally 
different versions of the kingdom origins, with different casts of characters mi-
grating from different homelands across different rivers. Indeed there are many 
modern groups who claim to have founded the old capital of Mbanza Kongo, 
let alone those who claim to have originated there, but the widespread traditions 
of an origin from the east across the Kwango River and from the north across 
the Congo (Zaïre) have the warrant of early as well as recent documentation. As 
can happen in serial stranger-kingships, the dynastic stories may get conflated 
such that elements of one appear, more or less incongruously, in traditions of 
the other. Based on information collected in 1665, the account of Ntinu Wene’s 
advent by Cavazzi is one of the most informative narratives on the origins of 
the reigning dynasty, except that instead of Vungu it situates the hero’s point 
of departure as “Coimba in the region of Kwango”: that is, east of the Kongo 
kingdom. The Jesuit Mateus Cardoso, writing in 1622, got Ntinu Wene’s home-
land as Vungu (“Bungu”) alright, but he also recorded the names of six earlier 
rulers not found on any other extant king list. What these anomalies evidently 
represent is the subjacent tradition of a prior kingship that had indeed come 
across the Kwango. Consider, for example, a text of 1680 by the soldier-histori-
an Antonio de Oliveiro de Cadornega: 
Concerning the origin of this kingdom of the Congo, the old conquerors of 
Angola testified that the mexicongo nation was always reputed to be foreign . . . 
that they had come from the interior to dominate the kingdom, just as we say 
of the Romans . . . . In that way this mexicongo people came from the interior 
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and expanded. They came from the lordly lands of Congo de amulaca, [and] took 
possession of the powerful kingdom of the Congo, the natives of that kingdom 
being the Ambundos, of another stock. (Cited in Paiva Manso 1877: 266)
As Amulaka extended considerably beyond the Kwango, this is something com-
pletely different. 
Yet it is not completely different from certain legends recorded in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Not to forget that Ntinu Wene’s own 
story involves contacts with previous regimes, including the one at the capital 
of Mbanza Kongo, which he is otherwise supposed to have founded. The Prot-
estant missionary Karl Laman, writing of Nsundi province, says the epony-
mous Sundi people “had immigrated and established a great kingdom before 
the foundation of the Congo” (1953–68, 1: 1). In one version of the kingdom 
origins, the story he reported is much the same as Vungu tradition, with Ntinu 
Wene (aka Lukeni) as the main protagonist, except that the river he crosses is 
the Kwango and the relations he kills for not paying the toll are his brother-
in-law and the latter’s wife (1957: 137).21 Laman was convinced in general that 
the people came from across the Kwango, as indeed the tradition current among 
them was “our ancestors came from the East” (1953,1: 10). In this regard, the 
traditions of an original Bantu kingdom in the Congo established by migrants 
from the right bank of the Kwango River collected by the Jesuit missionary 
J. Van Wing (1959) are particularly suggestive for their resonance with local 
references to ancient kings reported in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries. From the Bankanu people, for example, who inhabit the region watered by 
several tributaries of the Kwango on the Congo side: “Their principal town was 
Mbansa Kongo, situated at the angle formed by the Kwilu and its tributary the 
Tawa. They say that their Kongo was founded by a great chief, Na Kongo, when 
he crossed the Kwango” (ibid.: 38). Or again, from the Inkisi region:
The Bakongo of the Inkisi region still know that their ancestors came from the 
Kwango, and it is from the Kwango that they left to found Kongo di Ntotila, or 
21. Killing his brother-in-law is not radically different from Ntinu Wene’s killing his 
father’s pregnant sister. In all probability the victim was not his sister’s husband as 
the wife in question would then be his sister; given the BaKongo preference for 
father’s sister’s daughter marriage, the brother-in-law was more likely his father’s 
sister’s son. Hence as in the Ntinu Wene exploit as reported by Cavazzi, the principal 
victim was the hero’s paternal affine.
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San Salvador [that is, the “Kongo of the King,” San Salvador being the renamed 
capital, Mbanza Kongo]. Most traditions and legends known to the masses do 
not go back beyond San Salvador to the origin-place of the population. But sev-
eral chiefs distinctly affirmed to me that the first chiefs of the tribe came from 
the Kwango. (1959: 38)
Then there are the complementary accounts from clans in Mpangu province 
that trace their genesis to a dispersal from Mbanza Kongo ordered by this Na 
Kongo, the king of Kwango origins. From these several sources, Van Wing 
(ibid.: 40) constructs an alternate history to the Vungu tradition, a narrative of 
migration and kingdom formation under the aegis of Na Kongo, “the principal 
chief of the Bakongo clans,” and his successors of the same title and distinction. 
Beginning with the crossing of the Kwango and the initial residence on 
the Kwilu in the northeast, the story takes Na Kongo and his people through 
the Congo heartland to the ancient capital of Mbaza Kongo in Mpemba prov-
ince, leaving people along the way to form dependent chiefdoms (see fig. 1). 
That is how the important Mbata province was generated, including certain 
Kwilu and Inkisi settlements under a ruler who acknowledged the suzereignty 
of Na Kongo. By the tradition, Mpangu province was constituted in response 
to the growth of population in Mbanza Kongo, which prompted the king, Na 
Kongo, to dispatch a levy of people from each resident clan to other areas on 
a mission of conquest. This dispersal of ruling groups from Mbanza Kongo is 
repeated in the traditions of Ntinu Wene and the Vungu dynasty; but what is 
also paradigmatically relevant in the early historical chronicles is that a set of 
interdependent kingdoms and chiefdoms centered in Mbanza Kongo preex-
isted the installation of the Vungu kings in the same sacred center. Moreover, 
in their notices of local traditions, these sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
records correspond closely to significant elements of the Na Kongo traditions 
that Van Wing collected much later from much the same places. 
With regard to Na Kongo’s initial residence in the Kwilu Valley, there is 
the 1664 text of Cavazzi relating that “in Esquila [Nsi a Kwilu in the Kwilu 
River Valley . . .] they revere a site hidden deep in the forest, which by ancient 
tradition was the residence of the first kings.” Cavazzi was told that anyone 
who looked upon the site would die (in Thornton 2001: 109–10).22 The Kwilu 
22. A descendant of the Kwilu rulers came to the Kongo throne in 1568 as Alvaro I. It 
may be this was a reprisal of the ancient Kwango kingship. The argument the other 
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sites noted by Van Wing were in the domain of the ruler of Mbata (the Mani 
Mbata), whose incumbent figured prominently in the Ntinu Wene tradition as 
the latter’s maternal uncle. In the Lopes/Pigafetta work of 1591, the Mbata rul-
er is described as a stranger-king in his own right—as might be expected from 
the narrative of the Na Kongo incursion: “The Prince of Batta has many Lords 
under him, and the natives are called Monsobos, their language being under-
stood in Congo. They are a much ruder tribe than the Mocicongo [the Bakongo 
rulers], and slaves coming from them prove extremely obstinate” ([1591] 1881: 
62). Regarding the information gathered by Van Wing of the colonization of 
the Mpangu area by Na Kongo’s people, a passage in Pigafetta indicates that the 
Mpangu ruler of the sixteenth century indeed belonged to the “oldest nobility” 
of the kingdom: “The present governor is called Don Francisco Manipango, and 
belongs to the oldest nobility of the chiefs of Congo. In councils of state he is al-
ways present, being already an old man and of great prudence, and for fifty years 
he has governed this province without any outbreaks” (ibid.: 60). The Mpangu 
notable’s political functions in the historic Kongo regime are consistent with the 
typical role of former rulers in serial stranger-kingships. 
Finally and more recently comes strong linguistic evidence of a pre-Ntinu 
Wene dynasty from across the Kwango in an article, “On the origin of the royal 
Kongo title ngangula,” by Koen Bostoen, Odjas Ndonda Tshiyavi, and Gilles-
Maurice de Schryver.23 Of this “traditional king’s title,” the authors write:
Thanks to a distinctive diachronic sound change, it is even possible to locate 
quite precisely the term’s origin within the KiKongo dialect continuum. Its prov-
enance gives new credibility to an earlier but dis carded hypothesis situating the 
origins of the Kongo kingdom in the eastern part of the lower Congo, some-
where in-between the Inkisi and Kwango rivers. (2013: 54)
In contrast to the dominant Ntinu Wene narrative, the authors would accord-
ingly revive the “older and alternative scenario [in which] the Kongo kingdom 
was founded by conquerors who subjugated an autochthonous population 
way around, that Alvaro’s reign motivated the Kwango tradition, would not seem 
persuasive, as the Kwango, at that time the territory of the kingdom’s Yaka enemies, 
would not be logically pertinent or politically desirable as a newly invented source 
of the kingship.
23. Many thanks to Cécile Fromont for bringing this work to my attention.
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commonly recognized as Ambundu and came from region known as Kongo dia 
Nlaza between the Inkisi and Kwango Rivers” (ibid.: 72). In this connection 
they cite a “highly relevant” notice from Montesarchio’s account of his travels in 
1650 though the eastern part of the Kongo kingdom and beyond. Here the ruler 
of a place called Elema styled himself “Grandfather of the King of Kongo”: a 
title analogous to that of the Mbata ruler in the Ntinu Wene regime, a, the lin-
guists correctly observe (ibid.: 73)—and which, as mother’s father to the king, 
also signifies the founding marriage of the stranger-prince with the daughter 
of the native ruler. One need only add the linguists’ reiterated assurance that 
the royal ngangula title “could only have originated in one specific region of the 
Kongo, i.e., east of the Inkisi River” (ibid.: 73). 
Following Thornton’s (2001: 104) translation of Pigafetta, Mbanza Kongo 
in Mpemba “was the center of the state of Congo and the origin of the Ancient 
Kings of the land where they were born.” A priori, then, it would be highly un-
likely that “the origin of the Ancient Kings” referred to Ntinu Wene, inasmuch 
as the Vungu tradition says Mbanza Kongo was already inhabited by the priest-
chief of an older regime when Ntinu Wene arrived. By all evidence,the political 
configuration of the Kongo region when Ntinu Wene arrived was like Borgu 
in more ways than one. A galactic polity in a phase of decentralization, Borgu 
consisted of several independent kingdoms and chiefdoms acknowledging the 
nominal superiority of the original state of Bussa, founded by the famous Kisra, 
from whom the rulers of the others had derived. Recall also the Bakarakundi, 
“The Old Man Who Was There” in Bussa: the descendant of former rulers, who 
gave the immigrant warrior Kisra permission to settle, installed him in the king-
ship, and became “the principal chief of the earth” in the kingdom at large. Just 
so, in the Vungu tradition, Ntinu Wene came upon a congeries of autonomous 
principalities south of the Zaïre centered on Mbanza Kongo of sacred memory, 
where one Nsaku ne Vunda was established as “lord of the earth.” Also known 
in the chronicles as Mani Vunda and Mani Cabunga, Nsaku ne Vunda was the 
descendant of former rulers, with kinship ties to the first inhabitants. There 
was a local political chief of Mbanza Kongo, but his title of Mani Pangalla evi-
dently could not match the scale, prestige, or authority attending the Nsaku ne 
Vunda’s hegemony over the earth—which would have reflected the past glory 
of Mbanza Kongo as the dominant center of the region as well as “the origin 
of the ancient kings.” That Ntinu Wene came from a peripheral chiefdom to 
take over a declining galactic center is a process common enough in regional 
polities of this kind (Ekholm 1980, 1985b; J. Friedman 1992; chapter 6 in this 
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volume). That Vungu had already accumulated considerable power under the 
reign of Ntinu Wene’s father, Nimi a Nzima, as Thornton and Hilton have ar-
gued, seems likely in that the important Mbata king had accorded the Nimi a 
sister to wife. As previously noted, then, Ntinu Wene, who thereby combined 
the native and foreign kingly virtues, was destined to be immortalized as the 
conquering hero, even as the tradition of his fateful interaction with the indig-
enous priest-chief Nsaku ne Vunda would become the paradigmatic charter of 
the Kongo kingship.
Residing in Mbanza Kongo, the Nsaku ne Vunda was effectively the epito-
me of the quondam ruler become the priest-chief of the indigenous owners of 
the country. Under the cognate name of “Mani Cabunga,” he is described in the 
anonymous, seventeenth-century History of the Kongo kingdom as “the Supreme 
Pontiff (speaking in our way)” among the Congo nobility. In Cuvelier’s refer-
ences to his powers, he was the intermediary between the living and the ances-
tors—who were “the real owners of the fields, the forests, the rivers, and the 
streams” (1946: 80). The Nsaku ne Vunda was the person to whom one appealed 
for help in all circumstances, on whose authority one planted and harvested, 
who had the magical powers of the hunt and the remedies for madness and 
convulsions; and although he himself did not reign in the country, neither could 
anyone who had not been recognized by him (ibid.: 15). We have encountered 
this kind of Kongo figure before: the kitomi who as priest-chief of the prov-
ince installs the foreign governor from across the river—although not before 
humbling him into acknowledging the kitomi’s own precedence in the land (see 
above). “Considered by many as a god on earth, according to Cavazzi, the kitomi 
was the plenipotentiary of the heavens, and was offered the first fruits of every 
harvest” (Randles 1968: 39). In Hilton’s generalized depiction: “The kitomi were 
described as the owners, masters, lords, or chiefs of the land and gods of the 
earth, seed, or region, and it was believed that . . . they could grant or withhold 
the rain, thereby making the world fecund or barren” (1985: 25).
By all evidence, then, Nsaku ne Vunda was the kitomi of Mbanza Kongo, and 
insofar as the earth priests of a region were hierarchically ordered (MacGaffey 
1986: 195–97), he would be endowed with such powers on a scale commensu-
rate with the ancient preeminence of Mbanza Kongo.24 Hence his traditional 
24. It is consistent that certain Nsaku people (kanda) claim pygmy ancestry, thus 
an association with the original inhabitants—in the maternal or paternal line? 
(Cuvelier 1946: 252).
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and historical role as kingmaker: “It is certain, according to the documents as 
well as tradition, that Nsaku ne Vunda had the privilege of being the principal 
elector of the kings, of installing them, and of receiving the portion of the tribute 
rendered when they acceded” (Cuvelier 1946: 252). Nsaku ne Vunda shared the 
kingmaking privilege with others whose chiefly ancestors had also submitted 
to Ntinu Wene, notably the Mani Mbata or Nsaku Lau, and they continued in 
this office well into the Christian era. What had distinguished Nsaku ne Vunda 
as so-called “principal elector” is that he alone could proclaim the king-elect to 
the assembled Kongo nobility, hence his assent to the decision was deemed es-
sential. And the reason for this distinction was that in so recognizing the king, 
the Nsaku ne Vunda reprised in historical practice the paradigmatic tradition of 
the inauguration of the Kongo dynasty at Mbanza Kongo, where his ancestor 
transferred the sovereignty to Ntinu Wene—although not before suitably hum-
bling him. Like stranger-heroes elsewhere, Ntinu Wene was legitimated at the 
price of his domestication as a conqueror from the dangerous outside.
Ntinu Wene had defeated the overlord of Mbanza Kongo, the Mani Pan-
gala, and was installed on a mountain some four leagues distant, where he 
divided his conquests among his followers. (I am following Cuvelier’s [1946: 
11ff.] recounting of the tradition, based largely on Cavazzi and the anonymous 
History of the kingdom of the Congo.) But because Ntinu Wene had failed to 
secure recognition of his authority from Nsaku ne Vunda, he now fell ill with 
convulsions. His people thereupon went to Mbanza Kongo and, bowing before 
Nsaku ne Vunda, pleaded with him for a cure: “Lord, we know that you are the 
elder, the one who first occupied this region, or in the expression of the country, 
the one who was first in the nostrils of the universe. Ntinu Wene has fallen 
into convulsions, make him calm.” At first incensed, Nsaku ne Vunda protested 
against what he deemed an invasion, but he relented and agreed to accompany 
them to Ntinu Wene. Here the latter addressed him, saying: “You are the eldest 
among us. Strike me with the buffalo tail, that my convulsions may cease.” Cu-
velier explains the symbolism: the cure was the making of Ntinu Wene as king; 
striking with the tail of the buffalo stands for the sprinkling of the king-elect 
with lustral water in the royal installation ceremonies. Hence by this request, 
writes Cuvelier, Ntinu Wene recognized the authority of Nsaku ne Vunda, and 
implicitly confessed that the illness he suffered was due to his negligence of the 
indispensable formality of acquiring the consent of “the religious chief.” Nsaku 
ne Vunda responded to the plea and sprinkled the Ntinu Wene with the water. 
“That is how we know, Congo people still say now, that in order for every king 
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to rule, Nsaku ne Vundu must be present and strike with the tail of the buffalo 
or sprinkle the water. If Nsaku is not there, his [the would-be-king’s] authority 
will not be recognized.”
The reconciliation of the king and Nsaku ne Vunda was sealed by the usual 
contract of stranger-kingship: the marriage of the foreign hero with a daughter 
of the native authority, here Ntinu Wene with a daughter of Nsaku ne Vunda. 
According to a 1665 text, Ntinu Wene also ordered his followers to marry daugh-
ters of the native people, “nobles with nobles and commoners with common-
ers”—which again implies the presence of a distinctive, preexisting ruling group. 
His installation by the native chief of the earth accomplished, Ntinu Wene then 
left his mountain redoubt and settled in Mbanza Kongo. “He took the title 
of mani Kongo or ne Kongo, Lord of Kongo, from the name of the locality 
founded by the Nsaku clan.” Reading from Cuvelier, this union between Ntinu 
Wene and Nsaku ne Vunda was instrumental in bringing about the voluntary 
incorporation of Mbata province in the Kongo kingdom. If so, the submission 
of Mbata would be further testimony of an ancient regime centered at Mbanza 
Kongo. In any event, as we know, the Mani Mbata (Nsaku Lau) now became 
the primary wife-giver to the king, providing a daughter to the inheritor of the 
crown, a practice still faithfully observed through the early seventeenth cen-
tury. Also still observed were the powers of the Nsaku ne Vunda and the Mani 
Mbata in kingmaking and other respects. Both were “grandfathers” of the king 
in that their daughters’ sons inherited the rule—Nsaku ne Vunda’s grandchild 
originally and Mani Mbata’s regularly; and the Mani Mbata was also the king’s 
maternal uncle, as originally the brother of Ntinu Wene’s mother. After the king, 
these two were the most important personages in the realm, although over time 
Christianity and the Mani Mbata’s political support of the crown apparently 
made him the more prominent, albeit the Nsaku ne Vunda remained no less 
indispensable. For that matter, neither was the political chief of Mbanza Kongo, 
the Mani Pangala, forgotten: every year the title-holder mounted a ritual protest 
of Ntinu Wene’s usurpation. Details are unknown to me; it would be interesting 
if the rituals again involved the submission of the foreign king to the native ruler 
as a condition of the submission of the native ruler to the foreign king. 
In the matter of serial stranger-kingship, everything happens in the tradi-
tions and the historical texts as if the Nsaku ne Vunda and Nsaku Lau repre-
sented dispersed branches of the royal clan which previously ruled the cen-
tral and eastern portions of the Ntinu Wene kingdom. As in the ideal-typical 
stranger-kingship pattern, these Nsaku notables of the ancient regime became 
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the electors, councilors, and wife-givers of the historic Kongo dynasty. Cuve-
lier writes of the Nsaku under the new dispensation: “At Mbanza Kongo, the 
Nsakus (Nsaku ne Vunda and Nsaku Lau) occupied the highest rank. Among 
the Congolese the Nsaku clan is considered the oldest of the clans. Nsaku 
Lau, whose family governs Mbaka, is of royal blood. One can presume that the 
Nsakus were the principal councilors of the king” (1946: 305).25 Not only are the 
royal Nsaku the oldest clan (relative to Essikongo latecomers), but according 
to Van Wing, the Nsaku Lau clan “is very widely spread through the Bakongo 
country” (1959: 32). That the Nsaku Lau in Mbata ruled a rustic people called 
“Monsobos” indicates they were stranger-kings in their own right. In sum, the 
Nsaku people, extending over the country they once ruled, exercised a certain 
residual sovereignty as a condition of the legitimacy they conveyed to their alien 
successors. Serial stranger-kingship.
HISTORIOGRAPHY (THE END)
Something must be said, then, for the distinctive ways that different peoples are 
the authors of their own histories. Particularly at issue are the people’s ongoing 
re-creations of how their society came to be, in practice as well as discourse, thus 
endowing their charter traditions with a certain historicity. In this connection, it 
deserves reiteration that stranger-king structures are distinctively and inherently 
temporal. The entire cultural order, from its dual modes of production through 
its social and political and religious cults, is predicated on a diachronic narrative. 
Accordingly, like Maori, people in these societies find themselves in history. 
So it should not surprise that Ndembu accounts of their kingdom’s origins are 
not one-off stories. And inasmuch as they are rehearsed in connection with the 
activities and relationships they underwrite, tradition and structure reciprocally 
affirm the truth of the other—or indeed, by way of awakened memories, they 
reproduce each other. Ian Cunnison observes of another kingdom of Lunda 
origin, the Kazembe realm of the Luapulu Valley: “The whole justification of 
the existence of the kingship and its customs is referred back to its origins in 
the state of [the Lunda ruler] Mwata Yamvo” (1959: 149). Similarly for Tallensi:
25. The councilor role would belong specifically to Nsaku Lau, supposing the report 
that after the installation of the king the Nsaku ne Vunda could not come into 
contact with the king was accurate and referred to the pre-Portuguese period.
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All that matters of the past which lies beyond the span of man’s recollection 
lives on in the social structure, the ideology, the morality, and the institutions of 
today. These are palpable proofs of things that happened . . . “in the days of our 
forefathers and ancestors.” (Fortes 1945: 24)
Nor was Kongo an exception. Speaking of Kongo matters such as war, the death 
of the king, and the royal installation, Balandier recounts: “At each decisive mo-
ment in the life of the kingdom, reinforcement was sought in a symbolic return 
to the origins, in a sort of communion in which the notables and the people 
were associated” (1968: 201). Although the deceived wisdom may have it that 
because so-called “mythical” charters are merely narrative justifications of the 
sociocultural order, they cannot be historically true, in practice it follows rather 
that because people put these foundational traditions into their ongoing rela-
tionships, they must be historically true. It’s true because they do it, and they do 
it because it’s true: society endures on such tautologies.
The big issue here is the status of “myth,” its historiographic value, arising 
from the fact that in the received language of Western scholarship it denotes 
something fictional, whereas for the African peoples whose story it is, it is cer-
tainly true and frequently sacred. The effect can be a fateful disconnect: the 
people’s sacred truth is the historian’s axiomatic falsehood. Together with some 
historically minded anthropologists, historians seem especially prone to thus 
oppose “myth” to “historical reality.” As, for example, Collins and Burns when 
writing of the rulers of certain Swahili city-states who trace their origins to 
Shiraz in Persia: “These assertions are more myth than historical reality” (2007: 
103). For these Swahili, however, this is the historical reality upon which they 
are organized and in terms of which they act; and as it is truly their historical 
consciousness, it cannot simply be ignored as false consciousness. 
Of course, not all historians are disposed to thus write off the distinctive 
ways that other peoples may know and make their history in favor of an archival 
determination of what actually happened—or, more often, what probably hap-
pened. As for anthropologists, the classic statement of the fallacy of myth was 
penned by their armchair ancestor, Sir James Frazer:
By myths I understand mistaken explanations of phenomena, whether of human 
life or of external nature. Such explanations originate in that instinctive curiosity 
concerning the causes of things which at a more advanced stage of knowledge 
seeks satisfaction in philosophy and science, but being founded on ignorance and 
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misapprehension they are always false, for were they true they would cease to be 
myths. ([1921] 1976: xxvii)
Likewise well known, however, was the critique of Frazer and his like by the 
Africanist anthropologist William Bascom (1965). In the course of rescuing 
myths from Frazer’s calumnies, Bascom offered a useful typology of three kinds 
of prose narrative: myth, legend, and folktale—and one mixed category, notably 
common in African societies, of “myth-legends.” Concerned with superhuman 
persons and the origins of the world, mankind, death, and other such cosmic 
themes, myths, wrote Bascom, “are prose narratives which, in the society in 
which they are told, are considered to be truthful accounts of what happened 
in the remote past . . . . Myths are the embodiment of dogma; they are usually 
sacred, and they are often associated with theology and ritual” (ibid.: 4), whereas 
legends “are prose narratives which, like myths, are regarded as true by the nar-
rator and his audience, but they are set in a period less remote, when the world 
was much like it is today” (ibid.). Concerned with such things as wars, chiefs 
and kings, heroic deeds, and dynastic successions, legends are like our “history” 
in their content, if not in their science. The third category, folktales, consists 
of entertaining stories not told as truths, nor in the social or ritual contexts 
that suppose they are. The African “myth-legends” are the product of a simpler 
dichotomy of true and fictional narratives: cosmic and historical traditions are 
thus grouped together and distinguished as “historically true,” as distinguished 
from folktales—by Yoruba, for example:
The Yoruba recognize two classes of tales: folktales (alo) and myth-legends (itan). 
Myth-legends are spoken of as “histories” and are regarded as historically true; 
they are quoted by the elders in serious discussions of ritual or political matters, 
whenever they can assist in settling a point of disagreement. (1965: 11)
Note the implication: these “historically true” narratives function as paradig-
matic precedents. 
Two different issues of historicity are entailed in these myths and legends: 
whether they make history—that is, as paradigmatic precedents—or they are 
history—that is, as reports of what actually took place. Too often, however, in 
opting for one alternative, Western scholars are apt to ignore or discard the 
other. Considering that the myths and legends are a priori true for the peo-
ple concerned, hence that they function continuously as precepts of order and 
213THE ATEMPORAL DIMENSIONS OF HISTORY
action, for some analysts (mainly but not exclusively anthropologists), whether 
the events reported in the narrative truly happened is irrelevant. Alternatively, 
in concluding that that these traditions are a priori untrue and could never have 
happened, either because of their fabulous character or because they are merely 
functional reflexes of existing institutions, other scholars (mainly but not exclu-
sively historians) eliminate them from historical consideration altogether, either 
as being history or as making history. For reasons to be explained, I will here ar-
gue against both these extremes. But for the same reasons I would also reject the 
common average scholarly refuge in “the answer lies somewhere in-between”: 
that these traditions may well harbor some historical realities, which we can 
determine by subtracting their obviously fantastic and irrational elements.
This common, average historical wisdom about myths might be labeled the 
“kernel of truth” thesis. The supposition is that the traditions are more-or-less 
valuable means of discovering real-historical events provided their fantastic as-
pects are debunked and discarded. The object is to find the “kernel of truth” in 
an otherwise unbelievable story, upon which the rest of it is best ignored. Or 
else, as in the case of certain traditions of stranger-king origins, the rest is writ-
ten off as a counterfeit claim of legitimacy. Among scholars of African history, 
Jan Vansina (1985) has been the great master of this kind of historicist exegesis. 
In an interesting way, it involves an inversion of the relation between “myth” and 
“fact” that has been argued above concerning the analytic value of a demonstra-
ble discrepancy between traditions of origin and what actually transpired. In the 
typical kernel-of-truth practice, one subtracts the “fanciful” from the “mythical” 
in order to arrive at the “truly historical.” But if the so-called “myth” is known 
to be the historical reality by the people concerned, what actually happened be-
comes the means of historical wisdom rather than the end: for the comparison 
with the tradition shows how these happenings have been appropriated within 
a given sociocultural scheme. The relationship between what happened and how 
it was construed, which is also to say what historical effects it may have, is the 
work of culture—or, more precisely, of people making what happened intel-
ligible by means of cultural standards of what there is. Too often, scholars have 
worked from the tradition to the event by a process of rational abstraction, sup-
posing historical truth is factual; whereas a comparative anthropology would 
work from the event to the tradition by a process of exegetical elaboration, sup-
posing the cultural truth is historical.
A parenthesis here, lest I be charged with the crude notion of relativism to 
the effect of “any morality is as good as any other” by which critics too often 
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slander an anthropological sensitivity to the ways other cultural orders, and cor-
relatively other histories, differ from our own (cf. MacGaffey 1976: 116f.). My 
understanding of cultural relativism has always been the following:
Cultural relativism is first and last an interpretive anthropological—that is to 
say, methodological—procedure. It is not the moral argument that any culture or 
custom is as good as any other, if not better. Relativism is the simple prescription 
that, in order to be intelligible, other people’s practices and ideals must be placed 
in their own historical context, understood as positional values in the field of 
their own cultural relationships rather than appreciated by categorical and moral 
judgments of our making. Relativity is the provisional suspension of one’s own 
judgments in order to situate the practices at issue in the historical and cultural 
order that made them possible. It is in no other way a matter of advocacy. (Sahl-
ins 2012b: 46)
Cultural relativism is an anthropological way of discovering cultural differ-
ences, rather than a charitable way of granting them moral absolution. End of 
parenthesis.
By contrast to “the answer lies somewhere in-between,” some scholars would 
endorse the radical argument that since myths are sacred truths, all that matters 
is that they function as historical paradigms, regardless of their factual status. 
For Edmund Leach, what is structurally and historically effective about myth is 
that the people believe it is true; that it may or may not have “really happened” 
is “irrelevant.” In the Frazer lecture of 1988, he offered a most un-Frazer-like 
take on the historical value of “myth”: 
In the language of contemporary anthropology, the assertion that a particular 
story (either oral or literary) is a myth need not imply that it is untrue. Stories are 
myths if they are used as . . . justifications or precedents for social action, whether 
secular or religious. Whether the precedent story in question was or was not true 
as factual history is entirely irrelevant . . . . Myth is believed to be true by those 
who use it. In this sense, all the Christian gospel stories are myth for Christians. 
Although practicing Christians are deeply committed to a belief that the key 
events recorded in the gospels “really happened,” the fact is that the historicity 
of the stories (if any) is irrelevant for the religious implication of what the texts 
contain. (2011: 283–84)
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In his excellent treatments of history in the Kazembe kingdom of the Luapula 
Valley, Cunnison comes to a similar conclusion, but with an important caveat 
about the nature of the truth-values at issue:
What actually happened matters little unless the people concerned have means 
of knowing that what they say happened, did happen, or did not. The important 
thing is this: what the Luapula people say now about the past is what they know 
actually happened in the past. Simply to say they believed it happened in the past 
is too weak, for they do not doubt it. (1959: 33)
It thus seems sociologically irrelevant whether the history is in quality possible, 
improbable, or downright mythical . . . . What is important to Africans about 
their histories is not their probability or reliability, which are unquestioned and 
outside discussion, but it is the implication present in the form which the history 
finally takes; and nowadays this conception has found currency among some 
of the people by the use of the English word “meaning.” And in the mythical 
histories of clans and subclans and tribes the meaning is the raison d’être for 
the group’s coming there in the first place, of their position in regard to the oc-
cupation of land, and their relation to other neighboring groups, or groups with 
whom they live together. (1951: 22)
Clearly Cunnison’s stronger contention that traditions of the past involve in-
dubitably known, objective judgments—this happened—is preferable to the 
dubitable subjective propositions entailed in belief—I hold that this is what 
happened. Moreover, given that this history organizes the relations between 
groups, it also has to do with what will happen. Considering the sense of fiction 
that ever attends the word, then, why continue to call these unquestionable nar-
ratives “myth”? Even Malinowski’s “charter myth” is an ethnological oxymoron, 
inasmuch as a tradition that establishes the constitution of the society could not 
be fictional in the society in which it so functions. On the other hand, if “belief ” 
and “myth” are too weak for a proper anthropological understanding of these 
origin stories, to say that their relation to what really happened is irrelevant 
goes too far in just that anthropological respect. Especially if by archival or ar-
chaeological means one could determine a discrepancy between wie es eigentlich 
gewesen and the tradition thereof, it would be an intellectual bonanza. To repeat: 
it would expose the cultural work in the organization of a historical praxis, how 
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what happened has been effectively recuperated in the terms of a particular 
sociocultural order. What the discrepancy between “fact” and tradition would 
reveal is the way—which is never the only possible way—the events have been 
culturally construed by some social process of valuation. For historians and an-
thropologists both, the fundamental question is not what actually happened, but 
what it is that happened.
But that cannot be a question addressed through the Kongo indigenous 
traditions of the past according to Wyatt MacGaffey. MacGaffey could agree 
with Leach and Cunnison that whether or not such narratives are factual is 
irrelevant; for in his own view, they are not really about the past. Whatever 
their relation to the actual past, they have no place in a historical account, since 
historical is not what they are. Merely epiphenomenal is what they are: discur-
sive expressions of social institutions whose logic, purpose, and content they 
embody, syntagmatically or metaphorically, explicitly or in disguise. For Mac-
Gaffey, to give charter traditions any historical credence is to make the major 
methodological error of suborning the analytical position of the anthropologist 
by an indigenous point of view beholden to its own structures and functions. 
Speaking of conventional attempts to separate historical fact from the magical 
aspects of traditions, he writes: 
The conventional ethnographic view regards such magical details as accretions 
upon an historical core. Tradition, that is to say, is implicitly sorted into a class of 
events that seem likely to the European mind, and thus as possibly or probably 
historical and a class of unlikely events that are discarded the procedure is arbi-
trary and unjustified . . . . Real history cannot be inferred from tradition in any 
simple way. To accept as historical even such portions as look real to the foreign 
eye is to submit unawares to the authority of indigenous cosmology as much as 
though one had also accepted the magical portions as historically real. In fact, 
there is no boundary between the two: the myth is all one piece and all of its 
parts make sense from the same point of view. (1974: 420–21)
And since the traditions of stranger-kingship too are functionally dissolved in 
and as religion or some other social institution, since they cannot be “real his-
tory,” everything is then written as if they had no temporality or historical sig-
nificance of their own.
The point of view from which BaKongo construct these traditions and 
which thus comprises their native logic and substance is variously determined 
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by MacGaffey as ritual, political, sociological, religious, or cosmological. And 
while any and all such kinds of narrative or practice cannot then be “historical 
material,” in a recurrent deference to Marxist anthropologies they are deemed 
to have ultimate sources in the relations of production and social reproduction. 
In one of MacGaffey’s latest statements of this position, the dual system of 
stranger-kingship featuring the complementary relations between immigrant 
chiefs and autochthonous priests, as summarized for Kongo by Luc de Heusch 
(2000), is referred to the even more abstract basis of Space and Time:
De Heusch dwells quite rightly on what he calls “dual systems,” but evidently the 
pairing of earth-related and dynastic rituals is independent of the narratives that 
purport to account for them . . . . The pairing can be understood sociologically, 
in that every community exists both in space and time, which are the necessary 
dimensions of production and social reproduction and will be ritualized to some 
extent in every agricultural society. Space is the earth itself and the forces of na-
ture on which all depend in common. Time, on the other hand, is the source of 
authority and the measure of social differentiation; reference to the past purports 
to distinguish older from younger, first-comer from late-comer, aristocrat from 
commoner. These two dimensions are what Victor Turner called communitas and 
societas, although he thought of communitas as occurring only in marginal situa-
tions outside the reach of societas. As Michael Jackson put it, “The complemen-
tary principles of social organization which are variously called lineage/locality, 
kinship/residence, ancestors/earth, descent/territoriality, can be abstractly and 
heuristically polarized as a distinction between temporal and spatial modes of 
structuring.” Not the origin of this polarity but how it works out in practice is a 
contingent, historical question. (MacGaffey 2005: 195)26
We are not specifically informed either by Thornton or by MacGaffey how 
one accounts for the particular attributes of stranger-kingship by the mode of 
26. Speaking of Lele religious symbolism involving animals, Mary Douglas observed 
that it is not relevant to ask how accurate the observation of the creature’s behavior 
need be. 
   A symbol based on mistaken information can be fully effective as a symbol, so 
long as the fable in question is well known. The dove, it would seem, can be one 
of the most relentlessly savage of birds. The pelican does not nourish its young 
from its own living flesh. Yet the one bird has provided a symbol of peace, and 
the other of maternal devotion, for centuries. (1959: 56) 
218 ON KINGS
production. A Marxist “determination by the economic basis” involves the forc-
es and relations of production, but in this MacGaffey text all the explanation 
we get by “production and social reproduction” is a generic reference to “agri-
cultural society.” As a technical means, agriculture does not entail any particular 
structure of society. Certainly it does not specify that the working class of native 
subjects monopolize the ownership and control of this primary means of pro-
duction by virtue of their forebears’ original settlement of the earth in life and 
continued occupancy in death, such that the descendants of these first-comers 
are uniquely able to ritually nurture the growth of crops which are in effect the 
transubstantiation of their ancestors. Rather than explicating stranger-kingship 
and its rituals by determinate properties of production, then, MacGaffey’s treat-
ment becomes more and more abstract. Now we are told that the dualism at is-
sue is an opposition between Time as the source of authority and of the measure 
of differentiation and Space as the nature upon which we depend in common: 
Time is to Space as societas is to communitas. But perhaps nowhere is space so 
radically differentiated as in the pervasive African distinction between the hu-
man community of the settled and the wild populated by powerful evil and ben-
eficial forces—through the associations with which the stranger-king derives 
the measure of his authority. Finally, we learn that not only are the dualisms of 
stranger-kingship forms of Time and Space, but likewise the complementary 
principles of lineage and locality, kinship and residence, ancestors and earth, 
“can be abstractly and heuristically polarized as a distinction between temporal 
and spatial modes of structuring.” We are thus encouraged to explain differences 
by a constant and particulars by universals-–to which MacGaffey, by invoking 
history to bridge the epistemological abyss, thereupon adds an explanation of 
the recurrent by the contingent. 
Although MacGaffey and Thornton have their more principled reasons 
for dismissing the historical value of Kongo origin traditions, whether of the 
kingship or the clans, they also on occasion pooh-pooh them for the trivial or 
unlikely causes these stories may assign for large events. So Thornton (2001: 
109) follows MacGaffey in writing off the so-called “Cabbage Patch Wars,” a 
recurrent motif in clan traditions which alleges that an original ancestral group 
was definitively divided as a result of a quarrel between women over the owner-
ship of a cabbage patch. (I have seen the like in traditions of Fijian clans and 
the origin of the Hawaiian ruling chiefs, not to forget the Luo kingships that 
were sequitur to a brother’s child swallowing a certain bead.) Without claiming 
to assess the possible symbolic weight of the incident, one could easily suggest 
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from our own Judeo-Christian traditions that though such episodes may seem 
unlikely, they can serve as the reasons for major real-historical consequences. Or 
is it not partly because they have accumulated such effects over time that to the 
rational-positivist eye, they seem disproportionately trivial? In any case, for two 
thousand years Christians have known that they are inherently marked by sin 
and condemned to labor, suffer, and die, all because Adam ate an apple. There is, 
however, no historical record of the event. Or of Adam, for that matter. Perhaps 
Augustine’s influential notions of the inheritance of acquired characteristics in 
regard to original sin were instrumentally designed to combat the alternative 
interpretations of the rival doctrines abroad in North Africa, even as they would 
be of functional value to the exercise of Roman imperial power (Pagels 1988). 
Still, the stigma of the original sin together with its many doctrinal comple-
ments has survived all manner of regimes, including the medieval, feudal, and 
the modern democratic, notwithstanding the mythical and irrational—not to 
say ridiculous—tradition of its origin. It also has been successfully perpetrated 
on colonized peoples who needed to be persuaded they were inherently evil. 
All that grand history has been sequitur to a trivial event that never happened. 
Yet because MacGaffey and Thornton are convinced that events described in 
the Kongo traditions of stranger-kingship never happened, or in any case that 
they are of no historical moment, they dismiss these traditions as precedents 
and thereby ignore their specific structural entailments—as in the relations of 
agricultural production—as well as their historical reiterations—as in the politi-
cal functions of the Nasku ne Vunda (Mani Vunda) in the Christian kingdom. 
Otherwise said, they confound a syntagmatic history with a paradigmatic one, 
and having denied the facticity of the former, that also precludes the possibility 
of the latter. This is not to say that for MacGaffey this is standard ethnographic 
or historiographic procedure. In regard to other aspects of Kongo history, he 
is prepared to recognize the historicity of Kongo traditions that, like stranger-
kingship, suppose that power comes from a spiritually charged other world: 
The conversion of the king and the leading nobles to Christianity in the fifteenth 
century meant from their point of view, as Randles effectively indicates, their ini-
tiation into a new and more powerful cult which, like all the other cults known to 
them, offered privileged access to the powers of the other world through contacts 
with the dead. The subsequent religious history of the BaKongo down to the 
present day is the history of this misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is as 
fundamental as the definition of death (lufua) which to BaKongo is a condition 
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of life in another place, or as the definition of race, which to BaKongo is a matter 
of changing one’s skin. Any foreigner attempting to understand must be pre-
pared to recognize a logic totally unlike his own. (1974: 426)
The numerous working misunderstandings that have attended Western colo-
nial enterprises afford perhaps the best demonstration of the historical signifi-
cance of the difference between “what actually happened” and “what it is that 
happened.” The Whitemen thought they were buying Maori land; by the same 
transaction, the Maori understood they were acquiring Whitemen. One can un-
derstand why Luapulu people translate their traditions as “meaning”: the same 
happening can have different meanings, hence different historical effects, for 
peoples of different cultural heritage. In 1779, Hawaiian women of ordinary 
rank ate with their sailor paramours aboard Captain Cook’s ship during his 
fateful sojourn at Kealakekua Bay (Sahlins 1981a). That is what actually hap-
pened; but what it is that happened, among other meaningful things, is that the 
women broke the Hawaiian taboos on codining with men and eating sacrificial 
foods, pork and bananas, strictly forbidden them. For the sailors what happened 
was something like a date for lunch, an expression of intimacy. For the Hawai-
ians, it was a significant historic event, which—along with other exchanges of 
mundane significance to Europeans that amounted to violations of the human 
and divine order for Hawaiians—contributed to the climactic abolition of the 
indigenous religion in 1819. At that time, in a symmetrical and inverse act of 
codining, King Liholiho launched a cultural revolution by eating in public with 
women of the highest nobility. Consider, then, that the syntagmatic event is as 
much dependent on cultural conditions that are not coterminous with it as are 
events that are paradigmatically inspired by ancient memories. One might say 
that the happening becomes an event insofar as it is recuperated by values origi-
nating outside of it, that is, by the meaningful or symbolic values of a particular 
cultural scheme. Indeed, the event as such is doubly beholden to phenomena 
external to it: both to cultural values preposed to it and to subsequent events 
that retrospectively make it more-or-less consequential. Not that these values 
determine what actually happens, as this also depends on contingent circum-
stances not specifiable as such in the relevant cultural scheme. The British ex-
plorer Captain Cook was not foreseen in the Hawaiian order of things, however 
much the annual visitation of the god Lono, with whom Cook was identified, 
became the cultural template of his fatal end. 
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However circumstantial, history is necessarily atemporal and cultural 
through and through. Whether the pertinent causation is sequential or analogi-
cal, syntagmatic or paradigmatic, the transhistorical cultural context is the con-
dition of its possibility—of what it actually is that happens. Otherwise, without 
the culture concerned, what actually happens would be as significant as a tree 
falling in an uninhabited African forest.

chapter 4
The stranger-kingship of the Mexica
Marshall Sahlins
According to Cortés, upon first meeting Moctezuma, the Mexica ruler famous-
ly told him:
It is now a long time since, by means of written records, we learned from our 
ancestors that neither myself nor any of those who inhabit this region were de-
scended from its original inhabitants, but from strangers who immigrated hither 
from a very distant land; and we have also learned that a prince, whose vassals 
they all were, conducted our people into these parts, and then returned to his 
native land. He afterwards came again to this country .  .  . and found that his 
people had intermarried with the native inhabitants, by whom they had many 
children and had built towns .  .  .  . And when he desired them to return with 
him, they were unwilling to go, nor were they disposed to acknowledge him as 
their sovereign; so he departed from this country, and we have always heard that 
his descendants would come to conquer this land and return us to subjection. 
(1843: 87–88)
For all the scholarly controversy that has ensued about the veracity of Cor-
tés’ account, when one considers the worldwide distribution of stranger-king 
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dynasties with quite similar structural features and historical traditions as are 
entailed in Moctezuma’s discourse, what he is reported to have said is quite 
unremarkable. Stranger-kingdoms of this description constitute the dominant 
form of premodern state (Sahlins 2010, 2014). The rulers of a remarkable num-
ber of societies the world around have been foreign by origin to the peoples they 
rule. As rehearsed in ongoing traditions and enacted in royal rituals—notably 
the rituals of their installation and of the New Year—the kings come from else-
where. Moreover, as their cosmic-cum-celestial powers derive from their exter-
nal origins, the foreign identity of the kingship is perpetual, a condition of their 
sovereignty, in contrast to the earthly powers and identity of their indigenous 
subjects. A common counterpart of the fabled origins of the stranger-kings is 
their cultural superiority: just as in the Moctezuma text, they are (literally) the 
civilizers—they built cities. Yet most indicative of stranger-kingship is the mar-
riage of these powerful foreigners with native women—in the paradigmatic 
case, the union of the original stranger-king with the daughter or daughters of 
the autochthonous ruler—an alliance that is in effect the fundamental contract 
of the new society. Sovereignty here is embodied in and transmitted by women 
of rank. In the sequel, the union of the native woman with an immigrant prince 
engenders a succession of kings who combine in their own persons the essential 
components of the new regime: foreign and indigenous, celestial and terrestrial, 
masculine and feminine—each component incomplete in itself, but taken to-
gether they make a reproductive totality. Have you ever wondered why vassal 
lords address Moctezuma as “my child”? I have heard the like in the Fiji Islands, 
where the indigenous chieftains similarly assume the status of the paramount’s 
elders, for he is the offspring of their clan, their ancestress. First in the land, giv-
ing birth to the king, the subject people are senior kinsmen of their ruler.
The return of the original king, ruler of the native people—the Quetzal-
coatl figure in the Moctezuma text—is another common narrative of stranger-
kingdoms, as well as an annual ritual drama. The king of ancient memory and 
godly status comes back to reclaim his sovereignty, only to be deposed again 
by the usurper now in power, although usually not before he renews the fertil-
ity of the land during his temporary ascendency. Also not uncommon is the 
tragic irony involved in the identification of the colonizing European with the 
returning popular god-king: the way Captain Cook was considered an avatar of 
Lono in Hawai‘i, or Sir James Brooke, the “White Raja of Sarawak,” was taken 
by some Iban people as the son of their primordial progenitors, Keling and 
Kumang—then again, in another version, Sir James was Kumang’s lover, thus 
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replicating the contractual union of the stranger prince with the ranking woman 
of the native people (cf. Sahlins 2010: 113). Similar marvelous tales of White-
men are told in Amazonia and Melanesia. For the Micronesians of Ponape and 
Truk, things that drift ashore, including the founders of chiefly lineages, have 
come from the spirit world; which is why, as Ward Goodenough explained, 
Europeans, on their first arrival, were greeted as denizens of that divine realm 
(1986: 559). The parallels with Moctezuma’s alleged greeting of Cortés would 
not be worth further discussion were it not for the disputable speculation of 
some scholars that the identification of Cortés with the lost god-king of Tollan 
greatly facilitated the Spanish Conquest. That this does not necessarily follow 
is demonstrated in the case of Captain Cook, whose identification with the 
ancient deity Lono merely got him killed. What will happen in the showdown 
between the returning god and the king whose ancestors came to power by 
usurping him depends on contingent circumstances of the historical conjunc-
ture. Moctezuma hardly had to give in as a result of the tradition; he could have 
as well concluded from it that Cortés was a threat and got rid of him. What is 
structural is that either outcome, the death of the god or the king, is a logical but 
not inevitable sequitur to opposition between them in the indigenous cultural 
order: one might say it is structurally sufficient but not historically necessary. 
That is one possible conclusion from Mexica history on the relation between 
structure and event. 
Another is the remarkable similarity between the Mexica history and that of 
the Bunyoro kingdom of the East African Rift Valley—itself a lacustrine basin 
geographically similar to the Valley of Mexico. The resemblances include the 
Banyoro people’s notions of early European visitors, who were sometimes iden-
tified with the Bachwezi rulers of the fabled Kitara “empire” that once dominat-
ed the Valley and peoples beyond. “Europeans,” reports the ethnographer John 
Beattie (1971: 50), “were sometimes taken for Bachwezi returning to their old 
kingdom, and . . . were said to have possessed marvelous skills and marvelous 
powers”—should we not say, like the Toltecs? Indeed the Banyoro relate that 
they inherited the great realm and high culture of the Bachwezi in much the 
same way as the Mexica became the successors of the glorious Toltecs, including 
the parallel saga of their origin as uncultured barbarians who migrated from the 
northern peripheries of the empire to its interlacustrine heartland. So the re-
semblances continue: the Bachwezi of ancient Kitara are analogously described 
as “a mysterious race of semi-divine rulers,” of whose extraordinary wisdom and 
achievements stories are still told, including their takeover of the country from 
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“an even more shadowy dynasty” (ibid.: 25, 45). (Hint: Teotihuacan.) And the 
Bachwezi kings, too, were high priests of their Kitara realm, as wealthy as they 
were wise, reigning over many lesser kingdoms of the Rift Valley and beyond.
Just as the Bachwezi resemble the Toltecs, so the Banyoro who replaced 
them were like the Mexica in their original Chichimec state. Their own tradi-
tions stress the Banyoro’s “ignorance and uncouthness when they first arrived 
from their uncivilized homeland” (ibid.: 59). Like the common depictions of 
the Chichimecs, the Banyoro are described as rough hunters, naked and savage, 
without knowledge of riches, courtly manners, or diplomacy—as it were, “sans 
roi, sans loi, sans foi.” Speakers of the uncivilized Nilotic Luo tongue, this, too, 
the Banyoro would give up when they adopted the customs and language of 
the Bantu Bachwezi. It is remarkable, comments the historian Roland Oliver 
(1955: 115), that the successor kingdoms of the Bachwezi in the Rift Valley—
Buganda, Toro, Nkole, Sogo, and Bunyoro, among others—attribute most of 
the social and cultural practices that mark them off from surrounding regions 
to their glorious Kitara predecessors. Many “are at pains to describe how they 
learnt and copied the kingship customs” of these ancient rulers, from whom 
indeed their own kings claim to be descended—like Moctezuma, who similarly 
transcended Chichamec origins by virtue of an ancestral connection to the fa-
bled Toltecs (see below).
In juxtaposing the Mexica and the Banyoro, I join a small cottage industry 
in Mesoamerican studies that has turned out a number of such cross-cultural 
comparisons: likening not only the Mexica’s polity to various African states, 
but also their hegemony to the Roman empire and their kings to sovereigns of 
Polynesian islands. In the latter connection, Susan Gillespie’s (1989) adaptation 
of the Polynesian stranger-king model to Mexica history, including her appro-
priate emphasis on the passage of sovereignty through high-ranking women, is 
most pertinent to the present discussion. So is David Carrasco’s (2000) analysis 
of core–periphery relations in the Valley of Mexico on the model of the “galactic 
polities” of Southeast Asia, as described in influential works by Stanley Tambiah 
(1976, 1985, 1987). Still, these excellent studies are also relevant to Mexica his-
tory and culture in a way that is not usually envisioned, for, like the Banyoro, we 
are here considering a stranger-kingdom established by a peripheral, relatively 
undeveloped society over the legendary “high culture” core of a galactic polity. 
Although such takeovers of dominant centers by hinterland peoples are not all 
that unusual, everything thus happens in reverse of the ideal-typical case where 
foreign kings from legendary homelands subjugate uncultured aboriginals. The 
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structural permutations and contradictions that ensue from this reversal—Mex-
ica who proudly know themselves at once as Toltecs and Chichimecs, for exam-
ple—make up the main subject matter of this essay. 
STRANGER-KINGS, GALACTIC POLITIES
To make these points, I will need some further preliminary discussion of stran-
ger-king formations and a summary of the dynamics of galactic polities.
In the prototypical stranger-king traditions, the heroic founder of the dy-
nasty comes from some fabled homeland, terrestrial or celestial, actual or leg-
endary. Commonly, he is the son of a powerful king in a realm of great repute 
who failed to succeed his father, perhaps because he was bested by a fraternal 
rival, perhaps for some fault that led to his banishment. Or in a higher register, 
the dynastic founder is the offspring of the gods, perhaps expelled from their 
presence by some similar conflict or offencs, who descends upon an autochtho-
nous people from the heavens—always a good address for persons with royal 
ambitions. In a common topos, the hero undertakes an arduous journey to his 
future kingdom, mastering both natural and human forces along the way, thus 
demonstrating his transcendent powers and prefiguring the royal gifts of fertil-
ity and victory he will bring to his native subjects. As has been said of certain 
African kings, their powers of destruction were powers of creation. The hero is 
often known as well for more sinister exploits such as fratricide, parricide, incest, 
or other crimes against common morality, which likewise puts him above and 
beyond ordinary society and proves he is stronger than it. Both Quetzalcoatl 
and Huitzilopochtli were notorious for betraying or slaying close kinsmen-- 
sisters, paternal uncles, brothers, and sisters’ sons among them—on the way 
to their respective kingdoms. They were something else, not like the kinship-
ordered peoples they were destined to rule. 
Endowed with cosmic potency and stronger than society, the stranger-king 
is in a position to reorganize it. The advent of the foreign hero is a civilizing mis-
sion, bringing the aboriginal people out of their original state of naked savagery. 
Such was the condition of the primordial Chichimecs: a people without idols or 
storehouses, living in straw huts, subsisting on game that was not always cooked, 
as well as wild roots, fruits, and herbs—“in short, they lived like brute ani-
mals” (Motolinia 1951: 27). In the paradigmatic Mesoamerican tradition, the 
Chichimecs were delivered from this primitive condition by “advanced” peoples 
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such as the Toltecs, and in particular by Quetzalcoatl (or Kukulkan), who intro-
duced marvelous crafts, precious goods of various kinds, houses and temples of 
stone, clothing of cotton, and a lot more. But not necessarily by conquest.
Stranger-kingdoms may be established by conquest, and the kings are typi-
cally ferocious by nature, but notwithstanding certain popular nineteenth-cen-
tury theories of state formation to that effect, conquest is often overrated as the 
source of foreign dynasties. Noticing the prevalence of an ethnic distinction 
between rulers and ruled in premodern states, Ludwig Gumplowicz (1899) fa-
mously concluded that might must have made right in all such cases. While 
this ethnic divide does indeed suggest the ubiquity of stranger-kingdoms, in the 
traditions at issue the dominance of the foreign ruler is not necessarily gener-
ated by forcefully overcoming the autochthonous people, since his superiority is 
an original condition. Arriving from an exalted realm, his power derived from 
gods of universal scope; the stranger-king is a ruler a priori, whereas the native 
people, insofar as they approximated an Aristotelian definition of barbarism, 
would be subjects if not slaves by nature. In the charter traditions at issue, the 
rule of the foreign hero is often peacefully accepted for a variety of divine or po-
litical benefits, ranging from bringing rain to suppressing feuds and protecting 
the native communities against even worse regimes in the neighborhood. Fre-
quently enough, for some such reason, an indigenous group will actively solicit 
a ruler of their own from a more powerful king: just as the Mexica elders did 
from the king of Culhuacan, himself of Toltec heritage. There will be more to 
say of this in the context of Mesoamerican galactic polities, but for the present 
note that the Mexica had good precedent in certain traditions of Quetzalcoatl 
that tell of how the Toltecs brought him from Cuextlan to install as their king 
in Tollan. According to The annals of Cuauhtitlan. 5 House (ad 873) was the year 
“the Toltecs went to get Quetzalcoatl to make him their ruler in Tollan, and in 
addition he was their priest” (Bierhorst 1992: 29).
As Rousseau famously argued in The social contract, force alone is not enough 
to make a society. The strongest, he said, will never be strong enough to rule un-
less he turns might into right and obedience into duty; for “to yield to force is an 
act of necessity, not of will—at the most, an act of prudence. In what sense can 
it be a duty?” (1997: I.3, 44). Just so, conquest or not, the kingdom is established 
by contract: the aforementioned union of the immigrant prince with a high-
ranking woman of the land. So far as I can make out, marriage of this kind is a 
condition of the formation of stranger-kingdoms everywhere, notably including 
the Indo-European ancients, as in the origin traditions of Greek city-states, 
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whose ruling lines were established by unions of the daughters of autochtho-
nous kings with strangers fathered by Zeus (on human women, another union 
of the same kind). The eponymous Pelops (namesake of the Peloponnesus), also 
of Zeussian descent, became ruler of Pisa when he conspired with the king’s 
daughter, Hippodamia, to win her hand in a chariot race with her royal father. 
Marseille (Masila) was founded when the local Celtic princess chose to give 
the drink of sovereignty to a handsome Greek immigrant youth from Phocaea. 
Again, sovereignty is embodied and transmitted in the women—whose marital 
congress with the stranger is a replication in miniature of the celestial royal’s 
appropriation of the bearing earth. Marriage makes a structurally analogous 
pair with the kingship by virtue of the common feature of an outsider (as by 
the incest taboo) who fertilizes the land. Speaking of a number of such Indo-
European kingdom origins, J. G. Preaux (1962: 112) writes:
Every foundation of a city, every conquest of royal power becomes effective the 
moment the stranger, charged with sacredness of the gods or the fates, endowed 
moreover with the force of the warrior, symbolically gains possession of a new 
land either by receiving peacefully, or by conquering valorously or by ruse, the 
daughter of the king of the land.1
Yet everything in the Valley of Mexico is by all appearances the inverse of clas-
sical stranger-kingdoms, since here the foreign rulers are the barbarians. They 
are Chichimecs by origin, and although they indeed founded their dynasties 
through marriages with the daughters of autochthonous leaders, the latter were 
Culhhuacan kings of sacred Toltec descent.2 In the event, it was the primitive 
foreigners who were civilized by the highly cultured aborigines. And this would 
not only be true of the Mexica, but also of the Acolhua, the Tepaneca, and 
others of Chichimec or Otomi origins whose rulers ennobled themselves with 
Toltec affiliations. In some respects, the prototypical sequence is reinstated by a 
compensatory story alleging that the Chichimec invaders were the autochthons 
of the Valley who had early on left it and latterly returned. But more particularly, 
it is the stranger-king system of society that is turned around and restored by 
1. For these Indo-European and other such stranger-king formations, see Sahlins 
(1981b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2014).
2. This was also true at the divine level: the Mexica tutelary deity Huitzilopochtli 
married the goddess of the Culhuacan, the earth goddess Tuci (Gillespie 1989: 55).
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these hypogamous marriages of Toltec royal women with Chichimec leaders. 
For insofar as the Chichimec rulers have been differentiated and elevated by 
their Toltec affiliations, the polity assumes the classic form of a late-coming civ-
ilized aristocracy of glorious ancestry imposed upon a stratum of primitive first 
settlers. The effect is a recuperation of the paradigmatic structure of stranger-
kingship that leaves a permanent residue of ambiguity: a Chichimeca-Tolteca 
aristocracy (cf. Clendinnen 1991; Nicholson 2001). 
But then, the paradigmatic structure of stranger-kingship is everywhere inher-
ently ambiguous by virtue of the residual authority retained by the underlying 
native people as the original settlers and owners of the country. It is a general rule 
of stranger-king formations that even as the foreign rulers impose their author-
ity on a subjugated native people, they are in turn domesticated in the process. In 
critical respects, the stranger-kingdom is a system of dual sovereignties in which 
the immigrant rulers and their indigenous subjects reciprocally encompass one 
another. Having transformed the country into habitable and productive space in 
the first place, the native people are already practiced in taming the wild. They do 
something similar in taking charge of the installation rites of their rulers of foreign 
derivation—who come out of an uncontrolled outside world with antisocial dispo-
sitions as well as beneficial powers. The successors of the indigenous chieftains—or 
of the previous dynasty, in the case of successive stranger-king formations—are the 
constituted kingmakers, who in legitimating the royal heir demonstrate their own 
residual sovereignty. It is not unusual in the royal installation rites for the king-
elect to suffer a symbolic death as an outsider at the hands of the native authorities, 
who then preside over his rebirth and maturation as their own sacred child.3 
Something quite similar occurs in the installation of the Mexica king when 
he is seized by the kingmaker-priests, evidently the successors of the teomama, 
the four native bearers of the tutelary god Huitzilopochtli who led the migration 
to Tenochtitlan (Sahagún 1953–82, 8:18; Townsend 1987). Brought before the 
assembled leading lords and warriors by these priests, the heir to the kingship is 
stripped naked, hence deprived of all signs of rank, status, and property and placed 
in a state of weakness. Thereupon, the upper part of his body is stained black by the 
chief priest, and he is dressed in a black cape decorated with skull and crossbones. 
“The attire symbolized death,” Richard Townsend observes (ibid.: 392), as would 
the subsequent self-sacrificial bloodlettings of the king before Huitzilopochtli. 
3. For much more on the nature and implications of the juvenile status of the king, see 
David Graeber’s discussion in chapter 5.
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Probably, then, the ensuing four-day seclusion of the king-elect with his entou-
rage involved a ritual rebirth and maturation; as indeed the god being supplicated 
here was Tezcatlipoca, who, beside being regarded of Toltec origin, “was identified 
with the life force that animates all beings and things” (ibid.: 393). Subsequently, 
the new king moved to the palace for the spectacular sacrifices and brilliant rites 
of his investiture. Everything thus happens as if the heir to the kingship goes 
through a symbolic death, rebirth, and growth to maturity—which is also a do-
mestication of the foreign prince by the indigenous authorities.
Nor do the powers and privileges of the native notables end in stranger-
kingdoms when the foreign regime begins. Speaking again in ideal-typical 
terms, the native chieftains, beside maintaining control of their own communi-
ties, are often titled councilors of an outsider king who has reason to fear the 
ambitions of his own kinsmen. Noteworthy in this connection are the diarchies 
of various forms involving queen mothers who represent the indigenous powers 
or second kings whose affiliation with the indigenous population gives them 
the active leadership in temporal affairs. Most significantly, as just said of the 
Mexica, the leaders of the ancient regime become the principal priests of a 
country whose enshrined ancestors and gods are their own rightful heritage—
which makes the health of the bearing earth their responsibility. Even the king’s 
own cosmic powers of prospering and protecting the people, as by the rain he 
brings to fertilize their earth, may only become effective when mediated by the 
sacrificial offices of the indigenous priesthood.
As mentioned earlier, because the external sources of the stranger-king’s 
power, including his privileged relations to his own ancestral gods, are signifi-
cant means and necessary conditions of his authority, the kingship is perpetually 
foreign to its own realm. Even where the immigrant aristocracy is acculturated 
by the native population, which is usually the case, “the king comes from else-
where” (de Heusch 1991).4 By contrast, in many parts of Africa, Oceania, and 
Southeast Asia, the autochthons are explicitly known as “the owners” of the 
land.”5 We shall see similar notices of the Mexica. Likewise certain passages of 
4. “The king comes from elsewhere” is the title of an illuminating article by Luc de 
Heusch (1991), commenting on a study of the Mundang kingship of Chad, studied 
by Alfred Adler (1982). See the discussion in chapter 6.
5. The autochthonous clans in Fijian chiefdoms are designated by a term (i taukei) that 
at once means “owners” and “first settlers.” They are likewise the “land people” (kai 
vanua) or “the land” (na vanua). Similarly the Nyakyusa common people are “the 
earth.”
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the Codex Chimalpopoca, for example, identify the “landowners or founders” with 
the Chichimeca (Bierhorst 1992: 46; cf. ibid.: 117). Accordingly, the people 
of the Valley of Mexico as a whole are in certain contexts “Chichimeca”: the 
totality is known by its underlying native inhabitants. What the Banyoro say 
in such regards holds for many a stranger-kingdom: “the Mukama [the King] 
rules the people, the clans rule the land” (Beattie 1971: 169). Or again, as it is 
said of the Kongo king of old: in relation to “those who are there,” who hold 
the land, “he remains a stranger” (Balandier 1968b: 38). Historical materialism 
notwithstanding, in the premodern states of this description, the subordinate 
class controls the means of production in the primary sector of subsistence.6
By contrast, “the king rules the people”: the economic powers of the rul-
ing class are a function of their politico-religious domination of the produc-
ing people; hence they mainly take the form of taxation or pillage as opposed 
to the control of capital and the productive process as such. The economy has 
something of the same dual structure as the polity, divided between a native 
sphere primarily concerned with subsistence production and an aristocratic 
sphere critically concerned with the acquisition of wealth from abroad. The na-
tive economy is based in real property, organized largely by kinship, and ori-
ented to domestic consumption. The relation of the ruling class to the native 
sphere—apart from their ritual access to the divine sources of prosperity—is 
for the most part extractive rather than productive: they appear on the scene 
post messem, after the harvest, to take a toll on people’s products and manpower. 
But as Mary Helms has shown in a series of remarkable works (1988, 1993, 
1998), the aristocratic economy, likewise by means of its powers over people, 
is primarily oriented to the acquisition of moveable valuables from abroad by 
raid, trade, and/or tribute: the accumulation of riches whose value objectifies the 
life-and-death potencies of the realms from which they come, as well as exotica 
that represent the submission of distant peoples. Strategically redistributed, 
conspicuously consumed, or offered to the gods, the valuables of the aristocratic 
economy sustain the greater order of the kingdom—not least by sustaining its 
ruling powers-that-be.7
6. Likewise. the merchants usually owned their stocks-in-trade and craftsmen owned 
their tools, workshops, and raw materials (Calnek 1974: 194).
7. “Those who create and/or acquire goods and benefits from some dimension of the 
cosmological outside are not only providing goods and benefits per se but also are 
presenting tangible evidence that they themselves possess or command the unique 
qualities and ideals generally expected in persons who have ties with distant places 
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I have indulged on this account of stranger-kingship particularly because, as 
will be described presently, the Mexica of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
underwent a revolution from above that produced a classic version of it. The 
summary of the galactic polity which follows will also be useful in this regard, 
since its structures and dynamics were clearly in play in this creation of a Toltec 
aristocracy ruling over a Chichimec peasantry.
Stanley Tambiah introduced the galactic polity as a worldly realization of 
the cosmological mandala form well known in South and Southeast Asia.8 
Here was a scheme of creation spreading “from a refined center outwards and 
a refined summit downwards, each outer reality or circle being a progressively 
weaker representation of the preceding .  .  . grosser in constitution and more 
imprisoned on sensory pursuits and desires” (1985: 322). By further reference to 
famous Buddhist and Hindu texts on universal Cakkavatti and Devaraja kings 
of kings, Tambiah transposed the cosmic dynamics to a political register:
We are told that the wheel-rolling emperor solemnly invokes the wheel to roll 
outward; the wheel rolls successively to the East, the South, the North, and the 
West. As the mighty monarch with his fourfold army appeared in each quarter 
following the wheel, the rival kings prostrated themselves in submission. The 
cakkavatti allowed them to retain their possessions on the condition of obser-
vance of the five moral principles binding on Buddhist layman. (1976: 45–46)
When Tambiah still further objectifies the model in terms of actual galactic 
polities, more needs to be said: for instance, some further notice of the progres-
sive reduction in the imperial center’s hegemonic power as it moves to periph-
eral sectors of the galaxy, where tributary dues may have to be exacted by force. 
In this respect, the reach of the center is typically beyond its political grasp: 
not only in that the galactic potentate usually claims a greater domain than he 
rules; but also in that his grandeur and divine potency are known to the peoples 
of supernatural origins and, therefore, are themselves ‘second creators.’ Evidence of 
inalienable connections with places of cosmological origins thus conveys a certain 
sacrality which readily translates into political-ideological legitimacy and facilitates 
successful exercise of power” (Helms 1993: 49–50).
8. The galactic polity as Tambiah described it is essentially the same as the core–
periphery “world systems” of premodern civilizations analyzed by Ekholm, Friedman, 
and colleagues, and the “segmentary state” concept developed by Aidan Southall, 
among other, similar regional hierarchies otherwise identified (see chapter 6). 
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beyond, in distant and uncontrolled hinterlands. This imagined imperium of the 
galactic outer reaches is an important factor in the attraction and movement of 
peripheral peoples toward the “high cultures” of core regions—like the move-
ment of the Chichimecs into the Valley of Mexico, apparently taking advantage 
of a weakening Tollan.
Among Tambiah’s historical examples of galactic polities is the fourteenth-
century realm of Sukhothai (Sukhodaya), a kingdom in the Upper Chao Phraya 
Valley of Siam that flourished under immigrant Tai rulers who had replaced an 
earlier Mon dynasty (Tambiah 1976). Incidentally and coincidently, a number 
of Tai peoples had poured into and taken over Southeast Asian valleys from 
their original homeland redoubt in the southern borderlands of China, rather 
in the same way (and the same direction) the Chichimec groups established 
themselves in the Valley. In certain respects, Sukhothai’s own success was also 
like the Mexica’s god-driven ascent to power, including a history of competi-
tive relations with other kingdoms within its own galactic system and beyond. 
Aided by the importation of Sinhalese Buddhist concepts of universal kingship 
and a famous image of the Buddha that became the palladium of their rule, the 
Tai sovereigns of Sukhothai transformed their realm from a tertiary outpost of 
the Khmer kingdom of Angkor Wat in Cambodia to the independent ruler of a 
number of other principalities in the region, even as they developed pretensions 
of empire in regions beyond.
The Sukhothai capital was a mandala in itself: centered in the royal pal-
ace and principal temples, quartered by roads laid out in the cardinal direc-
tions, and encircled by three concentric ramparts. This was the area of direct 
administrative control by the Sukhothai king. Beyond were further concentric 
zones marked by diminishing powers of the center and weakening versions of 
its royal forms and practices. The sphere immediately outside the capital zone 
consisted of four major provinces (muang), governed by sons of the king from 
secondary centers situated in the cardinal directions. Beyond lay an outer ring 
of more or less independent kingdoms controlled by their own traditional rul-
ers—whose allegiance to the Sukhothai ruler was often problematic. For all 
that the layout of the Sukhothai realm in the cardinal directions signified a 
universal extension of the ruler’s authority, the monarch’s hegemonic ambitions 
exceeded his real-political powers. For that matter, like all the Southeast Asian 
potentates claiming to be the king of kings, the Sukhothai monarch periodi-
cally sent tributes to the Chinese emperor for the purpose of legitimating his 
authority relative to rival princes and vassal kings within his own domains as 
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well as the rulers of rival galactic regimes—who likewise affected cosmocratic 
titles: for example, the erstwhile tributary kingdom of Ayutthaya—reputedly 
founded by a Chinese merchant prince—which defeated and absorbed Suk-
hothai in the early fifteenth century. The Ayutthaya rulers created a Siamese 
imperium of their own, achieved recognition from the Chinese emperor, and 
claimed authority over such distant realms they could not rule as the important 
sultanate of Melaka in the Malay Peninsula. A great commercial empire in its 
own right, Melaka was ruled by descendants of Alexander the Great in his Ko-
ranic persona of Iskandar D’zul Karnain (C. C. E. Brown 1952). That is another 
story, illustrative of many aspects of stranger-kingship, including the practice 
known in Mesoamerica where, rather than strangers becoming native kings, 
native kings sometimes become strangers: that is, they take on the identities of 
legendary world-historical rulers. 
If you will forgive the English pun, galactic systems are marked by a politics 
of “upward nobility,” whereby the chiefs of satellite areas assume the politi-
cal statuses, courtly styles, titles, and even genealogies of their superiors in the 
regional hierarchy—who for their part imitate the galactic hegemon, while the 
latter, in invidious contrast to ambitious vassals and rival emperors, claims to 
rule the world. In the event, the structural effect is a certain “galactic mime-
sis,” insofar as peripheral groups assume the polities and cosmologies of their 
regional superiors. Recall Edmund Leach’s descriptions in The political systems 
of Highland Burma (1954) of hinterland Kachin chiefs who “become Shan,” 
acquiring the cultural trappings and political backing of Shan princes—even as 
the Shan princes retire to their Burmese or Chinese palaces and the lifestyles of 
their own imperial paragons. For all the apparent delusions of grandeur, these 
pretensions could be calculated political moves, as when a highland Kachin 
chief marries a daughter of a lowland Shan prince, perhaps acquiring a Shan 
title as well as making himself a client of his princely father-in-law. As Leach 
tells, this did not make him any less a Kachin chief, but potentially too much of 
one in the view of his countrymen—who would then be inclined to rebel and 
return to an egalitarian state. 
These upward moves in the galactic hierarchy are typically motivated by 
competition with immediate rivals in a given political field, who are thus 
trumped by the chief who goes beyond the shared structures of authority by 
adopting a politics of higher order. Gregory Bateson (1935, 1958) called this 
“symmetrical schismogenesis,” a type of conflict that works on the principle that 
“anything you can do I can do better.” Competition of this kind occurs within 
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and between groups at all levels of the galactic system, including the attempts 
of subordinate groups to displace their superiors. As we shall see momentarily, 
it marks the ascent of the Mexica of Tenochtitlan from their contest for supe-
riority with the fraternal town of Tlatelolco to the overthrow of their Tepanec 
imperial predecessors, the Mexica rulers taking progressively greater titles at 
critical junctures along the way. Such practices of galactic mimesis suggest that 
the upward and inward movement of groups such as the Mexica or Banyoro 
from the barbarian periphery to the imperial core may well be anticipated in 
structural form before it is achieved in historical practice. Indeed, the Mexica of 
the long march from Aztlan were an agricultural people, not simply Chichimec 
hunters, and they had paramount leaders before the institution of a Toltec king-
ship. Taken together with the imposition of kingly forms and practices from the 
center in the course of extending its rule, the dynamics of galactic polities are at 
once centrifugal and centripetal, involving displacements of power and culture 
in both directions. 
In the event, the galactic polity becomes a main forcing ground of stranger-
king formations, both as emanating from the politics of the center and as emu-
lating the center from the peripheries. Regarding the former, the fallout from 
fratricidal battles royal among princes contending for the rule of the center 
is a major source of the spread of stranger-kingdoms to outlying sectors of 
galactic regimes—and beyond that, into the barbarian fringe. At least some 
of the princes who fail to win the crown, including some for whom discretion 
was always the better part of valor, are then likely to move to peripheral regions 
where they can establish kingdoms of their own, whether as dependencies of 
their homeland or as autonomous realms. Hence the constitution of society 
as previously implied, consisting of a single royal kindred or lineage spread 
over a set of diverse native communities. A similar effect is achieved where the 
galactic hegemon establishes his sons as rulers of dependent provinces. This 
practice is usually confined to areas in and near the capital, however; in the out-
er regions, particularly among peoples of other cultural and ethnic identities, 
the local kings are normally left in charge of their traditional domains. (The 
long-reigning ruler of the Tepanec empire, Tezozomoc, seems to have been 
an exception, installing many of his sons as kings of subordinate cities such as 
Tlatelolco, where they gave rise to new dynasties.) Here it is worth remarking 
that the greater galactic systems often called “empires” in the historical litera-
ture were primarily regional systems of tribute collection rather than unified, 
bureaucratically ruled regimes. Apart from the supervision of tributary dues, 
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they were not directly administered by officials from the capital; even in the 
aftermath of a conquest, it was often more politic to leave the kings and chiefs 
of the outlying sectors in place.9 The only problems came when these chiefs did 
not know their place and defiantly took on great ambitions and exalted titles 
of their own.
Another mode of stranger-king formation from below is what Fijians call 
“to beg a chief ” (kere turaga), that is, to solicit a ruling chief of their own from 
a higher and greater power, most commonly a son of a renowned ruler of the 
region. Perhaps the best-known African example concerns the ruling dynasty of 
Benin, founded by a Yoruba prince who had been granted by the ruler of fabled 
Ile Ife on the request of the Benin elders (Bradbury 1967). Then there were the 
elders of Israel, who, when besieged by dissension within and enemies without, 
petitioned Samuel to have a king, “that we may be like all other nations; and 
that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles” (Samuel 
I 8:20). Put out because he was not deemed sufficient to rule his own chosen 
people, God instructed Samuel to tell the Israelites if they got a king they’d 
be truly sorry; and although Samuel laid it on about the evils of kingly power, 
the Israelites insisted, and the omnipotent God had to give in. You will recog-
nize the origins of the Mixteca stranger-king in the person of Acamapichtli, 
solicited by the elders from the ruler of Culhuacan in (suspiciously) similar 
terms: “We are all alone and forsaken by all nations. We are guided only by our 
god. . . . We must have a ruler to guide us, to direct us, to show us how we are 
to live, who will free us, who will defend us and protect us from our enemies” 
(Duran 1994: 49). Alternatively, a native chief may simply claim membership in 
a dominant or legendary foreign dynasty: the way that certain “barbarian” rulers 
on the Chinese borderlands took on prestigious Han ancestry (Backus 1981); 
or certain Gaulish leaders claimed descent in the Julian or Augustan line of 
Roman emperors (Drinkwater 1978). Nor were the Mexica kings the only rul-
ers of Chichimec origins to appropriate a Toltec identity, but as that ambitious 
move was most fateful for the history of Mexico, I conclude by considering it 
in a bit more detail.10
9. This was certainly the case of the Mexica “empire” (cf. Calnek 1982).
10. Cf. Ixtlilxóchitl (1840); Tezozomoc (1853); Sahagún (1953–82, 8 and 10); Soustelle 
(1964); Davies (1974, 1977, 1980); Bray (1978); Clendinnen (1991); Nicholson 
(2001); E. de J. Douglas (2010).
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CHICHIMECA AND TOLTECA
The stranger-kingship developed by the Mexica in the fourteenth century was 
not only typical in form; it was motivated, at least in part, by a classic dynamic of 
galactic systems: a schismatic rivalry among compatriot adversaries, leading one 
faction to put down the other by appropriating a higher political form drawn from 
the larger region. I mean Tenochtitlan’s conflict with the fellow Mexica commu-
nity of Tlatelolco. That Tlateloco originated by splitting off from Tenochtitlan 
indicates their relationship had been antagonistic from the beginning (Duran 
1994: 47). As recounted in the Codex Ramirez, when the elders of Tenochtitlan 
decided they needed a king of their own, and such as they had never had, it 
was because of “the seditious activities of their co-citizens at Tlatelolco” (Ranirez 
1903: 37). According to Frey Duran, the Tenochca feared that Tlatelolco was out 
to dominate them, and by obtaining a king they proposed rather to turn the tables 
and rule their Mexica fellows. Although that didn’t happened for some time—the 
Tlatelolco people refused to acknowledge Tenochtitlan’s rule, and soon enough 
they solicited their own stranger-king in the person of a son of the Tepaneca 
ruler Tezozomoc—by a characteristic process of symmetrical schismogenesis, the 
Tenochca did get a king like the other nations. And apart from the quarrel with 
Tlatelolco, this king could stand the Tenochca in good stead in relation to the 
Tepanec rulers of Azcapotzalco on whose land they were squatting.
The problematic relation of the Mexica to their Tepaneca overlords in Azca-
potzalco was the other part of the motivation of the Mexica elders in begging 
a ruler from Culhacan. At least the Tepaneca must have thought so, for they 
promptly doubled the Tenochtitlan’s tributary obligations, including imposing 
some peculiarly difficult forms of payment. Still, the Tenochca elders would trump 
the Tepaneca as well as Tlatelolco by acquiring a ruler of supreme status in Mesoa-
merica, a ruler of Toltec descent through the Culhuacan monarch of that lineage, 
which thus connected the Mexica with the great Tollan of ancient memory and 
its own original king Quetzalcoatl. The Mexica elders, playing the paradigmatic 
native part of kingmakers, created a polity of imported Toltec rulers of indigenous 
Chichimec subjects, thus reproducing a recurrent Mesoamerican tradition of 
kingship—one might even say, the normative form of Mesoamerican kingship.11
11. The Mexica assumption of Toltec kingship, by contrast to the Tepanec “lord of 
the Chichimecs,” also involved an element of a second form of schismogenesis: 
a competition by invidious differentiation of the kind that Bateson called 
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All the same, the historiography of the Mexica kingship has been vexed by 
the multiple versions of the lineage of the dynasty’s ancestor, Acamapichtli. While 
some of the alternatives are clearly outliers inspired by the chroniclers’ own civic 
loyalties, the more credible texts offer two contradictory versions which, by the 
prevailing norms of patrilineal descent and succession, would make Acamapichtli 
either the Toltec king of the Mexica or the Mexica king of complementary Toltec 
filiation. As related notably by Motolinia (1951: 77–78), the strong Toltec version 
includes another classic feature of stranger-king traditions: the founder of the dy-
nasty is a prince of a great land who fails to succeed his father and instead migrates 
to a country where his royal virtues are recognized by the native people, who there-
upon install him as their ruler. In this text, Acamapichtli’s father, the thirteenth in 
the main line of the Toltec kings of Culhuacan, was assassinated by a rebel who 
then usurped his throne, forcing the young prince to flee the city and take refuge 
in Tenochtitlan. In the contrasting version, however, Acamapichtli’s father was a 
true Mexica notable who had remained in Culhuacan from the time his people 
sojourned there in the course of their migrations; and there he married a daughter 
of the Culhua king, the mother of Acamapichtli. Although this version may be 
the less plausible—as by its implication of the existence of a high Mexica nobility 
before the letter—it has to be considered historically relevant, not least because it is 
the more popular of the two. Indeed there is good reason to suppose both were cur-
rent at the time of the Conquest, since they have valid if different political values 
and would be functionally appropriate in different contexts. Each has its place.12 
Basically, the Toltec identity of Mexica kings looks outward, making a claim 
of higher pedigree against rival potentates; this is kingship in its foreign-en-
compassing aspect. Whereas a dominantly Mexica identity looks inward, at the 
“complementary schismogenesis”—of which another, striking example will be 
discussed below in connection with Texcoco. 
12. I say the paternal Culhuacan ancestry of Acamapichtli is the “strong Toltec 
version,” not only because nobility among the Mexica would have to be patrilineally 
determined—given the maternal descent of Acamapictli’s children rather from 
calpulli elders—but for incidents such as are described in Duran (1994: 68), where 
Tezozomoc fails to prevent certain Tepanec nobles from seeking the death of his 
daughter’s son, the Mexica ruler Chimalpopoca, they arguing “that even though 
Chimalpopoca came from the lineage of the Tepaneca, this relationship was through 
a woman, that because on his father’s side he was the son of an Aztec, he would 
always be inclined towards his father’s people and not his mother’s.” In Sahagún’s 
discussion of kinship relations, “one’s father” is described as ”the source of lineage, the 
beginning of lineage” (1953–82, 10.1); but there is no such valorization of maternity. 
240 ON KINGS
preeminence they achieved by the aid of their particular tutelary god, Huitzilo-
pochtli; this is kingship in its indigenous-exclusive aspect. Giving the Mexica 
rulers a purely Toltec genealogy clearly makes them different from and superior 
to their “Chichimec” subjects, not only in Tenochtitlan but in the whole region 
of Mesoamerica inhabited by peoples of that description. It gives the greatest 
legitimacy to the Mexica’s representations of themselves and their empire as 
“Culhua,” and to the title of their king as “Lord of Culhua”—notably by op-
position to the Tepanec ruler, who styled himself “Lord of the Chichimecs.” On 
the other hand, the Mexica paternity of the kingship remained relevant, insofar 
as it directly connected the rulers to the divine source of their sovereign power, 
their patron god Huitzilopochtli. The distinctive guardian of their fortunes from 
the time of their Chichimec origins in the barren north, Huitzilopochtli was 
also identified with the sun. In the latter capacity he was a central figure in the 
human sacrificial rites that at once sustained that celestial body and testified 
to the sovereign’s earthly domination. In short, the Mexica paternity of King 
Acamapichtli, thus linking him to Huitzilopochtli, was as critical for legitimacy 
of his royal descendants as his Toltec paternity. Indeed, as the source of Mexica 
rulers’ power, the affiliation with Huitzlopochtli was the condition of the pos-
sibility of their Toltec hegemony. It follows that both genealogies remained his-
torically relevant so long as the Mexica remained politically dominant—much 
to the consternation of the later professional scholars who need to know which 
one is “true.” If in fact one were true and the other not, it would only confirm 
Nigel Davies’ astute observation (1977: 71) that Mexica history can consist in 
the reenactment of legendary events that never took place—as in the return of 
Quetzalcoatl or Lono (Captain Cook), for example.
Indeed, to believe the Codex Chimalpahin (Chimalpahin 1997: 69–71), the 
dual genealogy of Acamapichtli reenacts the ambiguous origins of earlier rulers, 
sometimes described as “captains-general,” who presided over the last stages of 
the migration of the Mexica from the Chichimec homeland. Here again were 
stranger-kings who may also have claimed affiliation with the Toltecs: for as the 
first of them, Huehue Huitzilihuitl descended from the ruler of Xaltocan; and 
Xaltocan by some accounts was founded by migrants from Tollan following the 
fall of that city (Bierhorst 1992: 41; Davies 1980: 91).13 Deemed “the very first 
13. However, Xaltocan is most commonly identified as an Otomi city (Davies 1980; 
E. de J. Douglas 2010); albeit there are suggestions its rulers had more exalted 
genealogical connections, including Culhaucan (Davies 1980: 91, et passim).
241THE STRANGER-KINGSHIP OF THE MEXICA
ruler of the Mexica” in the Chimalpahin text, Huehue Huitzilipochtli was by 
one version the son of a Xaltocan prince and a daughter accorded him as wife 
by the Mexica, among whom he had lived.14 By the symmetrical and inverse 
version, Huehue Hutzilihuitl was the offspring of a daughter of the Xaltocan 
ruler and a Mexica man, hence Toltec in the maternal rather than the paternal 
line. Still, as the Codex indicates, one way or another “the very first ruler of 
the Mexica” was a grandson of a foreign king, and thereby set over the native 
priests and elders who were erstwhile leaders of the migration from Aztlan. Se-
rial stranger-kingship. 
Returning to the kingship of Acamapichtli, this Toltec-minted ruler inau-
gurated a new order of society, dominated by a newly formed aristocracy. As in 
stranger-kingdoms in general, the contractual foundation was again the union 
of the foreign prince with daughters of the native leaders. The “elders” of Teno-
chtitlan, as many as twenty calpulli heads (according to the version), voluntarily 
provided wives for Acamapichtli: out of sympathy, it is commonly said, for his 
principal wife, a Culhuacan princess, was barren. The effect would be a kingship 
that integrated in the royal persons the two fundamental components of the 
society, native and foreign, Chichimec and Toltec. Descended from a common 
ancestor, the offspring of these alliances of Acamapichtli with Mexica wom-
en would form a kinship-integrated, Toltec-affiliated nobility (pipiltin)—one 
might even speak of a royal lineage—spread over a set of discrete groups of 
Chichimec origins, each such group being the maternal kin of some subset of 
the nobility. (There are dozens of African stranger-kingdoms of the same de-
scription.) If in the early period of Tenochtitlan these nobles, without lands of 
their own, went to live with their native maternal kin, this may account for the 
presence of persons of high rank in the several calpulli of the kingdom.
But then, some of the native leaders who were involved in the establishment 
of Acamapichtli’s kingship themselves became “lords” under the new regime. As 
we have seen, this, too, is a normal feature of stranger-king formations: the be-
stowal of offices of state on indigenous leaders, notably as the councilors of kings 
and major priests of the realm. Just so, the Codex Ramirez (Ramirez 1903: 38) 
14. Huehue Huitzilihuitl was killed at Chapultepec by the Culhuaque in1299, to 
be succeeded by Tenoch, who led the Mexica to Tenochtitlan. Tenoch was the 
predecessor of Acamapichtli, first of the new tlatoani regime. (Huehue Huitzilihuitli 
[I] is not to be confused with Acamapichtli’s son and successor as tlatoani, likewise 
Huitzilihuitl [II].) Davies (1980: 202) considers that a Mexica nobility had surely 
existed for long before the dynasty inaugurated by Acamapichtli.
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relates that at the time of Acamapichtli’s kingship there were “still some of the 
old men who had made the pilgrimage from the distant country to Mexico, old 
men who became the elders, the lords, charged with grand offices and the con-
duct of the nation” (ibid.: 36). At least through the succession of Acamapichtli’s 
son Huitzilopochtli, the native notables continued to act as kingmakers, operat-
ing as an “electoral college of priests, elders and calpulli officials” (Davies 1977: 
198). And they continued to be a major force in the government until the victo-
ry over the Tepanecs in 1427 ushered in the imperial era, at once enriching the 
nobility by the distribution of booty and patrimonial estates, and empowering 
them by military and political office. “Although Acamapichtli’s sons and grand-
sons appear to have collaborated closely with traditional leaders until 1426,” 
writes Edward Calnek, “they were evidently not permitted to make or execute 
important decisions until first obtaining consent of a strong popular assembly in 
which traditional leaders retained a dominant voice” (1982: 53). Following the 
defeat of the Tepaneca at Azcapotzalco, the tlatoani Itzcoatl bestowed titles on 
the nobility—and also burned the books so the common people would not need 
to know what did not concern them. Even so, “Until the end of Ahuitzotl’s reign 
(1502), commoners continued to hold powerful positions within the imperial 
court, and in some instances must have outranked hereditary noblemen by vir-
tue of their offices” (Calnek 1974: 203; cf. P. Carrasco 1971). Moctezuma II 
abolished all that in a famous reform that restricted official service in the palace, 
the city, and the provinces to noblemen of unimpeachable pedigree, excluding 
persons born of “a lowly woman”; for “he considered that anyone born of a lowly 
woman or a slave might take after his mother and be, therefore, ineligible for his 
service” (Duran 1994: 395). What is here repudiated is the original formation 
of polity through the marriage of the stranger-king with the daughters of the 
native leaders, thereby constituting a nobility of indigenous maternity. Still, the 
fundamental duality of the stranger-kingdom, consisting of foreign newcomers 
and indigenous owners of complementary natures and functions, remains evi-
dent in many aspects of the culture—as witness the enduring notion of a world 
basically composed of Chichimecs and Toltecs.15 
More generally than the native leaders’ political powers, the chronicles speak 
of their presence in many parts of Mexico in terms that indicate their antiquity, 
their priestly functions, their kinship seniority, and especially their privileged 
15. “There are two types of people in this land, that still exist today, according to various 
histories, Chichimec is the first, and Toltec the second . . .” (Davies 1980: 79).
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relations to the land. Having given rise to the chiefly children through their 
daughters, they may be described as “grandfathers” of the rulers and the realm, 
the “elders” or “fathers” relative to the parvenu aristocracy, or the “original lead-
ers” or “founder chiefs.” All these are again common attributes of the underly-
ing autochthonous peoples in stranger-kingdoms, but most significant in this 
regard is the association of the native people with the land, by contrast to the 
foreign-cum-celestial aristocracy. I alluded earlier to the entry in the Codex Chi-
malpopoca referring to certain Chichimecs as the “landowners” as well as the 
“founders” of the country. Another entry rehearses the opposition between for-
eign rulers and indigenous landholders in a Chalco town:
This was the year [7 Rabbit, 1486] a dynasty began in Chalco Tlacochcalco, 
starting with Itzcahuatzin, who was made lord [apparently by the Mexica] at 
this time. Those who tolerated him there, since they had no ambitions of being 
princes themselves, were the landholding Tlatecacayohuaque Chalca. (Bierhorst 
1992: 117)
Analogously in practice if not also in name, the native calpulli of Tenochtitlan 
were the main landowners. Apparently the nobility were not a landed class until 
they acquired estates as spoils of Mexica conquests (e.g., Tezozomoc 1853, 1: 
40–41). The distribution of conquered lands by Itzcoatl to the noble captains of 
the early wars of Mexica expansion is described by Tezozomoc (ibid., 1: 40–41, 
69–70) as an act of charity, given the impoverished conditions of these promi-
nent men and the necessity to provide for their families and descendants. As 
opposed to the estates—together with their inhabitants—awarded to the king 
and the warrior nobility, the booty of the Mexica commoners consisted only of 
common lands for the upkeep of the calpulli temples (Duran 1994: 81–82).16 
Moreover, the opposition between an indigenous population associated with 
the land and a conquering aristocracy of foreign derivation was replicated by the 
two main gods, Tlaloc and Huitzilopochtli, and their respective priests, in the 
principal temple of Tenochtitlan. In contrast to the solar deity of the upstart 
16. In Ixtlilxóchitl’s (1840, 1: 242–43) discussion of tenure referring to the same period, 
the calpulli lands constituted the greater part of the territory of the city or village, 
and while held by ordinary people and inherited by their children or relatives, the 
same were also described as lands of the king and nobility—meaning governed 
by them? Ixtlilxóchitl also refers to a category of land held by the “old nobility” or 
“former nobility,” a symptom of stranger-kingship.
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Mixteca, Huitzilopochtli, Tlaloc was the chief among the old gods of the land, 
and indeed associated with earthly, agricultural fertility. “Their double presence 
at the head of the religious world,” comments Jacques Soustelle (1964: 58), 
“consecrated the union of the two basic ideologies of Mexica, which the Mexica 
had brought together when they became the ruling nation.” And more particu-
larly, as Edward de J. Douglas observed:
Tlaloc’s half of the temple, like Huitzilopochtli’s, represented a mountain, Tona-
catepetl, “Mountain of our Sustenance,” the counterpart to Coatepetl, [“Serpent 
Mountain,” Huitzilopochtli’s birthplace and site of his initial conquest—of his 
sister and brothers]. A diphrastic metaphor, the building’s complementary op-
posites—Coatepetl and Tonacatepetl, south and north, sky and earth, sun and 
rain, fire and water, young and old, foreign and native, Mexica/Chichimec and 
pan Mesoamerican/Toltec—evoke the fundamental quality of being and, more 
specifically . . . war, the creative force of existence. (2010: 100)
Most striking is the way the basic dualism of the stranger-kingship polity is 
recreated at the kingdom level in late pre-Conquest times in the relations be-
tween the Texcoco “Chichimecs” and the Mexica “Toltecs” (Ixtlilxóchitl 1840; 
Townsend 1987; Douglas 2010; Duran 1994). The Triple Alliance was rather 
more of a diarchy in which the Texcoco ruler–particularly the famous King 
Nezhualcoyotl–bearing the inherited title of “Lord of the Chichimecs,” ap-
pears as second in authority to the Mexica “Lord of Culhua.” The Texcoco kings 
adopted the Mexica tutelary god, Huitzilopochtli, and enshrined him alongside 
Tlaloc in the central temple of their own city. Moreover, at least from the time 
of the Moctezuma I, inaugurated in 1440, the Texcoco rulers were the king-
makers in Tenochtitlan. The Chichimec kings of Texcoco legitimated the Toltec 
kings of the Mexica: Nezhualcoyotl and his successor Nezhualpilli were the 
principal electors of the Mexica tlatoani, and the ones who actually crowned the 
latter in the investiture ceremonies. 
The Texcoco rulers’ claim as Lord of the Chichimecs represented their 
descent from the legendary Chichimec conqueror Xotlotl, said to have cre-
ated a great “Empire” in the Valley of Mexico.17 True to classical stranger-king 
traditions, the Texcoco people’s own story is that the “primitive” Chichimecs 
17. The other title of the Texcoco king, “Lord of Alcohua,” as the heritage of the “empire” 
of Xolotl, bore the same Chichimec connotation as “lord of the Chichimecs.”
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led by Xolotl predated the “civilized” Toltecs in the occupation of the Valley. 
In Eduardo de J. Douglas’ reading of the old Texcoco documents such as the 
Tlohtzin Map, the Chichimec ancestors are depicted as “self-generating and 
autochthonous, like the Mixtec ancestors”; while in the Codex Xolotl and the 
Quinitzin Map, “the Toltecs are the migrants, and the Chichimecs, the native 
inhabitants . . .” (2010: 55, 58; cf. Bierhorst 1992: 5 for an analogous tradition). 
In thus depicting their ancestors as the autochthons, the Texcoco traditions 
differ from the common narratives of Chichimec migrations into the Valley fol-
lowing the collapse of Tollan of the Toltecs. But that is not the only anomaly of 
Texcoco’s Chichimec identity.
The more interesting anomaly is that the Texcoco rulers, for all their Chi-
chimec identity, were affiliated genealogically and assimilated culturally to the 
Toltecs in the same fundamental ways as the Mexica kings who claimed to 
be the Lords of Culhua. Beginning with Xolotl’s immediate descendants, No-
paltzin and Tlohtzin, the founders of Texcoco dynasty repeatedly married and 
fathered their successors by Toltec women: brides and mothers who, as Doug-
las notes, “transmit civilization, and the Toltec legacy, to their daughters and 
eventually their male descendants” (Douglas 2010: 105). But only eventually to 
their male descendants, who rather follow their fathers as Chichimecs for some 
generations. Xolotl’s grandson Tholtzin was a Chichimec, although his mother, 
Nopaltzin’s wife Azcaxochiti, was a Toltec, a daughter of the royal house of Cul-
hacan—the same kind of alliance that produced Acamapichtli and launched the 
Toltec heritage of Mexica kings. In another example, two members of Xolotl’s 
court move away and marry the daughters of the ruler of a Toltec city; each cou-
ple has a daughter and a son, and the daughters are born Toltecs and the sons 
Chichimecs (ibid.: 223 n. 46). The implication of ethnic affiliation descending 
in separate male and female lines, the former Chichimec and the latter Toltec, is 
what actually is pictured diagrammatically in Texcoco documents. Whether this 
was an expedient the illustrator devised for representing double descent—pat-
rilineal and matrilineal—is hard to say.18 But safe to say, the self-representation 
of the Texcoco aristocracy as “Chichimec” is arbitrary: as arbitrary as it is politic. 
18. In this connection, an emphasis on matrifiliation in an otherwise patrilineal order 
is not necessarily an indication of a cognatic or a double-descent system (cf. Calnek 
1974; Kellogg 1986), inasmuch as a kinship order of preferred patrilineal succession 
and group affiliation commonly involves vital complementary relations to affinal/
maternal kin (Leach 1961; Sahlins 2013). 
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“Do not forget that you are Chichimec,” the dying Texcoco king Ixlilxochiti 
told his son Nezhualcoyotl (Ixtlilxóchitl 1840: 127).
It follows that the Toltec identity of Mexica kings is equally arbitrary, since 
their maternal descent from Culhuacan kings does not differentiate them from 
Chichimec rulers who could claim as much. Rather than some sort of pre-
scriptive identity, the process in play is a high-stakes mode of complementary 
schismogenesis in which major kingdoms selectively position themselves vis-à-
vis each other by adopting contrasting values from a common stock of cultural 
traditions. Texcoco was already involved with the Tepanecs of Azcapotzalco in a 
conflict of the symmetrical schismogenesis variety before the rise of the Mexica 
and the formation of the Triple Alliance. Not long after the Tepanec ruler Tezo-
zomoc proclaimed himself “Lord of the Chichimecs,” which was something of 
a usurpation in the Alcohua view, the Texcoco king Ixlilxochiti went him one 
or two better by having himself installed as “Universal Monarch” and “Lord 
of All the Earth” (Davies 1980: 56). When the Mexica came along as Toltecs, 
their ruler assuming the title of “Lord of Culhua,” it was not so much a play of 
a symmetrical kind as what Bateson called “complementary schismogenesis,” 
which works rather on claiming a status “different to and better than” the other 
party.19 By virtue of such oppositions, a complex set of values may come into 
operation: the way the Chichimecs are mere “barbarians” from the perspective 
of the civilized Toltecs, but in their own view “hardy and great warriors” of the 
hinterlands as opposed to the city-dwelling Toltec artists and craftsmen. On 
the other hand, as Bateson (1935, 1958) pointed out, insofar as such contrasting 
values are complementary and interdependent, the conflict between them may 
reach a point of equilibrium and reciprocal exchange.20 It seems fair to say that 
this is what happened in the case of the Texcoco “Chichimecs” and the Mexica 
“Toltecs,” no doubt motivated by a political situation in which alliance was the 
better part of valor.
I close, then, with one of the many anthropological lessons that could be 
drawn from such histories of interacting and interdependent societies. Clearly, 
these societies are formed in relation to one another: perhaps to the extent that 
19. In other registers, the Mexica double claim of being Chichimecs and Toltecs—or 
alternatively worshipers of Huitzilopochtli and Tlaloc—thus as Lords of Heaven 
and Earth—would indeed symmetrically top even the Lord of All the Earth. 
20. For an excellent example, see Lévi-Strauss’ (1971) study of the differentiation and 
reconciliation of the Native American Mandan and Hidatsa peoples.
247THE STRANGER-KINGSHIP OF THE MEXICA
the legitimacy of their own rulers depends on their foreign origins—stranger-
kingship—or that these rulers take on borrowed notions of authority that are 
beyond their own political means—galactic mimesis. The lesson is that anthro-
pology has long been implicated in a major theoretical scandal, insofar as it has 
been futilely engaged in various ways of explaining cultures from within, as if 
they were self-fashioning, although even their differences are formed in relation-
ships to others—schismogenesis. “Human societies are never alone,” as Lévi-
Strauss (1952: 9) said, although he might have added that anthropologists—as 
others in the human sciences—have generally acted as though they were. I won’t 
go into the reasons, which range from the prevalence of nationalist concepts to 
the limitations of ethnographic practice, hence the habitual epistemological in-
clination to know cultures as isolated monads. Suffice it to note that, with some 
important exceptions such as globalization and world-systems studies, virtually 
all our received paradigms of cultural order and development—functionalism, 
structural-functionalism, cultural materialism, evolutionism, Marxism of base 
and superstructure, the new ontology and the old ecology, patterns of culture, 
even postmodern discourses, epistemes, and subjectivities—all these paradigms 
suppose that the forms, relations, or configurations at issue are situated within 
a more or less coherent cultural scheme, and that the articulations and dynam-
ics of that scheme are the theoretical matters at issue. French structuralism has 
had an interesting history in this respect, likewise inner-directed so long it was 
based on Saussurean notions of a systematic semiotic field in which “tout se 
tient,” but from which it broke out in Lévi-Strauss’ intercultural permutations 
of mythical structures. By and large, however, as Fredrik Barth succinctly put 
it decades ago, “Practically all anthropological reasoning rests on the premise 
that cultural variation is discontinuous: that there are aggregates of people who 
essentially share a common culture, and the interconnected differences that dis-
tinguish such culture from others” (1969: 9).
The scandal is that this is empirically not so and evidently never has been 
so. The great majority of societies known to ethnography and archaeology, as 
remote in space and far back in time as we can get, are formed by their situation 
within fields of cultural others. Even as Immanuel Wallerstein (1976) was de-
veloping the notion of a capitalist world-system, Stanley Tambiah had worked 
out the galactic polity, and Kajsa Ekholm (1980) and Jonathan Friedman (1992) 
had discovered the five-thousand-year-old history of regional core–periphery 
configurations focused on dominant civilizations (cf. Ekholm and Friedman 
1979). Not to forget Alfred Kroeber’s (1945) similar discussion of the Eurasian 
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ecumene and its underdeveloped margins, Morton Fried’s (1975) arguments 
about the relations between pristine states, secondary states, and dependent 
“tribes,” and Aidan Southall’s (1988) depiction of “segmentary states.” Early on, 
Kroeber (1947) and Clark Wissler (1938) were mapping Native American “cul-
ture areas” that were likewise centered on certain “dominant cultures” or marked 
by “cultural climaxes.” More recently, Deborah Gewertz (1983), Anthony Forge 
(1990), and Simon Harrison (1990), reporting on the peoples of the Middle 
Sepik, New Guinea, and Dan Jorgensen (1990c, 1996), on the Sepik Headwa-
ters, have ethnographically recorded just such regional systems, focused on the 
Iatmul and Telefol peoples, respectively. These studies show that by means of 
the demonstration-effects of punctuated warfare and the demonstrated efficacy 
of the spirits and rituals of the leading peoples, regional patterns of core–pe-
riphery relations analogous to the galactic polities of “high cultures” exist as 
well in the tribal zone. They may even involve a degree of economic domina-
tion, insofar as the agricultural prosperity of the peripheral peoples depends 
on rituals controlled by the central groups. In sum, this hierarchical system of 
“interculturality,” as it may be called, is the normal state of cultural affairs in 
many places. Perhaps everywhere. Certainly from my own limited knowledge 
of the primary texts on Native Mesoamerica and the brilliant scholarly analyses 
made of them, I suspect that such interculturality is equally a feature of Mexica 
history. It seems appropriate, then, to leave the last word to the greatest student 
of intercultural relations among Native American peoples, Lévi-Strauss: 
It is high time that anthropology freed itself from the illusion gratuitously in-
vented by the functionalists, who mistake the practical limitations imposed on 
them by the kind of studies they advocate for the absolute properties of the ob-
jects with which they are dealing. An anthropologist may confine himself for one 
or more years within a small social unit, group or village, and endeavor to grasp it 
as a totality, but this is no reason for imagining that the unit, at levels other than 
the one at which convenience or necessity has placed him, does not merge in 
varying degrees with larger entities, the existence of which remains, more often 
than not, unsuspected. (1990: 609) 
chapter 5
The people as nursemaids of the king
Notes on monarchs as children, women’s uprisings, 
and the return of the ancestral dead in central 
Madagascar
David Graeber
The institution of kingship embodies a kind of paradox. Kings are both omnipo-
tent and helpless. On the one hand, the essence of sovereignty is the sovereign’s 
power to do as he likes with his subjects and their possessions, and the more ab-
solute the monarchy, the more absolute, arbitrary, and unaccountable this power 
tends to be. On the other hand, kings are, in part for this very reason, dependent 
on their subjects. They are fed, clothed, housed, and have their basic physical 
needs attended to by those ostensibly under their power. And the more absolute 
their power, the greater that dependency will also tend to be.
For those educated in European philosophy, this observation will imme-
diately call to mind Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s master–slave dialectic, 
where the conqueror, in reducing his rival to servitude, becomes dependent on 
him for his means of livelihood, while the conquered at least achieves a kind of 
paradoxical autonomy, and mastery, in work. But Hegel was by no means the 
first to have noticed this dynamic. There have been times and places, far from 
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Hegel’s Germany, where the paradox is seen as lying at the very center of the 
idea of kingship; not just in the reflections of philosophers but in the ritual life 
surrounding kings themselves. 
In this essay I’d like to explore one of them. In the Merina kingdom of the 
north central plateau of Madagascar, kings were quite often represented as in-
fants, toddlers, or petulant adolescents. They were assumed to be both willful, 
difficult, and utterly dependent on their subjects. Framing institutions of gov-
ernment in this fashion created a peculiar moral alchemy whereby selfishness, 
imperiousness, even occasional outbursts of vindictive violence, could actually 
be seen as endearing, or, at the very least, as reinforcing the feeling that it was 
the duty of commoners to attend to royal needs. Yet this way of imagining royal 
power clearly cut two ways. For one thing, it was accompanied by a sense that, 
while the living ruler could be seen as a kind of perpetual minor, it was dead 
kings—the royal ancestors—who really represented mature authority. For an-
other, it gave subjects a language with which to chasten and admonish rulers, 
whether in their own names or the names of those ancestors, whenever they 
were seen to have gone too far. 
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This aspect of Merina kingship has largely been ignored in the existing 
scholarly literature. But as soon as you start looking for it in the primary sources, 
it’s everywhere. 
It is one of the unique pleasures of studying the Merina kingdom that these 
sources are so rich. After King Radama I invited foreign missionaries into his 
kingdom to set up a system of primary education in 1820, literacy became wide-
spread, and the result was an unprecedented outpouring of texts, official and 
unofficial—ranging from histories, compendia of customs, poetry, oratory and 
folklore, including a 1,243-page collection called the Tantara ny andriana eto 
Madagascar (“History of the kings of Madagascar”) which consists of a detailed 
history and ethnography of nineteenth-century Merina1 society in pretty much 
all of its aspects, drawn from a wide variety of authors. Infuriatingly, since most 
of this material only reaches us through missionary sources, almost none of the 
authors’ names have been preserved. (The Tantara, for instance, is remembered 
as the work of one Père Callet, a Jesuit priest who assembled and edited the 
manuscripts.) Still, combined with the detailed correspondence, legal records, 
and official registers preserved in the National Archives, they provide an almost 
unparalleled window on nineteenth-century Merina society. 
What I’m going to do in the following pages, then, is to examine how the 
theme of king as child works itself out in this literature. I’ll start with a story 
that I heard while I was carrying out my own fieldwork in 1990 and 1991, 
about an arrogant prince who literally fell from power. Stories like his, it seems 
to me, raise obvious questions about the nature of authority in the highlands: 
first and foremost why, if kings really did receive the unquestioning devotion of 
their subjects, as all foreign observers insisted they did, are they now remem-
bered largely as bullies and tyrants? To understand that, in turn, will require an 
examination of the overall organization of the kingdom itself, conceived as a 
vast structure of ritual labor; then, reexamining moments in the past when royal 
authority was challenged through that lens. Finally, I will ask whether the ap-
parently exotic formulations of Merina kingship, in which the people regularly 
represented themselves as “nursemaids” of the king, might not also provide in-
sights into more general questions about the nature of social authority.
1. The name “Merina” is rarely used nowadays, and even in the nineteenth century 
was one term among many (Larson 1996). Generally speaking, I avoid the term 
when speaking of the contemporary descendants of those known in the literature as 
“Merina,” but it seems appropriate in this historical context.
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INTRODUCTION: LEILOZA AND THE PROPHET OF 
VALALAFOTSY 
Leiloza, the last prince of Imamo
I carried out my doctoral research in the northern hinterlands of the town of 
Arivonimamo, in Western Imerina. This is rolling country, dotted by small gran-
ite mountains, valleys full of tiny streams and terraced rice fields, broken by 
expanses of tapia forest—tapia being a tree that looks a little like a dwarf oak, 
and sports silkworms from whose webs a native cloth is manufactured. This is 
what the area has long been famous for. Until the very end of the eighteenth 
century, too, this territory, along with all the lands west of the Ombifotsy River, 
were part of an independent kingdom called Imamo, distinct from Imerina to 
the east. Or, to be more specific, they were considered to have once, long before, 
been unified under a great wise king named Andriambahoaka, just as in the 
same time Imerina was considered to have been created by a great wise king 
named Andriamasinavalona. Such great wise kings always seem to have existed 
a few generations in the past, just beyond living memory. In the case of Imerina 
and Imamo, the same story was told: the great wise king, unwisely, split his ter-
ritory between four sons, resulting in endless civil wars. 
In the case of Imamo, however, these rival princes did all share a single tomb. 
In the nineteenth century, this tomb was known as Fondanitra (“in the heart 
of the sky”), a huge stone structure which sat atop the sugar-loaf mountain of 
Ambohitrambo—a mountain that dominates the landscape of the region, vis-
ible for miles around. 
The mountain, and the tomb, is still there; and it’s still a place of pilgrim-
age. But now the tomb is remembered not as the burial place of the collectiv-
ity of Imamo’s kings—just about all of these have been forgotten—but as the 
tomb of a boy named Lailoza, or Leiloza, remembered as a childish, tyranni-
cal young prince who, it is said, never actually came to the throne of Imamo.2 
Still, everyone knows his story. According to the legend, Leiloza was so literally 
high and mighty that he refused to walk along the hillside paths like ordinary 
humans, but instead employed the women of the kingdom constantly weaving 
silk, which he had turned into giant cable bridges between Ambohitrambo and 
other nearby mountains; bridges reserved for his personal use. This caused such 
2. The name means “the great disaster,” though used of a person loza can also mean 
“fierce” or “angry.”
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suffering that one day, his father could no longer stand it, and cut the cable 
while his son was on the bridge, sending his only child plummeting to his death. 
The place where he is said to have fallen is a village now known as 
Manjakazaza, which literally means “a child rules.” “Because he was just a child,” 
people told me, “but he bossed everyone around.” (zaza fotsiny fa nanjakajaka; 
cf. Graeber 2007a: 90).
These elements of the story appeared in every version I heard, or am aware 
of. Some added further embellishments: random executions, whimsical or-
ders—in one version, the prince is even said to have forced all the women in 
the kingdom to cut off their hair to provide materials for his bridge. By at least 
the 1960s, such actions had become proverbial. One French ethnographer who 
worked in the region cites an informant as follows:
This Leiloza loved to make the population suffer for his own pleasure; now, he 
had a herd of cattle; sometimes, he would give the order to take the entire herd 
up some hill for no reason, and then bring them down again; hence the saying 
“Akaro toy ny andry ombin’i Leiloza.” [Go up the hill like those minding Leiloza’s 
cattle.] (Augustins 1971: 553)3
When asked why Leiloza acted the way he did, people would usually just say 
that he was maditra—a word that can probably be best translated as “naughty,” 
since it’s mainly used for children who misbehave. In dictionaries it’s some-
times translated “stubborn,” in the sense of actively resisting parental authority, 
rather in the way English-speaking parents will say a child “won’t listen” when 
they mean “won’t do as he’s told.”4 It’s unusual to spend any length of time 
with a Malagasy woman taking care of, say, a toddler without hearing the word 
evoked at least once or twice, often called out in a chiding tone that seems 
3. Augustin’s informant continues: “Or again, when, at Antongona, a village twenty-
five kilometers away from Ambohitrambo, something was burning. Leiloza would 
say ‘put out that fire at Antongona, the smoke from it might choke me.’ And from 
that comes the saying ‘Efa ho lava ny afon’Antongona,’ ‘interminable like the fire of 
Antongona’” (ibid.). This story I never heard myself, but it seems to distantly evoke 
myths where upstart heroes challenge the divine powers by setting fires to send 
smoke to heaven to choke the children of God.
4. Hence Richardson defines maditra as “obstinate, stubborn, pertinacious” (1885: 
123). This makes sense because the root, ditra, also refers to things that are hard and 
resistant, such as a knotty piece of wood that cannot easily take a nail. 
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simultaneously indignant and at least a little bit bemused. Yet the same word, 
maditra, was also employed to refer to princes, kings, or other figures of high 
authority when they behaved unjustly and arbitrarily. In one early source, the 
bad prince of Ambohitrambo is actually referred to not as Leiloza, but simply as 
Rakotomaditra, or “Naughty Young Man” (Callet 1908: 573 n. 1). 
Leiloza, then, is the very embodiment of selfish, childish, royal behavior.
The curious thing is that this term, maditra, is not really a generic word for 
irresponsible or headstrong behavior. It’s used when referring to children or 
figures of authority—especially royalty—but only rarely anybody else. When I 
was still doing my fieldwork, I often wondered why this should be. What was it 
about powerful people, and recalcitrant children, that people found analogous? 
It also always struck me as curious that while one might think the real hero 
of the story was Leiloza’s father—he, after all, was the one who was ultimately 
willing to sacrifice his own posterity for the sake of his subjects—his name was 
never mentioned. I often asked; but few were even willing to speculate as to 
what it might have been.5 Leiloza’s fame, in contrast, has only increased since his 
death. This is in part because his death redeemed him. He has become a royal 
ancestor, one of a pantheon of spirits called on to possesses mediumistic curers, 
and help them to cure the sick, answer vows, and battle the designs of witches. 
His tomb has become a doany, a portal and a place a pilgrimage—perhaps not 
nearly so important a one as Andriantsihanika, the most famous royal tomb in 
Imamo, located further to the west, but this is largely because Ambohitrambo 
is far from any paved road, and Andriantsihanika is very close to the highway. 
Most large mountains are said to be marked by royal tombs of one sort or an-
other, and many of these have become doany, a word which literally means “cus-
toms office,” opening on a kind of spectral universe inhabited by heroic figures 
from “Malagasy times.” They are referred to collectively as “kings” (andriana). 
But the stories associated with them tend to be, like Leiloza’s, markedly anti-
monarchical in tone. Andriantsihanika, for example, is remembered now as a 
descendant of a king who voluntarily abandoned his andriana status and be-
came a commoner because he “didn’t want to have slaves” (Peetz 1951a). Others 
were magicians who defied unjust royal power, women betrayed by royal friends 
or lovers, or simply notable historical figures—diviners, water-nymphs—with 
5. One informant suggested “Ratrimo,” but there’s no other record of such a figure. 
Augustin (1971: 553) suggests Andriantokanandy, but this seems to be taken 
somewhat arbitrarily from a different royal genealogy.
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no particular relation to royalty at all. Some bear the names of documented 
historical rulers, but rarely, if ever, even in those cases did I hear anyone who 
frequented, made vows and offerings at, such rulers’ doany have anything good 
to say about their behavior when they were still alive. Perhaps few went so far 
as Ratsizafy, the old and venerable astrologer in the community where I did my 
own fieldwork, who insisted that all the famous kings of Madagascar were actu-
ally witches, who only since their death had returned to cure the diseases they 
once had caused (Graeber 2007a: 302). But everyone seemed to feel that dead 
kings were very much preferable to live ones. 
Still, there was a universal acknowledgment that, however cruel and disas-
trous monarchs might have been in life, as soon as they were placed inside the 
stone chambers of the tomb, everything changed, and monarchs were immedi-
ately transformed into “holy spirits” (fanahy masina) capable of protecting the 
living from the very disasters they used to inflict on them in life. 
The uniformity of this attitude surprised me. Almost no one had anything 
good to say about past monarchs—this despite the fact that almost everyone 
had learned at least a little Malagasy history in primary school, where histori-
cal monarchs were presented in a far more favorable light. In fact, the only real 
exceptions I encountered were a handful of educated history buffs who had 
memorized the names and dates of ancient rulers from textbooks. They, at least, 
would often take the view common amongst the intelligentsia and see at least 
some of the past rulers as nationalist heroes of one sort or another. But I never 
heard such sentiments from anybody else. Ask an ordinary farmer, trader, or la-
borer, one would invariably hear some variation of the same story: the andriana 
of “Malagasy times” (tany gasy) had abused their authority, they had kept slaves, 
or treated their subjects like slaves, or both; and for this they had been punished, 
like Leiloza’s father, by the loss of their posterity. Even after they were deposed, 
many insisted, they often proved infertile, or their children came to bad ends, 
their numbers dwindled, the few left falling into madness or poverty. This was 
God’s judgment, said those who considered themselves pious Christians. The 
less pious cited the famous Malagasy proverb, “divine retribution may not exist, 
but what you do comes back” (ny tody tsy misy fa ny atao no miverina).
Such statements were all the more striking because in the nineteenth century 
there is simply no sign of such sentiments at all. They are nowhere to be found 
in the voluminous Malagasy literature of the time, which tended to represent 
ancient kings as wise and benevolent founders of contemporary institutions. 
Neither can one see anything like it in the observations of foreign visitors, who 
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would uniformly remark on the absolute, unquestioning devotion of the Merina 
population to their queen. Yet as soon as the colonial period (1895–1950) be-
gins, such stories seem to pop up out of nowhere. So how did popular views of 
royalty change so rapidly?
My first attempt at an answer to this question—the one I develop in my 
book Lost people (Graeber 2007a)—was that the change of attitudes had some-
thing to do with the shock of colonization. Practically the first thing the French 
colonial regime did after conquering Madagascar in 1895 was to dissolve the 
monarchy—but they also abolished slavery at the same time. The fact that un-
der the police state regime that followed, Christianity became about the only 
institutional form in which it was possible to express nationalist sentiments, 
combined with the continued presence of a population of ex-slaves living in un-
comfortable proximity to their former masters, created an environment where 
slavery became a continual source of guilt and embarrassment. It became the 
kind of issue that everyone didn’t want to talk about, but almost invariably 
ended up talking about anyway: a reality that had to be so constantly hidden 
it ended up seeming the hidden reality behind everything. When I asked rural 
people about precolonial history, almost no matter what I asked about, my in-
terlocutors would half the time assume I was really asking about slavery. 
All powers of command—whether royal or colonial power—seemed to fuse 
together in people’s minds as so many extensions of the principle of slavery, of 
making one person an extension of another’s will.6 As a result, even wage labor 
was frowned upon, at least among adults. Curiously, this moral condemnation 
of relations of command was particularly marked among the descendants of the 
free population, the descendants of hova (“commoners”), or andriana. The actual 
descendants of slaves, who constituted roughly a third of the population, do not 
feel they are in a position to be nearly so punctilious about such matters: in fact, 
they were not only more likely to become Zanadrano, that is, mediumistic cur-
ers who still tended the tombs of royal ancestors, they were also the most willing 
to join the actual military, work for wages, or otherwise subordinate themselves 
to others in ways that would ultimately extricate themselves from poverty.
6. Hence, people would often refer to both kings and the French as having treated 
their ancestors as slaves, slaves were often described as “soldiers,” and fundamental 
institutions of the royal period, such as fanompoana, or royal “service,” which 
was once what distinguished free subjects from slaves, were now seen as simple 
euphemisms for “slavery.” 
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In fact, the cult of the Zanadrano, which has also existed at least since the 
colonial period (cf. Peetz 1951a, 1951b; Bernard-Thierry 1960; Cabanes 1972), 
has been dominated, from the beginning, by descendants of slaves. Royal tombs, 
for example, the kind that become places of cult, are almost invariably accompa-
nied by small outlying tombs of figures who are usually referred to as the king’s 
“soldiers,” who still serve their old masters, and whose spirits do the hard work 
of actually fighting the witches and retrieving the evil charms they have planted 
in patients’ houses, fields, wells, and gardens. It would often be explained to me 
that the word “soldier” here was really just a polite way of saying “slave.” It was 
the presence of such slave-tombs that marked the royal tomb as royal. But at the 
same time, the mediums, too, would refer to themselves as the “soldiers” of the 
divine spirits who—wicked in life, benevolent in death—possessed them and 
rendered them extensions of their will. 
Such was my reading at the time. I still stand by it. It’s clear that the shock 
of colonization, and the end of slavery in particular, did play havoc with existing 
conceptions of authority. And there is certainly no precedent for any of this in 
the cult of the “twelve sacred mountains,” each with its purely benevolent royal 
ancestor, that existed under the monarchy. Still, political ideas don’t come out of 
nowhere. It’s all a matter of where you look. And if one turns back to the nine-
teenth-century literature and looks in the right places, one can, I think, already 
find strong evidence that the nature and legitimacy of the power of kings was, 
indeed, being contested, and often quite openly. The most compelling evidence 
is the fact that almost all the foreign observations about subjects’ unquestioning 
obedience to the sovereign referred not to kings, but to queens. In fact, dur-
ing the seventy-eight years where foreign observers were present, from roughly 
1816 to 1895, only two men (Radama I and Radama II) sat on the throne, for 
a total of fourteen years between them, and both faced significant popular op-
position. All other heads of state were women. 
Here is the canonical list of Merina monarchs, to give a sense: 
King Andriamasinavalona (c. 1675–1710)
[period of civil wars, c. 1710–87, all contesting parties male]
King Andrianampoinimerina (1787–1810)
King Radama I (1810–28)
Queen Ranavalona I (1828–61)
King Radama II (1861–63)
Queen Rasoherina (1863–68)
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Queen Ranavalona II (1868–83) 
Queen Ranavalona III (1883–95)
Now, the standard narrative of the Merina kingdom runs like this: once upon 
a time, there was a wise old king named Andriamasinavalona, who managed to 
unify the numerous tiny kingdoms of the northern highlands into what was later 
to become the Merina state. After his death, the kingdom descended into civil 
wars, with his various male descendants vying for power. Up to this time, in fact, 
there is no record of female monarchs of any sort, other than legends about the 
very distant, misty past. Eventually, the ruler of one of these principalities man-
aged to conquer the rest, took on the name Andrianampoinimerina (“the desire 
of Imerina”), and laid the foundations of the Merina state—insisting his ultimate 
goal was to bring the entire island of Madagascar under his suzerainty. His son, 
Radama, managed to accomplish his father’s vision by entering into an alliance 
with British agents from Mauritius, who sent military aid and advisors to help 
him create a standing army, and invited foreign missionaries to enter his king-
dom on condition they establish a school system on which he could train civil 
service. But Radama’s early death threw the kingdom into crisis. Commoner 
generals seized power, and placed his widow, Ranavalona, on the throne.
Ranavalona reigned for the next thirty-three years, and is remembered both 
as a terrifying tyrant who fostered endless wars against coastal “rebels,” and 
a protonationalist who restored the ancient rituals, expelled missionaries and 
other foreign agents, and demanded world powers recognize Madagascar as a 
fully independent modern state. Her death provoked another crisis, and after a 
brief attempt by her son Radama II to open Madagascar to foreign powers once 
again, another military coup in 1863 led to a compromise where from then on, 
only women would actually sit on the Merina throne. The last three queens were 
all selected by, and secretly married to, the commoner prime minister, Rainilaia-
rivony, the general who actually held ultimate political authority.
Such is the canonical version. The story is true as far as it goes. But one 
must ask: If what we are dealing with is essentially a ploy, a series of queens 
put up as figureheads by what was really a commoner military junta, what 
was it that made the generals think such a ploy would be effective? As I’ve 
noted, there was little precedent for women rulers in Merina history.7 Even 
7. According to legend, in very early times there were two female monarchs named 
Rafohy and Rangita, but these were “Vazimba” monarchs, Vazimba often being 
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in world-comparative terms, what they came up with was an extraordinarily 
unusual arrangement. In fact it may well be unique. I am not aware of any 
other kingdom on record, anywhere in the world, where a clique of commoners 
seized power and legitimated their rule by placing a series of exclusively female 
monarchs on the throne.8 
Even more, one has to ask why the ploy actually was effective. Because while 
both Radamas faced strong popular resistance, by all accounts, the queens—
however oppressive the military cliques that actually ran their governments (and 
they were often very oppressive indeed)—did not. Even the terrifying Ranava-
lona I seems to have inspired genuine devotion.
* * *
So far the story of Leiloza, which purports to explain the end of the monarchy 
in Imamo, has led us to a series of historical puzzles. Let me arrange them in 
reverse order:
1. Why is it that in the nineteenth century, the legitimacy of male kings fell 
into question, but the legitimacy of female ones did not?
2. Why is it that after the French conquest, popular history was quickly rewrit-
ten so that all ancient monarchs were represented as being oppressive or 
even outright evil during their lifetimes, but benevolent and protective after 
their deaths?9
3. Why is it that when describing their unjust and oppressive behavior, kings 
are so often represented in their lifetimes as petulant, egotistical, “naughty” 
children?
represented as an early, aboriginal people expelled by the current inhabitants of the 
country. 
8. There are a few cases where the paramount political position is always expected to 
be held by a woman: the Lovedu “rain queen” (Krige and Krige 1943) being perhaps 
the most famous. But it is surprisingly rare. 
9. It’s worth pointing out here that almost all documented eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century rulers, including the queens, were quickly forgotten in the colonial period. 
The founder of the Merina state, Andrianampoinimerina, is still an important curing 
spirit, and there are still shrines to a few earlier kings, but the latter are of virtually 
no ritual importance. The “kings” remembered now are a peculiar hodgepodge of 
ancient figures almost none of whom were actually rulers, let alone important rulers, 
during their lifetimes. 
260 ON KINGS
The best way to start to think about answers to these questions, it seems to me, 
would be to reexamine the history of Leiloza himself. Because there was a his-
torically documented prince of Imamo named Leiloza, who did in fact fall from 
power, and it happened just around the time that the fabled Leiloza of Ambohit-
rambo is supposed to have tumbled from his bridge. It’s actually rather remark-
able we know the story, because most stories from Imamo have been irrevocably 
lost. By a peculiar historical accident, history has been preserved, in the unpub-
lished journals of one James Hastie, a British infantry sergeant dispatched to the 
court of king Radama by the governor of Mauritius in 1817, and who was at the 
time acting as the king’s chief military advisor. In this very early account, many 
of the key elements that were later to come together in Merina attitudes toward 
their rulers—from mediumship to female rule—are already very much present, 
and might be said provide a kind of structural foretaste of what was to come. 
Let me begin, then, with Hastie’s account.
The real Leiloza and the bandit queen
The Leiloza in Hastie’s account was not from Ambohitrambo but from a small 
kingdom called Valalafotsy, also part of the region of Imamo, but on the very 
western fringes of the highlands, where it drifts into uninhabited no-man’s land. 
His story appears in account of the death of Leiloza’s son, Rabevola, at the 
hands of the Merina king, Radama I. 
In October 1824, Radama’s new British-trained army, fresh from its con-
quest of the Sakalava kingdom of Boina, was marching south through a terri-
tory called Mivamahamay. It was largely open country, dotted with occasional 
forests, renowned for its dense herds of feral cattle, which the soldiers stopped 
to hunt. The only inhabitants of this desolate land were a band of several thou-
sand runaways from the highlands, most of them Manendy—members of a 
famous warrior caste who had once served Radama’s father (Domenichini and 
Domenichini-Ramiaramanana 1980; Rakotomanolo 1981). They had presented 
themselves at the court of the king of Boina, who granted them leave to estab-
lish themselves in this no-man’s land. There they formed what Hastie referred 
to as a “Manendy Republic,” welcoming a variety of other refugees from the 
highlands, who ranged from escaped slaves to various unseated princes and their 
retainers. This motley crew soon became notorious for launching marauding 
raids on Radama’s subjects in the highlands, and in the process, accumulating a 
great deal of moveable wealth. 
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In fact, the “Manendy Republic” was only a republic in a certain very broad 
sense of the term. It had a supreme leader: a “prophetess,” as Hastie describes 
her, widely feared across the region. This woman went by the unwieldy name of 
Triemanosinamamy.10 
This is where the story becomes relevant to us, because in describing the ori-
gins of this prophetess, Hastie begins telling stories, obviously culled from her 
followers, about events in the highlands several generations before. As it turns 
out, Sergeant Hastie explains, Triemanosinamamy was not originally the name 
of the prophetess, but the name of an earlier ruler of Valalafotsy, a kingdom on 
the very western marches of Imamo. What’s more, the prophetess was the suc-
cessor to the recently deceased former chieftain of the Manendy Republic, who 
was, precisely, Leiloza. Leiloza had himself originally been king of Valalafotsy:11
It is said that four generations back, a Chieftain named Triemanosinamamy 
governed the district Valalafotsy in so equitable and successful a manner as to 
render himself highly respected and even revered by all his subjects. His good ac-
tions had such an effect that they transferred his influence and popularity to his 
descendants and particularly to the Chieftain from whom the late Leiloza was 
descended. During the reign of Leiloza, a slave boy that was sent for firewood 
returned with a dry faggot and placed it under the cave, outside his master’s 
house, where it was soon discovered to grow luxuriantly, and the boy ran into a 
little building or cemetery which was erected over the remains of Triemanosi-
namamy; a place considered so sacred by the natives that they suppose any per-
son not of noble blood would die immediately on entering it. The boy, however, 
10. Since the text was written just before Malagasy spelling was standardized in its 
current form, I follow the version adopted by the English missionary William Ellis, 
who summarizes Hastie’s account in his History of Madagascar (1838, II: 345–48). 
Ellis’  version abbreviates the narrative, leaves out several elements such as the magical 
charms and prophetess’ harem, but otherwise remains fairly faithful to the original. 
The most peculiar omission is the name Leiloza, whose name is written Lahilooza 
in Hastie’s text—Ellis for some reason renders this Sahiloza and incorrectly ascribes 
the name to the first “prophet” in the story, rather than to the king. There’s also the 
question of the old king’s name, which takes an unusual form. Trie- is a rare prefix, 
and manosimamy would literally mean “to confiscate that which is sweet,” which 
doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense. I follow Ellis but suspect the real name was 
different. Hastie’s first mention of the name is Tsiemamoshima maam, which seems 
better rendered Tsiemamotsiramamy, which would make slightly better sense.
11. I have kept the original, but changed the spelling of the Malagasy names to standard 
form. 
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soon began to sing, and roar loudly; and after singing, and roaring alternately for 
some time, he declared himself to be filled with spirit, and ultimately to be the 
absolute person of the long-deceased Chief Triemanosinamamy, whose voice it 
was imagined by those on the outside he had assumed. Under this assumed title 
he issued from the tomb and was received by many as a true prophet; the miracle 
of the dry faggot growing being considered an incontrovertible proof, that he was 
not an imposter, and it so occurred that he gained confidence with the people by 
happening to foretell, with exactness in several instances, their success or defeat 
in marauding expeditions. 
 Leiloza finding his own power declining, and that of the prophet fast in-
creasing, charged him with being an imposter and urged that his dark colour and 
particularly his curly head proved that he could not be the personage that he 
represented himself to be. And Leiloza caused him to be put to death.
 At that period commenced the victorious career of Radama’s father An-
drianampoinimerina, who, aiming at conquest, attacked the district of Valala-
fotsy, and met little opposition from Leiloza, who was deserted by the greater 
part of his subjects; it being their belief that in the prophet they had lost the 
only means by which the invaders could be restrained. And Leiloza, with a few 
followers, sought safety in the Boina district, where they were joined by the 
Manendy and other immigrants or runaways from Imerina. They all settled at 
Mivamahamay, where Leiloza died, leaving the settlement without a leader of 
distinction. 
 Much confusion succeeded until a female of more than ordinary talent 
raised herself to notice among them, and in confidence told Rabevola (the son 
of Leiloza) that she was the identical person that his father had caused to be put 
to death; in testimony of which she showed the wounds inflicted on her former 
person, when in the character of a man, and this she asserted to be the cause of 
her now assuming the character of a female.
 Rabevola gave full credit to her story, and several of the persons who had 
witnessed the execution of the slave boy prophet testified that the report she 
made of the wounds was correct. She had no difficulty consequently in get-
ting herself installed as the leader of the people. However she always permitted 
Rabevola and Tsiafondrazana [her second husband, the Manendy leader] to ap-
pear to share the power of Government with her; and the several petty Chief-
tains that have since joined the population under her sway have been allowed to 
form their parties, and enjoy all the privileges of royalty, within their respective 
divisions; so that she has thus kept in favor with all. And though she had only 
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two reputed husbands, she exercised her extensive prerogative in that respect as 
a true-born Princess of the country is entitled to do. (Hastie n.d.: 402–6)12
After having defeated the main force of Manendy a few days previous, Radama’s 
soldiers had captured the prophetess and her chief followers red-handed, trying 
to make off with some royal cattle. Curious to meet so extraordinary a figure, 
Hastie accompanied two officers who had been sent to interrogate the captives. 
Her people, probably numbering not more than a few hundred, had, it would 
seem, established a certain reputation for themselves, not so much for military 
might, as for knowledge of dangerous medicines. Their forest camp, serving as 
temporary capital, was guarded only by ody: “pieces of sticks, and roots in various 
forms, and rubbed with oils, were suspended on the trees around them” (ibid.: 
402) without, to Hastie’s surprise, any more conventional fortification. At the 
center of the camp, they encountered the prophetess herself. Hastie found her 
decidedly unimposing in appearance: about twenty-five-years of age, short and 
fat, dark of complexion, with frizzy hair but excellent teeth, she appeared flanked 
by her two “copper-colored” husbands. Backed up by Leiloza’s son Rabevola, 
“she launched into vigorous protestations of innocence, swearing endless fidelity 
to the Merina king” (ibid.). Rabevola added that any accusations of their being 
in possession of ody mahery, or evil medicine, were entirely unfounded: they had 
12. Some liberties have been taken with punctuation. That Leiloza was indeed a 
historical ruler of Valalafotsy is confirmed in the Tantara ny andriana (Callet 1908: 
567), a series of manuscripts assembled sometime in the late nineteenth century, 
where the king reigning in Valalafotsy at the time of Andrianampoinimerina’s 
conquests is called alternately Andriandeiloza or Andriandailoza—the prefix here 
just meaning “lord” or “king.” Otherwise the name is the same. No indication is 
given of his ancestry, but he is said to have made common cause with the last high 
king of Imamo, Andrianampoetsakarivo, who led the western resistance against the 
Merina king, but then is said finally, on realizing his kingdom would inevitably fall, 
to have buried his wealth somewhere in his ancestral lands and “fled to Sakalava.” 
The story now attributed to Leiloza, about Mount Ambohitrambo and its bridges of 
silk, does appear in the Tantara (ibid.: 573 n. 1), but the imperious prince is referred 
to instead as Andriankotomaditra (“lord naughty young man”), though the author 
adds, “who some call Andriandahiloza.” (To make matters even more confusing, 
Rakotomaditra is nowadays remembered instead as the name of a faithful slave of 
Andriantsihanika, the king who gave up his throne, who is buried next to his tomb 
and still assists him in doing battle with witches.) So two generations later, the 
legend of Leiloza’s bad behavior and consequent fall was already beginning to take 
on its current form—but it had not completely done so.
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only such as were required to protect them from the envy of their enemies, but 
even those they would gladly abandon should it please the king. 
Radama assured Hastie he had abundant proof that they were lying in all 
these matters, and were guilty of numerous crimes. He ordered their immediate 
execution. 
When Radama’s commands were communicated to the heroine, she stood up, 
and taking her spear and shield, both of which she handled with skill, she at-
tempted to harangue her followers. She used much gesticulation and said that 
those who believed her to be the spirit of Triemanosinamamy were right, and tho’ 
her person might now again suffer, she would still be victorious and she roared 
out “never despair never despair.” 
 When the infatuated woman was conveyed to the place in which she was 
to suffer, she requested that she might be dispatched with a spear, as she had a 
great antipathy to being shot. Her wish was complied with, and Rabevola suf-
fered at the same time. (Hastie n.d.: 402)
Such, then, was the real ignominious end of the line of Leiloza. Radama or-
dered the entire settlement razed, and the bulk of its population returned to 
Valalafotsy.13 
Hastie’s text is particularly intriguing because it appears to represent the 
very earliest reference we have to spirit mediumship in the Malagasy highlands. 
Written in 1824, it refers mainly to events that must have taken place in the 
1760s, 1770s, and 1780s. Hastie lacks the language to describe it—hence his 
talk of “prophets” and “reincarnations”—but, clearly, this is what he was talking 
about. The slave boy in the story was possessed by, and spoke with the voice of, 
the ancient king. When acting as his medium, he would have possessed all the 
authority the king would have had in life. (Hastie implies it was a permanent 
state, but this is very unlikely to have been the case.)
What’s especially interesting for present purposes is the fact that medium-
ship is clearly operating here as a form of political contestation: the people 
rally to the boy who speaks with the voice of their ancient king, though the boy 
13. Cf. Edland (2006: 103–4) for a brief summary of the campaign and its significance, 
which, however, relies only on European sources. Some Manendy remain there to 
this day (cf. Raison 1984, I: 267; Raison, incidentally, claims the Manendy, too, were 
originally from Valalafotsy, but this seems a misreading of the evidence).
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himself is of the lowest possible social status;14 the current king eventually reacts 
with simple violence, but thus delegitimizes his rule. After his fall, yet another 
“prophet” appears—this time, not just a former slave but also a woman—who 
quickly becomes effective leader of the rambunctious “republic” of Valalafotsy’s 
refugees.
EMBLEMATIC LABOR AND THE KING AS CHILD
The historic Leiloza was a tyrant so jealous of the child possessed by the be-
nevolent spirit of his grandfather that in the end he killed him. Thus did he lose 
the loyalty of his subjects and precipitate his fall from power. The legendary 
Leiloza of today is a tyrannical child who, after his fall, himself became a be-
nevolent spirit that possesses mediums. Between the two stories, it seems to me, 
you have all the themes and elements required to start writing a proper history 
of Merina attitudes toward their rulers—that is, if one wishes to understand the 
crisis of authority that engulfed Merina kings from at least the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, these stories tell you precisely where to look.
Let me give an example. One of the striking elements of the Leiloza story as 
it’s told around Mount Ambohitrambo today is that it talks about forced labor. 
Under the Merina kingdom, fanompoana, or royal service, was the overarching 
principle of governance. Every subject was expected to perform some form of 
labor for the sovereign. And indeed the story echoes much of what ordinary 
subjects seemed to have considered most obnoxious about fanompoana at that 
time: the tending of vast herds of royal cattle; industrial projects; transporting 
lords too high-and-mighty to walk on the ground (real Merina royalty didn’t 
employ silk bridges, but they were regularly carried about in palanquins). All 
this is extremely unusual. While stories about kings told nowadays regularly 
14. That is, a slave. Hastie emphasizes the African appearance of both “prophets,” but 
in fact he seems to be projecting a Euro-American racial bias onto the Malagasy. 
At that time, African descent would not in itself have been taken as a sign of servile 
status; in fact, while northern highlanders were, then as now, more phenotypically 
Asian than coastal populations, they were then more likely to be enslaved by 
coastal populations than the other way around. However, it is possible that spirit 
mediumship itself reached the highlands from Africa via Malagasy populations on 
the coast. 
266 ON KINGS
emphasize their injustice and cruelty, those stories almost never have anything 
to say about fanompoana.15 
Nineteenth-century sources, on the other hand, often seem to talk of noth-
ing else. Foreign observers would regularly remark that the bulk of an adult 
Merina subject’s waking hours was spent either performing fanompoana for the 
queen or avoiding doing so, and everything from school attendance to military 
service was considered a form of royal service. Not only was fanompoana the 
central principle of governance, it was key to the status system and the animat-
ing principle of royal ritual as well—if, indeed, royal work and royal ritual can 
even be entirely distinguished. 
What I’m going to do in this next section, then, is explore the internal logic 
of that system of ritual labor that characterized the old Merina kingdom, since 
I think it’s the key to understanding Merina kingship itself. 
* * *
Malagasy ritual provides an unusual challenge to the interpreter because ritual 
gestures often seem to be saying two quite contradictory things at exactly the 
same time. Malagasy rhetoric (or kabary) is quite similar; it often seems that 
everything is double-edged, in the sense that it can be read in at least two differ-
ent ways, sometimes even three. Blessings can be curses in disguise, and curses, 
blessings; statements of submission are often covert challenges; assertions of 
power often take the form of mock self-effacement. Anyone who has spent 
much time in a Malagasy community knows this is one of the things audiences 
find most enjoyable about good kabary: observing the agility with which skillful 
rhetoricians use professions of support or agreement to subtly slice each other 
apart. Yet when analysts turn to ritual, they tend to assume, instead, that ritual 
statements must all be taken at literal face value.
Merina royal ritual is a perfect case in point, since it’s often subject to this 
kind of heavy-handed reading. Most existing literature on the subject (e.g., 
Lejamble 1972; Delivré 1974; Bloch 1977, 1982, 1986, 1989; Berg 1979, 1988, 
1995, 1996, 1998; Raison-Jourde 1983b; S. Ellis 1985, 2002) emphasizes that 
the legitimacy of kings was bound up with a concept referred to as hasina. Here’s 
a fairly typical example: 
15. This is largely because fanompoana has now become a euphemism for “slavery” 
(Graeber 1996, 2007a: 43).
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Common to those kingdoms in old Madagascar which succeeded one another, 
rising and declining in the extent of their influence, was the notion of hasina. 
This designates the invisible essence of power and fertility that can be channeled 
to human beings, particularly through ancestors. Maintaining this life-force de-
mands respect for ritual obligations and taboos that in effect bind members of 
a family or a community to each other, to nature, and to the land. The foremost 
principle of political authorities throughout the island was that they should em-
body hasina and bestow it on their subjects. (S. Ellis 2002: 103; cf. Randrianja 
and Ellis 2009: 109) 
Statements like this are not so much incorrect as extraordinarily crude. They 
annihilate all the subtlety and ambiguity that, in Malagasy eyes, give concepts 
like hasina their conceptual power. The passage above would be a little like an-
nouncing that the English political system is organized around a notion of 
“force” or “power,” then explaining that English people assume force and power 
to be basic constituents of the natural universe, and finally concluding that Eng-
lish political and bureaucratic institutions exist primarily to channel force and 
power in benevolent directions. None of these statements are exactly false. But 
as with hasina, this, first, suggests a very naïve understanding of what are in fact 
quite sophisticated concepts, and, second, assumes everything fits together in a 
far neater fashion than it actually does. In fact, if one examines how the term 
hasina is used in ritual contexts today, it is clear that it is in no sense some kind 
of liquid fertility or power that flows one way or another, let alone something 
that powerful figures “bestow” on anybody else. Hasina is first and foremost a 
way of talking about powers that no one fully understands. Royal rituals always 
play on this: subjects are constantly “giving hasina” to the king, in the form of 
unbroken silver dollars,16 which express their desire to create a unified kingdom; 
but it is utterly unclear, and indeed people seem to have been of very much 
two minds, as to whether those desires created the kingdom, or whether it was 
the mysterious allure of royal power that created the desire. Royal ritual often 
seems to be declaring that the people recognize the power of the king, and that 
the people create the power of the king, at exactly the same time. But this was 
simply typical of those domains that we would label “magic” or “politics”—they 
16. Most cash transactions in highland markets made use of imported silver coins 
cut up and weighed: whole coins were unusual, and in this context were said to 
represent the unity of the kingdom such acts of allegiance were meant to create.
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were precisely those domains where no one could ever completely understand 
what was going on.
On ritual labor
How, then, might we attempt a less heavy-handed approach to Malagasy royal 
ritual? 
Until now, the most creative and insightful work on Merina royal ritual 
has surely been that of Maurice Bloch (1977, 1982, 1986, 1999). I suspect his 
work stands out not just because of the quality of the theoretical insight, but 
also because Bloch is virtually the only writer on the subject who has comes at 
it armed with detailed first-hand knowledge of ritual life in the northern high-
lands today.17 Bloch is most famous for his analysis of the Merina circumcision 
ritual (1986)—a ceremony that is typically performed on quite small children: 
boys are usually circumcised between the ages of two and four. His analysis of 
fahasoavina, or circumcision rituals, is his starting point for analyzing the whole 
ritual system, royal ritual included. My own ethnographic work has focused 
more on mortuary ritual (famadihana: Graeber 1995) and curing rituals car-
ried out by spirit mediums (fanasinana: Graeber 2007a, 2007c). But I think it’s 
significant that even though these rituals aren’t typically held for children, meta-
phors about children, and the raising of children, do also appear prominently in 
both of them as well. 
What I’m going to do in this next section, then, is to read eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century royal ritual, as it were, backward—through the kind of ritu-
als I myself witnessed in the Merina countryside. 
First, mediums. Mediums, and curers in general, are often referred to as 
mpitaiza olona, the nursemaids, nurturers, or carers for others. The verb mitaiza 
17. About the only other body of work that sets out from contemporary ethnographic 
observation and moves from there to Merina royal ritual is that by archaeologists 
Susan Kus and Victor Raharijaona (e.g., 2000, 2001, 2008). Francophone literature 
on the subject is largely by historians, and mostly unabashedly diffusionist, more 
interested in representing the kingdom as an unstable amalgam of elements of 
Austronesian, East African, Arab, or even South Asian origin than as an emergent 
totality in itself. (This is most dramatically true of the work of Paul Ottino: e.g. 
1983, 1986, which, while often intriguing in its own right, is of quite limited help 
in solving the kind of questions being asked here.) This is not to say there have not 
been ethnographically based studies of other Malagasy systems of royal ritual, in 
French and in English—I am speaking strictly of the northern highlands here. 
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is ordinarily used for either breastfeeding an infant, or, by extension, taking care 
of a small, dependent child.18 It can also be used for caring for the sick, as here, 
but in this context the implication is somewhat broader than simply “taking 
care of ”:19 rather, as in the case of a child, it implies the benevolent, nurturant 
authority of someone more able and knowledgeable. In the case of mediumistic 
curing, of course, there are in effect two levels of such benevolent authority: 
the mediums, and the royal spirits that possess them. Ordinarily, mediums are 
simply “pressed down” (tsindriana) by these spirits, which means that while in 
trance they remain at least partly conscious, yet hear disembodied voices, or 
even see visions, directing them. But if they fall deeper into trance, the metaphor 
reverses: they are no longer “pressed down by something” (tsindrin-javatra) but 
“carried by something” (entin-javatra), and they become the spirit, their ordi-
nary personality entirely effaced. 
A similar reversal lies at the center of the famadihana ritual, where the bod-
ies of ancestors are temporarily removed from tombs and rewrapped in native 
silk shrouds. (The word famadihana literally means “reversal.”) When people 
talk casually about their communities, they often make it sound as if ancestors 
are the only real adults—living people are often referred to as ankizy, “children,” 
in comparison. (If you ask who are the local elders, you will almost invariably 
be told that the real elders are all dead: “Only we children remain.”) Yet during 
famadihana, ancestors themselves are turned into children; they are first placed 
across women’s laps—the word used for this is miampofo, “to nurse a child car-
ried on one’s lap”—given candies and honey and small change (though also 
rum), coddled as one would a child. Only then, once the ancestral relation has 
been thus reversed, can the bodies be taken up by everyone, danced with, re-
wrapped, and in the process, largely pulverized before being locked back in the 
ancestral tomb, where they can no longer trouble the living (Graeber 1995). A 
18. So one current dictionary defines the word “to breast-feed, to take care of a child 
not yet capable of taking care of its own needs” (Rajemisa-Raolison 1985: 909), 
with nurture, attend to, etc., as secondary derivative meanings. Richardson suggests 
“to nurse, to take care of ” (1885: 662); Abinal and Malzac suggest “allaitar, nourrir, 
élever un nourisson; prendre soin de quelq’un, comme une mère s’occupe de ses 
enfants” (1899: 624). 
19. That would be mikarakara or mitandrina, or, if the meaning was just curing, mitsabo. 
It’s important to emphasize in what follows that mitaiza has never been used as a 
general term for any relation of caretaking, but only those of a particularly intimate 
or, alternately, ritually significant kind. 
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celebration of the ancestral dead thus ultimately turns into a war against death 
itself, and just as an unlocked or unattended tomb can lead to ghosts escaping 
to steal one’s babies, the most appropriate response to locking one, I was often 
told, was to immediately go home and have sex, preferably with one’s wife or 
husband, if not with anyone who’s willing and available, since doing so at that 
moment was most likely to bring new babies into the world.
These are obviously extremely abbreviated descriptions, but they serve to 
bring home two points I believe to be critical. The first is that the theme of nur-
ture, and, especially, women’s labor in the rearing of children, is a key way of im-
aging the creative power of ritual; the second, that such relations tend to become 
the locus of reversals of authority structures, where ancestors turn into children, 
or slaves turn into vehicles for kings. These reversals don’t necessarily overthrow 
or challenge relations of authority (though they can), but they definitely become 
a way of negotiating such relations. All this is important when one turns back 
to royal ritual, because the moment one begins to look, one starts seeing all sorts 
of obvious parallels—even though these are precisely the elements that might 
otherwise be most likely to be overlooked if one did not have this larger ritual 
context in mind.
Understanding the ritual logic is all the more crucial because highland king-
doms—whether the various warring principalities of the eighteenth century or 
the great imperial state of the nineteenth—were essentially organized on ritual 
terms. This is not to deny that they were not also vast forms of labor extraction; 
rather, it is to suggest that within them no clear distinction between what we 
would call “work” and what we would call “ritual” could be made (cf. Sahlins 
1985: 113). Both were seen as necessary, and overlapping, aspects in the con-
stant human efforts required to create and maintain the material and social 
universe.20 
We might state the matter this way: What we call “societies” are always vast 
coordinated systems of ritualized labor. Always, too, the elementary unit of any 
such system is some kind of household; however it might be configured (and 
as anthropologists know, there are an enormous number of possibilities in this 
20. It is worth noting that while there is a Malagasy word for “work” (asa), there is no 
generic word for what we’d call “ritual”—the closest is, perhaps, fanasinana, which 
is the term for the actions of making things masina, powerful or sacred. But not 
all forms of ritual were considered fanasinana—mortuary ritual, for instance, was 
not. What’s more, many types of ritual—notably, mediumistic curing—could often 
themselves be referred to as “asa” or work. 
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regard), this household is the elementary unit of work, solidarity, domination, 
and the creation and fashioning of human beings. In this sense women’s labor, 
which tends to predominate within households, is also the most fundamental 
form of work itself. These statements, I think, can be made of any known hu-
man society. Obviously, this is never all. Anything we feel merits the name of 
a “society” will also have more encompassing structures through which all this 
is coordinated: clans, temple complexes, joint-stock corporations, and so forth. 
Usually, these look quite different from households. What makes monarchies 
unique is that, much though there might be all sorts of things going on in the 
middle of the hierarchy, the very top almost exactly resembles the very bottom. 
Kingdoms not only begin with households, they also end with one. This apical 
household is, of course, the royal household. 
Now, certainly, royal households are almost invariably far more elaborate 
than any ordinary households (which do not, for instance, ordinarily involve 
harems attended by eunuch slaves, dancing dwarfs, and so forth), and often they 
are organized in ways that can only be described as intentionally perverse, in the 
sense of violating the basic moral principles that govern ordinary households 
(led by men who murder their fathers, marry their sisters, and so forth), but they 
are considered households nonetheless; in the final analysis, they are the same 
sort of unit, a domestic unit creating, nurturing, and educating children—that 
is, producing people—as the household units at the very base. 
The difference, of course, is that the royal household, in the vast majority 
of cases anyway, was only about the creation of people, and did not involve all 
those other forms of production—of food, clothing, ironware, basketry, and so 
on—that in ordinary households served as essential material elements for that 
process of tending, growing, and nurturing human beings. In fact, the tendency 
in those ordinary households is for what we would label “work,” “play,” “ritual,” 
and “education” to be, not indistinguishable perhaps, or not usually, but in every 
way entangled, overlapping, and mutually entailed. In contrast, royal households 
could be seen as the first prefiguration of the modern consumer household, 
which at least ideally is set in a sphere entirely opposed to the “production” of 
material goods, which is just about the creating and shaping and maintaining 
of people. Royal households largely divorce the making, shaping, and maintain-
ing of people from the making, shaping, and maintaining of things. They also 
separate work, ritual, and play—at least, when royal figures do plow fields or lay 
the foundations of buildings, it’s almost invariably as a form of ritual play; it’s 
not considered actual labor. Royal households will tend to be full of servants and 
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retainers, some of whose work is to continually teach members of the royal fam-
ily how to behave like proper royalty, just as, say, presidents and prime ministers 
nowadays tend to be surrounded by hosts of aides and advisors whose function 
is to teach and remind them how to be proper heads of state. But rarely do they 
do a lot of what we’d consider productive work. What we’d call “material pro-
duction” tends to be outsourced onto other households. 
This might seem an odd way to frame things. Surely, kingdoms are not run 
by a royal household. They’re run by an individual called “the king.” Which is, 
of course, true: no kingdom has ever been ruled by a household collectively (at 
least, not officially), and in principle, the entire purpose of the royal household 
is to produce that one single individual—the monarch—who is, properly speak-
ing, the entire focus of all ritual labor. But the apparatus for the creation of such 
individuals is nonetheless crucial, since such individuals, for all their occasional 
insistence to the contrary, are mortal, and can be replaced at any time. 
I’m emphasizing all of this—at least some of which might seem self-
evident—because I think it’s important to problematize received categories in 
order to understand what’s really going on in monarchies, which are, after all, an 
extremely common form of government historically, even if they seem strange 
and exotic to most people today. The terms of political economy, invented in 
the North Atlantic world around the same time that modern republican forms 
of government were being instituted in the late eighteenth century, really don’t 
seem adequate to describe them. These terms propose a very simple schematic 
version of what an “economy” is, one that has become so much a matter of com-
mon sense that we have to remind ourselves that for most people, the very idea 
of a division between spheres of “production” (in workplaces) and “consump-
tion” (at home) would simply make no sense. Some of the attendant political 
economy categories have been thoroughly critiqued by anthropologists. Others 
have not. 
Take, for instance, the commonplace notion that labor is basically about 
“production”: that it’s typically directed at making things, transforming the 
world by combining raw materials into finished products. This is simply as-
sumed in most theoretical literature. But it’s a very odd assumption. Even a 
moment’s reflection should make clear that nowhere in the world is most activ-
ity we would ordinarily refer to as “work”21 directed at making anything. This is 
21. Let us define “work” here as repetitive or formalized activity not performed for its 
own sake, but primarily to change the state of something else. 
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true even if we restrict ourselves to work directed at material objects. Most such 
labor isn’t aimed at producing things, but at cleaning or maintaining them or 
moving them around. A ceramic coffee cup is “produced” just once; it’s washed 
and stacked a thousand times. Even if it’s a disposable paper or styrofoam coffee 
cup, far more time and energy is spent transporting, storing, and disposing of it 
than in the relatively brief moment of its actual fabrication.22 
This blindness has any number of pernicious effects, but for present purposes 
I am just invoking it to make three points which I think are crucial to under-
stand the organization of labor in Merina kingdoms. The first is the obvious an-
thropological one: that we cannot presume Malagasy assumptions about what 
work is and what is important about it necessarily mirror our own. And they 
are indeed quite different. The second is that, as I’ve argued elsewhere (Graeber 
2007c), assumptions about the nature of work tend to be organized around cer-
tain forms of what I will call “paradigmatic labor”—that is, certain varieties of 
work effectively stand in, in the popular imagination, for a whole class of other 
ones. In contemporary social science, and, to a large extent, popular discourse as 
well, the two most important of these are factory work and childcare. The first 
has become the paradigm for all paid work, the second, for unremunerated, do-
mestic labor. This is the imagery lurking in the background, for instance, when 
Marxists speak of “productive” versus “reproductive” labor; this is what can allow 
popular commentators to blithely declare that the decline in the number of fac-
tories in Britain or America means there is no more working class in such coun-
tries, even though there’s probably never been a single place in the history of the 
world where the majority of working-class people were employed in factories. 
The third point is that in monarchies like the Merina kingdom, the easiest 
way to understand how work was imagined is by examining the forms of ritual-
ized labor surrounding kings.
Let me introduce another distinction here, and cite a term I introduced in an 
earlier work (Graeber 2007c): “emblematic labor.” If paradigmatic labor is what 
you imagine to be the model for work in general, or a whole broad category of 
work, emblematic labor is work seen as typical of a certain group of people, a 
kind of work that defines what sort of people they are seen ultimately to be. A 
“fisherman” might spend only a relatively small proportion of his time actually 
fishing, he might even get a larger proportion of his income from something 
22. In this sense, even my previous comments about households and production aren’t 
precisely right.
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else, but a “fisherman” is nonetheless what he is basically seen to be. In many 
societies, this emblematic labor is the kind of work that sort of person does in 
ceremonial contexts. Caste systems are an obvious case in point: drummers or 
washermen or barbers in an Indian village do not spend most of their working 
days making music, washing, or cutting hair. Yet those activities define their role 
in the larger society, largely by determining what role they play in important 
cosmological rituals.
A. M. Hocart (1950) in fact insisted that caste systems of this sort originate 
specifically in royal rituals, where, as in Fiji, different groups in a kingdom were 
defined by the kind of labor they performed specifically for the king. Thus in 
Fijian kingdoms, there were certain groups identified as fishermen—not be-
cause they spent most of their time fishing, or even because they spent more 
of their time fishing than anyone else (everybody fished), but because it was 
their responsibility to provide fish to the court or royal rituals. Each Fijian clan 
was characterized by its own form of emblematic labor, and this was seen as 
establishing what kind of people they really were. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Merina arrangements have been referred to as “caste-like” for similar 
reasons (e.g., Bloch 1977): different ancestries, and different orders of nobility, 
were defined by the work they performed for the royal household (particularly, 
the products they brought as first-fruits or santatra), and the role they played in 
building royal houses and royal tombs. 
I think examining emblematic labor in the Merina kingdom in this fashion 
is the best way to understand the structure of the kingdom, and the role of 
the royal household. But in order to do so we first must say something about 
paradigmatic labor. In highland Madagascar, the paradigm for work in general 
is not production or even, precisely, childcare. When people think of “work,” 
they think first and foremost of the bearing of burdens: moving, dragging, and, 
especially, carrying things, which includes everything from carrying babies to 
dragging trunks of wood to moving earth with shovels. The semantic range and 
web of associations is quite different than we are used to. But once we under-
stand this, a lot of other things begin to make much better sense.
Speaking, carrying, and making
The essentials of the matter do not seem to have changed much since the nine-
teenth century. Then as now, work was seen as centered on the household, and 
was primarily the business of women. This is not to say men did not work at 
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all—often they worked very hard—but women spent more of their time in ac-
tivities viewed as working (asa), and women’s general dispositions were seen as 
pragmatic, industrious, and generally work-oriented in a way that men’s simply 
were not.23 If I were to guess what kind of paradigmatic image was called to 
mind by the idea of work—parallel to the clock-punching industrial worker 
of our own imagination—it would most likely be a young woman, infant slung 
over her back, laboring in a rice field, or carrying water or produce on her head. 
Domestic labor here represents the perfect fusion of child-rearing and physi-
cal work because women tend to attend to children and carry out other duties 
simultaneously. 
The paradigmatic form of work, then, was—and is—not seen as a making 
or building anything, or even maintaining anything, but, rather, lifting things 
up and moving them around. The importance of such matters can be seen in 
that fact that, traditionally, who carries what for whom in what circumstances 
is carefully regulated, at least in formal or ritual moments—indeed, formal or 
ritual moments are above all those in which the niceties of etiquette in such 
matters are strictly enforced.24 Who carries what for whom is probably the most 
important way of indicating rank. Even well-educated, not particularly tradi-
tional women, I found, would on trips occasionally make (half-hearted) offers 
to carry my backpack, noting that, properly, if a man and woman are of roughly 
the same age, the man shouldn’t be the one shouldering the burden. But mainly 
these rules applied to seniority. As elsewhere in Madagascar, the ranking of 
children by age is especially important. Indeed, insofar as one can speak of an 
“atom of hierarchy’” in highland society, it is embodied in the principle—re-
peated in proverbs—that elder brothers or sisters should speak for their juniors, 
and juniors, carry burdens for their seniors.25 Often this is treated as a reciprocal 
23. Women in general endlessly denounced males as lazy (kamo lahy), either individually 
or as a category. The reverse was never heard. I once asked a woman if the phrase 
“lazy woman” even existed, and she seemed rather taken aback. “That,” she said, 
“would be outrageous. It’s not even all that insulting to call a man lazy because all 
men are lazy really; in the case of a woman it would be a genuine insult.” 
24. Traditionally, modes of carrying are also strongly gendered: it’s often noted that 
women carry objects on the head or hips; men on the back or shoulders. 
25. Hence the well-known proverb, Manan-jandry, dia afak’olan’entina; manan-joky, 
dia afak’olan-teny: “if you have a younger sibling, then you’ll have no problems 
with carrying, if you have an older one, then you’ll have no problems with speech” 
(Cousins [1876] 1963: 37; Camboué 1909: 385; Houlder [1915] 1960: #1901). 
276 ON KINGS
obligation: a younger sibling (zandry) has the right to demand an elder (zoky) 
speak for them in court, or in a communal assembly, an elder sibling has the 
right to demand the younger one carry their bags. But it is also considered scan-
dalous for a zandry to speak for zoky, a zoky to carry a zandry’s things—at least, 
if the zandry is old enough to carry anything. 
In fact one could define the first stages of a child’s life through the gradual 
application of this principle. I observed this even in contemporary households. 
Infants were themselves carried by their mothers or older sisters, toddlers were 
often sent off on play-tasks of fetching and carrying things, greeted as heroes 
if they succeeded, or with indulgent laugher if they refused or wandered off; 
then, gradually, play-tasks turned into real ones, and as soon as a child is physi-
cally capable, she finds herself thrust into situations where the youngest sibling 
is, paradoxically, expected to carry the heaviest burdens. This happens earliest, 
again, for girls, and it’s not uncommon to see girls even of eight or nine toting 
baskets on their heads or infants on their backs. But the same thing eventually 
happens to boys. “By the age of about ten, children begin to help in the gardens 
and rice-fields by carrying burdens and packages. What is remarkable about 
the practice is that: it is to the youngest that the heaviest parts usually fall” 
(Camboué 1909: 385). 
The Malagasy word for “oppression” is, precisely, tsindriana, to be pressed 
down. And it makes a great deal of intuitive sense that it should, since one can 
only imagine the first deep feeling of injustice a child will have is at precisely 
this moment when being a child suddenly pivots from having no responsibili-
ties, to having the most onerous responsibilities of all (Graeber 2007a). 
This opposition between speech and carrying is crucial. It runs through all 
political affairs. Speech, particularly formal speech, is seen as essentially consti-
tuting political society. Public assemblies are called “kabary,” which is also the 
word for formal rhetoric. On the level of the kingdom, the opposition between 
speaking and carrying was even further elaborated because speaking was paired 
with making, what we’d call “production,” and the carrying of burdens became 
instead the general figure for any sort of labor that, rather than being creative, 
was about nurturing, sustaining, and maintaining things.26 
26. Many of the paragraphs that follow in this section are adapted from an essay called 
“Oppression” (Graeber 2007c). Normally I don’t like to reproduce whole paragraphs 
of my own work, but in this case it seems justified since as far as I can make out the 
article has never been cited by anyone, and I have no reason to believe that even 
many scholars of Madagascar have ever read it.
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* * *
Highland kingdoms were organized around a figure called the Andriana. The 
word, as I’ve mentioned, literally means sovereign, or king. But as much as a 
quarter or third of the free population in the heartland of the kingdom were 
also called andriana, either because they could claim descent from the royal 
line, or because their ancestors had been ennobled because of some outstanding 
service to royalty. By the end of the eighteenth century, these andriana were 
divided into seven ranked orders. Other free subjects were referred to as hova, 
or “commoners.” Like the lesser andriana, hova were divided into ancestries 
(called foko, or firenena), each with their own ancestral lands. While all but the 
very most exalted andriana were expected to do some form of royal service, or 
fanompoana, hova were defined first and foremost as those who performed work 
in the service of the king.27 Slaves were those who did not do so. Slaves served 
their masters. In fact, royal service was considered the primary mark of free 
status within the kingdom: legally, if a slave could demonstrate that he or she 
had been part of a royal work crew, especially if it was engaged in something in-
timate like clearing ground for a royal palace, then that was considered grounds 
for manumission in itself.
Almost everyone who writes about the Merina kingdom emphasizes the 
importance of fanompoana, since it really was the central organizing principle 
of just about everything: the political system, the economic system, the status 
system as well. The rank and character of any given ancestry was determined 
by the kind of service it traditionally performed for the royal family. These tra-
ditional tasks were especially important because, while in theory a local king 
could demand most anything from his subjects, evidence suggests that—at least 
before the nineteenth century—a ruler’s ability to extract goods and services 
from anyone who did not happen to live in the immediate vicinity of a royal 
residence was actually quite limited. Therefore, those services they did receive 
revolved largely around these traditional emblematic tasks, especially those in-
volved in building and rebuilding royal houses and royal tombs, or participating 
in great public ceremonies like the circumcision of royal children or the annual 
27. There were other groups, such as the Mainty Enin-Dreny, who are often referred to 
in European sources as “royal slaves,” but are actually specialized groups of warriors 
or retainers with a direct relationship to royalty. The Manendy, whom we have 
already encountered, and Manisotra, whom we shall meet in the next section, were 
among their numbers. 
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New Year’s festival. It’s important to bear in mind that in terms of how they 
earned their livelihoods (again except for those who belonged to the very high-
est andriana orders), nearly all of these groups were almost exactly the same. All 
devoted most of their energies to growing rice in the summer, and to handicrafts 
or petty trading in the agricultural off-season. It was largely during these rituals 
that each was assigned some specific task or set of tasks as emblematic labor, 
which was seen as defining their place in the kingdom, and, hence, what kind 
of people they ultimately were.28 As a result, even though subjects might flee or 
mutiny if rounded up for certain tasks, like clearing out drainage ditches, the 
same subjects might come to physical blows over the privilege of carrying out 
other ones—say, being allowed to raise the central pillar in a royal house (Kus 
and Raharijaona 2000; cf. Clark 1896.)
So the next question is: How did emblematic labor define the nature of 
groups, and what did this say about the structure of the whole? Our material 
is uneven, but there’s enough of it to see that the speaking/carrying division is 
indeed reproduced on the level of the kingdom. Andriana were seen as monopo-
lizing powers of creativity. Andriana spoke first at council and were seen as being 
the masters of oratory and poetic speech (Callet 1908: 288; Rasamimanana and 
Razafindrazaka 1909; Andriamanantsiety 1975; Domenichini-Ramiaramanana 
1982). At the same time, andriana also fashioned beautiful objects. Hova con-
veyed things from place to place. 
What this meant in practice is that while carrying out work for the king, 
tasks involving what we would consider “productive” labor, the actual making, 
shaping, or fashioning of material objects, were almost invariably assigned to 
those at the very top of the social hierarchy. The building and repair of royal 
tombs might serve as an example—just because we happen to have a fairly 
good breakdown of how those tasks were divided up. Malagasy accounts writ-
ten in the 1860s divide the necessary work into two broad categories. The first 
involved the actual building of the tomb and manufacture of the objects that 
would be placed inside. These tasks were monopolized by andriana. The noble 
orders of the Andriamasinavalona and Andriantompokoindrindra, for example, 
provided the stonemasons and carpenters who made the tomb itself; the Andri-
anandranado provided the smiths who produced the huge silver coffin in which 
28. The notion of “emblematic labor” might be compared to Barth’s idea of ethnic 
“diacritics” (1969), where one or two apparently minor features can become the 
reference to distinguish otherwise overlapping or similar social groups. 
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kings were buried, and, later, who made the tomb’s tin roof; women of the An-
driamasinavalona and Zazamarolahy orders wove the mats that would be hung 
on the walls inside. Three others were expected to provide the silk shrouds used 
for wrapping the dead (Callet 1908: 260–62, 267, 1213–14). The second set of 
tasks were phrased as matters of “carrying”: especially, carrying off the tattered 
mats and other rubbish from inside a tomb when it was opened or repaired, and 
gathering and conveying baskets full of the red clay that was used to seal it af-
terward (ibid.: 164, 307, 490, 534–53, 812–31). These tasks were never assigned 
to andriana but always to hova, though, since having the right to do any sort of 
labor on royal tombs was considered an extraordinary privilege, generally only 
hova ancestries who had rendered some extraordinary favor to royalty.29
In such ritual moments, andriana were indeed defined as the kind of people 
who make things; commoners, as those who fetch and carry them. These em-
blematic tasks could influence what people were considered apt to do outside of 
royal ritual as well. The Andrianandranado, for instance, the order of andriana 
who provided the smiths for royal rituals, also produced all the gold and silver 
objects used at court; as a result, they eventually managed to win a formal mo-
nopoly on gold- and silverworking within the kingdom. During the nineteenth 
century, other branches of this same order provided almost all the tinsmiths and 
a large number of the skilled ironworkers in the capital. Similarly, the Andri-
anamboninolona, the andriana group with whom I did my own fieldwork, were 
famous as smiths, and ironwork was considered not just an art but something 
of a privilege; while there was no formal monopoly and little way to enforce 
one, if anyone not of andriana descent were to have taken it up, it would have 
been considered quite presumptuous (Graeber 2007a: 99–100, 338). Similarly, 
Andrianamboninolona women were seen as having a de facto monopoly of the 
weaving of native silk. But in other places such a monopoly did not exist. 
As a rule, andriana were seen as producers, makers; it was their basic identity 
in the structure of the kingdom. This fact was perhaps most clearly revealed 
when, in 1817, British envoys asked King Radama I to chose a handful of boys 
from his kingdom to study artisanal trades in England. Every young man the 
king chose was andriana.
29. I note that one group of former andriana, of somewhat ambiguous status, did have 
the special privilege of providing one silk shroud on such occasions. Another group 
of similar ambiguous status receiving the privilege of actually “carrying” the royal 
body to be placed in the tomb—the most exalted form of carrying, but still one not 
relegated to a group considered royal kin. 
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Royal service as principle of government
When we turn to actual governance, however, things get a bit more complicated. 
Like so many key Malagasy concepts, the notion of fanompoana was double-
edged. On the one hand, it refers to a meticulously graded system of ritual labor. 
On the other, it was the power of the sovereign to make anyone do anything at all. 
It’s not hard to imagine how this situation might have come about. As I 
mentioned, for much of highland history, rulers’ powers of compulsion were 
fairly limited. Archaeologists confirm that from the sixteenth century, most lived 
on hilltop or mountaintop fortresses—the higher the better, since in principle a 
king’s domains corresponded to everything he could see from the summit—and 
Maurice Bloch is probably right in adding that most were little more than suc-
cessful brigands, which, as we’ve seen, is exactly the situation to which unsuc-
cessful monarchs like Leiloza would be likely to revert (Bloch 1977; Dewar 
and Wright 1993: 448; D. Rasamuel 2007: 171–75). When a heavily armed 
band appears in a defenseless village its leader can, of course, make anyone do 
pretty much anything he orders them to do. What he can make them do when 
he is not actually physically present is quite another matter. The apparent con-
tradiction at the heart of fanompoana no doubt originates in this very practical 
circumstance. But that hardly explains why this pragmatic circumstance (being 
able to order anyone to do anything) should be preserved as a ritual principle—
indeed, as the definition of sovereignty itself. 
It’s also not hard to see how, if a ruler insists on building his house on the top 
of a mountain, the real challenge entailed in constructing and maintaining that 
house will not be finding skilled craftsmen to do the metalwork or carpentry, 
but rounding up people to do the really onerous work of dragging the building 
material, and, later, daily supplies of food, fuel, and water, up the slopes. This 
is what stories like that of Leiloza are clearly playing on. Given the cultural 
context in which all this took place—all those distinctions between speaking, 
making, carrying, which were already so important in the internal organization 
of families and households—it was hardly surprising that as a result, the pro-
duction of material objects, and particularly magnificent objects, should have 
ended up becoming a special privilege to be allotted to kin and loyal followers, 
while bearing burdens should be seen as both the essence of real work and, in a 
broader sense, the key to the creation and maintenance of actual human beings. 
The fact that the arbitrary will of the sovereign remained the core of fonom-
poana allowed the principle to regularly be put to new purposes, whenever sov-
ereigns were, in fact, in a position to impose their will in any sort of systematic 
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way. In the late eighteenth century, King Andrianampoinimerina used the prin-
ciple of fonompoana to marshal the manpower to reclaim thousands of hec-
tares of arable land from swamps; in the nineteenth, his son Radama, to compel 
children to attend mission schools and teenagers to serve in a newly created 
standing army. At the same time, wars of expansion brought thousands of slaves 
into the country. All of this meant that in practice, actual labor arrangements 
transformed quickly and dramatically. Still, in principle, fanompoana remained 
the basis of the monarchy. 
As I remarked, pretty much all observers made a point of emphasizing this. 
Here’s a typical comment from a late nineteenth-century missionary named 
Houlder. He begins by noting actual power was held by a commoner prime 
minister named Rainialarivony, who was secretly (not that secretly, since every-
body knew it) the consort of the queen:
Under the rule of this strong personality, as under that of his predecessors, no 
direct taxes, or next to none, were levied. In lieu thereof came fànompòana, or 
compulsory unrequited service, such as a slave renders to his master, a very oner-
ous duty and a very questionable exchange.
 Fànompòana is the genius of the native government, and seemed to be its 
principal end. The rulers were most concerned, not with the promotion of the 
prosperity and happiness of the people, but with the proper carrying out of ser-
vice to the Queen. The whole of a native’s life is taken up with doing fànompòana 
of one sort or another. . . . Anything in the nature of service was fànompòana, 
from the superintendence of all the arrangements of Her Majesty’s household 
down to the cleaning of her royal shoes; from presiding over the council of Gov-
ernment, or the running of a province, to the shouldering of a musket in war, and 
the carrying of a stone or lump of earth in peace. Any and every labor could be 
exacted at any and every time at her sovereign will and pleasure.
 Fànompòana for the government, whether civil or military, was bad 
enough; but it was made a hundred times worse by the fact that the system 
involved, not only a multitude of petty oppressions and exactions by the persons 
duly appointed to carry it out, but also the fànompòaning of one another. The 
theory was that the unrequited service was rendered to the Queen, but unfor-
tunately it did not end with service to royalty. The organization requisite for 
getting work done for Her Majesty was a system of subordination, by means of 
which any person who had authority over another could make that person work 
for his own benefit, and the inevitable result was that there was infinitely more 
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fànompòana done for private individuals than there was for the Government. 
The peoples’ lives were often made a perfect misery to them. (Houlder 1912: 
37–38)
Most accounts by foreign observers from the period contain similar observations 
about the simultaneous legitimacy, universality, and abusiveness of fanompoana. 
The principle that royal service was by its nature the unlimited personal 
power of the sovereign helps explain one of the more peculiar features of the 
archival record: the fact that, much though everyone who observed the func-
tioning of the kingdom talks incessantly about it, there is almost nothing about 
forced labor in the government’s administrative documents themselves. This 
never ceased to puzzle me while I was doing my own archival researches. Es-
pecially after the 1860s, almost everything has been preserved: the National 
Archives contains thousands and thousands of school and military registers, 
property censuses, court transcripts, grievances, audits, and administrative cor-
respondence of every sort. By compiling everything I could find concerning the 
area immediately surrounding Leiloza’s tomb in Ambohitrambo,30 I was able to 
reconstruct a quite detailed sense of how the government worked and what the 
day-to-day experience of governance was like. I was even able to reconstruct the 
organization of work brigades for fanompoana, since “100s” and “1000s”, that is, 
districts responsible for providing teams of either a hundred or a thousand male 
or female workers for royal labor projects, were the basic administrative units. 
The one thing on which I could get virtually no information was what those 
teams were actually made to do. It was all the more surprising since, for all the 
fact that, say, taxes were, as Houlder remarked, very light and largely symbolic, 
tax assessments and receipts were meticulously registered, down to the penny. 
But on labor duties there was virtually nothing written down at all.31
30. The region selected was, to be more precise, what was often referred to as “Eastern 
Imamo.” It included everything between the Ombifotsy and Onilahy Rivers, from 
Ambohibeloma in the north to Arivonimamo in the south. Ambohitrambo is its 
center. 
31. The only exceptions I could find in the region in question was one document 
concerning ironworking in a town called Vatolevy, and a couple of very late registers 
of people summoned for gold prospecting in the desperate days before the French 
invasion. The LL series in the royal archives does contain a few more detailed 
documents from other parts of the kingdom, but, again, there are far, far fewer of 
these than almost anything else.
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Apparently, then, the personalized, arbitrary nature of fanompoana was seen 
as so essential to its nature that to subsume it within the bureaucratic apparatus 
would have been seen as a violation of principle—so much so that even register-
ing who was sent on what task might be considered to compromise the absolute 
power of the queen. 
So, what did people actually do in service of the queen at the height of the 
nineteenth-century kingdom, and how did they conceive it? The question is 
important because, as foreign observers uniformly insisted, the sense of absolute 
legitimacy of fanompoana as personal service to the queen was really what held 
an otherwise corrupt and often brutal government together. Here, we have to 
turn, I think, from lists of what people had to do—which mostly don’t exist—to 
lists of what they didn’t have to do: that is, lists of tasks from which especially 
privileged groups were considered to be exempt. These do exist, and they give 
us a sense of what generic fanompoana was thought to consist of. The lists of 
exemptions, in fact, are strikingly uniform. They almost always include four pri-
mary sorts of work which always occur in the following order:
1. Manao Hazolava, or “dragging trees.” Since Imerina proper was largely de-
void of timber, it was necessary to form crews of workmen to drag the vast 
trunks needed for royal houses and palisades from the edge of eastern forests 
up to the center of the country. 
2. Mihady Tany, or “digging earth.” This mainly refers to leveling and the mak-
ing of embankments for royal building projects.
3. Manao Ari-Mainty, or “making charcoal.” In practice this mainly involved 
transporting baskets of charcoal produced in the eastern forests to the royal 
court in the capital, Antananarivo.
4. Mitondra Entan’Andriana, or “carrying royal baggage.” Most often this in-
volved transporting imports bound for the court from the port of Tamatave 
to the capital, but it could include any number of other transport duties, 
including literally carrying the palace baggage when the monarch was 
traveling.32 
32. This follows the same order as the list given by Standing (1887b: 358), though I left 
out Standing’s fifth category (building and maintaining roads and bridges) since it 
does not appear in any Malagasy-language account. For evocations of the standard 
list in nineteenth-century legal cases, see National Archives IIICC 365 f1:43–48 
(Tsimadilo, 1872), IIICC37 f2 (Ambohitrimanjaka, 1893); for standard lists of 
exemptions in the Tantara ny andriana, see Callet (1908: 411 [Andriamamilaza] 
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Once again, in every case, we have tasks which centered on dragging or carry-
ing heavy objects—usually, in baskets on one’s back or on one’s head. (“Digging 
earth” might seem a partial exception, but in fact anyone who has ever taken part 
in a large-scale digging project knows the lion’s share of the labor does in fact 
consist of hoisting and carrying away containers of displaced earth.) 
Now, obviously, to some degree the list is just reflective of material reali-
ties: nineteenth-century Imerina lacked beasts of burden or wheeled vehicles; 
even the now-ubiquitous ox-carts had not yet come into general use; it was also 
notoriously lacking in decent roads. As a result, just about everything had to 
be moved by human beings, and often with great difficulty. But there’s clearly 
more to it. Many of the more onerous tasks reported by foreign sources (tending 
royal cattle, repairing streets and bridges) are conspicuously absent from the list. 
Choosing these tasks as paradigms of fanompoana clearly drew on a sense that, 
in the kingdom as in the household, carrying things for someone else was em-
blematic of subordination. Indeed, in the case of royalty the principle was taken 
even further, because, as noted above, royals and officers of state did not walk on 
the ground for long distances; like foreign visitors, they were carried everywhere 
on palanquins borne on the shoulders of trained bearers. Royal bearers were 
themselves a class of relatively esteemed specialists, of a status similar to royal 
warriors (in the documents they are referred to as alinjinera, or “engineers.”) 
Important court figures, or local grandees, tended to keep specially trained bear-
ers of their own, who usually formed an elite corps amongst their slaves. 
Still, bearing the palanquin remains one of the most potent symbols of op-
pression (tsindriana again) throughout Madagascar: as on the East Coast, where 
memories of colonialism always seem to focus on the way local people were 
arbitrarily summoned to carry officials and missionaries and planters about.33 
and 545 [Antehiroka]); see also entries in the Firaketana (an early-twentieth-
century Malagasy encyclopedia) for Ambohibato, Ambohimalaza, Ambohimirimo, 
Andriana, and Antsahadinta, all of which provide variations on basically the same 
list. 
33. A later ethnographer working on the East Coast reports: 
   Countless people—both those who had lived through colonial times and those 
who were born well after it was over—told me about the palanquin. They never 
failed to mention the fact that people riding in them urinated and defecated 
on those below. Josef once commented, with his usual gentle, rueful smile, 
“They must have deemed us Betsimisaraka less than human to act that way.” 
Surely there is no more appropriate symbol of one people’s exploitation by 
another than the image of the colonial official carried on the very backs of 
285THE PEOPLE AS NURSEMAIDS OF THE KING
Thus the lists of exemptions will, when they come to the fourth, occasionally 
write, instead of “not to carry the royal baggage,” tsy milanja andriana: “not to 
have to carry the king” (e.g., Domenichini 1982: 15)—or, even more colorfully, 
tsy mibaby andriana, “not to have to carry the king ‘like an infant on one’s back” 
(Callet 1908: 545).34 And in nineteenth-century Imerina, at least, one of the 
most dramatic images of royal power—and one which, as we’ll see, made a 
profound impact on the popular imagination—was the rounding up of people 
to carry royal baggage when the monarch set out on a trip. This practice became 
particularly destructive during the reign of Queen Ranavalona I (1828–61); 
whenever the queen traveled abroad, she brought her entire court and enor-
mous quantities of furniture and provisions with her, so much so that she was 
obliged to send ahead agents at each town along the way calling up almost 
the entire able-bodied population as porters. This was a very ambivalent de-
mand, since carrying royal baggage was indeed personal service to the crown 
and hence seen as inherently legitimate; but the results were usually frequently 
lethal. Since those recruited were not fed, and the queen’s party tended to absorb 
all available provisions in the regions through which it passed, hundreds if not 
thousands would perish of a combination of exhaustion, hunger, and disease. 
“Never,” wrote the queen’s secretary Raombana, after one particularly disastrous 
trip to Manerinera, “was an excursion of pleasure more productive of famine 
and death” (n.d.: 488).
Reversals: The king as child
If there is an “atom of hierarchy” in highland culture, I have suggested, it is the 
dichotomy between the elder child, who speaks, and the younger one, who car-
ries. Children in fact learn about the nature of social rank largely through the 
experience of carrying burdens—of being literally “oppressed,” pressed down by 
the weight of objects balanced on their heads, or backs, or shoulders—objects 
which, significantly, belong to someone else (or, in the case of babies, since small 
the Betsimisaraka? Few indeed were the older men who had not suffered the 
indignity. (Cole 2001: 165)
34. Perhaps unsurprisingly since carrying the queen’s packages was considered, in a 
sense, almost the same as carrying the queen herself. William Ellis (1867: 256) 
notes that inhabitants of the capital were expected to doff their hats and bow down 
as anything belonging to the queen passed them on the street, much as they would 
if the queen’s own person were to pass.
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children are sometimes obliged to carry even smaller ones, actually are someone 
else). Carrying is thus both the paradigmatic form of work and emblematic of 
subordination; production, creation, is, in contrast, seen as much more similar to 
speaking, which can create social realities, ex nihilio. One might say, in phenom-
enological terms, that the experience of physical compression implied by being 
“pressed down” by something contrasts here with the ability to expand, or extend 
oneself into the world. 
The contrast can be observed in the most important forms of work within 
the household itself—when a man is working a forge or a woman weaving, 
it is generally the most senior person who actually fashions the object, while 
younger ones scurry back and forth carrying supplies—and in formal settings 
(feasts, funerals, etc.) it is meticulously applied, as elders speak first, and it is 
often considered strictly taboo for them to so much as pass a plate to their jun-
iors. It recurs on the level of the kingdom: when the ruler assembled his people 
to pass down rulings or ask their permission to begin some project (say, drag-
ging trees to make a new palace), it was the representatives of andriana orders 
who had the privilege of speaking first (Rasamimanana and Razafindrazaka 
1909: 31).35 
So far, these arrangements seem simple enough. But we’ve already seen 
hints—in the image of the mother carrying her baby, in the peculiar concept of 
the people carrying the sovereign, like a baby—that there might be something 
more subtle going on. That as with the spirit mediums, at a certain point, sub-
ordination itself was seen as “turning” into a kind of covert power. And indeed, 
just as in the famadihana and possession rituals mentioned earlier, the royal ritu-
als also contained at least a potential element of reversal. The ritual emphasis on 
the people’s support for the king shaded into the notion that the king was him-
self a dependent child cared for by the people. Much like a toddler, kings were 
assumed to be egocentric, irresponsible, petulant, given to destructive tantrums, 
certainly not entirely in control of themselves; and thus it was sometimes the 
responsibility of their subjects to chasten or admonish them. Some nineteenth-
century texts state the matter outright. Here is a quote from the Tantara ny 
andriana about the immediate family of the king:
35. In doing so, they represented the kingdom, in the same way an elder does his junior 
(Callet 1908: 288). Cousins (1873, [1876] 1963) provides samples of the sort of 
kabary made on such occasions.
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The Royal Family are like infants nurtured by their parents. And it’s just like 
taking care of children; this is why they’re referred to as “Children and Descend-
ants.” And it’s the people who nurse, nourish, and support—and by doing so, 
honor —the Royal Family. (Callet 1908: 364)36
The verb here translated “nurture” is again mitaiza, which literally means “to 
nurse.” 
Let me take this step by step. 
Even in ordinary usage, “carrying” has a double meaning. The verb mitondra 
means not only “to bring” or “to carry,” but also “to lead.” Hence one can say a 
person arrived “carrying a shovel” or “leading a detachment of a hundred sol-
diers”: it’s exactly the same word. Authority itself can be spoken of as a burden, 
so that one “carries” a certain responsibility or public office; active governance 
is a matter of “carrying the people” (mitondra vahoaka), and the most common 
word for governance is in fact an abstract noun, fitondrana, which might here 
best be translated as “the manner of carrying.” This is also the word being used 
in the quote above for “taking care of ” children—fitondrana, literally how one 
carries them around.
These idioms, too, go back to relations of seniority in the family. In the 
household, the duties one owes to one’s elders are often framed in terms of 
a kind of reciprocity. Let’s return here to the woman with the baby on her 
back, which I’ve suggested is the primordial figure for labor. In speaking of 
child-rearing, carrying children was often invoked as a paradigmatic image 
that summed up all the work of caring for, feeding, clothing, cleaning, teach-
ing, and attending to a child’s needs which parents—and of course particularly 
mothers—were acknowledged to provide. Obligations of support which adult 
children later owe to their parents and ancestors, in turn, could be collectively 
referred to as valim-babena: “the answer for having been carried on the back.” 
36. Original Malagasy: “ny Havanandriana no toy ny zaza taizainy ny raiamandreny, 
dia tahaky ny fitondrana ny zana’ny hiany, dia atao ny hoe Zanak’amam-para; ary 
koa ny ambaniandro no mitaiza sy mamelona sy manampy ka manome voninahitra 
ny Havanandriana.” Note here the term for “nurture” is literally “nurse,” but the 
word for “taking care of ” is literally “carrying.” Compare the same collection, “Fa 
ny vahoaka no mitaiza ny andriana, ary ny andriana koa sady mitondra no mandidy ny 
vahoaka rehetra” [“for it’s the people who nurture the king, and the king, too, both 
carries and commands the whole people”] (Callet 1908: 366). As in all subsequent 
cited Malagasy text, the translation into English is my own.
288 ON KINGS
Alternately, they can be called loloha or lolohavina, “things carried on one’s head” 
(and it’s important to remember here that carrying on the head was considered 
paradigmatic of women’s work in particular; men carried packages and similar 
burdens instead on their backs and shoulders). The term lolohavina was used 
as way of referring to any responsibility to support others, but particularly the 
obligation to maintain ancestral tombs, and provide the ancestors within with 
cloth and other gifts at famadihana (during which they were, as noted, symboli-
cally rendered children once again).37 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, some nineteenth-century documents use the term 
filolohavina, “things carried on the head,” to refer both to one’s responsibilities 
to one’s ancestors, and to one’s responsibilities to provide taxes and labor to the 
state. 
There’s kind of a continuum here from carrying as pure subordination, to 
carrying as nurture, to carrying as outright authority. It’s the second term, the 
woman with the baby on her back, that marks the point of transition between 
the other two. She is precisely the pivot around which one flips over, and turns 
into its opposite.
I would argue that the exact same thing happens in royal ritual. If one re-
turns to the most prestigious ceremonial moments of fanompoana, where labor 
becomes most emblematic, and different ancestries defined their place in the 
kingdom as a whole, one finds these are also the moments where the idiom of 
nursing or nurturing (taiza) is most likely to be evoked. This is true above all in 
first-fruits ceremonies (santatra), where various representatives of the kingdom’s 
many ancestries “carried” not just the first of the rice crop:
Once the first rice harvest is brought in, then the people present the first-fruits 
to the Andriana, each variety of rice crop, and it’s only once they have done so 
that the people can eat of it. . . . This was the custom from olden times: to honor 
him, as he is the child nursed by the people, as he is the master (tompo) of the 
land and the kingdom.38
37. Compare Cole (2001:214-15) and Lambek (2002) for parallels among the 
Betsimisaraka and Sakalava, respectively. 
38. “Dia manome santa-bary ny andriana ny vahoaka, isan-karazana ny mamboly vari-
aloha, vao izay no maka ho hanina. Raha tsy ny andriana no manantatra, dia tsy mahazo 
homana ny vahoaka . . .. izany no fomba fanao hatr’ izay hatr’ izay: fanajana azy fa izy 
no zanaka taizany ny ambanilanitra, fa izy no Tompo ny tany sy ny fanjakana” (Callet 
1908: 61–62).
289THE PEOPLE AS NURSEMAIDS OF THE KING
As in most Austronesian societies, sacrificial ritual is a way of invoking the gods’ 
power only to banish it again; most often, in order to lift some taboo those gods 
might otherwise impose. First-fruits are a variation: in principle, the entire crop 
could be said to belong to the gods (because the gods caused it to grow) or the 
king (because he owns everything). By accepting a small symbolic sample, the 
true owner (tompo) releases his claim over the rest. 
This ritual, too, is modeled on household practice, where the eldest mem-
ber of the family receives the same santa-bary from the family’s lands after the 
harvest, and must taste it before anyone else is allowed to eat. Now, the process 
of the “ripening” and harvest of the rice crop is spoken of in much the same 
terms as the gestation and birth of infants, and the ceremony of first-fruits, as 
several of my own informants emphasized, is identical in form to an infant’s 
first haircut, conducted when he or she is three to six months old (Graeber 
2007a: 284–85; cf. Standing 1887a: 35–37; Camboué 1907: 988; Molet 1976: 
37–39). This is the ceremony that marks the child’s debut as an autonomous 
social being (it’s sometimes the occasion for giving a child a name). Like the 
rice, the clipped hair is cooked with milk and honey, though while the rice is 
first eaten by the head of the household, who then releases the remainder of the 
harvest to everyone else, the hair is placed in a banana-leaf spoon and sampled 
by everyone, particularly young women, since it is said to convey fertility. In the 
case of the rice, then, a release of ancestral authority; in the case of the haircut, 
a general distribution of human vitality.39 Yet each implies the other, and in the 
case of the royal santatra, the two are, at least rhetorically, combined. Much as in 
the famadihana, where ancestors were turned into infants so as to free the living 
from their (often petulant, arbitrary) demands, here the monarch, “owner” of the 
land and the kingdom, is presented with the product of those lands in a way that 
39. There are other parallels. The bearers of first-fruits, for instance, had to be velond-
rai-aman-dreny, that is, men and women both of whose parents were still alive. This 
is true also of those who conduct the haircut ritual (fanala volon-jaza). The ceremony 
is also a sort of foreshadowing of the circumcision ritual to be conducted perhaps 
two or three years later, when another part of the child is removed, though in this 
case, the precipice should be swallowed instead by the child’s mother’s’ brother. 
Finally, it is probably relevant that this is a presentation of vary aloha, that is, of a 
double-cropping system said to have been developed by rulers who used fanompoana 
to drain the swamps surrounding the capital, and thus from fields the monarch 
would have laid particular claim to. In this context, Andrianampoinimerina was said 
to have declared, “me and the rice are the same” (izaho sy ny vary dia mitovy, Callet 
1908: 746).
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transforms him into a dependent child, helpless but for the nurturant support 
of the kingdom’s inhabitants. 
Reflections on the king as toddler
How, then, do we think about this notion of the king as child nurtured by the 
people? 
In much of Madagascar, kings typically represent themselves as foreigners: 
they trace their genealogies to far-away kingdoms, exotic half-forgotten lands 
like Mangalore or Mecca. As Marshall Sahlins (1981b, 2008) has demonstrated, 
this circumstance is not at all unusual. Most kings insist they come from some-
place other than the lands they rule. In myth, and also ritual, the stranger-king 
scenario, as Sahlins describes it, follows a fairly predictable narrative sequence: 
the king first arrives from far away as a kind of holy terror, an alien, outrageous 
power, whose absolute vitality is signified by a tendency to engage in arbitrary 
acts of violence. But in conquering his people, he is also, subtly, conquered by 
them; often this culminates in his marriage to a daughter of the people of the 
land, who thus become the closest thing he has to parents; in the process, he is 
surrounded, incorporated, domesticated, even symbolically killed and reborn as 
a child of his people.40 
Might something like this be happening here? It’s tempting to make the 
connection. But there’s a problem: Merina sovereigns didn’t really represent 
themselves that way. In other parts of Madagascar, royal lineages certainly did. 
They tended to see themselves as conquering outsiders, imposing their domin-
ion on an autochthonous population who were seen as the true “owners of the 
land” (tompon’tany)—and who therefore, nonetheless, maintained certain crucial 
ritual privileges, such as the right to nominate or install the king. While there 
are traces of such arrangements early in Merina history, by the late eighteenth 
century, at least, traces were all that remained. Official histories instead repre-
sented the entire Merina population, andriana and hova alike, as foreign in-
vaders, and the country’s true aboriginal inhabitants, the Vazimba, as elf-like 
40. Hence in the original essay, about Fiji, Sahlins notes “the usage that long puzzled 
Hocart, that the Fijian nobility are styled ‘child chiefs’ (gone turaga), while the 
native owners of the land are the ‘‘elders’ (qase). The relation is one of offspring to 
ancestor, as established by the gift of the woman” (1981b: 119). Kings in Benin were 
also addressed as “child” (Bradbury 1973: 75). No doubt other examples could be 
compiled.
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primitives who had been defeated and driven from the country. Merina kings 
claimed absolute command of everything, including all land and labor, within 
their kingdoms (Fugelstad 1982). 
Still, one could say that the image of the king as child—and particularly the 
king as naughty child, like Leiloza—takes the two moments of the stranger-
king story—the king-as-extramoral-outsider and king-as-tamed-by-the-peo-
ple—and effectively fuses them together. 
In my essay on the divine kingship of the Shilluk (chapter 2, this volume), 
I suggested a slightly different way these same pieces often come together. One 
can also pluck two more general principles out of this scenario that are always 
simultaneously present, and in constant mutual tension. I referred to these as di-
vine and sacred kingship. The first applies not so much when kings are taken to 
be gods (this happens surprisingly rarely), but rather when they act like gods—
that is, with arbitrary impunity. Divine kingship corresponds to sovereignty in 
Carl Schmitt’s sense in Political theology ([1922] 2005); it is something that 
stands entirely outside the legal order, and can therefore, constitute it. Sacred 
kingship is very different. To be “sacred” is, as Durkheim long ago recognized, 
drawing on the logic of Polynesian taboo, to be “set apart,” and what setting the 
king apart as a sacred being always means in practice is surrounding him with 
such an elaborate system of restrictions, protocols, and taboos (“not to touch the 
earth, not to see the sun”) that it becomes extremely difficult for a sovereign to 
exercise that arbitrary divine power except in very carefully circumscribed ways. 
In fact—and this is true particularly in nonbureaucratized kingdoms—the more 
elaborate the court ceremonial, the less effective personal power the monarch 
was likely to wield. 
What I am suggesting here is that the pomp and protocol that surround 
powerful figures are rarely, if ever, the creations of those powerful figures them-
selves—any more than King Tugo, sometimes credited with having “invented” 
the Shilluk sacred kingship, is himself likely to have simply decided one day that 
it would be a neat idea to create a body of armed executioners with the power 
to kill him whenever his senior wives decided he was no longer capable of ade-
quate sexual performance. Deference is always double-edged. On the one hand, 
violent men invariably demand “respect,” a certain kind of ritual deference; on 
the other, the more extreme forms of such respect can easily become ways of 
isolating and controlling such violent men. This continues to be true even if a 
monarch remains in other respects a despot, capable of ordering executions and 
similar acts of spectacular cruelty or destructiveness at whim: first of all, because 
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all kings worthy of the name are to a certain degree despotic, “sovereignty” and 
“despotism” being at root the same thing; and, secondly, because the tension 
between the divine and sacred aspects of kingship is always to some degree con-
stitutive of kingship itself. True, it is possible for ritualization to overwhelm and 
entirely hollow out the crown, leaving it a purely ceremonial or constitutional 
monarchy. But the opposite cannot really happen. Even in the case of Leiloza, 
who descended from monarch to something very like a simple bandit, his son’s 
need to establish himself as something more than just the son of a bandit com-
pelled him to quickly pass most of his power to someone else. 
One might well argue that both the classic stranger-king narrative and the 
baby-king image are two different ways of elucidating this fundamental tension. 
Within the Merina kingdom, that tension was above all summed up in 
the phrase mpitaiza andriana, literally, the “nursemaids of the king.” All major 
royal aides and advisors—that is, those who created and maintained that court 
ceremonial—were called this. The term was applied to the tandapa, or palace at-
tendants (Cousins [1876] 1963: 50; André 1899: 55–56 n. 1; Callet 1908: 324, 
361, 500, 634, 832, 895, 904, 1053, 1063, 1084, 1187, 1100; Soury-Lavergne and 
de la Devéze 1913: 312), to royal councilors (Callet 1908: 425, 691, 832, 943, 
962, 1028–29, 1006, 1146), and to the diviners and keepers of the charms that 
protected the kingdom ( Jully 1899a: 325; Callet 1908: 19, 165, 440; Domeni-
chini 1977),41 as well as to the retainers assigned to support various lesser lords 
assigned to menakely, or local estates (Callet 1908: 148, 439, 492, 1043)—these 
latter were said to “nurse” or “nurture” these children of the royal line in the 
same way as the people did the king himself.42 The term could thus be applied 
either to those who fed, cared for, and physically sustained the king, or to those 
41. This one is a little more complicated, as the mpitahiry sampy, or keepers of such 
guardian “palladia” (Berg 1979), were the mpitaiza not only of the king but also of 
the sampy themselves (Callet 1908: 188, 194–97, 203, 213, 222, 227). (Sampy was 
the name given to the major political charms that protected larger groups, up to and 
including the kingdom.) Finally, insofar as the charms were also used to heal, one 
could also speak of the charm as “nurturing” its patients, much as one would now 
(ibid.: 231). 
42. So, for instance, the very first andriana to receive a menakely were the 
Andriantompokoindrindra, and they were assigned a lineage of attendants, the 
Zafitsimaito, who are alternately described as their mpitaiza (ibid.: 149) or “those 
who carry their bags” (ibid.: 1211). The subjects of those minor lords could also be 
said to mitaiza them, in much the same way as the subjects of a king. I could find 
only one reference, though, to slaves who mitaiza their adult owners (ibid.: 189).
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who might be said to provide for the king’s ongoing education: reminding him 
of his duties and responsibilities, guiding him toward appropriate conduct.43 
Neither were these simply metaphors. In the histories, mpitaiza regularly speak 
to kings using terms of address—notably the informal second person, ialahy 
or leiretsy—which would be utterly scandalous if directed at anyone of higher 
status in any other context (there is no precise English equivalent, but it would 
be roughly analogous to addressing the king as “boy”44)—and kings respond 
with the terms of address a child would use for a father, guardian, or elder: 
ikiaky or idada. 
These same mpitaiza andriana, of course, were those responsible for the ac-
tual creation of royal ritual as well. 
* * *
Earlier, I observed that royal households always stand at the pinnacle of an 
elaborate system of ritual labor. They also tend to be somewhat different from 
the households that make up the base of the kingdom, because while in ordinary 
households, the creation and sustenance of people was inextricably bound up 
in the creation and maintenance of things, royal households, for the most part, 
produced only people. To this we can add: but they did not produce those people 
43. About the only scholarly source that discusses the use of the term is a footnote in 
Bakoly Domenichini-Ramiaramanana’s book on Merina court poetry (1982:406 
n. 148), which is worth quoting in full. “The term ‘mpitaiza’ which is commonly 
translated ‘intimate councilor’ when it appears in the phrase ‘mpitaiza andriana’ 
(mpitaiza of a prince), currently designates a nurse-maid, governess (male or 
female), curer (male or female), priest or priestess who assures moral guidance, and 
seems to indicate that the king was in some sense an eternal minor simply insofar 
as he was andriana” (my translation from the French). This seems exactly right. Yet 
this profound insight into the nature of Merina kingship was not further pursued, 
as far as I’m aware, either by the author or by anyone else. Standard histories of 
the kingdom continue to follow Édouard Ralaimihoatra (1969: 164–65), who 
claims that the title of mpitaiza andriana was invented in the 1830s to deal with 
the unprecedented situation of having a woman on the throne. Hence the entire 
phenomenon has somehow been excluded from discussions of Malagasy kingship: 
for example, of the seventeen essays brought together in the volume Les souverains 
de Madagascar (Raison-Jourde 1983c), not one makes any mention of mpitaiza 
andriana at all.
44. To get a sense of how shocking this would ordinarily be, in my experience, men 
never used terms like that even to men of equal age or status unless they were drunk 
and trying to start a fight. 
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all by themselves. In a larger sense—and this is clearly the case here—the or-
ganization of kingdom-wide ritual labor was itself directed not just toward the 
material provisioning of royal households, but also toward the active shaping of 
those offspring royal families produced. Everyone, in their own way, contributed 
to the raising of royal children, not just in terms of feeding and clothing them, 
but even in the broader sense of bringing them to full maturity: certain groups 
carried out the circumcision rituals for princes, others were assigned to play 
with princesses, and so on. Yet as a paradoxical result of the enormous focus 
on the task of raising royal children, that task would always remain incomplete. 
Kings and queens never quite grew up and never quite became autonomous. 
They were, in a sense, permanent toddlers. This was both the key to their le-
gitimacy—they were cherished, their health and well-being were the common 
project of the Ambaniandro, the common people or “under the day”—but also 
an obvious limit to the exercise of power, since while childish displays of petu-
lance were only to be expected, as we shall see, the framing of the king as child 
allowed everyone, in principle, to step in and impose gentle but firm maternal 
discipline when the monarch was seen to have overstepped his bounds.45 
What I am suggesting is that this is precisely the idiom through which the 
relation between divine and sacred kingship here plays itself out. The idiom of 
the king as dependent child provides a framework through which the arbitrari-
ness of power, even the arbitrary violence of individual kings—and there was 
quite a bit of that in Merina history—not only makes sense, but can itself be-
come a token of legitimacy, if one that can also be easily contested. 
The ritual system seen from the perspective of the child-king
So, why were Merina kings represented as children?
One obvious reason was that, for all they might be occasionally be hailed as 
“fathers of the kingdom,” they ruled because they were children of someone else. 
A king is a king because his ancestors were kings. Hence the constant invoca-
tion, at every ritual event, of the names of the royal ancestors. In the case of 
commoners, this situation was reversed: their importance for the kingdom was 
45. Similarly, there is a proverb everyone knows, ny marary no andriana, “sick people 
are kings,” which suggests the same logic: sick people are the objects of constant 
nurturant attention, must be indulged, but are at the same time helplessly dependent 
on their carers. It’s no coincidence that curers can, in certain contexts, also be known 
as mpitaiza. 
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the fact that they produced and fostered children themselves. This was brought 
home most clearly in naming practices. Queen Ranavalona I, during her reign, 
was known as Rabodon’Andrianampoinimerina—literally, “King Andrianam-
poinimerina’s little girl.” Her son, who became Radama II, is always referred 
to in official texts as RakotondRadama, which in turn means “Radama I’s little 
boy.” These names continued in use even after the rulers themselves became 
quite advanced in years. Queen Ravanavalona was still being called “the little 
girl” when she was eighty. Commoners, in contrast, tended as soon as they had 
offspring to name themselves after their children, adopting teknonyms such as 
“Rainikoto” (father of Koto) or Renibe (mother of Be).46 
Similar naming practices have been documented elsewhere in the Austro-
nesian world (e.g., Geertz and Geertz 1964; Brewer 1981; Schrauwers 2004). 
It seems a common side-effect of the tendency of aristocratic lines to monopo-
lize genealogies: once the royal line becomes the core organizing principle of 
the kingdom, and local ancestors become unimportant, then only nobles are, 
properly speaking, descendants. Certainly this came to be the case in Imerina, 
where the ritual advisors of King Andrianampoinimerina, who reunified the 
kingdom after its period of civil wars and is generally regarded as the founder 
of the Merina state, first laid out the kingdom-wide arrangement of “twelve 
sacred mountains,” each with its royal ancestral tomb of one of the “twelve who 
reigned”—the great royal ancestors—which meant the memory of any local 
royal ancestor who was not integrated into the new system became simply ir-
relevant, for ritual purposes. (This is, for instance, why no one remembers the 
kings of Imamo buried in Fondanitra today. They didn’t make it into the new 
system, so no one had any reason to remember them.) 
The keepers of these royal tombs were, paradoxically, a group of men called 
the velond-rai-aman-dreny, “Those Whose Mothers and Fathers Are Still Liv-
ing,” whose task it was to present various kinds of santatra, or “first-fruits,” at 
royal ceremonies. From the late eighteenth century, they were drawn from eight 
key ancestries, and these were considered to have the very highest and most 
exalted position in the great system of royal service that anyone could possibly 
46. In the nineteenth century, virtually every hova official who served in the government 
bore such a teknonym. Since it seems unlikely that each one had children, one 
has to assume that some had adopted or fostered children just to be able to do 
so. Monarchs, on the other hand, only became defined as parents on their deaths: 
Ranavalona I, known in her lifetime as “King Andrianampoinimerina’s little girl,” 
became Ranavalonareniny, “Ranavalona the Mother,” afterwards. 
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have. These santatra were not limited to rice. Almost any object dedicated dur-
ing a ritual was considered santatra. Santatra of one sort or another had to be 
brought for every major action or project the monarch undertook, from the 
building of a new cattle pen to a military expedition, every time the monarch 
appeared in public, and, crucially, at every major ritual marking the life-course 
of royal offspring: birth, first haircut, circumcision, marriage, and so on. Hence 
Those Whose Mothers and Fathers Are Still Living were sometimes said to 
“care for (mitaiza) the king when living, and bury him when dead” (Callet 1908: 
260, 1185). 
Whereas the cult of ancestors focused on the great kings of the past, first-
fruits were all about creating something new. Technically, all this followed from 
the logic of Malagasy astrology.47 As our sources emphasize, all these rituals 
were created by court astrologers and followed the basic astrological princi-
ple that, just as the fate of a child is determined by the hour of its birth, so 
is the success or failure of any undertaking determined by the moment of its 
beginning. Still, destinies are never inexorable. Hence, much of the Malagasy 
astrologer’s art, then as now, consisted of “adjusting” or “repairing” destinies 
(manamboatra vintana), through the assembling, manipulation, preservation, or 
disposal of various symbolically potent objects: in this case, animals for sacri-
fice (not just oxen but eels, or forest animals like hedgehogs), rare woods and 
plants, incense, honey from a living hive, baskets, stones, and even the unbroken 
coins presented to the sovereign. These are the objects brought (literally “car-
ried”) by Those Whose Fathers and Mothers Are Still Living, and the Tantara 
provides us with elaborate lists of them. So, despite the fact that these are the 
same men and women who take care of the royal tombs, their principal work is 
not commemorating the past, but preparing the way for the future. Insofar as 
royal ancestors are relevant to these rituals, they, too, rather than the ancestors 
in famadihana nowadays (who are locked back in the tomb after the ritual), are 
something to be propitiated and then shunted off to someplace safe where they 
cannot interfere with everyday human affairs. As the French colonial ethnog-
rapher Charles Renel (1920: 157–58) observed when speaking of santatra: the 
ancestral order being seen as fixed, the creation of anything new was always a 
47. There is a traditional system of astrological calculation common to the island, which 
is based on the Arabic lunar calendar; at one time, knowledge of it was a monopoly 
of certain in-marrying groups of Muslim immigrants and the Merina court 
employed some of these, but by this time it had also been more widely popularized. 
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certain sense an act of defiance, and, therefore, seen as requiring an act of propi-
tiation directed at the ancestors themselves. This is presumably why calling such 
actions “first-fruits” made sense to begin with: in each case, there is a similar 
logic of appealing to authorities (whether king or ancestors) to lift some taboo 
or restriction they could otherwise impose, and in doing so, subtly, banishing 
them, at least temporarily. 
* * *
All this matters because presentation of santatra was the apogee of the system 
of ritual labor as a whole. First-fruits were presented either at moments when 
subjects performed some great project for the king, or when royal children were 
being shaped into proper adults. The obvious implication is that these two mo-
ments were in some a sense equivalent—that royal service, even if it involves 
dragging trunks or making charcoal, extends the principle of caring labor for 
the royal household to the population at large, infantilizing the king at pre-
cisely the point where the royal will was, by definition, absolutely sovereign and 
unconditional. 
It might be helpful to turn again here to the above-quoted passage about the 
presentation of first-fruits of the rice harvest to the sovereign. In fact it occurs 
at the very end of the exposition on santatra in general in the Tantara (Callet 
1908: 48–61), as if this is what everything is leading up to. Recall the language: 
“This was the custom from olden times: to honor him, as he is the child nur-
tured by the people, as he is the master (tompo) of the land and the kingdom.” 
Tompo means both “owner” and “master.” It refers not only to command of land 
or other resources, but also to command over others’ labor. It’s also the root of 
fanompoana, which literally means “the action of making someone else an owner 
or a master.” So even the king’s mastery of his people, or ownership of the land, 
is not an intrinsic quality. The people make him the master and owner by doing 
whatever he says.48 What’s more, that willfulness, the tendency of the master 
to give orders, the pure arbitrariness of sovereign power, is also what reduces 
the sovereign to a permanent minor, and hence a cherished object of devotion. 
48. In a similar way, the misconception that hasina “flows” can largely be traced back to 
the existence of the abstract noun fanasinana, from the verb manasina, an identical 
construction which means to “the action of causing someone or something to have 
hasina”—for instance, by making offerings or observing taboos (cf. Graeber 2007a: 
37–38). 
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As representatives of Queen Ranavalona I’s subjects announced to her in one 
famous speech, spoken on the occasion of her assembling her people for fanom-
poana, royal service was a matter of performing “whatever your heart desires, 
whatever sweetens your belly, whatever you wish to do with us, your playthings” 
(Cousins 1873: 42).49 She was the sovereign with the power to do with her 
subjects what she would. But by that same token she was ultimately a beloved, 
but helpless, dependent child—and thus not fully responsible for her actions, 
because in a certain sense, like any child, she stood outside the adult moral or-
der. If a toddler breaks the teapot, you might get angry, but you can’t really say 
it was “wrong” of her to do so. Similarly, since it was the sovereign’s right to do 
anything she liked, she could be “naughty,” but she couldn’t actually be wrong.
POPULAR CONTESTATION, WOMEN’S REBELLIONS, AND THE 
RETURN OF THE ANCESTRAL DEAD
At this point, I think, it is possible to pull the threads of this essay together. 
The reader will recall that I began by describing how, after the abolition of the 
monarchy in 1895, almost all past kings were immediately recast in the popular 
imagination as oppressive and unjust, even as spoiled children, and suggesting 
that this apparent overnight transformation couldn’t really have come out of 
nowhere. At this point, we can certainly understand where the notion of the 
king as child was coming from. It’s the linchpin of the system of ritual labor on 
which the kingdom was founded. The question, instead, is how is it that royal 
immaturity came to be considered objectionable, and not endearing. 
The other question is why the uneasiness with royal power first manifested 
itself in a broad rejection of male kings in favor of female ones. Why did kings 
come to be viewed like the contemporary image of Leiloza, as self-indulgent 
child-princes endlessly making up oppressive new tasks for their subjects, while 
even notoriously violent and tyrannical female sovereigns like Ranavalona con-
tinued to inspire the devotion of their subjects? 
It might not be possible to answer this last question definitively, but if we 
reread Merina history through the terms that have been laid out so far in this 
essay, it becomes a lot easier to understand. If nothing else, the story begins to 
49. “Fa izay sitrakv ny fonao sy mamin’ ny kibonao sy tianao hatao aminay amin’ ny 
filalaovana.” 
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look very different to the received official history. Because, in fact, at just about 
every point in that history where one finds an acute crisis of royal authority, 
one also finds these same themes cropping up: the childishness of displays of 
arbitrary royal power; the people as nursemaids, or as embodiments or avatars 
or royal ancestors, or both. 
* * *
Now, it’s easy enough to see how the notion of the people as nursemaids could be-
come a language of political protest. And indeed it regularly did. Here’s a speech 
reported to have been made by representatives of the town of Alasora, appealing 
to King Andrianampoinimerina to remove the local lords (tompomenakely) who 
had been appointed to rule over them:
Children are sweet, but when they bite the breast, they must be pushed away. . . . 
Don’t give us any more children to take care of, but if you please, let this become 
land directly under your own control. Alasora is a place of abundance, but those 
who’ve wound up here in the past have revealed the evil of their ways; let us no 
longer take care of them, because you have naughty children, and we the people 
have been fooled. (Callet 1908: 1043)50
Oral traditions suggest that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
nature and extent of royal power were under constant negotiation. While in 
principle, there were no limits at all on what a king might do, and kings did, 
often, act quite arbitrarily, the mpitaiza andriana had the power to admonish, 
chasten, or even mobilize the people to remove them. This was particularly true 
of royal councilors, who at the time acted as the principal representatives of 
the commoner population (Rafamantanantsoa-Zafimahery 1966). The first re-
cord we have of a ruler actually being deposed was that of a monarch named 
50. “Mamy ny zanaka: raha manaikitra ny nono, tsy maintsy akifika. . . . Aza omen-jaza 
hotaizanay; aoka ho menabe io raha tianao; fa tany manana zina Alasora, ka izay 
mivilivily eo miseho ny ratsy atao; ary aoka izahay mba tsy hitaiza intsony, fa maditra 
anaka hianao, koa izahay vahoaka no voafitaka.” The distinction here is between 
menakely (land granted by the king for the support of some lesser andriana) and 
menabe (land that provided all its taxes and services directly to the king.) It was 
commonplace to refer to these lesser lords both as “children” of the king, and as 
“children nursed by” the population of their menakely.
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Rajakatsitakatrandriana (c. 1670–75), long remembered as the quintessence of 
selfish, tyrannical irresponsibility. After five years in power, he was unseated at 
the instigation of his father’s aged former chief councilor and astrologer, An-
driamampandry.51 There are several contradictory accounts of how the old man 
managed to effect this. All agree that it began with his summoning a great 
kabary, or assembly, to win popular consensus that the king must be removed, 
where it was agreed that his younger brother be placed on the throne in his 
stead. According to some accounts, Rajakatsitakatrandriana then simply col-
lapsed before the power of the elders’ imprecations; in others, he was tricked out 
of the palace by divination (only to later make a failed attempt to find foreign 
allies to recapture it); yet others imply an actual uprising, since Andriamam-
pandry is said to have set fire to the village of Andohalo just outside the royal 
precinct in order to drive away the king’s most faithful followers (Callet 1908: 
284–88; Julien 1909, I: 126–27; D. Rasamuel 2007: 218). 
Andohalo was never rebuilt. Instead, the open space where the village once 
stood became the site of the great kabary held between kings and people from 
that point on. Later visitors describe it as “natural amphitheatre, in which some 
eighty to one hundred thousand persons may conveniently assemble” (W. Ellis 
1838, I: 103), and in the nineteenth century, it was the scene of gaudy royal 
ritual and proclamations. 
The Tantara claims it was King Andriamasinavalona (c. 1675–1710), the 
ruler Andriamampandry placed on the throne after the rebellion, who first 
made a systematic practice of consulting with the people before making impor-
tant decisions (Callet 1908: 386). Often these consultations seem to have been 
mere formalities. At other times they involved serious negotiations between 
well-balanced powers. It was at these kabary, as well, where hasina was pre-
sented, oaths and vows of loyalty were pronounced, and the kingdom as a whole 
effectively created and re-created the kingdom, and thereby the king. Yet such 
actions could only have meaning if all were also aware that the people could, 
in the last instance, act otherwise. It was possible to withdraw one’s oaths. And 
surely, the fact that all these oaths and consultations took place on the very site 
51. As astrologer: Callet (1908: 31). Raombana (1980: 44–45) has him use divination as 
a pretext for removing the king from the palace. Some contemporary scholars make 
out Andriamampandry to be of noble descent, presumably because of his name, but 
both the Tantara (Callet 1908: 284) and Raombana (1980: 41) clearly identify him 
as hova. 
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of an earlier popular insurrection could only have constantly underlined the 
possibility that such things could, in the last instance, happen again. 
* * *
According to the tradition, Andriamasinavalona lived long and wisely, but in his 
dotage made the unfortunate decision to divide his kingdom between his four 
favorite sons. (Andriamampandry strove mightily but failed to dissuade him.) 
The result was a chaotic descent into civil disorder. The histories refer to this as 
the period of civil wars. They ended only after a prince of Ambohimanga—the 
one who was eventually to call himself Andrianampoinimerina, roughly “the 
desire of Imerina”—managed, through a skillful combination of brutal force 
and delicate diplomacy, to patch together the various warring kingdoms into a 
single, unified, state. 
It is especially difficult to assess Andrianampoinimerina in retrospect, since 
by the 1860s, when the histories were put down in writing, he had already be-
come something of a folk-hero, the paragon of the old wise king against whom 
contemporary monarchs and their councilors could be judged. Earlier sources 
present a much more ambivalent picture: of an enterprising monarch sincerely 
dedicated to the prosperity of his subjects, but who was also responsible for the 
deaths of thousands, both in calculated massacres, and in the constant submis-
sion of the populations of whole towns and villages to the poison ordeal, or 
tangena (e.g., S. Ellis 2002). Even in the idealized accounts preserved by Callet, 
he is constantly threatening to kill law-breakers and dissenters. And some later 
sources preserve popular memories of the king that must have circulated among 
his enemies of the time, as a brutal usurper, ally of foreign slave traders, and 
murderer of innocents—memories still vividly alive—especially in andriana cir-
cles—long after his death.
Case 1: Andrianamboatsimarofy, an unstable king
In the stories collected in the mid-nineteenth century, Andrianampoinimerina 
is always represented as the stern but principled monarch, the one true adult on 
the throne. Since he is universally recognized as laying the foundations of the 
later Merina state, historians usually focus on him as the paradigm for kingship; 
but in fact, he seems to have tried to completely reinvent the institution. To get 
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a sense of what early monarchs were like, it seems to me, it would be better to 
focus on his chief rival, King Andrianamboatsimarofy, king of Antananarivo. 
Tsimarofy, as he is sometimes called, is regularly contrasted to Andrianam-
poinimerina as an almost comical figure, an impulsive blowhard given to every sort 
of indulgence and vice. In the Tantara, his court is represented as a kind of mad-
house, its denizens constantly wasted on rum, cannabis, and opium. One typical 
passage: “There was one palace attendant who was smoking marijuana, and when 
high on marijuana chased a dog and fell into ditch, and for a while they didn’t 
know if he would survive; but the king was not alarmed, neither did Tsimarofy 
forbid it but just let him carry on preparing the stuff anyway” (Callet 1908: 761).52 
Typically, such passages are followed by declarations by Andrianampoini-
merina that he would order the execution of anyone who indulged in such dan-
gerous pastimes.
For over a decade, Andrianampoinimerina and Tsimarofy fought a 
see-sawing war over the control of the great city of Antananarivo, in which the 
capital repeatedly fell to the usurper’s armies, only to be snatched back again 
by the Manisotra—Tsimarofy’s most devoted troops. The Manisotra were (like 
the Manendy, whom we’ve met already) a kind of military order or specialized 
warrior caste. The sources often refer to both as “royal slaves.” In reality, they 
were also a powerful descent group with their own ancestral towns and villages, 
and a peculiar relation of privileged familiarity with the royal household. Not 
only did the Manisotra lead and form the elite core of the king’s armies; they 
alone were allowed to play with royal children.53 There are long passages in the 
Tantara, many clearly meant for comic effect, purporting to record Tsimarofy’s 
interactions with his protectors (ibid.: 964–69).
The first time the Manisotra drove Andrianampoinimerina out of the city 
and recovered the capital, they brought their king to show him,
And the Manisotra took Tsimarofy to Antananarivo, and they said, “Did we lie 
to you, Tsimarofy? Here is your land and your government; if you don’t care for 
it, then give it to someone else.”
52. “Nisy tandapa nifoka rongony, ary dia mamo rongony ka manenjika alika, na hady aza 
dia ianjera’ny, ka tsy mahalala ny ho faty, dia tsy matahotra andriana, ila hananika ny 
rova; koa tsy no raran’ Andrianamboatsimarofy avela ny hiany hanao.”
53. Domenichini and Domenichini-Ramiaramanana (1980) make a strong case that 
the Manisotra, like the Manendy, traditionally have a ziva, or joking relation, with 
the king (cf. Hébert 1958).
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 And Tsimarofy said: “I am happy, daddy Manisotra, I put my faith in you. 
Yes! You truly did not deceive me, so I thank you for that. Because here is my son 
Maromanompo, who dwells together with you and lives in the same house as you. 
So I have absolute confidence in you that you should live with him.” (1908: 965)54
The Manisotra then inform him that they are returning to their own ancestral 
lands of Ambohijoky, where they will be available in case the king should be 
so careless as to lose his capital again. They also propose he send his (roughly 
eight-year-old) son Maromanompo with them, “as he isn’t settled happily here, 
he’ll enjoy Ambohijoky, and [your daughter] Ravao too wants to play with the 
girls at Ambohijoky.” It’s not clear whether the king assents, but he does order 
a great celebration, presumably replete with rum and other intoxicants, and tells 
the Manisotra to bring their wives and children. The Manisotra women dance 
and rejoice, but while they do so, they gently chide the king, urging him not to 
fall asleep or become distracted once again. 
After a few years, Andrianampoinimerina again seizes the capital, and 
Tsimarofy is once more forced to appeal to his servants: “Come again, daddy 
Manisotra, because Antananarivo is lost once more, and once more I don’t know 
what to do.”55 The Manisotra representatives immediately ask him: Did not our 
women tell him not to fall asleep on the job? A proper king doesn’t play games 
but thinks about the government. Andrianampoinimerina only thinks about the 
government. If you prefer to play games, perhaps we should turn the govern-
ment over to him and leave you to your games in peace.
Tsimarofy was roused up by this, and took up his shield and spear, fired off a 
shot of his musket, and declared: “If you still love me, then I myself shall fight at 
the head of my army. I will fight in the manner of the Sakalava, where the king 
himself leads the army, because the people may be powerful, but if the king is 
defeated then the people are defeated too.” 
54. “Ary dia nentiny Manisotra Andrianamboatsimarofy nankany ao Antananarivo, ka hoy 
Manisotra: ‘Mandaingia va izahay, Andrianamboatsimarofy? lndro ny tany nao sy ny 
fanjaka’ nao, fa raha tsy tia· nao omeo ny olona.’ - Ary hoy Andrianamboatsimarofy: 
‘ Faly aho, ray Manisotra, matoky aho. Hay·! Tsy mamitaka ahy tokoa hianareo, ka 
misaotra anareo aho. Fa indro lahy Ramaromanompo, f ’iny miara-monina ami’ nareo 
ary miara-mitoetra ami’ nareo.’”
55. “Alao indray i kiaky Manositra, fa lasa indray Antananarivo, koa tsy hitako indray izay 
hatao ko.”
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 “God forbid,” said the Manisotra, “And where exactly did you come up 
with this ‘Sakalava manner of fighting,’ you with your bright ideas? You’ll just 
hand the kingdom over to Andrianampoinimerina! Because that’s all you’ll ac-
complish with this ‘let’s do the Sakalava manner of fighting’ nonsense. It’s not 
the ancestral way; the king is to be guarded. You think you’re going to lead the 
army, boy? All you’re going to do is get yourself killed.”56
The Manisotra leaders noted that great though their love was for the king, they 
were equally loyal to his ancestor, King Andriamasinavalona, who first granted 
them their lands in Ambohijoky, to which they were now inclined to return. 
When Tsimarofy persisted in his plan to personally lead his army into com-
bat, they finally turned to their sometime playmate, the little princess Ravao: 
“Goodbye Ravao. Your father has abandoned you. Your daddy doesn’t want to 
be king any more, . . . . so we must go home. Farewell!” 
At this point Tsimarofy conceded: “I’m sorry, fathers, I will not con-
tinue in my foolishness. I put my faith in you. Do what you must to recover 
Antananarivo.”57
* * *
Since all these stories are so clearly arranged to contrast the stern but efficient 
king of the north with the silly, feckless, self-indulgent king of the south, one 
might wonder how much of this is simply literary embellishment. But as a mat-
ter of fact there is good reason to believe the accounts are substantially cor-
rect. As it happens, a French slave-trader named Nicholas Mayeur personally 
visited Tsimarofy’s court on at least two occasions, and has left us two different 
56. “Taitra indray Andrianamboatsimarofy ka nandray ny ampinga sy ny lefona, dia nipoa-
basy tokana nanao hoe: ‘Raha mbola tia’nareo hiany aho, dia izaho no voalohan’ ady 
hitari-dalana, hanao adi-ntSakalava ka ny andriana mpitari-dalana, dia mahery ny 
vahoaka, ary raha resy ny andriana dia resy ny vahoaka.’ ‘Sanatria,’ hoy Manisotra, ‘Iza 
no mahalala izay adi-ntSakalava ny ialahy, ialahy hanao hevitra: fanjakana atolotr’ 
ialahy an’ Andrianampoinimerina! k’ izany no anaovan’ ialahy hoe “aoka hanao adi-
ntSakalava.” Fa tsy fanao ndrazana izany, fa ny andriana no ambenana; ary ialahy kosa 
no hitari- dalana? Ka hamono tena ialahy.’”
57. The Manisotra’s farewell: “Veloma ry Vao, fa lasa ray nao. Ray nao tsy tia fanjakana 
. . . fa hody izahay ka dia hanao veloma.” .. And the king’s reply: “Hivalo aho, ry kiaky, 
fa tsy hanindroa intsony ny fahadalana, fa hanome toky anareo aho, hatao lahy izay 
hahafaka an’ Antananarivo.”
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descriptions of it, written eight years apart (Mayeur [1777] 1913, [1793] 1913). 
These accounts provide striking confirmation of some of the details of the ac-
count in the Tantara, while at the same time showing that Tsimarofy’s miscon-
duct at one point became so outrageous it inspired an outright revolt.
Mayeur is, in fact, the first foreign observer to have left us any sort of de-
tailed eyewitness account of the Merina kingdom, which he called “the King-
dom of Ancove.”
While visiting the small highland kingdom of Ankay in the spring of 1777, 
Mayeur was, by his own account, approached by a small delegation who ex-
plained to him that they were agents of Tsimarofy, and that the king would be 
very interested in establishing direct commercial relations with French trad-
ers operating on the coast. Mayeur was, at first, hesitant. The king of Ankay 
was clearly very hostile to the project, and Mayeur himself had not heard good 
things about Ancove. When the head of the delegation asked why he came to 
Ankay, rather than the much larger kingdom to the north: 
I responded that this preference was only natural; that several times, caravans of 
people from the coast had been pillaged by the subjects of his master; and this 
was reason enough to strictly avoid his province.
 “It is true,” he replied, “that in the past the Manisotra have committed 
some excesses; because this class of men, who are slaves of the king, enjoy an 
unlimited liberty during such time as the king is not of age to govern. But he has 
now established order throughout his realm; I can assure you that foreigners will 
now enjoy the same security among us as they would enjoy in their own homes.” 
(Mayeur [1777] 1913: 155)58
The next morning one of Mayeur’s bearers took him aside and explained to 
him in confidence that he recognized the man claiming to be Tsimarofy’s chief 
envoy —he was not an envoy at all; he actually was Tsimarofy, who had traveled 
incognito into his enemy’s kingdom, at great personal risk, in order to effect the 
alliance. If nothing else, this impressed Mayeur of the man’s seriousness. When 
the king admitted it was true, Mayeur agreed to set out together with him to 
Ancove. 
58. My translation from the French. Translations from either Malagasy or French are 
mine unless otherwise indicated.
306 ON KINGS
Along the way, the two men struck up a friendship. Mayeur ended up leav-
ing an enthusiastic account of his capital, Antananarivo, a city that rose like a 
startling acropolis from the middle of a vast plain of terraced rice fields crowded 
with villages whose industrious inhabitants appeared, despite their complete 
lack of contact with foreigners, to have mastered the agricultural, industrial, and 
even administrative arts with far greater sophistication than any other inhabit-
ants of Madagascar. (Mayeur was particularly impressed that Ancove’s silver-
smiths could perfectly counterfeit European currency and that its blacksmiths 
were able to manufacture functional replacement parts for European guns.) 
The king took a great interest in promoting and regulating circulating weekly 
markets. The inhabitants of Ancove, Mayeur observed, seemed a fundamentally 
peaceful people, more interested in commerce than in war; though he must also 
have noted with some professional interest that the division of the country into 
numerous warring principalities, and resultant instability, ensured it was in a 
position to supply unusually large numbers of slaves.
When Mayeur returned eight years later, in late August 1785, matters were 
not going nearly so well for his old friend. The king was perpetually drunk, and 
had become addicted to opium purveyed by Arab merchants. Tsimarofy seemed 
at constant war with all his neighbors, especially Andrianampoinimerina, who 
seemed, Mayeur estimated, at this point to be gaining the definite upper hand. 
Finally, Tsimarofy’s own people had indicated there was a very definite limit to 
their patience with his behavior. 
Three years before, Mayeur reported, Tsimarofy had killed his chief wife in 
a drunken rage. His people, outraged, convoked a general assembly in order to 
decide whether to remove him from office and pass his formal title on to their 
preadolescent son. In the end, the answer was affirmative. Mayeur summarizes 
the message presented to the king in the kabary—it was presumably held at 
Andohalo—in his characteristic, slightly stuffy, style:
Prince, here is your legitimate successor. He is now under our watchful care; we 
wish to teach him how to govern us, because it is true that currently, if he remains 
with you, he will only witness bad examples. We wish for tranquility, far from 
the vexations which your continual inebriation has imposed on us. The inno-
cence of your son, and the respect that the hova have for their sovereign, mitigate 
against the vow we have already taken to change our ruler. Yet the crime you 
have committed against your wife, your own first cousin, which marks the very 
culmination of our indignation, cannot remain unavenged, so we have assembled 
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to deliberate on the matter. It has been decided that you will no longer receive 
either our allegiance or our tribute; that we will regard all those among us as 
remain attached to you as enemies of the Hova people, up to such time as you 
solemnly declare that you have completely renounced the use of strong liquor. 
We have also taken a vow to allow you a fixed term to reflect on this matter. Until 
that term is expired, all authority you have over us shall be suspended. Our al-
legiance will be directed to your son. (Mayeur [1793] 1913: 39) 
The declaration was followed by the firing of muskets, and the conferring of 
Maromanompo to the protection of the Manisotra. After the appointed term 
was over, a second kabary was held, and the king determined to have remained 
sober in the interim. His people therefore renewed their vows of fealty again. 
Still, according to Mayeur, this newfound sobriety was short-lived. Before 
long the king had lapsed, Andrianampoinimerina returned, and the resulting 
popular disillusionment played no small role in his ultimate military defeat.
* * *
The role of the Manisotra and Manendy, collectively known as the Mainty 
Enin-Dreny, the warrior orders of ancient Imerina, has always been something 
of puzzle for historians. While referred to as “royal slaves,” they have many of 
the same privileges as andriana; they seem to rank in certain ways above, in 
other ways below, the bulk of the population. The understanding of the ritual 
structure of the Merina kingdom developed in the course of this essay sug-
gests one way to understand this apparent paradox. Such warriors were (like 
the Tsiarondahy, the palace attendants with whom they were often grouped), a 
particularly intimate kind of mpitaiza andriana, not just because they protected 
the king in battle, but because even in ordinary times, the king’s own children 
were relegated to their care. Here their playful intimacy with little princesses 
like Ravao. As a result, if the monarch was not yet of an age to rule, or else if he 
was simply not acting as if he were, his sovereign power—that is, his right to 
engage in arbitrary, essentially lawless violence—devolved onto them.59 This is 
59. The impunity of the Manisotra probably refers to a status known as tsy maty manoto, 
a privilege granted in recognition of extraordinary favors to royalty (as in the story 
of Trimofoloalina: Kingdon 1889; Callet 1908: 316–21). The Manendy, the other 
major warrior caste, were said to be tsy maty manoto as well (Rakotomanolo 1981: 7). 
Those who held it could not be held accountable for certain crimes, notably, theft.
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why during Tsimarofy’s minority, the Manisotra could revert to simple banditry, 
preying on foreign caravans at whim. But even when, as an adult, he attempted 
to take full command of his armies, they treated him as a child again, and put 
him firmly back in his place, in such a way as to ensure he was aware their loyalty 
was as much to his family (whether his ancestor Andriamasinavalona, or his 
six-year-old daughter Ravao) as it was to him. He was neither the eldest nor the 
youngest of his lineage. 
And in the end, what was true of the Manisotra was, in an attenuated sense, 
true for all of his subjects as well, since, in the event of the king’s proving himself 
utterly unfit to preside over the royal family (by killing his wife), they were will-
ing to temporarily convey power to a minor (his son, Maromanompo, restored 
to the supervision of the Manisotra) until he could prove himself capable of 
ruling even within those parameters to which he was allowed.
If so, it makes it easier to understand the fate of the historical Leiloza, and 
his son Rabevola, as well. Having been expelled from his kingdom in Valala-
fotsy, Leiloza fell in with a faction of Manendy, who took on exactly the same 
role: they offered him their nurturant protection, but at the same time used that 
relationship as the moral basis for effectively turning bandit and launching raids 
against all around. 
Case 2: Radama I and the first women’s uprising
Andrianampoinimerina was ultimately victorious, and in his new united Me-
rina kingdom, he marginalized both Manisotra and Manendy, relying instead 
for military support on two large hova ancestries from his native Ambohimanga, 
the Tsimahafotsy and Tsimiamboholahy. These were to provide his royal coun-
cilors, who were his own principal mpitaiza andriana, and the military com-
manders who were to effectively run the kingdom from then on. Yet, like his 
son Radama, who took power at the tender age of seventeen, Andrianampoini-
merina allowed the mpitaiza only a modest role in government. Other than the 
councilors, his chief mpitaiza were the guardians of the royal sampy (i.e., the 
keepers of the “political” charms that protected the kingdom): it was Andri-
anampoinimerina who seems to have systematized the elaborate ritual system 
outlined in the Tantara, with its pantheon of twelve royal ancestors, twelve sa-
cred mountains, and twelve national charms. Radama, once he had entered into 
alliance with the British governor of Mauritius, who recognized him as “king 
of Madagascar,” threw everything into the creation of his new red-coated army, 
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drilled and provisioned by British advisors, and no longer seemed to have found 
much use for mpitaiza of any kind. 
Radama also largely abandoned his father’s habit of calling grand assemblies 
to consult with his subjects about policy issues; increasingly, the great kabary at 
Andohalo became places to make proclamations and convey royal orders, or to 
make a display of military formations, but very little else.
Radama was the ultimate adolescent king, and it’s not hard to see him as a 
distant inspiration for the myth of Leiloza.60 He fancied himself a new Napo-
leon, whose portrait he in fact kept in his private chambers:61 an enlightened 
despot determined to employ his unlimited powers to reshape society in mod-
ern, progressive terms. He established a school system and a civil service. He 
sponsored industrial projects, and campaigns to modernize building techniques, 
clothing styles, and standards of public hygiene. He divided the entire male 
population of Imerina into two broad categories, military (miaramila) and civil 
(borizano), and invoked the principle of fanompoana to call the first up to service 
in the army, the second, to labor teams assigned to increasingly onerous royal 
corvée. At the same time, Radama played the enlightened skeptic in relation to 
the mumbo-jumbo of his father’s ritual system: he was especially famous for en-
tertaining himself by posing impossible tests for astrologers and magicians and 
trying to expose the various tricks and stage illusions employed by mediums.
One of the king’s most notorious comments was rendered to a French artist 
hired to paint his portrait, one André Copalle, himself apparently an Enlighten-
ment skeptic of sorts. Copalle wrote the followed account of a conversation he 
had with the king, after the latter’s return from a journey to the shrines of the 
royal ancestors, to petition them for rain:
60. Back in the 1960s, Radama was still an important healing spirit, at least in the 
region immediately surrounding Antananarivo, and he was sometimes also known 
as Rakotomaditra (“Naughty Boy”), which was the original name given to the 
spirit whose doany is of Ambohitrambo later to be known as Leiloza (Cabanes 
1972: 52-3). See above, footnote 12. 
61. Many sources speak of Radama as modeling himself on Napoleon. After the 
breakdown of his alliance with the governor of Mauritius, Radama replaced Hastie 
with a French-Jamaican sergeant named Robin, who had deserted Napoleon’s army 
and eventually fled to Tamatave. When the King first met him, he asked if he’d 
really served under Napoleon’s orders, and on hearing that he had, “he then showed 
him a portrait of the Emperor, saying, ‘behold my model! Behold the example that 
I wish to follow!’” (Ackerman 1833: 49). Radama eventually named Robin his 
supreme military commander. 
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The prince was long returned from his pilgrimage, from which he had obtained 
all the success he had wished for. Radama, moreover, did not believe in these 
spells and devotions, and even less in the divine power which superstition attrib-
uted to them. He sometimes laughed at it, and told me, between us, that it was 
all just a matter of politics. He questioned me one day on my religious opinions, 
and, I having in my turn addressed several questions on the subject, replied to 
me among other things that religions were nothing but political institutions, fit 
to lead children of all ages. (Copalle [1826] 1970: 37)
The latter remark takes on renewed significance coming from the mouth of a 
thirty-year-old monarch (in other words, himself little more than a child by 
Malagasy standards) in a political system where kings were regularly themselves 
treated as de facto minors. It sounds very much as if Radama was using his 
privileged relation with foreigners to reverse all this, to cast himself as a kind of 
stranger-king in the making, and, by that very token, render those who might 
otherwise have been considered his mpitaiza (astrologers, sampy guardians, the 
people as a whole) as so many benighted children in their turn.62 
This attempted realignment did not go unchallenged. Matters came to a 
head, in fact, over precisely the sort of personal household issues—the care and 
nurturing of the king, and royal family more generally—that were the tradi-
tional focus of the system of ritual labor. It will be recalled that the act of bring-
ing first-fruits was also modeled on the ritual of a child’s first haircut, the point 
where a child effectively begins to become a social being, capable of forming 
relations with others. In commoner households, this was a ceremony presided 
over primarily by women; and women continued to play a critical role in the 
care and maintenance of hair—their children’s hair, their menfolk’s, and each 
other’s—throughout their adult lives. This is more important than it may seem 
because traditional highland hairstyles were quite elaborate and required a sig-
nificant investment of care and labor to maintain: 
62. My interpretation here in part contrasts with Gerald Berg’s (1998) reading of the 
same statement. Berg argues that rather than being cynical, Radama was simply 
restating an ideology which made no distinction between what Copalle would 
consider politics and ritual—in this I certainly agree—but goes on to argue that this 
ideology was based on a notion of “the flow of hasina” from king to subjects whereby 
“Merina rulers had always been considered as ‘fathers’ of their subjects” (ibid.: 70). 
In fact, as we’ve seen, despite some lip service to this idea, matters were ordinarily 
quite the reverse. 
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From all accounts the various styles of plaiting the hair were innumerable. Men 
seem to have fully appreciated this mode of ornament as well as the women, so 
much so that King Andrianampoinimerina is said to have had a special style for 
himself, which was called Ny bóko antámpona, i.e. “The knob on the top of the 
head,” as all of his hair was gathered together into one big plait at the crown of 
the head. Another famous mode, called sàlo-bìta, consisted of plaiting the hair 
into an equal number of very fine plaits, which hung down in an even row. . . . 
The special feature of this plait consisted in the addition of a row of coral beads, 
sewn along each of the exterior angles, if the person was of the andriana, or 
noble class; whereas among the Hova, or commoners, it was the custom to sew 
on small silver chains or coins. The time spent in plaiting must have been very 
considerable. (Edmonds 1895: 471–72)
The careful maintenance of elaborate hairdos was, it seems, seen as one of the 
main preoccupations of women and itself became a kind of paradigmatic labor: 
a synecdoche, one might say, for the broader process of shaping human beings. 
If responsibilities to one’s parents and ancestors could be referred to as valim-
babena, “the answer having been carried on the back,” the two main marriage 
payments to a bride’s family were (and still are) called the akana kitay (“fetching 
firewood”) and the alana volo fotsy (“plucking out white hairs”), in both cases a 
recognition of the loss of the services the daughter might otherwise have pro-
vided to her family, in the first carrying things again, in the second, carefully at-
tending to the tresses of her aging parents. Second to bearing burdens (firewood, 
babies, etc.), hairdressing seems to have been a paradigmatic form of female 
labor, just as female domestic labor was the paradigmatic form of labor itself. 
As on the domestic level, so on that of the kingdom as a whole. Andrianam-
poinimerina not only had a unique hairstyle, his hair had to be elaborately re-
newed before every major royal ritual. For instance, an early-twentieth-century 
Jesuit source recalls this of the royal circumcision ritual, which was the occasion 
of one of the great national festivals: 
Under Andrianampoinimerina, when everyone wore their hair long, the first of 
the holy days was consecrated to the needs of coiffure. The sovereign’s hair, along 
with that of the fathers and mothers having some infant to be circumcised, had 
to be plaited according to a particular rite, in the middle of the public plaza of 
the capital. This initial ceremony began with the sacrifice of a white-spotted ox, 
it ended with the firing of canons. (Camboué 1909: 376) 
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The dressing of the king’s hair was itself a form of santatra, performed at Andoha-
lo by the most senior among Those Whose Mothers and Fathers Are Still Living 
(Callet 1908: 30, 73–74; Soury-Lavergne and de la Devèze 1912: 342–43; Molet 
1976: 41; Bloch 1986: 122–27, 135). Similarly, in the early part of Radama’s reign, 
the king wore his hair long, in a style so full of plaits and curls it was said to take 
up to three days to properly dress it (W. Ellis 1838, I: 287). In the spring of 1822, 
however, Radama made a momentous decision: to sheer off his locks, and adopt 
a military-style crewcut in the European fashion. What’s more, orders soon went 
out that all subjects of miaramila status were to cut their hair in the same way. 
This order was the culmination of a series of reforms that had the cumulative 
effect of transforming fanompoana from a system of ritual labor, focused on the 
royal household, to the organizing principle of a modern state. The unlimited 
power of the sovereign to call his subjects up for labor was being used to justify 
everything from the responsibility of children to attend mission schools, to the 
calling up of recruits to be sent to war, or simply to be stationed for indefinite 
terms in coastal fortresses—the latter leading to serious rates of mortality from 
malaria and other diseases. 
Against the above innovations, a spirit of daring resistance was evinced by a 
number of females in a neighboring district [Avaradrano], and a large meeting 
was held, to which the discontented repaired. Information of these proceedings 
soon reached the capital. About two thousand soldiers were immediately sum-
moned; they renewed their oaths of allegiance, promising that whoever should 
be found guilty of creating a disturbance, even if their own parents should be 
implicated, they required but the king’s order or permission to put them to death: 
after these assurances of fidelity, the soldiers were ordered to guard the capital. 
On the following day, four or five thousand females assembled at Ambatoraka, a 
village to the east of Tananarivo, and sent a kabary, or message, to the king com-
plaining of his having adopted foreign customs, and having allowed his people 
to be taught by Europeans. In reply, Radama sent to ask them what were their 
grievances; if they were too heavily taxed, or if they were displeased at having 
their sons employed in the army; whether he were their king or not, and whether 
they had chosen some other king in his stead? They replied to these questions in 
the negative; but said, they were the nurses of the king,63 and complained because he 
63. Larson, who reproduces this passage, oddly renders the word incorrectly as 
“caretakers,” but correctly notes the Malagasy word was “probably mpitaiza, a word 
suggesting the relationship between nurse and child” (2000: 249).
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had adopted the customs of the foreigners; had allowed them to teach him and 
his people; had changed the customs of the ancestors; and finally, he had cut off 
his hair, and drank spirituous liquors. Radama sent back a message to ask if, be-
ing king, he had not a right to do as he pleased with his hair without consulting 
women; reminding them, it was the inalienable right of the twelve monarchs to 
do as they pleased, and added, that he would presently give them a proof of this, 
by taking care that their hair should never grow again. (W. Ellis 1838, I: 288, 
emphasis mine) 
According to Ellis, five ringleaders were identified and summarily executed 
with bayonets. Others were flogged to within an inch of their lives. The rest of 
the “rebellious females” were surrounded by troops, held for three days without 
food or water, and forced to watch the bodies of their companions be “devoured 
by dogs and birds.” Finally, the king proclaimed the survivors would be allowed 
to return to their homes “to attend to their domestic duties, but must leave the 
business of government to himself ” (ibid.: 289; for a detailed analysis of the 
events, see Larson 2000: 240–53).
This was the most overt popular challenge to royal policy during Radama’s 
reign and it was quite in keeping with traditional forms. The protestors repre-
sented themselves as mpitaiza andriana (“nurses of the king”). The fact that this 
was an all-women’s assembly appears new—at least we have no record of earlier 
all-women’s assemblies in the highlands—but this might just be due to the bias 
of our sources, which overwhelmingly represent the perspectives of men.64 At 
any rate, it’s easy to see how, if the plaiting of hair was a major part of women’s 
daily occupations, and was an intrinsic part of the gradual process of rendering 
and maintaining their children as fully human, then abruptly removing this 
responsibility by forcibly shearing their children’s heads might seem the most 
vivid, and obviously outrageous, aspect of a series of royal edicts designed to re-
move them from domestic control and turn responsibility for their growth and 
64. In other parts of Madagascar, women’s kabary have been documented, but not in 
Imerina itself. The Tantara’s account of these same events, recorded almost a half 
century later (Callet 1908: 1078–80), is already beginning to downplay the women’s 
role (claiming it was men put the women up to it), which suggests that if there had 
been women’s revolts in earlier times, we wouldn’t necessarily have any record of 
them. Neither do we have any way of knowing if women were prominently involved 
in Andriamampandry’s revolt, or the kabary held to temporarily remove Tsimarofy, 
though women were presumably present in some capacity as they generally do 
participate in highland kabary. 
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development over to foreign-trained schoolteachers and drill sergeants working 
directly for the state. From their perspective, there simply was no meaningful 
distinction between “domestic duties” and “the business of government”; and 
reminding Radama of the people’s role as mpitaiza andriana, and admonishing 
him over his own domestic misbehavior—drunkenness, consorting with for-
eigners, neglect of customary usages, making major changes in how his very 
physical person was to be maintained without prior consultation with those 
charged with maintaining it—was the obvious way to make this point. 
In doing so, they also not only cast the king in the role of nursling, but 
also identified themselves, at least tacitly, with his own royal ancestors. In the 
Tantara, the delegates are instructed to appeal to the “twelve kings,” none of 
whom ever shaved their heads. 
We have come to admonish you, Sir, do not cut your hair because this is not a 
custom observed by kings. . . . King Andriantsimitoviaminandriana did not cut 
his hair. Andriambelomasina ruled and never cut his hair. Andrianampoinime-
rina, too, ruled and never cut his hair. And now we have you, Radama, and you 
make soldiers, and you shear off all your hair. (Callet 1908: 1079)65
Radama’s personal reaction, as remembered inside the palace, is recorded by 
later court historian Raombana:
With the greatest brutality (for he was rather drunk or completely drunk, I do 
not know which), he exclaimed that these abominable women want to stir a 
rebellion to upset him from his kingdom, but that he will disappoint them, for 
that he is not a child, and that he will be beforehand with them and cut short the 
rebellion which they meditate against him. (Raombana 1994: 79.803–4, empha-
sis mine)
Any act of mass political contestation—and this is true above all of nonvio-
lent ones—is an act of political theater in which the audience is not just the 
65. “Mananatra anao izahay, Tompokolahy, fa aza boriana ny volonao fa tsy fomba fanaon’ny 
Andriana nanjaka izao mibory volo izao. . . . Nanjaka Andriantsimitoviamanandriana, 
tsy notapahina ny volony; nanjaka Andriambclomasina, tsy notapahina koa ny volony; 
nanjaka koa Andrianampoinimerina, tsy notapahina koa ny volony. lty mby aminao 
Radama, ka manao miaramila hianao, ka hianao no manao sanga ka borianao ny 
volonao.”..
315THE PEOPLE AS NURSEMAIDS OF THE KING
government, but if anything, even more, those charged to carry out the govern-
ment’s orders. Successful rebels tend to be keenly aware of this. You win if you 
can either create a situation where those sent to shoot you refuse to do so, or else 
convince the government that those they would otherwise be inclined to send to 
shoot you cannot be relied on, and therefore that compromise is the only course. 
In Madagascar itself, movements of nonviolent resistance against standing gov-
ernments, starting with the Forces Vives in 1990, have tended to prepare the 
ground beforehand by using family connections, or often church ties, to reach 
out to the commanders of the security forces to ensure their neutrality before 
street actions began. Clearly, the rebels of 1822 were employing a similar strate-
gy. According to the Tantara, the great assembly that made the decision to hold 
a women’s march on the capital also decided to send women primarily from the 
province of Avaradrano: this was, significantly, the home province of the bulk of 
Radama’s officer corps and most loyal troops as well. This no doubt explains the 
king’s initial panic: calling in thousands of troops and asking them to swear to 
follow his orders to execute dissidents “even if their own parents should be im-
plicated”—since there was a very real prospect that that this exact circumstance 
might arise. Once he did secure that loyalty, the game was effectively over.
Or at least it was for the moment. In the longer term, it’s not nearly so clear 
who really won.
Case 3: Ranavalona I, the toddler queen and the return of the dead
On the surface, Radama’s victory in April 1822 would appear to be absolute. The 
survivors were terrorized into silence; no further movements of public opposi-
tion occurred. In retrospect, some of the demands of the women’s assembly—for 
instance, that all foreigners be immediately delivered over to them—seem so 
presumptuous that one wonders how those who made them could have imag-
ined things might turn out any other way. But a mere twelve years later, their 
core program had been largely realized. A woman sat on Radama’s throne, and 
she did indeed call in these same foreigners for ultimate expulsion; ancestral 
customs put into abeyance by Radama were, indeed, restored. What’s more, all 
of this was carried out under the aegis of the very officer corps to whom the 
women of Avaradrano had so—apparently—unsuccessfully appealed.
What happened?
According to the standard history, after Radama drank himself to death 
at the age of thirty-six in 1828, several high officials, led by a general named 
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Andriamihaja and an old judge named Andriamamba, effected a kind of coup. 
Pretending the king had named his long-neglected senior wife as successor, they 
quickly moved to assassinate all rival claimants. The new queen, Ranavalona, 
already fifty-one at the time of her coronation, went on to reign for thirty-three 
years, the longest of any historical Merina monarch,66 and while she maintained 
Radama’s standing army and school system, she eventually effected a radical 
break with most of her ex-husband’s other policies. Above all, she abandoned 
his attempt to open Madagascar to the larger world economy, adopting in-
stead a policy of self-sufficiency which ultimately led to almost all foreign-born 
residents of the island being expelled. The only ones allowed to remain were a 
tiny handful of favored advisors, such as Jean Laborde, a wanted criminal from 
France who was therefore assumed to owe no loyalties to his homeland, and 
who, being in possession of a set of technical encyclopedias, was put in charge 
of the government’s industrialization campaign. 
The expulsions, the prescription of Christianity, and subsequent execution 
of a number of Christian converts ensured that Ranavalona soon became the 
object of intensely hostile propaganda from abroad. Foreign histories came to 
depict her as a monster, a “mad queen,” even a “female Caligula,” whose end-
less wars and purges of suspected witches devastated the country—according to 
some of the more surrealistic claims, killing off between a third and two-thirds 
of the entire Malagasy population. Such numbers are obviously absurd, and 
might be forgivable, perhaps, coming from the pens of angry exiles at the time, 
with access only to sensationalistic horror stories; the peculiar thing is that it’s 
still possible to find them reproduced in the works of influential historians like 
Gwyn Campbell, who, completely ignoring the voluminous demographic mate-
rial in the royal archives, treat the most extravagant claims of foreign observers 
as literal historical fact.67 
66. Andriamasinavalona is also said in most accounts to have reigned thirty-five years, 
but the dates are an approximation.
67. Campbell’s works cite only European sources, almost entirely uncritically, while 
systematically ignoring almost all sources written in the Malagasy language—
whether because Campbell disdains such sources, or simply cannot read Malagasy, 
I cannot know. For instance, in his An economic history of imperial Madagascar, 
1750–1895 (2005), he provides a chapter with what he claims is a comprehensive 
list of sources on nineteenth-century Merina demography containing no Malagasy 
sources that have not been translated, and shows no awareness of the fact that 
Ranavalona’s government actually carried out a census in the 1840s, and that the 
census documents still exist, easy accessible, within the Malagasy National Archives. 
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* * *
A real social and economic history of Ranavalona’s reign thus remains to be 
written. What evidence we do have from sources inside the country (and there’s 
actually considerably more of it than historians like Campbell let on) suggests 
largely continuity with what was already happening under Radama. Young peo-
ple continued to be drafted into the army and sent off on military campaigns 
against “rebels” in the provinces; these continued to lead to massacres and a 
constant flow of coastal women and children into highland slave markets; all 
much as before. Inside Imerina, the main change was a withdrawal of state au-
thority. While the government kept a firm hand on the capital and major ports, 
it seems to have left small towns and rural communities in the highlands largely 
to themselves: the administrative apparatus set up under Andrianampoinime-
rina, and vastly increased under Radama, fell into abeyance.68 True, when gov-
ernment intervention did occur, it was often spectacularly destructive. Much as 
under Andrianampoinimerina, whole communities were sometimes put to the 
poison ordeal (tangena) on suspicion of being in possession of subversive mag-
ic.69 And the queen’s notorious pleasure excursions—these were the ones which 
led to the rounding up of thousands of subjects as porters— did wreak havoc on 
the communities through which they passed through. But state intervention of 
this sort was sporadic at best; there is no evidence that such depredations, when 
they did occur, were significantly worse than they had been under Andrianam-
poinimerina or Radama; the difference was that otherwise, for the most part, 
rural communities were largely left alone.
Meanwhile, in the capital, the royal household became the focus of endlessly 
baroque and spectacular forms of public ritual. 
As Pier Larson (2006) has pointed out, Campbell’s numbers are often bizarre: he 
once estimates the population of all of Imerina at 25,000, and, at the same time, 
the population of its capital at 800,000. Yet for some reason his argument that 
Ranavalona’s regime committed autogenocide on a scale two or three times worse 
than Pol Pot is taken at face value by numerous historians. 
68. During Ranavalona’s reign, internal administrative documents in the National 
Archives largely disappear, aside from census documents and some judicial registers. 
Military and diplomatic correspondence, however, continues unabated. 
69. Those who underwent the tangena were forced to imbibe water infused with 
scrapings of a poisonous nut, and three pieces of chicken skin. If they vomited up 
the chicken skin, they would be considered innocent; if they did not, they would be 
pounded to death with pole-like pestles used to pound rice.
318 ON KINGS
Since the unification of the island, Madagascar has witnessed a continual 
ebb and flow of state power in the countryside. In many ways, the regime of Ra-
navalona I seems to most resemble that of President Didier Ratsiraka between 
1975 and 1993: he, too, cut off most external trade and expelled foreign-botn 
residents, while simultaneously withdrawing state authority (up to and includ-
ing police) from most of the countryside. What’s important in Ranavalona’s case, 
however, is the ideological formula through which such arrangements came to 
be justified. Because, say what you will about the queen herself, the formula 
clearly worked. Her government was stable, successful, and long-lasting, and, in 
marked contrast to earlier reigns, it saw very little in the way of popular unrest.
Now, certainly there have been other times and places where rule by arbi-
trary, spectacular, but occasional violence is considered preferable to more ap-
parently gentle, systematic, but intrusive, forms of governance. My essay about 
the Shilluk (chapter 2 in this volume) addresses precisely this kind of situation. 
So Ranavalona’s case is hardly unique. In kingdoms that take this path, royal 
power is often seen as analogous to powers of nature; the sovereign becomes a 
kind of divine force standing outside the moral order. There is some evidence 
something like that was happening here, too. Ranavalona, like other Merina 
kings, was often greeted on her public appearances by songs comparing her 
to God, or to the sun. Still, there is no reason to assume such effusions had 
much more significance than they might have in, say, the court of Louis XIV. 
No one appears to have evoked them when speaking of the queen’s actual con-
duct.70 The arbitrary willfulness of the sovereign was instead directly identi-
fied with her childishness. As observed above, she was regularly referred to as 
Rabodon’Andrianampoinimerina, “King Andrianampoinimerina’s little girl,” or 
just Rabodo, “the little girl”; her advisors were her “nursemaids,” the people her 
“playthings” to do with as she pleased. Unlike the solar metaphors, these weren’t 
mere rhetorical effusions. These terms cropped up regularly when people dis-
cussed the regular conduct of political affairs.
70. The one song referring to Ranavalona as “God seen by the eye” and comparing her 
to the sun is, however, widely cited in foreign sources at the time (e.g., Sibree 1889: 
176; 1896: 214; Renel 1920: 71–72), presumably since it conforms so well with the 
current stereotype of Oriental despotism. As a result of this and one or two other 
references (most in folklore), the idea that Merina sovereigns were “visible gods” has 
been take up almost universally in contemporary scholarship (probably via Raison-
Jourde 1991: 78, though strongly echoed in Ottino 1986, 1993). But the sentiment 
is almost entirely absent from nineteenth-century Malagasy-language sources.
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* * *
We are fortunate enough to have a long and very detailed history of the reign 
of Ranavalona I, written by her personal secretary, Raombana, in English so 
that no one else at court could read it. Raombana, who had studied in London, 
considered the queen’s regime to be an utter catastrophe. His narrative reads 
like something halfway between Tacitus’ Annals (with its prolonged accounts of 
prominent aristocrats being unjustly put to death) and Procopius’ Secret history 
(with its shocking revelations of madness and debauchery at court). But it also 
makes clear that, despite many historians’ claims to the contrary, Ranavalona 
was in no sense a mere figurehead. If anyone was in a position to know who was 
actually in charge at court, surely it was Raombana; and in his version of events, 
Ranavalona makes all important decisions, from the general direction of policy 
(should Radama’s imperial ventures be maintained?) to the exact wording of 
diplomatic correspondence or military communiqués. Yet for all this, she’s con-
stantly treated like a self-indulgent child by everyone around her. 
Raombana himself attributes much of the organization of Ranavalona’s 
court to her previous sexual frustration. The queen had been named Radama’s 
senior wife largely because Andrianampoinimerina had wanted to pay off a po-
litical debt to her father; being ten years older than her husband and “not at all 
pretty,” Raombana explains, she was almost completely neglected by the prince; 
though at the same time, she was avoided by other men who feared the king’s 
wrath should they take up with her themselves. As a result, when she came to 
power, her first priority was to acquire a coterie of lovers:
Such being the propensity of the Queen, and not having for years been embraced 
by a man, no sooner therefore was she seated on his throne and before Radama 
was even buried when she formed the project of getting several paramours.
 Before Radama was consigned to his grave, she took to her bed Andri-
amihaja, Rainiharo, Rainimaharo, Rainijohary; and subsequently Rainiseheno etc. 
etc., and by these paramours she got to be with child about five months after the 
death of the King, a thing which neither she nor anybody else in Madagascar ever 
expected for she as I have already stated was about fifty-five [sic]71 years of age . . . .
 During the first months of her pregnancy she was very ill and often had 
falling fits, and it was thought that she would not survive long. Whenever she 
71. In fact she was fifty-one.
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recovered from these fits, she drank enormous quantities of rum and arrack; and 
lay with her paramours even in the day times and thus satisfied her lusts in an 
extraordinary manner. (Raombana n.d.: 76.1308–10)
Obviously, Raombana is taking a somewhat jaundiced view of things. For 
Malagasy royal women, establishing one’s sexual freedom was clearly a key part 
of the establishment of one’s political autonomy. We have seen the same thing 
in the case of Hastie’s “prophetess”: formally married to powerful political fig-
ures, but reserving the right to choose other lovers freely among their subjects 
too.72 Ranavalona’s situation was actually slightly different from theirs since her 
“paramours” were all, in fact, generals and men of state: Andriamihaja com-
manded the army; Rainiharo was prime minister; Rainijohary, as guardian of 
the sampy Kelimalaza, effectively became the kingdom’s high priest. Raombana 
observes that these men very quickly combined to convince the queen that ex-
panding her circle of lovers beyond palace officials would open her up to mortal 
dangers of witchcraft; they took particular care to keep her away from any men 
who were not, like them, of commoner descent. 
So Ranavalona’s taking on multiple lovers was in no way scandalous in itself; 
this was exactly how a woman in her circumstances was expected to behave. 
To convey a sense of scandal, then, Raombana has to emphasize the extreme 
nature of the queen’s behavior, and the degree to which it interfered with affairs 
of government—not to mention, endangered her own health and safety, which 
was the ostensible raison d’être for the entire apparatus of state. Ranavalona, by 
his account, would veer from indulgence to illness, needing to be literally nursed 
back to health; terrified of witchcraft, she continually forced those surrounding 
her to undergo the tangena ordeal, falling into panic and depression when she 
feared her lovers might perish as a result, often rising from her sickbed to dance 
with joy on learning they’d survived. The queen is represented in his account as 
imperious, gullible, vindictive, quick to shame but equally quick to anger—that 
is, as very much the spoiled child. 
72. The same applies to Matavy, the famous wife of the founder of the Betsimisaraka 
confederation, Ratsimilaho. She was daughter of a Sakalava king to whom 
Ratsimilaho wished to ally, but, apparently, on realizing his whole kingdom was 
something of a fraud cooked up in alliance with European pirates, she immediately 
began to flagrantly take multiple lovers from among his subjects. He seems to have 
felt incapable of raising any objections to her behavior and was forced to raise what 
everyone assumed to be another man’s child as his son and heir.. 
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Raombana, of course, is giving the view from inside the palace; he was also 
writing in English, presumably, for an imagined future audience abroad. The 
Tantara allows us to have some sense of how such matters were represented 
outside the walls of the rova, or royal enclosure. The chapter on Ranavalona’s 
government is entitled “Lehilahy mpitaiza ny andriana,” or, “Men who were 
nursemaids of the queen” (Callet 1908: 1146), and in the official historical re-
cord, all the queen’s lovers are officially referred to as her “nursemaids,” or men 
“taken by the queen to nurture her” (nalain’ny andriana hitaiza azy). 
Here’s, for instance, how Raombana begins his account of the downfall of 
Andriamihaja, the general who was primarily responsible for placing Ranava-
lona on the throne, and who was widely assumed to be the real father of her in-
fant son. According to European sources, the general represented a progressive 
faction, friendly to Christians, keen on pursuing Radama’s modernizing project, 
and opposed to Rainiharo and Rainimaharo’s traditionalists. Raombana first 
notes his role in bring the queen to power:
She was therefore fond of him, and trusted to him almost the whole manage-
ment of the state affairs, so that in fact, he acted as the first judge or minister, as 
chief secretary of Her Majesty, and as commander-in-chief of the army, which 
business he managed in the most admirable manner. As a paramour however, 
Her Majesty loved Rainiharo and his brother Rainimaharo more than him, es-
pecially Rainiharo who was the best looking man in Madagascar, and of the 
finest shape . . . . 
 Andriamihaja was not a very good looking man, but he had more tal-
ent than his opponent, so that literally speaking Rainiharo ruled the will of the 
Queen while in bed with her; and Andriamihaja, while he was out of bed and 
ruled almost as a sovereign when out of the palace: for he had the sole manage-
ment of the different affairs of the kingdom, the continual sickness of Her Maj-
esty, and she being continually in bed with her paramours both night and day, 
made her trust to Andriamihaja the affairs of her kingdom as already stated. So 
that a few months before his death, he was very seldom admitted into the palace 
on account of his business, besides so enamored was Her Majesty with Rainiharo 
and her other paramours that she did not much want his presence in the palace, 
as his presence there awes them, and keeps them from mirth, and while he is 
admitted into the palace, he always lays at night with Her Majesty for she was 
also afraid of him and dare not lay with the other paramours while he is in the 
palace. Therefore in order that she may be more in the company of Rainiharo, 
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etc., she said to Andriamihaja that the sikidy or divination does not allow him to 
remain in the palace for some time; and that he is to remain outside of the palace 
and manage all the business there. (Raombana n.d.: 12.448–53)
Andriamihaja, he goes on to explain, was an intimidating presence who had 
the presumption of occasionally rebuking the queen for dallying with other 
men. He felt he should really be her only lover. Early in Ranavalona’s reign, 
the queen’s solution had been to send him off on frequent military expeditions. 
(In fact Raombana implies that many of the wars that plagued Madagascar in 
those years were occasioned primarily by her desire to get him out of town.) But 
finally, her lovers made common cause to remove him. They charged him with 
possession of ody mahery, evil charms, claiming these were the real cause of the 
queen’s frequent illnesses, and, furthermore, that he had contrived to falsify the 
results of the poison ordeal. In addition, several testified that the general had 
come to refer to himself, among his friends, as “Bonaparte”—a very disturbing 
choice of nickname, they emphasized, considering that Napoleon Bonaparte 
was a commoner who had placed himself on the French throne after an uprising 
that led to the previous monarch’s public execution. The queen was still hesitant, 
so in the end, Raombana says, her lovers were obliged to send an assassin to An-
driamihaja’s home to murder him with a butcher’s knife, and then retroactively 
claim he had failed the tangena ordeal. 
Such, anyway, was Raombana’s palace-gossip version. The version preserved 
in the Tantara (Callet 1908: 1147–50) is entirely different. The author begins 
by observing that “under Rabodo, the chief men were her nursemaids, and An-
driamihaja, from Namehana, was chief among them.”73 Knowing he had the 
absolute support of the queen, the author says, caused the general to engage in 
much high-handed behavior, and matters eventually came to a head when he 
decided to round up a number of slaves belonging to free subjects and put them 
to work manufacturing shoes and cartridge boxes for the army. This was con-
sidered a violation of the principle that only free subjects perform fanompoana 
for the queen, and therefore an outrageous precedent that threatened the very 
foundations of the social order. Important court figures, including Ranavalona’s 
other mpitaiza and the twelve chief royal women, who were the still-surviving 
widows of Andrianampoinimerina, began to meet in secret to decide how to 
73. “Ary taminy Rabodo ny lehibe nitaiza azy tao, Andriamihaja, avy amy ny Namehana, 
izy no lehibe.” 
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respond. Local leaders were consulted. Finally, a decision was made to send a 
delegation to the queen. 
Yet when this delegation approached Ranavalona, they chose not to frame 
the issue in terms of the employment of personal slaves for state purposes; rath-
er, they insisted, the general was violating the principle of fanompoana by his 
demand for exclusive sexual access to the queen:
We don’t know what Andriamihaja is thinking, but no one has ever treated a 
monarch in the way he’s treated you. No matter whom the queen may love, there’s 
never been anything like this. Look! What he’s done to you is not like service 
(fanompoana), living with you and nurturing you (itaizany anao); he is treating 
you like he would a wife in his own home, like a person of the same status. So we 
can’t accept that, even if that is what you want. There’s no lack of people for you 
to love in this land, for you are a queen for whom nothing is forbidden. Whoever 
you desire, take him! So here are our thoughts, your fathers and your mothers: 
pretend to be sick, and we will request the poison ordeal. (Callet 1908: 1148)74
Presumably this was so as to arrange matters in such a way that Andriamihaja 
should be determined to be responsible.
The author goes on to explain that the queen first balked at the prospect 
of exposing her immediate circle to the tangena, but finally the intervention of 
some of the old surviving wives of King Andrianampoinimerina was decisive, 
and she agreed. In other words, in this version, the entire story about the queen’s 
illness was actually a ruse, and what Raombana represents as a purely bedroom 
affair was the result of extensive political consultation and debate among differ-
ent powerful interests in the kingdom, with royal women playing the ultimately 
decisive role. 
The above passage is revealing, however, because it lays bare the ideological 
foundations of Ranavalona’s reign. The entire apparatus of government—up to 
74. “Tsy fantatray ny hevitr’ Andriamihaja, fa tsy mbola nisy nanao ny manjaka toy izao 
nataony aminao izao; na iza tian’ andriana na iza tian’ andriana, tsy mbola nisy toy 
izao. Ka he! ity ataony anao tsy ohatry ny fanompoana ny itoerany sy ny itaizany anao 
atoana, ataony anao ohatry ny fitondrany vady ao an·trano, ohatry ny olona mitovy 
hiany. Ka tsy mety izahay, na dia tianao aza izy. Fa tsy lany olona hotiana amin’ ity 
tany ity hianao, ka mpanjaka tsy manam-pady hianao amin’ ity tany ity hianao; izay 
tianao alaina, alao. Ary dia izao no hevitray ray aman-dreninao .  .  . modia marary 
hianao, izahay hangataka finomana.” 
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and including the military—was indeed seen as ultimately just a means of pro-
viding for the queen’s personal needs, whims, and indulgences. It was still all a 
vast system of nurturance. Yet as such it is necessarily a collective affair, involv-
ing every subject in the kingdom; the only thing the queen could not do, then, 
was to violate the latter principle, by allowing any one of her mpitaiza to stake 
an exclusive claim.
* * *
It is telling, then, the closest there was to an overt popular challenge to Ra-
navalona during her thirty-three years in power played on that very image of 
the queen as the old king’s “little girl.” This was the event that, according to 
Raombana, caused Ranavalona to make her final break with Christianity, and, 
ultimately, to ban “the praying,” as it was called, entirely.
One of the effects of early Christian evangelizing was, in Madagascar as in 
so many other places, the appearance of millenarian movements prophesying 
the imminent end of the world. In 1834, a certain Rainitsiandavana, a minor 
sampy guardian from Mandiavato to the north of Antananarivo, unlettered and 
with, our sources assure us, only indirect knowledge of Christian doctrine, be-
gan to claim to have learned in visions that the end times were near, and the 
dead would soon return to life. When that day came, he announced to his fol-
lowers, Ranavalona would reign as queen of the entire world, the time of wars 
and recruitment drives and poison ordeals would be over, crops would grow of 
their own accord, and men and women would live in universal peace, harmony, 
and equality (Freeman and Johns 1840: 91–97; Rabary 1910: 54–55; Raison-
Jourde 1991: 131–38). Several hundred devotees marched with him to the capi-
tal, carrying the sampy, to inform the queen of the good news. According to 
the version of events that soon became canonical in the Christian literature, 
Ranavalona sent envoys to interrogate the prophet, until, finally, he was asked 
whether the story of Adam and Eve implied that the queen was of the same 
descent as Mozambican slaves—and was outraged when Rainitsiandavana af-
firmed that it did. Raombana, as usual, gives us a rather different view. The way 
the story was remembered inside the palace was that what really terrified the 
queen were the political implications of the return of the dead:
Before they could arrive in town, news was immediately spread in it, that Rainit-
siandavana has received power from God to raise the dead up to life again; and 
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that his object in coming to town is to raise them up; and that he will first raise 
up Radama, and the sovereigns who are interred in the palace; after which he will 
go about all Imerina and raise up all the dead . . . . 
 These reports were received with avidity and joy by the superstitious popu-
lace of Antananarivo who fully expected that they will soon see and embrace all 
their dead relations again.
 They whispered and asked one another who will reign when all the dead 
sovereigns are raised up; whether it will be Her Majesty, or Radama, or Andri-
anampoinimerina or Andriamasinavalona, or who. Some said that Her Majesty 
would not deliver the kingdom to any of them but will retain it, as she has felt 
and enjoyed the sweetness of reigning. Others said that she will be obliged to 
resign the throne to one of the old sovereigns who has reigned better than her. 
And others in the gravest manner said that they fear there will be civil wars in 
Imerina again between these sovereigns, for that each will have their partisans. 
(Raombana n.d.: 41.161–65)
The queen ordered Rainitsiandavana and his main confederates be placed head 
down in a ditch and drowned in boiling water; others were made to undergo the 
tangena ordeal; many died; the survivors were sold into slavery.
It would appear that one critical weakness of any monarchy where the ruler 
is conceived as a child whose legitimacy derives from royal ancestors is what 
might happen if those ancestors actually reappear. It’s not a danger that most 
kings have to worry much about. But in the northern highlands of Madagascar 
from at least the time of Leiloza onward, dead monarchs were to begin appear-
ing among the living with increasing frequency.
Case 4: Radama II and the second women’s rebellion
About a year into her reign, Ranavalona gave birth to a son who, despite the 
circumstances of his birth, was declared to be Radama’s offspring by some form 
of mysterious spiritual conception. He was given the name Ikotoseheno, though 
in official documents he is universally referred to as RakotondRadama, or “King 
Radama’s little boy.” From his teenage years onward, the prince began to take 
more and more after Andriamihaja, who was widely rumored to be his actual 
father: aligning himself with the progressive faction at court, and becoming 
the devoted companion of the few foreigners allowed to remain in the city, and 
protector of the kingdom’s Christians. (The prince, however, considered himself 
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a Deist.) The queen had by this point swung decisively into the camp of tra-
ditionalists; but in her eyes, the prince could do no wrong. By the 1850s, they 
were operating openly at cross-purposes. RakotondRadama began cultivating 
a circle of liberally minded young companions, known as the Menamaso, or 
“red-eyes,” purportedly because of their fondness for wild late-night parties. As 
the queen relied more and more on the pantheon of royal sampy, her son began 
openly ridiculing the cult, even once setting fire to the shrine of Kelimalaza. 
As the queen, increasingly ill-tempered and arbitrary, began flying into rages 
at the slightest provocation and sentencing dozens at a time to death, her son 
adopted the habit of simply walking into prisons holding those he considered 
unjustly accused, releasing their fetters, and providing them money for a safe 
trip home. Some claimed he’d released literally thousands in this way (Régnon 
1863: 57–64; Anon. 1900: 486). It’s not clear whether his mother simply wrote 
it all off as youthful hijinks, or whether her advisors were afraid to tell her this 
was even happening.
In 1855, six years before his mother’s death, RakotondRadama had already 
signed a secret entente with French representatives promising to open the coun-
try to foreign investment once he came to power. He also began putting his 
Menamaso companions into positions of authority, particularly in the judiciary, 
as counterweights to the traditionalist military elite who controlled public af-
fairs. And when he did finally come to power, in 1861, at the age of thirty-one, 
he moved swiftly to reverse almost all of his mother’s policies. Indeed, if Queen 
Ranavalona might be said, on taking power, to have attempted to put into effect 
the demands of the women’s uprising of 1822, the new King Radama II might 
well be said to have tried to institute a kind of liberal, this-worldly version of 
Rainitsiandavana’s millenarian vision of 1834—the one his mother so brutally 
suppressed. Radama called an end to military recruitment; he sharply reduced 
the employment of forced labor, abolishing capital punishment and the poison 
ordeal; he declared freedom of religion, abandoned most spectacular public rit-
ual, eliminated customs tariffs, and opened the country to foreign trade. He also 
made clear his ultimate aim was to abolish slavery, and to dissolve the kingdom’s 
standing army entirely. 
Within a very short period of time, this did indeed lead to something very 
like an apocalyptic scenario. 
The problem with Radama’s project was that while his mother’s isolation-
ist strategy might have seemed cruel and barbaric, given Madagascar’s larger 
geopolitical situation, it actually made a lot of sense. The moment the country 
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was opened, and particularly the moment it was made legal for foreigners to buy 
land, Antananarivo was instantly invaded by a small army of corporate agents, 
diplomats, speculators, purveyors of get-rich-quick schemes, and flimflam art-
ists pretending to be any of the above. The kingdom’s infrastructural develop-
ment, even its mint, was turned over to one giant French conglomerate that 
under Napoleon III’s encouragement proposed to give itself the historically un-
promising name of the French East India Company; foreigners began buying 
up slaves and establishing sugar plantations in the plains surrounding the capi-
tal; and word began to spread that foreign interests were preparing to acquire 
large chunks of the island wholesale. 
Before long the capital was subsumed by a sense of social breakdown and 
rampant criminality. None of this was helped by the fact that, under the in-
fluence of the Menamaso and some French advisors, the young king’s own 
court began to very much resemble that of Tsimarofy: marijuana, hashish, and 
opium, now being produced in quantity alongside the rum being distilled at 
the new sugar plantations, were openly consumed in nightly champagne orgies 
at the palace. Again, sexual indulgence of this sort, for all it disconcerted the 
missionaries,75 was not in itself considered particularly scandalous—this was 
more or less the way a young prince was expected to behave—but in the context 
of the times, the combination of intoxication, foreign influence, erratic policy 
decisions, and immature self-indulgence clearly must have been seen as a repeti-
tion of just the sort of behavior that sparked rebellions against male monarchs 
in the past—only now, writ exceptionally large. 
In the late winter of 1863, rumors began to reach the capital of an epidemic 
of spirit possession, a “dancing mania” as the missionaries came to call it. Those 
affected first felt stiffness and fever, and reported feeling as if they were strug-
gling under a heavy weight; gradually, they fell into a trance-like state, marked 
by the constant need to dance. Here is how its beginnings were described by 
75. A typical comment: 
   The ruin of poor Radama was accelerated, and his untimely end very much 
hastened by the conduct of some French officers and others who got to the 
capital, and who aided and encouraged him in his sins, and in those orgies that 
were practiced in his palace. They probably taught him many sins he had never 
dreamt of before. They had champagne suppers night after night, for weeks 
and months, followed by scenes that dare not be described, and for many 
months the poor King could seldom be said to be in his senses. (Matthews 
1881: 20) 
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Radama’s court physician, one Dr. Davidson, assigned at the time to diagnose 
the phenomenon, in an article he was later to publish in the Edinburgh Medical 
Journal:
In the month of February 1863, the Europeans resident at Antananarivo, the 
capital, began to hear rumors of a new disease, which was said to have appeared 
in the west or southwest. The name given to it by the natives was Imanènjana, 
and the dancers were called Ramanènjana, a word which probably comes from a 
root signifying to make tense. . . . 
 After a time, however, it reached the Capital, and in the month of March 
began to be common. At first, parties of twos or threes were to be seen, accom-
panied by musicians and other attendants, dancing in the public places; and in 
a few weeks these had increased to hundreds, so that one could not go out of 
doors without meeting bands of these dancers. It spread rapidly, as by a sort of 
infection, even to the most remote villages in the central province of Imerina, so 
that having occasion to visit a distant part of the country, we found that even in 
remote hamlets, and more wonderful still, near solitary cottages, the sound of 
music, indicating the mania had spread even there. . . .
 Those affected belonged chiefly, but by no means exclusively, to the lower 
classes. The great majority were young women between fourteen and twenty-five 
years of age; there were however a considerable number of men to be seen among 
the dancers; but they certainly did not exceed one fourth of the entire number, 
and these also belonged mostly to the lower orders of society. (Davidson 1867: 
131; 1889: 21–22)
The sudden appearance of musicians everywhere might seem puzzling, but there 
is a longstanding tradition, throughout Madagascar, of musical diagnosis and 
cure. If there’s any reason to believe an illness might be caused by some invisible 
being wishing to make itself known—and there are many such: Bilo, Tromba, 
Salamanga, etc.— it is necessary first of all to determine what sort of spirit it 
is by the sort of music it responds to; then, if possible, to allow the intruder to 
dance itself out, and in the process, to express any message it might be intend-
ing to convey. The latter is important. A frustrated spirit might well prove fatal 
to its host. 
The Imanenjana soon took on a character halfway between an epidem-
ic and a popular uprising. One French historian (Raison-Jourde 1976; 1991: 
269–84) has even labeled what happened a kind of revolution through spectral 
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theater—which seems about right: I would only add, one that soon came to 
combine the most salient themes of 1822 and 1834. Certainly, women, slaves, 
and enslaved women in particular had the most to lose if Madagascar really did 
become a plantation economy under the aegis of foreign corporations and inves-
tors.76 Yet anyone contemplating open defiance of the government would surely 
also be aware of the fate of the women who marched on Antananarivo under 
the last Radama—or, for that matter, of what had happened to Rainitsiandavana 
himself. Somehow, in the visions and trances of the dancers, in the stories re-
constructed by those who tried to cure them, in subterranean political alliances 
that thus began to be made, a form of rebellion began to take shape that proved 
utterly impossible for the government to suppress. We do not know precisely 
how the pieces came together, but we know what happened when they did.
At first, the kingdom filled with rumors. Neither Western medicine nor 
Christian exorcism seemed to have any effect on those afflicted. Royal ances-
tors, it was said, were returning in some form, but there was not yet a consistent 
narrative as to why and which. William Ellis, envoy of the London Missionary 
Society, caught the king at a point, quite early on, when rumors were just begin-
ning to reach the palace:
When I went to the king I found him greatly excited by some reports of a new 
kind of sickness which had made its appearance in some of the villages at a dis-
tance from the capital. These reports had been coming in from different parts for 
two or three days past. The people, he said, had seen strange sights in the air, and 
heard unearthly sounds. The spirits of his ancestors had been seen in the heavens, 
and were coming to Antananarivo, and some great events were about to occur, 
but what, he did not know. He did not believe, he said, in ghosts, but since the 
reports came from such a number of people—nearly forty—and continued for 
three days, he did not know what to think of it. “Was it a sign,” he asked, “of the 
end of the world?” (W. Ellis 1867: 253)
Ellis assured him it was not, since that would only come after all nations were 
converted to Christianity.
76. This is not really the place to enter into the matter, but the 1860s began to see a 
broad change in the conditions of slavery in Imerina, whereby many slaves began 
winning increasing de facto, if not de jure, autonomy. While Radama II aimed to 
abolish slavery entirely, whether or not he had done so, establishing a plantation 
economy would certainly have reversed these trends decisively. 
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Gradually, the stories did begin to coalesce. Women were being possessed 
by the spirits of royal baggage carriers. It will be recalled that one of the most 
dramatic forms of oppression under the old regime had been the queen’s peri-
odic pleasure excursions, for which all the finery of court had to be transported, 
and thousands of villagers swept up to be employed as porters, given no food or 
provisions, until many collapsed and died. Now the spirits of these unfortunate 
victims were descending from Ambondrombe, the mountain of the dead, be-
cause Ranavalona I was determined to come and admonish her son for having 
allowed the Christians to return to the capital (he had even visited their chapels 
and accompanied them in their prayers!). The Tantara gives us a sampling of the 
kind of stories that began to circulate—some that spoke of just the kind of civil 
war between former monarchs some had feared in the days of Rainitsiandavana. 
The following account, for instance, appears to have been partly occasioned by 
the sighting of distant forest fires along the slopes of Ambondrombe:
When Mother Ranavalona died and came to Ambondrombe, the andriana and 
commoners on Ambondrombe were happy and rejoiced, and the people cried 
out for joy, and soldiers stood in formation, and music played, and cannons fired 
all around. The celebrations lasted over half a month. Many oxen were presented 
to Mother Ranavalona, and many cannon, so even on Ambondrombe the whole 
town was agog at the grandeur of the queen’s ascent. After a while some palace 
attendants from Antananarivo came to Ambondrombe [presumably because they 
had died], and told Mother Ranavalona, “Radama II and the people are praying.”
 And Mother Ranavalona was furious and spoke with Radama, saying, 
“They say that Ikotoseheno and my subjects in Antananarivo are praying.”
 And, purportedly, Father Radama told her, “He belongs to both of us. Let 
him do what he likes, because he’s our only child.”
 When Mother Ranavalona heard what Radama said she cried out in a 
rage, “So what mortal person is it who’s caused Ikotoseheno to start praying?”—
calling here to the people of Antananarivo. 
 Furious, she set out for the capital. Radama tried to stop her, but she 
wouldn’t let him; Radama tried to block off the road, but he wasn’t able to block 
it; Radama ordered the forest around the highway set on fire, but even then he 
couldn’t stop her; she was determined to seize her son anyway, because there was 
absolutely nothing she hated so much as praying. 
 And when she’d gone, Radama was frustrated, because he hadn’t been 
given many soldiers, there were a mere handful consigned to follow him when 
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he set out for Antananarivo. So Mother Ranavalona in her anger said, “I put my 
faith in you, you Army that follow me, and you others who refuse to abandon 
your Mistress (referring to the small numbers of soldiers and civilians with her). 
We must set out this very night!” (Callet 1908: 640)77 
Neither monarch had, apparently, managed to scrounge up sufficient forces in 
the land of the dead to support a march on the capital. The queen, however, 
knew how to gather reinforcements; and so, the account goes on to say, when 
the next day her followers began to flag under the weight of her baggage, she 
ordered them to seize anyone they passed on the road as porters—apparently, 
since Radama I plays no further part in the story, leaving her late husband lan-
guishing helplessly behind. 
Before long, possessed women and their escorts were occupying the sites of 
tombs and tops of sacred mountains, where they danced with bottles of water on 
their heads, or flung themselves from heights, to return unscathed; others were 
donning their finest apparel and marching in processions toward the capital, 
snatching the hats of all men they passed, claiming they had to be removed out 
of respect for the passing queen. Often they’d eat nothing for days on end, yet 
still showed themselves capable of impossible feats of strength. Slaves joined the 
77. “Raha tonga tao Ambondrombe Ranavalonareniny efa niamboho, dia faly sy ravo ny 
andriana sy ny ambaniandro tao Ambondrombe; ary nihoby ny vahoaka, sy nilahatra ny 
miaramila, sy velona ny mozika, ary nipoaka ny tafondro manodidina, ary izany fifaliana 
izany naharitra tapabolana mahery. Ny omby betsaka no nentin- dRanavalonareniny, 
ny tafondro betsaka, ka mahagaga tokoa tany an-tanana n’ Ambondrombe tamy ny 
izany fiakarany ny andriana izany. Ka nony efa tonga elaela Ranavalonareniny, dia 
misy olona tandapa taty Antananarivo tonga tany Ambondrombe, ka nilaza tamy ny 
Ranavalonareniny:’fa mivavaka Radama II sy ny vahoaka.’ Dia tezitra Ranavalona, 
ka niteny tamindRadamarainy hoe: ‘Mivavaka, hony, Kiotoseheno sy ny vahoaka ko any 
Antananarivo.’ Dia niteny, hony, Radamarainy nanao hoe: ‘lny no antsika, ka avelao 
izy hanao izay tia’ ny, fa zaza tokana amy ntsika.’—Raha nandre ny fitenindRadama 
Ranavalonareniny, dia tezitra ka nanao hoe ‘Olombelona iza moa no hampivavaka 
any Kiotoseheno!’ miantso ny olona aty Antananarivo. Dia tezitra izy, ka niezaka 
hankaty Antananarivo; ka no sakanan-Radama, ka tsy azo no sakanana; ka nambenan-
dRadama ny lalana, ka tsy azo nambenana izy; nasain-dRadama no dorana ny ala 
lalambe, ka tsy azo izy, fa miezaka haka ny zana’ ny hiany: fa tsy tia ny dia tsy tia’ ny 
indrindra ny mivavaka. Ary nony efa nandeha izy, dia tezitra Radama, ka tsy nomena 
miaramila betsaka, fa vitsy foana no nome’ny hanaraka azy hankaty Antananarivo. Ka 
tezitra Ranavalonareniny ka nanao hoe: ‘Toky no ome’ ko anareo ry foloalindahy izay 
manaraka ahy, sy hianareo tsy mahafoy Tompo, (miantso ny tsimandoa sy ny borizano 
vitsivitsy), dia tsy maintsy handeha isika anio alina.’” 
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caravans, some shackled in invisible chains; others would suddenly fall writhing 
as they were lashed by unseen overseers, stripes from spectral whips appearing 
mysteriously on their flesh. Numerous raids were carried out on the new plan-
tations around the capital, cash crops were seized and deposited on tombs, and 
dancers descended on the city from all directions carrying stalks of sugarcane.
Many converged on the plain of Mahamasina, a wide-open space at the foot 
of the hill of Antananarivo, containing the sacred stone on which Merina kings 
are traditionally invested in office. “This stone,” Davidson noted, “was a favorite 
rendezvous for them. They danced here for hours on end, and concluded by 
placing the sugarcane, as a sort of offering, upon the stone” (1867: 133).
The king, increasingly drug-addled and confused, wavered between pater-
nalistic indulgence and occasional ineffective attempts at police repression:
[The Ramanenjana] conveyed the fruits of the land, they seized whatever they 
liked, whether oranges, or sugarcane, or bananas. And they didn’t have the slight-
est fear of the thorns, as often owners would surround such fields with thorny 
hedges, but they just walked across the thorns, and no part of their bodies were 
injured in the process; they did whatever was required to seize the fruit of the 
land to carry to the king. Even if it was land guarded by its owner, they just took 
it, and their kin would pay money later; because Radama II put out an edict: 
“Whoever stands in the way of those who are sick, I declare guilty, do not stand 
in their way, let them take what they want to take, for they are ill.” And there at 
the sacred stone at Mahamasina they took the things they’d appropriated; they 
didn’t eat it, not at all, they placed it atop the sacred stone, or on top of moun-
tains, or at the head of tombs; and every now and then, one would carry it home 
to place in the Corner of the Ancestors. And when they presented the sugarcane 
and other fruits of the land, sometimes, their fevers would abate.78
78. “Dia manatitra ny vokatry ny tany, ka maka voankazo na fary na akondro .  .  .  . dia 
tsy matahotra ny tsilo akory izy ireny; fa matetika mifefy ny saha n’olona ka be tsilo 
manodidina, ka manitsaka ny tsilo be iny izy, ka tsy maratra ny tena ny rehetra amy 
ny izany, fa atao ny izay ahazoa’ ny ny vokatra ny tany ho entina amy ny andriana; fa 
raha tany miaro ny tomponjavatra, dia alain’ ny hiany, fa ny havana no mandoa vola; 
fa tamy ny Radama II namoaka didy izy nanao hoe, ‘raha misakana ny marary dia atao 
ko meloka, fa tsy sakanana izy, fa avela haka izay tia’ny halaina ireo, fa olona marary,’ 
dia eny amy ny vato masina eny Mahamasina, no mametraka ny zavatra alaina, fa tsy 
dia hani’ny tsy akory, fa atao ny eny ambony ny vatomasina, eny antendrombohitra, eny 
andoha fasana; indraindray enti’ny mody ka apetra’ny eo an-jorofirarazana; ary rahefa 
manatitra ny fary na zavatra hafa vokatry ny tany, dia miafa ny sasany.”
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And they say there were some, ill with the Ramanenjana, who entered the rova 
[the royal compound] saying “Where is Radama II?” 
 And the guards said, “He’s here inside the rova.”
 And the sick women spoke again, “Let us enter, as his mother has sent us 
here to see him.”
 The guards relayed those words to Radama, and he allowed the sick wom-
en to enter, and once before him the sick women said, “Be well, my Lord! Live 
long, my Lord! May you grow old beside your mother!”
 And Radama was taken aback by the words, “may you grow old beside your 
mother.” But, he asked himself, isn’t my mother dead? 
 Then the sick woman spoke, and said, “My Lord! Your mother is waiting 
for you over in Mahamasina.” 
 Radama II was shocked again to hear that, but then he ordered the woman 
arrested, because there wasn’t anything at all at Mahamasina, aside from innu-
merable sick people around the sacred stone, and those singing for them. And 
when Radama saw the sick woman, having been tied up, was on the point of 
dying, her ordered her released . . . . (Callet 1908: 641)79
The “fruit of the land” referred to here were treated exactly as santatra, which 
were conveyed to the king as a gesture of homage which also recognized him as 
a child, nurtured by the people. In fact, every aspect of the proceedings—con-
ducted almost exclusively by the laboring classes—might have been designed 
to reinforce the message that human labor is properly directed to that larger 
ritual system which nourishes the sovereign (and not, presumably, toward inter-
nationally oriented commercial enterprise). The carrying of sugarcane, for in-
stance, recalls processions carried out during circumcision rituals—the prince’s 
79. “Ary misy koa, hony, ny marary Ramanenjana niditra tany anaty rova nanao hoe: 
‘Aiza Radama II?’—Dia niteny ny mpiambina nanao hoe: ‘Ato anaty rova.’—Dia 
niteny indray ny marary: ‘Avelao aho hiditra, fa asain-dreny ny mankaty amy ny.’—
Dia lazainy ny mpiambina amindRadama izany teny izany; dia navela ny hiditra ny 
marary; dia niteny ny marary eo anatrehan dRadama II nanao hoe: ‘Sarasara Tompo ko 
e! trarantitra Tompo ko e! mifanantera amy ny reny nao.’—Dia taitra Radama amy ny 
teny hoe mifanantera aminy reny nao.—‘Moa, hoy Radama anakampo ny, tsy maty ny 
reny ko!’—Dia niteny ny marary nanao hoe: ‘Tompokolahy o!: reny nao etsy Mahamasina 
miandry anao.’ Taitra indray Radama II nandre izany, ka nasai’ny ho samborina ny 
marary, fa teo Mahamasina tsy nisy na inona na inona akory, afatsy ny marary be dia be 
manodidina ny vato masina, sy ny mpihira ny marary. Ary rahefa voa fatotra ny marary, 
dia saikia maty, dia nasain-dRadama nalefa . . . ” 
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own circumcision, many years before, had been a nationwide festival of unpar-
alleled magnificence—but these were precisely the kinds of great public cer-
emonial he was currently abandoning. The fact that the women who now filled 
the streets of the city, surrounding the palace, claimed to have been sent there 
by the king’s own mother to admonish him only made the message unusually 
transparent.
Even when the king tried to propitiate the Ramanenjana, his gestures tend-
ed to backfire. According to one foreign observer, after the “crazy dancers” had 
descended on the palace, Radama even issued an edict that all who passed them 
on the road should, indeed, doff their hats as to his mother—an order which 
then caused no slight indignation on the part of members of the elite now 
obliged to render respect to what many considered mere mobs of rebellious 
female slaves (S. P. Oliver 1866: 94–95).
Before long, the sampy guardians, stalwarts of the anti-Christian faction, 
began to come out into the streets in support of the dancers. The Christians 
tried to mobilize their own marches against them. The city began to experience 
something like a general insurrection. Whole regiments of soldiers seized by 
the “disease” marched on the city, bringing their guns and even toting pieces of 
artillery; companies of workers summoned for fanompoana abandoned their as-
signments and converged on Mahamasina. The military high command—who 
were mostly from the traditionalist faction—became increasingly restless as the 
king’s behavior seemed to grow ever more unhinged and bizarre. Finally, in 
mid-May 1863, they found a pretext in a royal order legalizing dueling: consid-
ering the state of the capital, this must have seemed like a veritable invitation 
to civil war. The commander in chief, the later Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony, 
ordered two thousand troops into the city to besiege the rova and slaughter the 
Menamaso. A few days later, the king himself was strangled with a red silk cord, 
and the kingship allowed to pass to his wife—but only on condition she agree to 
reverse her late husband’s decision to allow foreigners to buy land in the country. 
(Christians, however, were still allowed full freedom to pray and to proselytize.) 
That August, the new queen Rasoherina duly appeared on the stone of Maha-
masina to accept the people’s vows.
So ended the brief reign of the last of Madagascar’s would-be Napoleonic 
reformers. In a kabary held on April 24 of the next year, her new prime minister 
introduced Rasoherina to the Ambanilanitra—the “below the sky,” or people of 
the country—in the following fashion:
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And as for the common people, whether white or black, may you live! But also, 
do not be the nurses of many; because it is Queen Rasoherina who is the nursling 
of the people. (Cousins 1873: 49)80
CONCLUSIONS
If half of wisdom is knowing how to ask the right questions, then we are, per-
haps, roughly halfway there. 
It would seem that something about the integration of the Merina kingdom 
into the larger world economy triggered a crisis in its very conception of sov-
ereignty. Traditionally, monarchs were seen as very much like children: willful, 
egocentric, yet totally dependent on the people whose willingness to tend to 
their needs made their lives possible, and whose willingness to obey even their 
most arbitrary orders made them sovereigns. Infantilizing rulers in this way had 
a double effect: on the one hand, it made it possible for their subjects to forgive 
even the most occasionally brutal behavior; on the other, it provided a language 
through which those subjects, as the king’s nursemaids, could intervene when a 
consensus arose among them that things had gone too far. 
One might argue that it was really King Andrianampoinimerina who first 
marked a break with this tradition. But matters seem to have really come to a 
head in 1816, shortly after his death, once European missionaries and advisors 
appeared on the scene. From that moment on, an unmistakable pattern appears. 
All male sovereigns—including near- or apparent would-be ones like Andri-
amihaja—see themselves as Napoleonic reformers,81 and each is directly chal-
lenged by women: Radama I by the women’s assembly of 1822; Andriamihaja 
by the former wives of Andrianampoinimerina who convinced Ranavalona to 
destroy her ambitious lover; Radama II by the trance dancers of 1863. Radama 
I seems to have been most effective in fending such challenges off, but in fact 
it wasn’t long before he fell into the drunken malaise that destroyed him—one 
80. “Ny ambani-lanitra, na ny fotsy, na ny mainty, veloma, koa aza maro fitaiza; fa 
Rasoheri-manjaka no taizany ny ambani-lanitra.”
81. Radama II never self-consciously identified himself with Napoleon as far as we 
know, but he actually entered into an alliance with one, Napoleon III, and clearly 
saw himself as an Enlightenment reformer on the same model.
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could argue, as a direct result of the dismantling of the ritual system which was, 
ultimately, designed to nurture and sustain the king. 
Why did this happen? 
In the existing literature, such overly ambitious kings tend to be identified 
with a mythic figure, derived from highland folktales, of the Andriambahoaka 
or “universal sovereigns” from the center of the four quarters of the cosmos,82 
and hence a revival of heroic figures of the past—even, kings who took seri-
ously the notion that they were “Gods seen by the eye.” They represent a kind 
of bursting into the present of mythological times. Worldwide, this is not at 
all an uncommon conception, but in this context it seems particularly inap-
propriate. What’s unusual about the vision of history that emerges from the 
Tantara and other nineteenth-century texts is that it does not follow the com-
mon pattern where time is, as it were, layered; accounts do not begin with some 
great cosmological epic full of gods and primordial beings, where fundamental 
institutions such as cooking or marriage or death came into existence, move on 
to a heroic world where cities and nations are founded, and only then, finally, to 
the more modest imitations of such primordial gestures by the lesser beings of 
today. Quite the contrary. The earliest beings, in such stories, were disorganized 
primitives known as Vazimba, and the conquering invaders who displaced them, 
ancestors of the hova and andriana, were led by rulers who were said to have 
gradually created the basic institutions of society—everything from ironwork-
ing to circumcision rituals to the protocols of deliberative assemblies—all by 
themselves (Delivré 1974: 185–99). 
Kings were thus expected to be innovators and inventors.
All this is familiar enough to scholars of Malagasy, but it seems to me few 
are willing to consider the full implications. If it is possible for kings to be in-
novators and inventors on this scale, it is because the powers of creativity that in 
so many traditions exist only in a distant illo tempore (as Mircea Eliade famously 
named it), that is, in mythological times, are distributed evenly across history. 
But if this is true that means that for all intents and purposes, Malagasy people 
were still living in mythological times. I think the same is true today. It took me 
82. Andriambahoaka actually just means “Lord [of ] the People,” but in some of the 
myths recorded in the nineteenth century this name is given not just to a legendary 
king of Imamo, but to a kind of generic all-powerful king of the center, matched 
by princes of the north, east, west, and south (Dahle and Sims [1877] 1986). The 
argument is that this is an essentially Javanese conception of sovereignty. It’s never 
been clear to me what the Andriambahoaka concept is actually supposed to tell us 
that we don’t already know. 
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a while to come to grips with the situation when I was conducting my own re-
search in Betafo. I had been taught to look for cosmological myths, and then try 
to understand ritual as small-scale, latter-day imitations of the great primordial 
gestures they encode. I found it quite impossible to apply this sort of cosmologi-
cal analysis. Almost no one knew anything that might be described as a cosmo-
logical myth, and if they did, they did not take them in any way seriously. It was 
only gradually I came to realize that any wondrous powers—to cast lightning, 
become invisible, transform landscapes, speak with animals, turn bullets into 
water, etc.—that might have featured in such stories, and that still featured in 
historical stories about “Malagasy times,” were still believed to exist today. Now 
as then, they were simply a matter of knowing how to manipulate medicine 
(fanafody).83 And such knowledge could be acquired, if one knew where to look, 
had a knack or natural facility, or were just willing to pay a great deal of money. 
There was no fundamental difference between the present and the mythic past. 
In such a world, the role of ancestors is necessarily ambivalent. On the one 
hand, who one is in the world depends largely on the status and location of one’s 
ancestors. On the other hand, to achieve anything significant in life, one must 
break away from one’s ancestors’ shadow at least to some degree. This is all the 
more the case for royalty. In fact, most of the mpitaiza andriana who created 
royal ritual—the astrologers, diviners, keepers of charms—were technicians of 
the future, not guardians of the past. And as Charles Renel (1920: 157–58) as-
tutely pointed out, the secret of the santatra borne by the guardians of the royal 
tombs was the desire to propitiate the royal ancestors, to effectively get them out 
of the way, so that one could create something radically new. 
But since one is living in mythological times, one also must accept the pos-
sibility that the ancestors might not accept this, even that the dead might per-
sonally intervene to bring matters back under their control.
This is the final implication of the king as child: sheer potentiality. One does 
not really know yet what a child might become. Royal children were expected to 
do something new and surprising. Thus perhaps it only stands to reason that once 
the Merina court was in direct contact with Europeans offering new and pow-
erful social and mechanical technologies, young princes would tend to eagerly 
embrace them, identify with them, fancy themselves enlightened despots, toss 
aside old technologies for new. Neither is it particularly surprising that women 
83. So characters in legends with wondrous powers are often specifically said to have 
acquired them through ody, or charms, and even when not stated, it could be said to 
be implied. 
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regularly appeared to remind them that these old technologies they were toss-
ing away were an intrinsic element of a vast system of caring labor that began 
with commoner households, but culminated in their own. What is surprising, 
perhaps, is that so many of the men in power were forced to acknowledge this. 
Placing queens on the throne, then, was above all a way of acknowledging 
this. Even the traditionalists who supported Ranavalona I were not conserva-
tives in the strict sense of the term—the queen didn’t abandon the tradition of 
royalty as a source of innovation; she even sponsored her own crash industri-
alization program—but they ensured that no one in the kingdom could forget 
what the kingdom ultimately was: an intricate system of ritualized caring labor. 
That we may still live in mythic times, but, as women know and men tend to 
forget, myth is founded on work. 
In part, this was effected by a startling reversal. The royal household at the 
very pinnacle of the kingdom became an exact inversion of the households on 
the bottom, being composed of a child-queen served and supported by her male 
“nursemaids.” That arrangement itself operated as a kind of magical charm that 
transformed even the most onerous unpaid male work assignments—dragging 
trees, toting fuel, digging ditches, carrying baggage, military service in distant 
garrisons—into caring labor, analogous to their own mothers’ or mpitaiza’s 
when they had been infants carried on a woman’s back. 
In the end, this was not successful as a geopolitical formula to fend off 
European aggression; but it’s not clear that any other approach would have 
worked particularly better. The resulting system was certainly oppressive. But 
if nothing else, reformulating all free labor as care and nurture to the queen, 
that is, establishing principles that were exactly the opposite of those of Euro-
pean political economy, also made it absolutely impossible for such commercial, 
agricultural, or industrial relations to make any significant headway while the 
island did remain independent. Even after Queen Ranavalona II’s conversion to 
Protestantism in 1869, which led to Christianity effectively becoming the state 
religion, British missionaries tried in vain to explain concepts such as capital 
and wage labor to their parishioners, and complained endlessly of the impos-
sibility of convincing the queen’s freeborn subjects that working for wages was 
fit for anyone but slaves.84 Even after sixty-five years of French colonial rule, and 
over a half-century of independence, many are still convinced this is the case.
84. For instance, the very first issue of the Malagasy-language mission journal Ny 
Mpanolo Tsaina (“The Advisor”) began with a piece explaining the concept of 
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* * *
It would be interesting to consider the case of the Merina kingdom in relation 
to contemporary theories of caring labor. Feminist theories of caring labor, from 
Nancy Folbre (1995) to Silvia Federici (2012) to Evelyn Glenn Nakano (2012), 
have tended, for obvious reasons, to examine how these matters are framed in 
the terms of political economy, since this is the logic behind the institutions that 
affect the vast majority of women today. In the world as imagined by political 
economy, (tacitly male) “productive” labor is always assumed to be the primary 
form, and (tacitly female) “caring” or “reproductive” labor becomes its usually 
unacknowledged mirror image. Still, even if one does acknowledge both sides 
of the equation, that primary division remains. This is by no means the only way 
to divide things up. In the highlands of Madagascar, everything was different. 
Labor was assumed to be first and foremost women’s business; the paradigm for 
work was bearing burdens; but bearing burdens was seen as combining a range 
of activities that we would classify into such different domains as transport, 
building, digging, and nurturance. Moreover, labor was also seen as continu-
ous with ritual, the ritual element was seen as making it truly creative, and the 
ritualization of labor—and the most ritualized forms of labor as well—was pre-
ponderantly the domain of men. 
Even under the queens, powerful men were obviously the primary benefi-
ciaries of the system. One would not wish to idealize it. But it was only because 
it was based on fundamentally different assumptions about what labor, and what 
we call an “economy,” is basically about that it both allowed women such power-
ful ways to influence politics, and managed to resist the incursions of those who 
would have reduced Madagascar to a plantation economy so effectively for so 
long.
* * *
Once the queens were no more, the entire ritual apparatus simply disintegrated, 
and the concept of fanompoana as caring labor appears to have been forgotten 
capital, followed in the next issue by a piece on the nature of wage labor (Anon. 
1879a, 1879b). Missionary accounts are full of complaints about how difficult it 
is to convince government officials to contemplate eliminating forced labor and 
substituting a regime in which the government taxes and then hires its subjects.
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almost instantly.85 Memories of the old kingdom quickly came to center on 
male figures like Leiloza, unjust oppressors who, insofar as they were seen as 
children, were anything but lovable. 
I’ve been emphasizing relations with the outside world as crucial in set-
ting off the crisis in Merina kingship. But one could make the argument it all 
really began with Andrianampoinimerina, who knit the various principalities 
into something that is universally acknowledged to qualify as a state. Maurice 
Bloch (2006) has made a case that, historically, something about the creation 
of states in particular had the effect of disorganizing domestic ritual, causing it 
to become partial and incomplete, and that, at least in the case of powerful and 
successful states, matters simply could not be put back again the way they had 
been—and that this remained the case if those states themselves collapsed or 
otherwise passed from history. (He argues that religion, as an autonomous in-
stitution, first emerged to fill the resultant gap.) The Merina kingdom is one of 
his prime examples. The more elaborate and beautiful its royal palaces became, 
Bloch argues, the less care and ritual attention subjects tended to invest in their 
own houses, until, finally, when the kingdom collapsed, houses never recovered 
their former ritual importance, but instead, the ritual focus shifted to ancestral 
tombs (Bloch 1995). 
It’s a compelling argument. In fact, one could argue that the two great con-
temporary ritual complexes around which I first framed my analysis of royal rit-
ual—famadihana, and the network of doany with their mediumistic curers—are 
both transformations and reappropriations of royal ritual itself. Already in the 
waning days of the kingdom, commoners had begun shifting their focus from 
royal ancestors to their own: the habit of periodically opening tombs to rewrap 
the dead (Haile 1891; Larson 2001) and defining themselves as descendants 
85. As part of my research for this essay, I consulted a number of Malagasy-language 
histories of Merina ancestries, compiled over the course of the twentieth century 
(Zanak’Andriantompokoindrindra: Rasamimanana and Razafindrazaka 1909; 
Zanak’Andrianetivola: Ratsimba 1939; Tsimiamboholahy: Rabeson 1948; 
Zanak’Antitra: M. Rasamuel 1948; Terak’Andriamanarefo: Andriamifidy 1950; 
Zanak’Andriamamilaza: Ramilison 1952; Antemoro-Anakara: Kasanga 1956; 
Ambohitrimanjaka: Randriamarosata 1959; Zanak’Andrianamboninolona: 
Andriamanantsiety 1975; Manendy: Rakotomanolo 1981), examining the language 
used to describe relations to royalty. Remarkably, even in the earliest, no trace of the 
language of taiza, ubiquitous in the Tantara and other nineteenth-century texts, 
could be found. 
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rather than ancestors.86 But the deep, hidden logic of royal ancestral ritual was 
preserved. Just as those bearing santatra effected a double reversal, first neutral-
izing the ancestors so that the living king could create or do something new, 
then infantilizing and thereby neutralizing the king himself so that living com-
moners could enjoy the fruits of their labor, so too did famadihana rituals honor 
the dead so as to ultimately lock them away and prevent their interfering with 
the living. At the same time, the spectral theater created by the Ramanenjana 
has now become permanent. The old cult of the “twelve sacred mountains” has 
been definitively appropriated by the descendants of commoners and slaves, 
who have turned its cast of characters, once celebrated in the Tantara ny an-
driana, into a kind of prolonged meditation on the moral perils of arbitrary, 
coercive power. 
* * *
Outside of Madagascar, the notion that kings are a little bit like children is 
unusual (notable exceptions being Schwartz 1989, 1990; Springborg 1990), but 
the notion that children, especially infants and toddlers, are a little bit like kings 
is commonplace. In China they speak of “little emperors.” Freud referred to “his 
majesty the baby.” 
It’s not hard to see why: it’s for all the reasons outlined in this essay. Mon-
archs are regularly expected to behave in ways that, were any of their ordinary 
adult subjects to imitate them, would be likely to be taken as profoundly im-
mature. And all of us—women especially, of course, but everyone to some ex-
tent—are also used to reacting with love and affection to egocentric tantrums 
or even outright cruelty on the part of actual children; this is true whether our 
culture teaches us that the proper way to respond is with nurturant indulgence 
or by stern rebuke. There’s no need to appeal to evolutionary arguments here; 
it’s necessary to do this, on a fairly regular basis, in order to bring children to 
maturity at all. And endlessly repeated, it can only become something of a habit. 
I have suggested, in this essay, that herein lies the secret of the ideologi-
cal power of monarchy. Because it cannot be denied that monarchy is, in 
86. The most telling sign here was the change in naming practices: teknonymy was 
almost entirely abandoned, and especially in the early years of colonial rule, 
more and more names took the form instead of, for example, Razanadrakoto or 
Razafindrabe, that is, “Child of Rakoto” or “Grandchild of Rabe.” 
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world-historical terms, a very common form of government, and often a stub-
bornly effective one; apparently, there is something about taking one single 
household, with all its inevitable household dramas, and placing it at the pin-
nacle of a political system that manages to grab hold of the imagination and 
affections of subject populations in a way that few others manage to do. Part of 
the reason is, of course, that monarchs actually produce babies; in almost any 
other form of government, children and babies are definitively off-stage. It’s not 
far from here to suggest that monarchs in many ways are babies. Childishness—
childish snits, childish indulgence, childish self-aggrandizement—is what court 
life is largely about. 
In the first chapter of this volume, Marshall Sahlins makes the argument 
that insofar as there is a primordial political state, it is authoritarianism. Most 
hunter-gatherers actually do see themselves as living under a state-like regime, 
even under terrifying despots; it’s just that since we see their rulers as imaginary 
creatures, as gods and spirits and not actual flesh-and-blood rulers, we do not 
recognize them as “real.” But they’re real enough for those who live under them. 
We need to look for the origins of liberty, then, in a primal revolt against such 
authorities. I do not mean to argue that ontogeny exactly reproduces phylogeny 
in this case; but it’s easy to see how the argument being developed here might 
be seen as complementary in a sense. Every human being has a primordial ex-
perience of autocracy, far earlier than any experience of equal relations could 
possibly be—and here I refer not, as usually supposed, to the apparent absolute 
power of mothers or other adults (since, at first, infants cannot even recognize 
others as autonomous beings with power or intentions), but in their own behav-
ior. Children are would-be autocrats. They are at first incapable of anything else, 
since they lack the capacity to even comprehend another’s point of view. 
Perhaps these truths are unusually apparent in a place like Madagascar with 
an explicit ethos of consensus-based communal decision making. In local as-
semblies, fokon’olona—really this word just refers to any meeting that brings 
together everyone affected by some common problem—the only criterion for 
participation is if one is mature enough to formulate a reasonable argument. But 
they also explicitly reject any principle of representation or leadership. Children, 
and kings, are thus the only people who are in a sense incapable of the mutual 
understanding and compromise that defines mature deliberation. 
It’s helpful to bear this in mind when we think about what raising children 
actually consists of. The text in the Tantara says that taking care of the royal 
family is “just like taking care of children,” but really it isn’t, since the point of 
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raising children is that they eventually grow up. The people’s nurture, in con-
trast, traps rulers in permanent immaturity. Time after time, in my own circles, 
I’ve heard parents with antiauthoritarian politics agonize over to what degree 
it is appropriate to discipline children, or even, sometimes, to control or guide 
their behavior in any way. It obviously can’t be avoided to some degree. Does 
that mean that on a certain level authoritarian behavior is not just legitimate 
but inevitable? I myself puzzled over the problem for many years until one day it 
occurred to me: Is it necessarily “authoritarian” to intervene to stop a child from 
behaving in an egocentric and harmful fashion? Surely it all depends on how 
you do it. There’s nothing intrinsically authoritarian about doing so because it’s 
normally only really required when children themselves behave like would-be 
autocrats. If it is done in such a way as to gently guide a child toward the even-
tual capacity to engage in mutually considerate, mature, egalitarian behavior, it’s 
not authoritarian at all: it’s actually antiauthoritarian. This would suggest that 
not only do we all share a primordial experience of (our own) autocracy, but 
we’ve all experienced a form of love designed to allow us to transcend it, and 
move us on to at least the capacity for something else.

chapter 6
The cultural politics of core–periphery relations
Marshall Sahlins
My intent is to put the issue of “soft power” in a world-historical frame. I 
speak here of the anthropological experience of core–periphery systems, which 
are much more extensive, ethnographically and historically, than the modern 
“world-system” of capitalism described by Wallerstein and colleagues. Similar 
configurations of domination are in fact planetary in scope—they are common 
even in tribal zones—and are doubtless even older than the history that began 
at Sumer. The effect is a multicultural order of intercultural relations in which 
no participating society is sui generis. So, for example, the relations between 
valley civilizations and the upland “tribals” of Southeast Asia—a major focus of 
this essay—as described by James C. Scott:
Both hill and valley peoples were planets in a larger galactic system (Indic or 
Sinic) of mutual influence. Hill peoples may not have been subjects of valley 
states, but they were active participants in the economic system of exchange and 
in the even wider cosmopolitan circulation of ideas, symbols, cosmology, titles, 
political formulas, medical recipes, and legends. (2009: 305–6) 
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And conversely:
Histories of the classical lowland court-states, taken in isolation, risk being unin-
telligible or vastly misleading. Lowland states (mandala or modern) have always 
existed in symbiosis with hill society. (2009: 26) 
I hasten to add that although they are often recognized, these multicultural 
orders are rarely theorized. They are largely ignored by a normal anthropologi-
cal science of autonomous and self-fashioning cultures, each a world unto itself. 
There is a radical disjunction between functionalist, structuralist, evolutionist, 
and other such paradigms of cultural self-determination, and the often observed 
fact that the cultural differences which distinguish interacting peoples—not to 
mention the similarities that unite them—are largely dependent on the rela-
tions between them. Consider this notice of Randall Collins (1992: 373), from 
the introduction to an article on “The geopolitical and economic world-systems 
of kinship-based and agrarian-coercive societies”:
I want to suggest that there is no type of society in any period of human exist-
ence in which world-system relationships do not affect its structure and dynam-
ics. That is to say, economic and political/military connections among organized 
social units affect these units as an overall pattern; all societies are in important 
respects structure from the outside in. 
Not to mention “spiritual” connections. Human societies the world over are not 
only interdependent with societies of other kinds, they are also dependent for 
their own existence on relations with humans of other kinds. I mean the gods, 
ancestors, ghosts, demons, species-masters, and other such metapersons, includ-
ing those inhabiting plants, animals, and natural features: in sum, the host of 
“spirits”—wrongly so-called; they are this-worldly and indeed have the attrib-
utes of persons—the host of whom are endowed with life-and-death powers 
over the human population. “Each society,” writes Georges Balandier, “links its 
own order to an order beyond itself, and, in the case of traditional societies, to 
the cosmos” (1972: 101). Lest you think I am going astray, everything I now 
say on this score is in support of the observation that the cultural-cum-political 
authority of dominant societies in many traditional core–periphery formations, 
notably as this authority extends as “soft power” into regions beyond the coer-
cive reach of the center, is based rather on an indigenous anthropology of the 
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metahuman sources of human welfare. No battle is won, no child is born, no gar-
dens flourish or pots come whole from the kiln without the intervention of the 
metapersonal powers-that-be—to whom the human powers-that-be have privi-
leged relations. The kingly gifts of fertility and victory, wealth and health, beauty 
and monumentality manifested in the center resound in the peripheries as so 
many demonstration-effects of divine life-giving powers. Unlike their material 
manifestations, such powers are discursively communicable, socially transmissi-
ble, and ritually accessible. In the event, hinterland peoples may be attracted and 
subordinated to the center culturally while they are still independent politically.1 
As noted previously (chapters 3 and 4), this soft power of acculturation ap-
pears by definition in Aidan Southall’s discussion of the “segmentary state,” a 
multicultural order of the core–periphery kind found in many parts of Africa—
in which, however, “the spheres of ritual suzerainty and political sovereignty do 
not coincide. The former [the ritual authority] extends widely towards a flexible, 
changing periphery. The latter [political authority] is confined to a central core 
domain” (1988: 53). Described in fine detail by Southall, the Alur chiefdoms in 
Uganda west of the Nile, where immigrant rulers of Nilotic Luo origin domi-
nate a variety of Sudanic, Bantu, and Nilotic communities, are classic exam-
ples of the segmentary state. Southall’s succinct characterization of the spatial 
structure of Alur rule could indeed serve as a model of core–periphery systems 
in general—even the imperial systems of cosmocratic ambitions, including the 
East Asian “world-systems” that will occupy much of this essay: 
In Alurland, the greater chiefs are focal points of rudimentary political speciali-
zation, from which an almost spatial zoning of authority spheres radiates, from 
that of chiefship in the center, through that of chieflets with non-Alur subjects, 
to that of peripheral non-Alur groups vaguely recognizing some aspects of the 
charisma of [Alur] chiefship but continuing with their own autonomous kinship 
authorities. ([1956] 2004: 124)
Also exemplary, and more pertinent for the moment, are the spiritual sources of 
the Alur chiefs’ domination of peripheral groups. Alur rule was not established 
by conquest or sustained by force. “Had his [the chief ’s] position depended on 
the command of force or on personal prowess in war it appears that many units 
1. The cosmic polity of metaperson powers encompassing human societies is discussed 
at length in chapter 1.
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of Alur domination of other peoples would never have come into existence, for 
no irresistible force was brought to bear in their establishment” (ibid.: 246). 
Rather the reverse: it is the Alur chief who is effectively conquered by the sub-
ordinate people, as happens often enough in practice and prescriptively in ritual, 
when chiefly Alur men are “kidnapped” and carried off by other ethnic commu-
nities—who have their own reasons for wanting a chief to rule them. Prominent 
among these reasons is “rain”:
Rain (koth) stood for material well-being in general, and a chief ’s ability to dem-
onstrate his control over it was a crucial test of his efficacy. The chief ’s control of 
rain and weather, together with his conduct of sacrifice and worship, stood for 
his general and ultimate responsibility in the minds of his subjects for both their 
material and moral well-being. (Southall [1956] 2004: 239)
As Frazer, Hocart, and numerous ethnographers have taught: the world around, 
the king is the condition of the possibility of the people’s welfare by virtue of 
his privileged access to the divine sources of prosperity and life itself. Note, in 
particular, Southall’s observation that the Alur chief gains authority over “the 
minds of his subjects”—not their bodies. This is a political economy of social 
subjugation rather than material coercion. Here, as in many such chiefdoms and 
kingdoms (see chapters 3 and 4, the means of production in the primary, sub-
sistence sectors are “owned” by the underlying producing population, and more 
particularly by the ancestors or local spirits indwelling in their lands. According-
ly, kingly power does not work on a proprietary control of the people’s means of 
existence so much as on direct command of the people themselves—and thereby 
on some portion of their product in goods and manpower. The powers-that-be 
have an extractive rather than a productive relation to the economic process. By 
contrast to capitalist enterprise, which aims at the increase in productive wealth 
as such, the objective of the palace economy is to increase the number and loy-
alty of subjects, as by beneficial or awe-inspiring effects of royal largess, display, 
and consumption. Wealth here is a strategic means of power, although not the 
only means, and not the ultimate end. And beyond any material advantage to 
the people-at-large, what the king’s disposition of riches demonstrates is his ac-
cess to its divine origins—from which follow the benefits he promises to others.2 
2. This politics of manpower rather than capital power as such is discussed in some 
detail in chapters 3 and 4.
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“Soft power” may thus become real-political power even in tribal zones As 
Mary Helms observes: for all that the best examples of superordinate centers are 
known from “centralized societies,” similar formations are commonly found in 
so-called “non-centralized societies.” Indeed, they are present “at least to some 
degree in any setting in which a polity extends its skillfully crafted symbols 
and encapsulations (‘regalia’) of political-ideological identity to at least select 
outside groups and/or acquires resources from some portion of the geographical 
outside realm.” (1993: 157).
Just so, the dominance respectively achieved by the Iatmul and Abelam peo-
ples over other groups in the Middle Sepik region of New Guinea peoples was 
essentially similar to the reign-cum-rain of the great Alur chief over Bantu 
and Sudanic villagers, or for that matter the superiority of the Celestial Em-
peror over the “raw” barbarians of the Chinese borderlands. Indeed, speaking of 
the Sepik “regional systems,” Deborah Gewertz (1991: 236) specifically likened 
them to “a world system . . . predicated on power asymmetries.” But, of course, 
the asymmetries of power did not entail the Iatmul’s governance of the peo-
ples who respected it and desired to share its benefits. Working from second-
ary centers subordinate to Iatmul, Gewertz from among the nearby Chambri 
and Simon Harrison from the Manambu people, the ethnographers describe a 
regional system quite like Southall recorded for the Alur: a series of concentric 
zones of decreasing cultural influence emanating from the dominant Iatmul 
core, as conveyed by intermediate groups to the less powerful hinterlands. 
The Manambu . . . seem to have imported throughout their history very many 
elements of Iatmul culture, particularly ritual, magic, totemism, and myth. To 
the Manambu, the cultural forms of the Iatmul are surrounded by an aura of 
especially dangerous power, and are therefore valuable to acquire. The Iatmul 
seem to have a similar domineering influence on all the groups they traded with. 
They exported many elements of their culture to the Sawos and Chambri, for 
instance, as well as to the Manambu, while the Chambri and the Manambu were 
in turn exporters of their culture to their respective sago-suppliers to the south. 
(Harrison 1990: 20)
The intermediately situated peoples, notably the Chambri, also appropriated 
powers and even ancestors from the marginal “bush” groups; but throughout 
the region it was particularly Iatmul metapersonal potency that was highly cov-
eted. In many ways, Harrison (ibid.: 78–79) explains, the Iatmul were deemed 
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by Manambu to be associated with “the ‘invisible’ world of spirits.” Such spir-
its spoke through their Manambu shaman mediums in a language laced with 
extraordinary Iatmul features: a language that conveyed the beings and forces 
of a widespread totemic cosmology. More than any other of their neighbors, 
Harrison says, the Iatmul “embody” this hidden realm “which is the perceived 
source of all power.” It perhaps goes without saying that the power thus im-
ported, as it gave access to the life-giving totemic ancestors, included the indis-
pensable means of human fertility and material livelihood. 
So run the reports of the Abelam hegemony as well. The extraordinary 
cultural achievements of the Abelam represented “spiritual” powers that were 
themselves dangerous, attractive, and useful to others. These were all-purpose 
achievements, not just material or military but also aesthetic and demographic 
distinctions that by invidious contrasts to surrounding societies could engender 
an indigenous anthropology of cultural evolution. In Anthony Forge’s summary: 
Effectiveness in warfare and skill in growing yams, particularly the phallic long 
yams, were in local terms merely the material manifestations of a more funda-
mental Abelam domination, that of power conceived fundamentally in magical 
and ritual terms. The Abelam were admired and feared for what was believed to 
be superior access to supernatural power in all forms and the concrete expression 
of this command in rituals, buildings, and an immense array of objects, decora-
tions, and styles loosely classifiable as “art.” In Sepik terms, it was the Abelam’s 
superior access to supernatural power that made their long yams larger, their 
gardens more productive, and their occupation of land previously the undoubted 
property of others so conclusive. (1990: 162–63)
This emphasis on the “superior access to supernatural power,” which under-
writes also the dominant status of major Alur chiefs among peripheral groups of 
various ethnicities, will be a recurrent theme in the pages that follow in regard to 
the similar reach of even major kingdoms into hinterland realms that they have 
neither conquered nor directly rule. 
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CORE–PERIPHERY RELATIONS
For all their ethnographic and theoretical obsession with self-determining so-
ciocultural monads, anthropologists have long recognized that societies were 
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never alone and were always interdependent. Long before world-systems theory 
made core–periphery relations a critical issue in the human sciences, it was a 
common anthropological observation—if not common cultural theory—that 
societies were set in regional systems of dominant centers and dependent hin-
terlands, hence adapted to one another in structural form and cultural content. 
(I am reminded of something I learned from Althusser: just to recognize a phe-
nomenon is not the same thing as knowing its right theoretical place.) By all 
evidence, cultural order has always been regional; or at least since the Neolithic, 
it has been marked everywhere by gradients of political-cum-cultural authority 
focused on apical centers thereof. 
As in the Native Americas, North and South, tribal to imperial, where “one 
could not go far in the study of an area,” as Clark Wissler wrote, “before rec-
ognizing that one or more tribes dominate” (1938: 261). Along with Alfred 
Kroeber, Wissler was a key figure in the development of the largely forgotten 
and little-lamented culture area studies of the early twentieth century. Although 
their primary interest was in the reconstruction of history from the distribu-
tion of “culture traits,” both Wissler and Kroeber were thereby led to recog-
nize the core–periphery relations in play among the societies of a given region. 
Conscious of their power, the dominant tribes of the area, Wissler wrote, were 
“centers of influence” (ibid.). For his part, Kroeber, in the Cultural and natural 
areas of Native North America (1947: 5), endorsed Wissler’s contention that the 
dominant center was “the integral thing about the area.” The center was a “cul-
tural climax,” whence radiated the forms and practices that united and distin-
guished the societies of the region. Both Kroeber and Wissler also recognized 
certain dynamic features that only many decades later were comprehended as 
recurrent and systemic properties of these multicultural configurations: that the 
centers rise and fall, competitively expanding and contracting, to the extent that 
erstwhile peripheral societies often become focal, even as the thresholds of the 
culture area prove unstable—which is also to say that important political forces 
are in play at the peripheries as well as the core of the system (cf. Helms 1993: 
187f.). Wissler made the point particularly in discussing the rise of the Teton 
Dakota and Cheyenne from marginal positions to dominance in the Great 
Plains during the nineteenth century. “They formed a focus for a central cluster 
of tribes whose influence is seen throughout the area and its corresponding re-
gional development” (1938: 261). Nor, then, was such domination characteristic 
only of the greater American civilizations such as the Inka, Maya, or Mexica: 
“We have found the higher centers of culture in Mexico and Peru to be not 
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really unique growths but to possess many of the fundamental traits common to 
the wilder folks in the marginal areas of both continents” (ibid.: 383). 
The decades following World War II saw several increasingly sophisticat-
ed—though apparently unrelated—anthropologies of cultural order radiating 
outward from dominant centers on a regional or world scale, the latest of these 
in dialogue with modern globalization paradigms. Beside Southall on segmen-
tary states, there was Kroeber (1945) on the Old World oikoumene of intercon-
nected “high civilizations” developing from around 1000 bc from the Straits of 
Gibraltar to Java, each with their culturally dependent hinterlands. In a related 
discussion in his encyclopedic textbook Anthropology (1948), Kroeber noted the 
“reduction” of culture as it spread from the more developed regions: “the ba-
sic idea” being that “culture gradually radiates from creative focal centers to 
backward marginal areas, without the original dependence of the peripheries 
precluding their subsequent independent development.” And in the latter con-
nection, he drew attention again to the instability of these regional hierarchies, 
noting that the high centers may shift as new ones emerge, even at the edges, 
“until what was peripheral has become focal” (ibid.: 701–2).
Then there was Morton Fried’s (1967, 1975) critique of anthropological no-
tions of the “tribe” as a self-determined indigenous form, contending rather 
that all tribes ancient and recent were created by colonial impulses of already-
existing states (in contemporary terms, a “state-effect”); even as most states were 
likewise secondary formations, constituted directly or indirectly by influences 
emanating from the pristine few that had evolved independently. Supposing 
this derivation of secondary states from the original ones, together with the 
derivation of tribes from existing states, the world according to Fried would 
again consist of multicultural constellations of core–periphery form. 
Speaking of intercultural relations, in the middle Sepik region of New Guinea, 
Deborah Gewertz was hardly the only anthropologist to find a “world-system” 
among “tribal” societies in the wake of Immanuel Wallerstein’s celebrated analy-
sis of the modern capitalist world-system in the 1970s. Some were put in mind 
of the earlier culture area discussions (e.g., Kowalewski 1996), yet even those who 
rejected the comparison described regional configurations of “stateless” societies 
in much the same terms. Barry Craig and George E. B. Morren, Jr. preferred to 
speak of “culture spheres” in their survey of the several regional systems of Low-
land and Highland New Guinea, but in a way quite reminiscent of Wisslerian 
culture areas: “A sphere is a politically expansive, segmentary, reticulated mosaic 
of local groups that, notwithstanding observable ethnolinguistic diversity, share a 
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common tradition and are strongly influenced by one or more core populations 
at the historic-geographic center(s) of their region” (1990: 10). In such terms, the 
authors describe the Mountain Ok sphere, whose ritually sustained core–periph-
ery relations were a subject of interest in chapter 1 above. In an extensive study 
of relations between the Wintu and neighboring peoples of the aboriginal Cali-
fornia region, Christopher Chase-Dunn and Kelly M. Mann (1998) also reject 
the analogy to classic culture areas, although taken in larger compass what they 
describe is an even greater multicultural order centered in the Pomo and Patwin 
peoples. Nor would it be altogether an oxymoron to speak of such regional hier-
archies as “world-systems,” inasmuch as for the peoples concerned they are the 
human world. The centers from which cultural influences spread were typically 
superior to the outlying societies in wealth, population, ritual powers, ceremonial 
pageantry, artistic and architectural achievements, and military prowess—and 
would be so acknowledged by the hinterland peoples. But when it comes to the 
economic exploitation of the peripheral societies by dominant ones, or the mate-
rial dependency of the former on the latter in the manner of a global industrial 
order, here the resemblances end. Introducing a collection of papers on world-
systems theory and archaeology, Peter Peregrine (1996: 3–4) writes:
What all these redefinitions of core/periphery relations seem to have in common 
is the notion that world systems did exist in prehistoric, pre-capitalist situations, 
but that Wallerstein’s definitions of core/periphery relations are too strict to be 
directly applied to them.  .  .  . Most of the scholars have argued in one way or 
another that dependency or exploitation is a basic characteristic of the capitalist 
world system but may not have been for pre-capitalist world systems. Models 
of core/periphery relations in the absence of this dependency open the world 
system perspective to a variety of pre-capitalist and non-capitalist situations . . . .
The ethnographic argument—as in the Sepik and Mountain Ok regions—
would be that the cultural attainments of the dominant peoples function as 
demonstration-effects of their superior relations to the metaperson powers of 
human welfare. Hence the movement of rituals and other cultural forms of 
cosmological import from the center to outlying peoples, including even gods, 
ancestors, clans, and totems.
In another critical reflex of world-systems theory, Kajsa Ekholm, Jonathan 
Friedman, and colleagues have argued in a series of ambitious works that a po-
litical economy of planetary—or at least hemispheric—dimensions has been in 
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existence since its origins in the Mesopotamian civilizations of five thousand years 
ago ( J. Friedman and Rowlands 1978; Ekholm and Friedman 1979; Ekholm 
1980; J. Friedman 1992; K. E. Friedman and J. Friedman 2008). There may have 
been some other original civilizations, as in China, but they were integrated into 
a single historically connected global network of regional polities—the modern 
European-based world-system included, having been a late relay from the Mid-
dle East. Although Friedman has explicitly argued against the explanation of 
particular cultural formations as such by their mode of production, his analysis 
of core–periphery relations reproduces classical utilitarian arguments—in fact, 
the lineaments of the modern world-system of industrial capital—at this inter-
cultural level. The dominant regional centers are manufacturing hubs exploiting 
peripheral societies organized as specialized suppliers of raw materials: until a 
surfeit of capital wealth at the center causes a production crisis, a rise in the 
price of raw materials, the flight of capital to outside societies, followed by the 
collapse of the core and its replacement often by one or another external group. 
Without subscribing to Friedman’s economics of core–periphery relations, we 
should retain the observation of their unstable, competitive character, especially 
the challenges to the center from the margins—a process typically preceded and 
made possible by a soft-power assimilation of the margins to the center.
Of the several extant anthropologies of core–periphery relations, the one I 
believe best serves as a general model is the “galactic polity” as formulated by 
Stanley Tambiah in the late1970s and early 1980s—and complemented by Mary 
Helms’ discussions of the like (Tambiah 1976, 1985, 1987; Helms 1988, 1993).3 
Tambiah coined the term in reference to premodern Southeast Asian civiliza-
tions such as Sukhotai, Ayutthaya, Angkor Wat, Pagan, Srivijaya, and Madjapa-
hit; but as we already know, similar constellations of apical centers reproducing 
themselves in diminishing versions as they spread into underdeveloped hinter-
lands have been ubiquitous modes of intercultural order from the beginnings 
of recorded history and anthropology. Unlike the Ekholm–Friedman economic 
model, however, the galactic polity was for Tambiah a cosmopolitical order: 
cosmology and polity being two modalities of the same fundamental structure 
(see chapters 3 and 4). Just as in the classic mandala system of the universe, 
the states ruled by Buddhist (chakkavatin) and Hindu (devaraja) kings of kings 
3. The following paragraphs reprise the discussion of galactic polities elsewhere in this 
volume, sometimes in the same terms. Aside from the fact that the chapters at issue 
were written on different occasions, I can offer little excuse for the repetition except 
that it is indispensable for what follows here.
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realized in another register the creative force and moral virtue radiating with 
progressively declining effect from an original, refined center to the gross beings 
of the world’s outer reaches:
We are told that the wheel-rolling emperor solemnly invokes the wheel to roll 
outward; the wheel roles successively toward the East, the South, the North, 
and the West. As the mighty monarch with his fourfold army appeared in each 
quarter following the wheel, the rival kings prostrated themselves in submission. 
The cakkavati allowed them to retain their possessions on condition of their 
obedience of the five moral principles binding on Buddhist laymen. (Tambiah 
1976: 45–46)
Tambiah makes the important observation that the galactic polity was “cen-
tered” rather than “centralized,” inasmuch as the authority of the sovereign, al-
though in principle extending indefinitely through the world in all directions, in 
practice was limited to the governance of the capital and surrounding provinces, 
beyond which were self-governing, tributary-paying principalities; and beyond 
these, an untamed zone at best linked to the core by raid and trade. While it is 
often noticed that the cosmocratic reach of galactic kings exceeds their admin-
istrative grasp, we should not forget that the repute of their divinely endowed 
potency does indeed extend beyond their ability to enforce it—thereby creat-
ing a far-reaching cultural subordination among hinterland peoples without the 
benefit of real-political coercion. 
Soft power thus begins at the cosmic center, which in these Southeast Asian 
kingdoms was the center of the world, an axis mundi running through the royal 
palace and the nearby temples of the dominant kingdom cults. In many of the 
major realms, this central establishment was identified with the famous cosmic 
mountain of the Indian tradition, Mt. Meru, through which were transmitted 
the divine powers that enabled the sacred ruler to “conquer” in all directions. 
Here also were housed the regalia and palladia of rule: statues of the Buddha, 
linga of Shiva, famous krises, sacred jewels, and other royal heirlooms whose 
subjective powers of sovereignty were as much objectified in the kingship as 
the kingship was objectified in them—the moi subtil of the king, as some an-
cient texts have it (Coedès 1968: 101).4 Or else, as in the case of the Emerald 
4. The founder of the Angkor empire, Jayavarman II, is said to have doubled down 
by installing a linga originally obtained from Shiva in a sanctuary atop a natural or 
artificial mountain at the center of the royal city.
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Buddha, the Sinhala Buddha, and other historic palladia of Thai kingship, the 
statue was “animated” by the “presence” of the Buddha himself, whence radiated 
a “fiery energy” that blessed and fecundated the world (Tambiah 1984: 204ff.). 
Tambiah meticulously documents the process by which the images are linked 
by a series of “reincarnations” to the Buddha himself, then consecrated in rituals 
that render him immanent in the statue, as by recitations that inject his biogra-
phy into it, culminating in ceremonies for opening the statue’s eyes. Prominent 
among the other fructifying effects that could now be spread abroad by the 
Buddha’s fiery energy was rain. The pervasive animism of the outlying hill tribes 
of Southeast Asia thus had its counterpart in what might be called the “po-
litical animism” of the civilized centers (cf. Århem and Sprenger 2016). Apart 
from the dynastic heroes, Indic gods, or the Buddha who might be enshrined in 
such sovereign objects, giving them agentive powers of prosperity and protective 
force, some might have come from the hinterlands—like the amulets of Thai 
forest monks, which, as Tambiah also documented, conveyed potencies of the 
wild to the kingdom’s civilized centers.5 
The capital of the exemplary fourteenth-century kingdom of Sukhotai was 
something of a mandala in itself: the royal palace and principal wat at the center, 
set within three concentric ramparts with gates situated at the cardinal direc-
tions (Kasetsiri 1976; Tambiah 1976). Surrounding the capital, which was un-
der the king’s direct control, was a zone of four major provinces (muang) ruled 
by sons of the galactic sovereign from secondary centers aligned with the capital 
by their location in the cardinal directions. In structure and courtly practice, 
these semiautonomous princely establishments replicated the galactic center in 
reduced form. Beyond lay an outer ring of more or less independent principali-
ties, populated by diverse ethnic groups, and governed by their own traditional 
rulers. Some of these rulers acknowledged the overlordship of the Sukhotal king 
and rendered him tribute; whereas the inclusion of others ranging as far off as 
the Malay Peninsula in the Sukhotai domain was evidently more nominal than 
political. The successor Siamese kingdom of Ayutthaya had essentially the same 
structure during its early history, with sons of the rulers in charge in the four 
5. Indeed, the sacred palladia of the Bugis and Makassar kingdoms of Sulawesi 
were nourished and maintained by their own rice fields, forests, fish ponds, and 
slaves (Andaya 2006). And as will be seen presently, these were not the only 
animistic powers available to galactic potentates, who characteristically knew 
how to appropriate the potent subjective forces embodied in nature—in the wild 
peripheries of their realms—as well as in culture. 
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major domains east, west, north, and south of the capital, and an outer zone 
of sovereignty extending eventually into cosmocratic ideology—but also effec-
tively encompassing Sukhotai among the tributary “vassal states” in 1385, and 
its satellites in 1438. Not incidentally, this galactic pattern of three circles and 
four directions is a common one—and not only in Southeast Asia (cf. Lincoln 
2007).6
CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF GALACTIC POLITIES
Galactic polities are never alone. Constitutionally inspired by hegemonic pre-
tensions of indefinite extent, each is engaged in a wider competitive field of 
galactic and would-be galactic powers whose rulers were ever prepared to de-
fend their own claims of world superiority. “Whoever he may be, he shall be 
my enemy in the world if he is an equal on earth,” is a statement attributed 
to Hayam Wuruk, ruler of the Javanese empire of Madjapahit at the acme of 
its power in the fourteenth century (Wolters 1986: 37n). At about the same 
time, Sukhotai on the mainland was surrounded by just such “world conquerors” 
contending with each other for the lesser kingdoms and principalities between 
them. Besides Ayutthaya to the south, there was the other Thai realm of Lan Na 
(Chiangmai) to the north, the Burmese power of Pagan to the southwest, and 
the famous Khmer empire of Angkor to the southeast—from which Sukhotai 
had won its independence in the late thirteenth century and which Ayutthaya 
would invade and defeat in 1431–32. This competition engaged a characteristic 
dialectics of theocratic regimes, in the course of which Sukhotai made a state 
cult of Theravada Buddhism (derived largely from Sri Lanka), thereby opposing 
its singularly empowered chakkavatin kings to the primarily Brahmanic rul-
ers of first its Angkor overlords, and then its Ayutthayan successors. Not only 
6. In a comprehensive work on mainland Southeast Asian history from the ninth 
to the nineteenth centuries, Victor Lieberman (2003: 33) prefers the term “solar 
polity” to Tambiah’s “galactic polity,” while describing the system in the same general 
terms—if according to a more sustained celestial metaphor. He also provides many 
excellent summaries of historic galactic systems: including those of Pagan, Ava, and 
Pegu in Burma; Funan and Angkor Wat in Cambodia; and Ayutthaya (Ayudhya) in 
Thailand. Lieberman is careful to note variations between those more (“Pattern A”) 
or less (“Pattern B”) effectively ruled from the center, He is also notably attentive to 
the structural and conjunctural sources of instability in these kingdoms. 
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is there god in these details but a general politics of cultural order, endemic 
in core–periphery systems, with the effect of bringing a transcendent series of 
encompassing cosmopolitical authorities into the regional conflicts between 
galactic sovereigns. Reading from this same Southeast Asian context, James 
C. Scott took some note also of the wider distribution of the phenomenon: 
“Much as the Romans used Greek, the early French court used Latin, and the 
Vietnamese court used Chinese script and Confucianism, so the rise of San-
skritic forms staked a claim to participation in a trans-ethnic, trans-regional, 
trans-historical civilization” (2009: 112).
O.  W. Wolters (1999: 110) talks of a process of “self-Hinduization,” by 
which the early Khmer courts of Cambodia, the Malay kingdoms known as 
Srivijaya, and the Javanese powers of Kendari and Madjapahit, among others, 
took on the gods, cosmology, protocol, ritual, art, architecture, and Sanskrit vo-
cabulary of southern Indian states of grand repute. In his magisterial work on 
the Sanskrit cosmopolis, Sheldon Pollock (2009) emphasizes the historic sin-
gularity of this process by which, beginning in central India early in the first 
millennium ad, such regimes spread in a few centuries through Southeast Asia 
as far as Java—without the benefit of outside political impositions of any kind. 
There is no evidence of the colonization of Southeast Asian regions from India, 
Pollock observes; nor of ties of political subservience to the South Asian sub-
continent; nor of forms of material exploitation or dependency relations; nor 
of large-scale settlement by Indian peoples, or anything resembling military 
conquest and occupation (ibid.: 123). And yet,
All across mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, people who spoke radically 
different languages, such as Mon-Khmer and Malayo-Polynesian, and lived in 
vastly different cultural worlds, adopted suddenly, widely, and long-lastingly a 
new language—along with the new political vision and literary aesthetic that 
were inseparable from it and unthinkable without it—for the production of what 
were often defining forms of political culture. In itself this was a remarkable 
development, but given the manner in which it occurred—without the enforce-
ment of military power, the pressure of an imperial administrative or legal ap-
paratus, or the promptings of religious evangelism—it is one without obvious 
parallel in history, except indeed for South Asia itself. (2009: 124–25)
Subsumed thus in realms of universal power, the Southeast galactic regimes 
would assert their superiority to any and all worldly rivals. Moreover, this is only 
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one of many examples in these pages of why the famous “determination by the 
economic basis”—or for that matter any such internal functional dynamic—is 
an inadequate explanation of the cultural order, inasmuch as the cosmopolitical 
“superstructure” is of historically distinct and structurally surpassing attributes 
relative to the “infrastructure.” We see the like at every level of core–periphery 
systems. 
When the Biak Islanders of Western New Guinea returned from their long 
voyages carrying tribute to the sultan of Tidore (in the Malukus), they passed 
the barak—the life-giving potency they had absorbed from the sultan’s pres-
ence—to their relatives by shaking their hands, upon which the latter promptly 
rubbed their faces with it. As Danilyn Rutherford has documented in rich eth-
nographic works on Biak, these same powers, indwelling in the titles, silver 
jewels, fine cloth, and other wealth bestowed by the sultan, amounted in Biak to 
a “currency of value, in both its functions: in the form of objects that reflected 
a person’s past achievements, and in the form of an invisible substance that 
conveyed the capacity to act” (2003: 16). Passed on locally—notably in affinal 
exchanges in which human reproduction appeared as the sequitur to foreign 
wealth—these things from a great and distant realm bestowed the honorable 
status of “foreigner” on the donors as well as productive and reproductive talents 
on the recipients—the children so empowered becoming ardent lovers as well 
as exceptional fishers, hunters, smiths, or singers.
There is a considerable history to this traffic in Malukan goods, titles, and 
power along the western New Guinea coasts: a network of exchange relations 
also involving islands in-between, altogether comprising a provincial galactic 
polity of its own (Elmberg 1968; Ellen 1986).7 It has been speculated that the 
tributes to sultans were set up in the wake of an Islamic holy war in which the 
local peoples purchased exemption from the depredations of the Maluku fleets 
at the price of an annual tribute in Papuan goods. Biak apparently was involved 
in some such arrangement by the end of the fifteenth century, receiving among 
the other returns for its tributes certain Tidore titles that suggested actual ad-
ministrative authority: the Malay radja for the head of an independent domain, 
and others for district chief and village chief. Alternatively, and more likely, 
7. It appears that Chinese goods had already reached Western New Guinea in Han 
times. When Chinese traders themselves appeared is uncertain, but some coming out 
of Manila were active in the area during the seventeenth century. As early as 1616, 
the Dutch found Chinese porcelain and Indian coral beads in Biak Island. In the 
eighteenth century, Chinese traders were still active on the shores of Geelvink Bay. 
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the titles referred particularly to tribute-collecting functions in these places. In 
time the titles became “incorporeal property which, like the various forms of 
esoteric knowledge and personal names constituted part of the status of the 
individual and his descendants” (Ellen 1986: 59). But in still another use, Biak 
Islanders themselves bestowed these Malukan titles on trading partners on the 
New Guinea coast in return for exotic goods obtained by the latter from in-
terior peoples—goods that could then be conveyed to Tidore on Biak canoes. 
A similar tributary and status system reached the western New Guinea shores 
from Tidore via the intermediate Radja Anpat Islands and eastern Ceram. At 
least some Ceramese people settled as rulers (radja) of local Papuan groups; 
and it was reported as late as 1902 that some still spoke their ancestral Ceram 
language. In a classic competitive move, however, one of their stranger-chiefs 
reckoned his lineage from a Javanese ship’s captain who had married a local 
woman (Elmberg 1968: 129). 
Meanwhile back in the Malukus, the sultans of the clove islands of Tidore 
and Ternate had been taking on the trappings of the renowned rulers of distant 
realms whose presence in the form of impressive commercial and naval vessels 
had long reached their shores. European realms were not excluded: toward the 
end of the sixteenth century, “Sultan Hairun of Ternate dressed like a Portu-
guese, spoke their language fluently, and governed his kingdom with the as-
surance of long familiarity and friendship with Portuguese officials” (Andaya 
1993: 58). Whereas in the seventeenth century, a Ternate sultan who owed his 
power rather to Dutch support named two of his sons “Amsterdam” and “Rot-
terdam” (ibid.: 177; cf. ibid.: 208). But as is obvious from the title of “sultan,” 
this was not the first time the Malukan rulers had assumed foreign identities. 
Indeed, their European imports adorned an Islamized royalty that for its part 
had long been fitted out with Chinese attributes. 
Call it “the real-politics of the marvelous.” Not only because, in line with our 
own sense of the political, it is motivated by competitive ambitions of domina-
tion, but because in the local anthropologies these exotic forms of power are 
effective means thereof: transcendent sources of human prosperity and victory, 
whose human agents are thus worthy of the deference of others. When the 
sultans of the flourishing fifteenth-century commercial empire of Melaka in 
the Malay Peninsula claimed descent from Alexander the Great—that is, in 
his Koranic manifestation as Iskandar D’zul Karnain—it made an invidious 
contrast to the important rival state of Melayu-Jambi in Sumatra (C.  C.  E. 
Brown 1952). For Melaka thereby laid claim to the legacy of the fabled ancient 
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kingdom of Srivijaya, where the prince, Sri Tri Buana, who was the sultan’s 
Alexandrian ancestor, first appeared, and along with two of his brothers turned 
the rice fields into silver and gold. A few generations later, Sri Tri Buana’s de-
scendants converted to Islam and metaphorically repeated the miracle by the 
commercial enrichment of Melaka. Malayu Jambi, however, may have gained 
the last word, according to an edict issued in the eighteenth century by the 
sultan of its successor state of Minangkabau. On it were three seals representing 
three descendants of Alexander: the sultan of Rum (Constantinople); the sultan 
of China; and, himself, the sultan of Minangkabau. As the youngest, the Mi-
nangkabau ruler was the privileged successor, fulsomely described in the edict as 
“king of kings . . . lord of the air and clouds . . . possessor of the crown of heaven 
brought by the prophet Adam” (Marsden 1811: 339). In the same connection 
it is notable that during the T’ang dynasty Srivijaya sent multiple missions to 
the Chinese emperor, which apparently were intended to legitimate that realm’s 
successful subordination of Melayu (Wolters 1986: 38). 
Likewise in the Sung dynasty, the Srivijaya dispatched several missions to 
China, which, according to Wolters,
were certainly occasions when the rulers could trade with China, but I believe 
the rulers had another and more important intention . . . . Foreign rulers in Sung 
times were anxious for imperial favors which signified their superiority vis-à-vis 
other Chinese vassals and especially those that were their neighbors and political 
rivals. Distinctions of rank were part of the political culture of Southeast Asia, 
and, when granted by the [Chinese] emperors, helped to establish status among 
Southeast Asian rulers whose spheres of influence overlapped. (1986: 37)
“Status,” yes, but should we not add that the indwelling aura of the Celestial 
Emperor transmitted in these “imperial favors” not only differentiates the re-
cipient from his rivals but also commands the loyalty of his followers? 
Clearly we have to do with a longstanding Greater East Asian Galactic Pol-
ity centered in the Middle Kingdom. China was similarly the high-stakes, soft-
power arbiter of political legitimacy in Ayutthaya and other distant kingdoms 
which it neither reached nor feared militarily. Still, China was present com-
mercially and politically: by the common tradition, Ayutthaya was founded by a 
local Chinese merchant prince who strategically married the royal daughters of 
two important kingdom centers in the region. His descendants by these women 
would then compete bitterly for the encompassing kingship of Ayutthaya for 
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decades—as by means of tributary submissions to the Chinese court. Between 
1369 and 1433, Ayutthaya royals sent fifty-eight such embassies to the emperor 
or members of his family, mainly in the interest of promoting their chances 
of succession in Ayutthaya. In the period 1370–1482, the Chinese court dis-
patched eunuch officials on seventeen celestial embassies to Ayutthaya, not all 
of them friendly. Among their functions: conveying condolence on the death of 
the Ayutthaya king; investing the new king; presenting royal gifts; and declaring 
imperial edicts, including instructions on conduct toward other states (Kasetsiri 
1976). This kind of diplomacy was not that unusual, considering that the strate-
gic demand for soft power in high places is common in galactic settings.
Marked by the civilizing mission of the Celestial Emperor and manifest 
in the petitions and tributes of distant peoples, a huge East Asian force field 
of Chinese influence was created, extending even to the island kingdoms and 
principalities of Java, Borneo, and beyond, where “Sina” was a political identity 
to conjure with. Chinese commerce has been long and widely spread beyond 
the borders of the Middle Kingdom. Chinese monks and other religious figures 
also traveled early and far. Chinese military might has been demonstrated pe-
riodically on the northern frontiers; and regarding the southern borderlands of 
particular interest here, the Mongol invasion and famous voyages of the Ming 
admiral Cheng Ho penetrated deep into Indonesia. Yet the Greater East Asian 
Galactic Polity centered in the imperial capital has endured longer in time and 
space than the presence of any Chinese coercive force. 
In ad 484, a petition reached the Southern Qi imperial court from the ruler 
of the original Khmer kingdom in the lower Mekong Delta, a distant Cam-
bodian place that had never known the presence of the Chinese arms it now 
solicited (Pelliot 1903). True, northern Vietnam had been successfully invaded 
by Chinese forces in Han times, but in Cambodia, as Keith Taylor comments, 
there was no experience with the soldiers and officials of a neighboring empire, 
nor the awareness of boundaries, in terrain and culture, that such an experience 
produced among the Viets and Chams. Information about the outside world 
arrive to Khmer leaders as news about Hindu gods and forms of Buddhist and 
Hindu devotion as well as cosmological notions of political space that were ex-
pounded in the Sanskrit language. (1993: 157) 
Still, King Kaundinya Jayavarman of the Khmer realm the Chinese knew as 
“Funan” must have been aware of the Son of Heaven’s might when he complained 
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to him about a certain “slave” who had rebelled against his own authority and 
enlisted support from a neighboring kingdom (“Lin-yi,” evidently the predeces-
sor regime of Champa in southern Vietnam). The Chinese ruler in question was 
probably the Emperor Wu of the short-lived Southern Qi dynasty. The mission 
is recorded at the beginning of the sixth century in The history of the Southern Qi 
dynasty, and accordingly presents a Chinese—indeed Confucian—perspective 
on what transpired. Jayavarman did not lead the embassy in person, although 
some Funan kings did so act; he sent a Hindu bonze as his representative. His 
petition begins properly with a profession of submission to the sage and saintly 
Celestial Emperor. “Your subject, Jayavarman,” it reads, “bows his forehead to 
the earth and fulsomely praises the divine civilizing virtue” of the “saintly mas-
ter,” wishing him all kinds of happiness, including that “the concubines of the 
six palaces be perfectly beautiful”; and voicing confidence that earth will know 
peace, harmony, and prosperity “because of the brilliant civilizing influence 
of your majesty.” Such is the preamble to King Jayavarman’s complaint about 
his “slave” rival, followed by the offering of “meager presents” in tribute to the 
“saintly and virtuous” majesty, including a golden image of the king of dragons. 
Jayavarman asks the emperor for troops to put down the rebel, promising in 
return to aid the imperial throne in “repressing the realms that border the sea.” 
Or if not an army, would the Divine Majesty issue a special edict authorizing a 
small number of Chinese troops to join his own forces in order to “exterminate 
this nefarious lowly one”? The emperor’s response is equivocal. Taking note of 
his benevolence, his reform of Buddhism, and his own resemblance to Indra, 
king of the gods, the emperor declares that: “For me, it is only by culture and 
virtue that I attract the distant peoples; I do not wish to have recourse to arms.” 
However, considering that King Jayavarman “comes from afar and with a loyal 
heart to ask for the aid of the imperial forces,” the emperor will refer the matter 
to his tribunal—where, as far as I can determine, the request for military aid 
died. Apparently it was soft power from beginning to end.
In ad 252, the Chinese military did intervene in Yunnan: an event that 
was inscribed in ritual memories and tribal polities for many centuries beyond, 
even as its political impulses also rippled further than the actual extent of the 
invasion. The famous Shu Han minister and strategist Zhuge Liang led the 
campaign in the aim of restoring the imperial authority that had lapsed with the 
decline of the Han dynasty. Sensing he could not rule what he had conquered, 
Zhuge withdrew, leaving the area in charge of the leaders of indigenous ethnic 
groups on whom he had bestowed Chinese offices and surnames—a practice 
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of letting “barbarians rule barbarians” apparently in effect since Western Zhou 
times, later commonly known as the “bridle and halter” policy, and, since Yuan, 
as the tusi system. For centuries after Zhuge’s withdrawal, he was numbered 
among local deities in temples built in his honor. As late as the twentieth cen-
tury, Bai peasants, reputed to be the aborigines of Yunnan, were using a carry-
ing yoke whose design was attributed to Zhuge, claiming their ancestors had 
learned the style when serving in his armies. Other longstanding traditions of 
local non-Han peoples related that their chieftains’ bronze drums—not merely 
a “symbol” of their authority, as often reported, but an active-animistic agent 
thereof—had been given their predecessors by Zhuge. Richard van Glahn tells 
that when a drum of this kind was forcibly surrendered to an invading Ming 
army in 1573, the chief lamented, “with two or three of such drums, one could 
proclaim himself king. Striking the drum at the summit of a hill will cause all 
the tribes to assemble. But now, all is lost” (1987: 15). Various signs and tradi-
tions of Zhuge’s conquests were long preserved in central Yunnan, some into 
modern times, although his forces had never reached that far. And in a phenom-
enon of the kind frequently recorded in the Sino-Southeast Asian borderlands, 
important chiefs of non-Han peoples in the areas he did pacify were known to 
convert their Chinese surnames into claims of Han ancestry (cf. Backus 1981; 
Giersch 2006; Took 2005). Stranger-kingship: the cultural politics of core–pe-
riphery relations have real-political effects.
GALACTIC MIMESIS: UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN 
CORE–PERIPHERY SYSTEMS
“Barbarian” chiefs of Chinese ancestry; New Guinea villagers who adopt clans, 
totems, ancestors, and rituals of their dominant neighboring peoples; Cam-
bodian or Javanese kingdoms ruled in Sanskrit terms by Hinduized kings; 
Indonesian rulers become Islamic sultans who assume a Portuguese lifestyle: 
in sum, a recurrent impulse of upward mobility—more exactly upward nobil-
ity—runs through these galactic systems, no less at the peripheries than at 
the center, as well as among the several secondary and tertiary societies in-
between. Even the kingdoms at the apex of the regional hierarchy aspire to a 
hegemony of yet higher order—a project that also engages them with exotic 
hinterland groups, thereby opening prospects of grandeur at the underdevel-
oped galactic margins. 
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The world over, would-be kings of kings would institute something ap-
proaching a cosmocratic regime by laying claim to ancient or current prede-
cessors of widespread and exalted renown: whether by descent, incarnation, or 
other privileged association; and whether these paragons be great gods such as 
Shiva, world-historical heroes such as Alexander, fabled cities such as Rome, or 
mighty empires such as the Chinese. Buddhist rulers in Southeast Asia invoke 
Ashoka. West African Islamic rulers and their nearby pagan counterparts trace 
their dynasties to Mecca: the former often to descendants of the Prophet, the 
latter to his reputed enemies. The Gauls and Spartan kings come from Her-
akles, although after the Roman conquests some Gaulish chiefs had Julian or 
Augustan ancestors. The kings of the Banyoro, Baganda, and several other East 
African realms claim to be heirs of the Bachwezi rulers of the fabled Kitara 
empire. Later Mexica emperors overlaid their barbaric Chichimec origins with 
an exalted Toltec identity by importing a ruler of known descent from that 
legendary civilization and its renowned god-king Quetzalcoatl. Aeneas of Troy, 
stranger-king of the Latins, became the ancestor of Roman emperors through 
Romulus, and thereby of the Holy Roman emperors and the Habsburgs, among 
others; whereas the Greek heroes who returned from the Trojan War, the Nos-
toi, particularly Odysseus, gave rise to the ruling aristocracy in city-states of 
northern Greece, Italy, and Sicily. Enough said, except that the ambitions of ga-
lactic sovereigns which thus impel an upward cosmic reach are complemented 
by a policy of outward expansion through war, trade, and diplomacy, going even 
beyond the strategic material returns with the aim of encompassing the potent 
animistic powers of the barbaric wild.8
These upward and outward ambitions were interrelated: everything happens 
as if the appropriation of the diverse earthly powers of the galactic hinterlands 
would thus validate the claims of universal hegemony entailed in the ruler’s 
privileged relations to transcendent cosmic authorities. Consider, for example, 
Lorraine Gesick’s description of Southeast Asian galactic orders:
Linked with the conviction that living things were ordered along a continuum 
from the bestial to the sacred, we found a circular conception of space in which 
politically charged centers were thought to radiate power outward and downward 
8. To document some of the most marvelous claims, see C. C. E. Brown (1952) on 
Alexander the Great, Malkin (1998) on the Nostoi, Tanner (1993) on Aeneus, and 
Drinkwater (1978) on Romanized Gauls.
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toward the less charged peripheries . . . . In the landscape, palaces, temples, sacred 
mountains, and capital cities were similarly surrounded by secondary and tertiary 
centers and villages, all of which participated in and reflected, in varying degrees, 
the power of the center. Finally, at the extreme periphery, civilized, cultivated 
lands and villages gave way to jungles and mountain ranges—“wild” territory 
beyond the reach of the center’s power. These territories were by no means im-
potent; on the contrary, they were filled with power; but it was anarchic, chaotic, 
primeval. Only a person who was extremely “civilized” in himself could, by medi-
tation and self-discipline, subdue these forces. (1983: 2)
Underlying it all, the reach for both celestial and terrestrial powers beyond 
the cosmocrater’s own, is the alterity of the sources of human life and death, 
and thereby of the welfare of the social totality. Speaking of “traditional so-
cieties” in general, Mary Helms refers to a “cosmologically-charged outside” 
from which are drawn materials, intangible energies, and original knowledge 
and culture “that allow the production of human life and social being” (1993: 7). 
And among a series of astute observations on the dynamics of core–periphery 
systems in general, Helms notes that in taming the wild hinterlands with their 
cultivated exports, the civilizing mission of dominant centers has a counterpart 
in the centers’ acquisition of “naturally endowed” imports that increase their 
“ideological and political potency by virtue of the autochthonous forces believed 
to be inherent in that which is exotic, curious, or different” (ibid.: 180). Here 
again is a real-politics of the marvelous, in the course of which the untamed 
forces of the periphery are transformed into the potency and prosperity of the 
center. As Helms describes, by trade and tribute from the hinterlands come rare 
animals, strange foreigners, precious stones and minerals, rare woods, spices, and 
drugs, and the horns, tails, furs, and feathers of exotic beasts and birds. One is 
of course reminded of the Celestial Emperor’s mission of bringing order to All 
Under Heaven, and particularly of the demonstration of his virtue (te) by incor-
porating the tributary wonders and monsters brought from afar by the barbarian 
inhabitants of fabulous countries. So likewise would the tribute-bearing peoples 
be culturally transformed, domesticated, and civilized by coming into the im-
perial presence and thereby under its power as manifested and transmitted by 
his person: that is, bodily as well as ritually, architecturally, and in the banquets, 
gifts, and honors the outlanders receive and consume. The overall effect is a 
two-way traffic in animistic potencies, political and wild, in which the subjective 
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forces of things endow vitality on both the central and outlying societies—and 
notably elevate and empower their leaders.
The center “desires the resources, the potency and the potentiality, the ‘alien 
powers’ of the periphery, the wild, the forest. Both center and periphery seek to 
restore ‘vitality’ in the exchange of powers” (Turton 2000: 25–26). So Andrew 
Turton describes the exchanges between lowland Shan states and the hill peo-
ples they call kha, “serfs” (or “slaves”)—although typically the hill peoples are the 
residual autochthonous “owners” of the fertile lowlands. For their part, the Shan 
states, historically tributary to Burmese or Chinese potentates, were included 
in the Greater East Asian Galactic system that stretched southward from the 
Middle Kingdom into Malaya, Sumatra, Java, and beyond. 
Edward Schafer tells that the aromatics and other exotica from Southeast 
Asia that reached China “partook of the godly and the beneficial, and at the 
same time the deadly and the devilish” (1967: 193). The animistic force was not 
merely a Chinese sense of the exotic; it was quite familiar to the tribal people 
who collected these potent things. Something like the divine and the deadly 
were already ensouled in the camphor crystals and other aromatics sought out 
by the indigenous peoples of the Indonesian forests. In his useful compendium 
of Malay magic, Walter William Skeat (1900: 212ff.) relates that camphor was 
controlled by indwelling spirits who had to be propitiated so that it could be 
discovered and harvested. Communication with these metapersons, moreover, 
required a special language, ordinary Malay being taboo. Transmitted thence to 
the Chinese court, the ensouled forces of the Malay wild redoubled the political 
animism of the emperor. As Schafer observed, incense from Southeast Asian 
aromatics “marked the presence of the royal afflatus, breathing supernatural wis-
dom through the worlds of nature and human affairs” (1963: 156). In imperial 
levees of the T’ang ministers, a table of these aromatics was placed before the 
Son of Heaven. Inhaled then by the court officials, the scent of camphor from 
Malaya or sandalwood from Borneo insinuated the emperor’s virtue into the 
persons of his officials, whereupon it could be realized in statecraft and dissemi-
nated through the world—to ultimately subdue and civilize the barbarians who 
had originally appropriated these powers. (That was long before Marx talked of 
the surplus value that returned in fetishized form to rule its producers.)9
9. I have discussed this use of Southeast Asian aromatics by T’ang emperors in much 
the same terms elsewhere (Sahlins 2010).
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On being informed that the Chinese protector-general had been chased 
from Vietnam by a rebellion, an imperial court official and poet wrote:
Remember when the North was on good terms with the Yueh [the Viets]. For a long 
time both were nourished by the southern fragrance.
All the same, the ensuing Ly dynasty (1009–1225), having established an inde-
pendent Dai Viet state, proceeded to organize the kingdom on basic principles 
of the Chinese imperium: a “Vietnamized version of Chinese political theory,” 
as Keith Taylor characterized it, with a “southern emperor” counterposed to the 
Chinese “northern emperor,” ruling his “southern kingdom” by the grace of his 
own “mandate of heaven” (1999: 147). Chinese sources identify the third Ly 
ruler, Ly Nhat Ton (r. 1054–72), as the first Viet king who had the presumption 
to claim imperial status; Vietnamese sources corroborate that he “adopted many 
of the formalities of China’s imperial court, from the official name of the realm, 
to the attire of his officials, to the ranks and titles conferred upon officials, upon 
members of the royal family, and upon the royal ancestors” (ibid.: 144). For all 
that the Dai Viet opposed imperial China, they did so by replicating it—just 
as certain Maluku rulers took on Chinese, Portuguese, or Dutch attributes; the 
Prussian court imitated the French; the Nilotic rulers of Nyoro assimilated to 
their Bantu predecessors of fabled Kitara; many a Khmer, Siamese, or Malay 
ruler became an Indic king, and some of the latter became Islamic sultans; and 
so on. 
As already noted, the phenomenon is endemic in core–periphery relations. A 
certain impetus of “galactic mimesis” runs through the regional system, whereby 
outlying rulers assume the political culture of the higher powers with which 
they are engaged. Virtually a law of political science, this dynamic is in play at 
every level of the intersocietal hierarchy: down to the pretensions of peripheral 
tribal headmen like the Kachin chiefs who famously “become Shan [princes]”; 
whereas, for their part, the Shan princes rule in the style of Burmese or Chi-
nese kings—which perhaps accounts for the rudimentary forms of the imperial 
Chinese temples of Heaven and Earth in certain villages of Kachin hill people 
(Leach 1954; cf. Scott 2009). The same acculturation from below is current even 
in purely tribal zones, absent a dominant civilization, as in the avidity of various 
Sepik peoples for the cultural powers of the Abelam or the Iatmul. In any case 
and every place, however, the spread of the cultural forms of dominant societies 
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is not all of their own doing. Something has to be said for this demand of higher 
culture from below.
This mimetic process is notably in evidence in the Greater East Asian 
Galactic Polity. James C. Scott documents many particular instances in his trea-
tise on relations between the greater states of the region and upland tribal peo-
ples. More generally he writes:
We have often noted what might be called the great chain of mimicry that ex-
tends from Angkor and Pagan through pettier and pettier states right down to 
hamlets with the slightest pretensions among, say, the Lahu or Kachin. The clas-
sical states similarly modeled themselves after the states in South Asia. (2009: 
306; see also above)10
The cultural exchanges in core–periphery systems do not emanate from the 
higher centers alone. Motivated especially by local political conflicts, there is 
agency at every level of the galactic hierarchy in the course of which politico-
religious forms of ruling societies are appropriated by subordinate ones, thus 
migrating downward through the system without the benefit of compelling 
initiatives from above. The soft power of dominant societies may thus be po-
tentiated by the people subject to it—inasmuch as it also empowers them. This 
galactic mimesis develops either as a mode or resistance to the encroachment 
of a higher power, a dynamic George Devereaux and Edwin Loeb (1943) 
called “antagonistic acculturation,” or by something like the “symmetrical 
schismogenesis” of Gregory Bateson’s devising (1935, 1958), wherein local 
rivals try to outdo each other by scaling up the competition to another level. 
We have already seen instances of both—some of which suggest both were in 
play at once. 
Antagonistic acculturation: by matching point for point a Southern Empire 
against the Chinese Northern Empire, Vietnamese rulers of the eleventh cen-
tury took the contrarian process to a remarkable structural extent. Making their 
own polity the same as and yet different from the ostensibly superior Chinese 
realm, the Ly dynasty kings thus undertook to separate from the latter and 
ward off its colonizing ambitions. Subsequent Vietnamese dynasties continued 
10. Curiously, neither here nor elsewhere in his major work (2009) on relations between 
upland and lowland peoples in Southeast Asia, and despite his occasional use of the 
term, does Scott refer to Tambiah’s work on “galactic polities.”
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to differentiate their realm from the Chinese by the fact that they had their own 
Chinese imperium—as in this 1428 proclamation by a Le dynasty official, upon 
the eviction of a Ming administration of two decades standing:
Now our Great Viet is truly a cultured country;
The features of our mountains and our rivers are different,
Just as the customs of the North [China] and South [Vietnam] are also different.
From the time of the Viet, Trieu, Dinh, Ly, and Tran dynasties’ establishment of our 
state, 
And from the time of the Han, Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties of the North,
Each emperor has ruled over his own quarter. 
 (Dutton, Werner, and Whitmore 2012: 91) 
Not that antagonistic acculturation is imperial politics only, for it is also en-
countered in the outlying tribal societies—which in the Southeast Asian up-
lands may resist lowland states with their own kingdoms, whether legendary 
ones of the past, messianic ones of the future, or current imitations of the greater 
regional powers. Like the Karen of Burma, whose history, writes James C. Scott, 
“seems to illuminate the preservation of a culture liberation and dignity fash-
ioned, for the most part, from the cosmology of lowland [Shan and Burmese] 
states” (2009: 285). He cites verse from a prophetic tradition:
That a Karen King would yet appear
The Tabin [Mon] Kings have had their season
The Burmese Kings have had their season 
And the foreign Kings will have their season
But the Karen King will yet appear
When the Karen King arrives
There will only be one monarch . . . 
(2009: 287)
Just so, F. K. Lehman describes the characteristic polity of the Kayah, a Karen 
people of eastern Burma, as “a quasi-state level political system developed among 
an essentially tribal people as an adaptation to the Shan-Burmese environment” 
(1967: 15). By common local traditions, these states were formed when a Kayah 
chief was victorious in a skirmish with a Burmese force; whereupon an honor-
able peace was negotiated, recognizing the boundaries of the Kayah domain and 
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of its ruler under the title of a Shan prince (Sawbwa) or lord (Myasa). Over time 
the differences and similarities increased together: the Kayah founder’s victory 
over the Burmese was celebrated as a miraculous feat, even as this charter narra-
tive was coupled to a Kayah regime with a Burmese cast—including courts that 
interfered in otherwise independent affairs of the villages. As Lehman observed, 
“This was essentially an exercise in foreign power within or attached to Kayah 
society” (ibid.: 26) It was an imitation of Shan princely practice, including the 
organization of the Kayah chief ’s house in the ritual form of a Sabwah’s palace, 
with the aim of contracting marriages between Kayah and Shan ruling families.
Seeking alliances with lowland Shan nobility, however, suggests something 
other than resistance is in play. Consider the common report that the preten-
sions of Kayah chiefs to Shan princely status are a matter of competition within 
their own communities, “something the leaders and would-be leaders were con-
stantly contending for” (ibid.: 30). The suggestion is that beside the opposition 
to foreign superior others that drives imitation of them—by way of antagonis-
tic acculturation—competition with similars likewise drives identification with 
foreign superior others—by way of symmetrical schismogenesis:
The acquaintance with foreign social and economic techniques of organization 
gave the Kayah leaders several sorts of advantage at home. In the first place, 
it gave them charismatic authority among their Kayah followers. That is, in-
sofar as they remained successful in dealing with the Shan and Burmans with 
some measure of economic advantage to their Kayah “subjects,” they came to 
be thought of as phre phraw. This expression means wonder-worker, miraculous 
person, seer, prophet, supernaturally endowed, and of miraculous birth . . . . As 
a result, those villages and persons who acknowledge a particular Sawbwa often 
had a considerable attachment to him, and in principle to his line. (Lehman 
1967: 26)
Miraculous person, wonder-worker: notice that this is still a real-politics of the 
marvelous, in which the dividend of successful upward nobility is the assimila-
tion of the metahuman powers of the “cosmological outside”–giving a hold, 
then, on the people inside. 
Where antagonistic acculturation involved conflictual relations between 
lower and higher or outer and inner peoples, symmetrical schismogenesis is typ-
ical of the competition between more or less equivalent parties at a given level 
of the regional hierarchy. The adversaries may be individuals or factions within 
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the same group with the leadership thereof at stake; or they may be groups 
of the same order in the galactic hierarchy contending for a superior position 
therein. The way Bateson described it, symmetrical schismogenesis works on the 
principle of “anything you can do, I can do better,” as in an arms race where each 
side strives to accumulate more destructive power than the other. Rather than 
“the same as and different from,” the favored competitive move here is “equal to 
and better than.” Indeed, the best move is to “go outside the box,” to introduce 
an unprecedented lethal weapon into the conflict, thereby trumping any and 
all adversaries competing by only conventional means. Or as Clifford Sather 
(1996: 92) reported of Iban of Kalimantan, competition among members of 
the community is essentially waged outside of it: “It is largely through deeds 
performed beyond the boundaries of the long house that unequal status within 
it was, and continues to be, measured.” In the context of galactic systems, the 
privileged tactic is to go above and beyond one’s own group to acquire the cos-
mopolitical powers of proximate superiors—whether by identification, alliance, 
predation, or some such mode of cultural assimilation.
Motivated thus by internal competition, these aspirations for the marve-
lous powers of galactic superiors have been effective means of cultural mimesis 
in core–periphery relations. As has been noted elsewhere (Sahlins 2010), they 
are a recurrent mode of stranger-king formation worldwide: native rulers who 
become foreigners rather than foreigners who become native rulers. The self-
Hinduization of Southeast Asian kings is a case in point. Another is the Malay 
sultans contending for local supremacy by adopting Alexandrian bona fides. 
An example so good I have already used it more than once concerns Hawai‘i, 
where, within a decade of Cook’s death in 1779, three of the island paramounts 
had named their sons and heirs “King George”; and even before the great con-
queror Kamehameha ceded the archipelago to his “brother” King George in 
1793, he was flying the Union Jack from his house and canoe. Early in the nine-
teenth century, the prime minister of the Sandwich Island kingdom was Billy 
Pitt Kalaimoku, the governor of Maui was Cox Keeaumoku, and John Adams 
Kuakini ruled Hawai‘i Island (Sahlins 1981a, 1992). Instances could easily be 
multiplied, but for convenience I cite one of James C. Scott’s general notices of 
the phenomenon in Southeast Asia—with the added indication of the major 
powers’ own interest in the politicization of the uplands:
The State’s desire for chiefs and the ambitions of upland local strongmen co-
incided often enough to create imitative state-making in the hills, though such 
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achievements were seldom durable. Local chiefs had ample reasons to seek the 
seals, regalia, and letters conferred by a more powerful ruler; they might over-
come rivals, and confer lucrative trade and tribute monopolies. Recognition of a 
lowland ruler’s implied charisma was, at the same time, entirely compatible with 
remaining entirely outside its administrative reach. (2009: 114)
Like Scott, virtually all the scholarly chroniclers of the region have stressed 
the endemic instabilities of core–periphery relations: egalitarian (gumsa) revolts 
against the pretensions and exactions of (gumlao) local chiefs who assume the 
style of superior foreign rulers; underlying villages or principalities that switch 
allegiance from declining to rising outside powers; the overthrow of local rul-
ers affiliated with an external power by a rival party affiliated with a different 
realm; high-level competition resulting in the defeat and displacement of one 
apical state by another. As many of these shifts suggest, an intrinsic evolutionary 
impulse is generated throughout the system by the cultural politics of galactic 
mimesis. Indeed there is always the potential that marginal societies, by virtue 
of some strategic advantage—military, commercial, or other—will fully realize 
in practice the greater foreign regime they had previously identified with by 
now overcoming and succeeding it. It may be that as a general rule, all great 
civilizations were peripheral once, outliers of galactic polities: like the Mongols 
and the Manchus were to China; or the Siamese kingdoms were to Khmer 
predecessors, who were themselves marginal to South Asian realms. For that 
matter, the Greeks were marginal relative to the Persians; the Romans to the 
Greeks; and the Gauls, Franks, and Britons to the Romans; and so on. Virtually 
all of this begins in soft-power politics, moreover, set up by the demonstrable 
cosmic potency of dominant centers, to which peripheral societies are oriented 
and subordinated culturally while they are still independent politically.
Recall, moreover, that there is a reciprocal search for vital power, from above 
as well as from below: a centrifugal expansion from the center outward toward 
the peripheries, as well as a centripetal movement from the peripheries toward 
the center. As Tambiah observed, while the central kingdom moves outward 
to incorporate the lower-standing territories of the “wild” hinterlands, “in the 
opposite direction, the lower attempts to raise itself by emulation of, and con-
tact with, the immediately superior” (1985: 322). Except that typically there 
is no political “incorporation” of the hinterlands by the central kingdom, al-
though, as a consequence of diffusion of its “high culture,” there is an interest-
ing disconformity between the cosmopolitical superstuctures and the material 
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infrastructures of societies throughout the field of core–periphery relations. 
Given the pervasive operation of galactic mimesis, the political and cosmologi-
cal order of the greater states is more or less replicated beyond their borders 
through a wider domain of effective influence than their practical means of 
domination could reach; whereas, by the same mimetic token, the lesser socie-
ties know more developed institutions of governance than their own “economic 
basis” could generate. “One major characteristic of any of the hill societies of 
Southeast Asia that live in symbiosis with civilizations,” as F. K. Lehman ob-
served, “ is the marked disparity between what their supravillage political system 
attempts to be, on the models provided it by its civilized neighbors, and what 
its resources and organizational capacity readily permit it to achieve” (1967: 
34). All this is to say that the conventional notions of the systematic coher-
ence of the sociocultural totality, these paradigms of “anthropology-cultures” 
or “national-cultures,” whether Marxist, Durkheimian, structural-functional, 
cultural-materialist, or whatever, supposing as they do in one way or another 
that the political and spiritual forms of any given society are reflexes of more 
fundamental social or material realities, are inappropriate to the uneven devel-
opment of structural registers in societies situated in galactic polities. 
We are back to the beginning of this essay and a repeated theme of this book: 
the specious assumption that societies are all alone and self-generating; and, ac-
cordingly, left thus to their own devices, they develop functionally consistent 
cultural wholes. But the diverse societies set in hierarchical core–periphery sys-
tems are nether isolated nor sui generis. They are interdependent structurally to 
the extent that their cosmological and political forms are in significant respects 
not of their own making, and accordingly without basis in the coexisting infra-
structures. Uneven development is the structural norm in galactic polities. And 
since, as far as we know, human societies virtually everywhere and everywhen 
have been situated in such fields of core–periphery interactions, our main theo-
ries of cultural order are, to put it benignly, in need of revision.
Also worthy of reconsideration are the premodern “empires” so-called, 
which, the world around, are not extraterritorial governments of colonized so-
cieties so much as predatory overlordships, ruled typically by hubristic kings 
of divine potency exacting tributes from subordinated proxy regimes—in oth-
er words, galactic polities as described here for Southeast Asian civilizations. 
The lineaments of the same also appear in earlier pages on Africa and Middle 
America. And the argument can be extended to famous empires of Mediter-
ranean and Western Asian antiquity: Median, Achaemenid, Seleucid, Sasanian, 
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Parthian, Egyptian, Akkadian, Aassyrian, and their like—even the Roman, par-
ticularly during the republic. Of course they vary considerably in structure, but 
all take the form of a core region under the direct administration of the domi-
nant ethnic group, whose powers and cultural influences diminish in propor-
tion to distance from the center and inversely to the self-determination of the 
outlying peoples. As has been noted of the Roman imperium—and is true of 
these galactic orders more generally—the relations of the center to subordinate 
peoples are effected in severalty, as so many bilateral arrangements; hence, un-
like the uniform government of national states, these empires are characterized 
by heterogeneous forms of submission of peripheral collectivities to the galactic 
core (Ando 2015: 13). Generally, however, the effect is a system of three concen-
tric zones, the circle beyond the ruling core consisting of vassal polities obedi-
ent to it, and a further region where submission to the center is nominal and 
tributary obligations are minimal. All the same, the pretensions of the galactic 
rulers are typically world encompassing, figured as extending indefinitely along 
the cardinal directions, the whole taking the form of three circles and four quar-
ters. Characteristically also, the cultural achievements and cosmic powers of the 
dominant people and their famous kings are respected beyond any actual po-
litical presence or authority, thus generating an orientation of marginal peoples 
toward the center that may presage their ultimate usurpation of their erstwhile 
superiors. Indeed, the dynamic phenomena of upward nobility and galactic mi-
mesis, involving progression culturally and politically from below, as motivated 
by competition within subordinate groups or resistance to dominant groups, are 
likewise endemic in imperial regimes. The outward reach of the dominant cent-
er is thus complemented by a centripetal impulse of peripheral peoples, produc-
ing chronic instabilities in a system that is otherwise envisioned, insofar as it is 
impelled by the search for the security of divine, life-giving benefits—elsewhere. 
chapter 7
Notes on the politics of divine kingship 
Or, elements for an archaeology of sovereignty
David Graeber
This essay is meant to draw some threads together from the other pieces as-
sembled in this collection; but also to propose some new ideas and possible 
directions for research. It’s an essay about the politics of divine kingship—as 
well as about the origins of the principle of sovereignty, since one of the main 
arguments is that the two are intimately linked. 
“Sovereignty” is a complicated word and nowadays it is often used to simply 
mean “national autonomy,” but as the etymology suggests, it originally referred 
to the power of kings. Sovereignty in the sense of royal power has always been 
fraught with paradoxes. One the one hand, it is in principle absolute. Kings will, 
if they have any possibility of doing so, insist that they stand outside the legal 
or moral order and that no rules apply to them. Sovereign power is the power 
to refuse all limits and do whatever one likes. On the other, they often tend to 
lead lives so circumscribed, so ringed about by custom and ceremony, that they 
can barely do anything at all. What’s more, this paradox has never gone away. 
It still lingers in the peculiar way we imagine the modern nation-state, where 
sovereignty has in principle passed from the king to an entity we refer to as 
“the people,” who are simultaneously viewed (in their capacity as “the people”) 
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as the source of all legitimacy, as capable of rising up in revolution and creating 
an entirely new constitutional and legal order, and also (in their capacity as just 
“people”) as those bound and constrained by those very laws.
What I want to do in this essay is to try to trace this paradox back to its 
origins. If we define sovereignty in its broadest sense as the ability to “lay down 
the law,” either literally or figuratively—that is, to both break all accepted rules 
of law, morality, or propriety at will, and to thus step outside the social order 
and impose new rules, or simply give arbitrary orders backed up with threat of 
punishment—then its historical origins are long since lost. They must surely 
to go back long beyond the advent of written records. But it’s possible, I think, 
to turn to the ethnographic record to create a conceptual model of the logical 
possibilities, as they have worked themselves out in cases that we actually know. 
The essays collected in this volume all share at least three common premises. 
The first is that A. M. Hocart was largely correct in arguing that what we have 
come to call “government” originally derives from ritual. The second is that rec-
ognition of this fact forces us to radically reconsider what we mean by both. And 
the third is that what Marshall Sahlins has termed “stranger-kingship” provides 
an ideal point of entry from which to do so. For the moment, let me focus on the 
second point. Despite occasional protests to the contrary, anthropologists still 
largely accept the premise that there is some kind of inevitable division between 
the cynical world of Realpolitik and the airy domains of ritual, which—even 
if they take the form of rituals of state—are assumed to consist of statements 
about the ultimate meaning of human life. Or perhaps the ultimate forms of 
authority. Or visions of an ideal social order. Or some kind of alternative, “as-
if ” reality. But anyway, always at a fundamental remove from the pragmatics of 
political action. This division between ritual and politics is maintained whether 
one insists that royal ritual exists largely for the sake of reinforcing pragmatic 
authority (e.g., Bloch 1989), or whether one instead insists that pragmatic au-
thority exists largely for the sake of enabling those in charge to perform rituals 
(e.g., Geertz 1980). To some degree, this division is just an effect of the dogged 
persistence, in both the British and American traditions, of the theoretical as-
sumption that society and culture, action and expression, must be treated as dif-
ferent levels of human reality, and one must therefore develop different sorts of 
theoretical tools to understand each. But to be fair, it’s not just that. Often those 
who organize and carry out rituals will themselves insist on a similar division. 
This may be because they see ritual as providing access to another dimension 
of reality, as famously with the Australian Dreamtime, or it may be because 
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intellectuals in charge of conducting such rituals—Confucian, Brahmanical, or 
Rabbinical—have developed their own theory of ritual as representing a kind 
of ideal, as-if, “subjunctive” universe standing apart from a chaotic and tawdry 
everyday existence (A. Seligman et al. 2008); but whatever the theory, rituals are 
always to some degree set apart, framed as different from mundane life, and in 
pragmatic terms, it is the creation and maintenance of those frames that is key 
to rituals’ power.
In this, at least, the Durkheimians were not entirely wrong.
Nonetheless, it is precisely in royal ritual and the politics surrounding it that 
such frames seem most in danger of collapse, where sometimes they do indeed 
collapse—where it is possible, even, to say that ritual really is politics by other 
means, but only to the measure that it is also possible to say that politics be-
comes ritual by other means. I think this is why Sir James Frazer’s stories about 
the killing of the divine kings continue to resonate among poets, mystics, and 
Hollywood script-writers down to the present day. Killing is one symbolic act 
of which it is simply impossible to write off as “just” symbolic—because, what-
ever you may or may not be communicating through the ritual, when the rite of 
sacrifice is over, the victim continues to stay dead. 
This is why anthropologists found ritual regicide so compelling back in the 
days when it was common to imagine people in earlier stages of history as 
themselves still living in a kind of poetic Dreamtime, and also why those most 
insistent on maintaining the division between symbolic expression and politi-
cal reality were so assiduous about insisting that such things never really hap-
pened, that kings were never really killed (e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1948, 1951). 
Or alternately, that if they were, such acts were really political acts dressed up as 
ritual, rather than moments when the frames collapse and it’s simply no longer 
possible to say there is a difference between the two. But in fact, as practitioners 
of cold-blooded Realpolitik from Pizarro to the Bolsheviks discovered to their 
irritation, king-killing is always, necessarily, a mythic and ritual act, whether or 
not those who perform the act feel it ought to be. 
At the same time, no one can possibly claim it’s not political. 
This essay, then, is not just an exploration of the politics of kingship, or even 
sovereignty; it’s also an exploration of what happens when such frames implode. 
One might even say that’s what sovereignty itself is: the ability to toss frames 
about. In the first part of the essay, therefore, I want to offer some suggestions 
about how sovereignty might first have burst out of the ritual frames in which it 
was originally encompassed, thus allowing divine kings to come into the world 
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in the first place. In the second two, I will again take up a notion I first proposed 
in my essay on the Shilluk (chapter 2 above): to consider what happens when 
kings either definitively win, or definitively lose, that war. 
SOVEREIGNTY CONTAINED IN TIME AND SPACE
Claire: How do you know you’re God?
The Earl: Simple. When I pray to Him, I find I’m talking to myself.
Peter Barnes, The ruling class
It’s a premise of this volume, as I’ve noted, that A. M. Hocart was correct to argue 
that forms of governance first appeared in the ritual sphere, as a part of a larger 
politics of the creation, channeling, and maintenance of life, and only later came 
to be applied to what we consider the political domain. As Marshall Sahlins has 
pointed out earlier in this volume, forager societies do have kings, even if they 
are not mortal ones. Mortal kings were modeled on gods and not the other way 
around. But the fact that this is true in the broadest historical sense does not mean 
that, for instance, Frazer was also correct in assuming that human government 
itself begins in divine kingship: the absolute rule of humans taken to be gods. 
It might seem like a logical step, but the archaeological and historical evi-
dence in no way supports it. What we know—and our knowledge is decidedly 
uneven—suggests a longer and more twisted path. The first bits of evidence 
we do have for marked social inequality appear surprisingly early, in the Pleis-
tocene, where, despite the fact most people do not seem to have been buried 
at all, a few clearly extraordinary individuals were not only placed in tomb-
like graves but their bodies were festooned with enormous quantities of bead-
work and other precious materials. Yet these “princely” burials (as archaeologists 
sometimes call them) appear in isolation, often thousands of years apart, and, 
despite the enormous amounts of human labor that must have been mobilized 
to create their costumes, never seem to lead to anything that otherwise resem-
bles a kingdom or a state. What’s more, the majority of these bodies appear to 
have been physically anomalous in some way: some were extremely tall, others 
were marked by dwarfism, yet others had markedly deformed skeletons (Formi-
cola 2007), and there is reason to suspect the burials might have been as much 
about containing and neutralizing their power as in honoring them (many, for 
instance, are topped by very heavy slabs of stone). Norse myth notwithstanding, 
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it seems unlikely the Paleolithic had really produced a hereditary aristocracy 
that largely consisted of giants, dwarfs, and hunchbacks. We can only guess, 
but the appearance of such striking characters in sumptuous and elaborately 
fashioned costumes, some thirty thousand years ago, in such magnificent isola-
tion, does rather suggest that insofar as we are speaking of Ice Age “princes”—as 
some of these individuals have been called—any powers they may have held was 
strictly limited in time and space: perhaps even to very specific ritual contexts 
(Wengrow and Graeber 2015: 604–5).
All this does not necessarily mean that the first princely figures in human 
history were, as a Hocartian reading would suggest, impersonators of divinities in 
dramatic rituals whose authority began to extend further during the ritual season. 
Other interpretations are possible. But that one would certainly fit the evidence, 
which, it must be admitted, most contemporary interpretations, caught up as they 
are in evolutionist categories, really don’t. What’s more, there are precedents for 
societies in which powers we normally associate with government—and particu-
larly sovereignty, even only in the minimal sense of the power to issue commands 
and back them up with the threat of punishment—exist only in ritual contexts, 
even, specifically, when participants are impersonating metahuman beings. It’s 
just that neither they, nor the gods they impersonate, are ever anything remotely 
like Zeus, Jehovah, Vishnu, or other familiar “King of the Gods”-type figures. 
* * *
What I am suggesting is that, while the emergence of sovereign powers most 
likely did follow a path from kingly divinities to divine kings, this path is in no 
way straightforward. It passed through a veritable circus-world of oddities. The 
region from the western littoral of North America to the Great Plains provides, 
I think, the closest we can get to a glimpse of what must have happened. Here 
one can see a clear progression from societies (central California, Northwest 
Coast, etc.) where direct orders between adults (or, in the latter case, free adults) 
are given only during ritual dramas in which mortals impersonate gods, even 
to the point where certain characters in those dramas are regularly referred to 
as “police” who enforce the rules of the ceremony; to those in which, as Robert 
Lowie was first to point out (1948b; cf. Wengrow and Graeber 2015),1 specific 
1. Kroeber (1922: 307–8) note that Californian cult associations never took on the 
broader police functions they did elsewhere in North America. 
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police powers are assigned (usually on a rotating basis) to clans or warrior socie-
ties during the three-month hunt and ritual season as a whole, even if, during 
the rest of the year, society reverts to its usual egalitarian decentralized political 
state, chiefs have to rely on powers of persuasion, not compulsion, and the for-
mer police have no more say in public affairs than anybody else. 
The really striking thing about the powers of command that could be exercised 
only during rituals, though, is that, most often, they were exercised by clowns.
Some examples from north central California might prove illustrative. In 
indigenous Californian societies, with very few exceptions, chiefs and other ex-
plicitly political authorities—where they existed—held no powers of command 
or punishment; neither were explicit orders given or taken by adults in the do-
mestic sphere. Even children were no longer punished after a fairly young age. 
The great exception was during the great Kuksu, or God-Impersonating rituals 
(Barrett 1919; Kroeber 1922: 307; 1925: 364–90; Gifford 1927; Loeb 1932, 
1933; Halpern 1988), held in the winter months. During the Kuksu ceremonies, 
cosmic powers became manifest to mortal humans in the form of costumed 
dancers, who trained young boys in arcane ritual and older boys and girls in 
curing, or participated in the renewal of the universe. 
On one level, these were fairly unremarkable examples of a broad type of 
spirit-impersonation ritual widely practiced in Australia, Melanesia, and parts 
of South America as well: involving elaborate disguises, the use of bull-roar-
ers to create terrifying unearthly noises, and the pretense that those excluded 
(young boys and many women) actually believe they are witnessing spirits. But 
in these dramas, the spirits almost never give orders. Mainly they just terrify 
people (or else people pretend to be terrified; it’s never entirely clear who’s really 
fooling whom), and then reveal to a certain elect the ritual knowledge that lets 
initiates themselves play spirits in their turn. The elders who impersonate the 
spirits in some contexts might, in others, beat and admonish the initiates, and 
order them around; but these initiates are children and the elders’ behavior is 
just a harsher or more exaggerated version of how parents normally treat small 
children. What we see in central California is in certain ways quite different. 
The most important spirit was known as Kuksu, or “Big Head,” the god who 
had revealed all the arts and sciences to humans long ago. Yet at least equal in 
importance were the clowns. Clowns were a fixture of many Californian rituals. 
They behaved like gluttons, lechers, and buffoons; they accompanied almost all 
rituals, no matter how solemn or important, with burlesque mimicry and slapstick 
routines, making fun of the officiants, musicians, and even gods. All this is much 
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discussed in the literature. But if one picks carefully through accounts of the ac-
tual ceremonies, one surprising feature emerges that has largely escaped previous 
comment. Clowns were also the only figures in those rituals, or, for that matter, 
in Californian life more generally, who had the power to issue direct orders to 
anyone else. Or at least, they were the only ones who could issue orders directly 
backed up by threat of punishment—since clowns also had the power to levy fines 
or other penalties for misbehavior. This might mean enforcing the various rules 
and regulations of the ceremony, though it might also mean whimsically making 
them up, and sometimes “misbehavior” might mean just laughing at their jokes, 
since unlike in ordinary life, during rituals, laughing at a clown’s jokes was strictly 
forbidden. During Pomo Kuksu rituals, if anyone cracked up at the clown’s antics, 
the clown—who we are told also acted as “sergeant at arms” for the ritual—was al-
lowed to (playfully) attack the culprit and then levy a fine (Barrett 1917: 417, 422; 
cf. 1919: 457 n. 24).2 Of the Wappo coyote dance, another Kuksu ritual, we read:
While the dance was open to women, it was only the men who made up as 
clowns. The latter danced naked, with stripes on their bodies, and colored clay 
on their faces. They made funny faces. . . . If a man (or woman) laughed, he was 
thrown up in the air. Then he had to pay a fine, give a feast, or do anything which 
the clowns demanded. (Loeb 1932: 111) 
In other words, clown orders could be completely arbitrary and, in principle, at 
least unlimited. Among the Wintun hesi ritual, S. A. Barrett observed that moki 
clowns, described elsewhere (Loeb 1933: 171) as “policemen” of the ceremony, 
are privileged to levy a fine on one who does anything contrary to custom, and 
especially upon those who show displeasure at their ridicule or refuse to do their 
bidding. When, therefore, they ask someone to sing, he must accede or pay a fine. 
It is said that nearly all individual singing is due to the commands of the clowns. 
(Barrett 1919: 458)3 
2. So among the Northern Maidu the director of ceremonies issues “commands” 
(Dixon 1905: 253); in Loeb’s description of the Pomo ritual, the clown or ghost-
clown has the role of fining dancers who make mistakes (1932: 50) or who laugh at 
their jokes (ibid., 5, 27, 110–12); on fines for laughing, see also Kroeber (1925: 264, 
450); Loeb (1933: 224); and Steward (1931: 199–200). 
3. Here the clown’s behavior seems to echo the behavior of shamanic spirits, who, at 
least among the Shasta, will demand the shaman sing and threaten punishment if 
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Clowns were the only performers who could break all the rules. Often they car-
ried out tasks literally backward, or upside down. But they also made up rules, 
and enforced existing ones. Sometimes clowns did both at the same time, like 
the Yuki clowns, who would tell initiates to do the exact opposite of what they 
were supposed to, then impose fines on anyone foolish enough to take them 
at their word (Kroeber 1925: 187).4 It was as if the clowns were the personal 
embodiment of the principle that only those not bound by rules can create 
rules. Clown commands were supposed to be whimsical—hence, arbitrary—but 
clown commands were the only genuine commands anyone gave or received 
in most Californian societies, since only they were enforced by the threat of 
sanction. What’s more, while clowns were not, like the costumed masquerad-
ers, identified with specific gods, they appear to have represented the divine 
principle in general. Rather than humans impersonating gods, they were gods 
impersonating humans, the absurdity of their behavior a way of conveying to 
us how ridiculous we appear in divine eyes (Park 1990: 270; cf. Makarius 1970; 
Hieb 1972; Handelman 1981).5 
For present purposes, though, what’s important is that the divine and ar-
bitrary power clowns wield is strictly confined to rituals. Some Californian 
communities did have their own village clowns; but those clowns had no right 
to give orders under regular circumstances. In fact, neither did anyone else: 
the main authorities among the Pomo, Wintun, Maidu, and their neighbors, 
whether chiefs, shamans, or heads of initiation societies, did not have the power 
to command others. What’s more, the clowns were most often drawn from a 
class of hobos and beggars, who were the last people who could be seen as hold-
ing authority of any kind, coercive or otherwise (Brightman 1999). 
Pueblo clowns similarly embodied gods, acted as “police” during ritu-
als, and had the power to whip and punish children. Clowns become more of 
an autonomous force here, as there are warrior societies that combine police 
they don’t (Dixon 1907: 473–76). The name Moki is used both for the master of 
ceremonies and for the clowns. In other instances the roles are combined. 
4. “They direct each other to step in the wrong place, which is their way of indicating 
where they are to stand. Should one really go where he is told, he has to pay” (ibid.).
5. “The key to understanding these ludic displays—their obscenity, their disrespect for 
property, and their seemingly irrational disregard for self—is a simple one: we are 
meant to view them not as perverse humans but as gods impersonating humans, 
showing us what clods we are in the gods’ eyes” (Park 1990: 270).
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functions and clowning.6 But perhaps the most impressive expression of police 
powers in the hands of buffoons is to be found among the Kwakiutl, during the 
Midwinter Ceremonials. During this ritual season, the normal social structure 
was suspended, people even took on different names, and society came to be 
organized around rights to dance certain roles in the great ritual dramas: Can-
nibal dancers, Thunderbirds, Grizzly Bears, Killer Whales, Seals, Ghosts, and, 
critically, Fools (Boas 1897: 498–99; Curtis 1915: 156–58). The system seems 
in many ways a transformation of a graded set of initiation societies, with ad-
ditional military functions added on: many of the dancers are specifically said to 
be warriors, and this alternative social structure also pops into action, replacing 
the normal one, whenever society goes to war (Boas 1899: 101–2; cf. Codere 
1950: 119).7
The highest order during the ritual season is represented by the Hamatsa or 
Man-Eater, a human seized by a terrible cannibalistic spirit who must gradually 
be cured over the course of the ceremonies. But it’s the clowns—the Fool Danc-
ers or nutlmatl, often aided and accompanied by the Grizzly Bears, armed with 
great bear claws—who functioned as “the tribal police during the winter period 
of aggregation and ceremonial” (MacLeod 1933: 339). According to Boas,
[The] “fool dancers” are also messengers and helpers of the Hamatsa who help to 
enforce the laws referring to the ceremonial. Their method of attack is by throw-
ing stones at people, hitting them with sticks, or in serious cases stabbing and 
killing them with lances and war axes. (1897: 468) 
6. “Pueblo clowns served as police during ceremonies to ensure that people attend 
performances and that they obeyed the taboos during ritual periods. Clowns might 
be given considerable power over others at these times.  .  .  . Among the Pueblo 
Indians clowns are also disciplinarians for children, and are used as bogeymen. 
Wearing masks and impersonating supernatural beings, they threatened to whip 
children and frighten them in other ways” (Norbeck 1961: 209, cited in Crumrine 
1969: 15, who provides a similar analysis of Mayo clowns). Similarly, Else Clews 
Parsons writes “the clowning society is dangerous and fear-inspiring. The clowns are 
licensed to do as they choose; they are punitive and have express police or warrior 
functions” (1939: 131). On police functions of Southwestern clowns in general, 
cf. Parsons and Biels (1939: 499, 504); Whitman (1947: 15).
7. It is probably significant that in the Southern Kwakiutl winter dancing societies 
documented by Drucker (1940), Fool Dancers were largely absent, though “warrior” 
dancers appear to have taken their place. 
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The Fools are said to menace or attack anyone who stumbled while dancing 
(Morland-Simpson 1888: 82; Boas 1890: 67), laughed, or coughed during a 
performance (Boas 1897: 506),8 mistakenly called someone by his or her sum-
mer name (ibid.: 517), or even took too long eating (ibid.: 551). Even if Boas’ 
informants were obviously sometimes exaggerating for theatrical effect (“if any-
one makes a mistake in dancing he is killed by the Nutlmatl” [ibid.]), Kwakiutl 
clowns were clearly far more dangerous characters than their Californian cous-
ins. Most in Boas’ time were experienced warriors. They are also even more gro-
tesque. Fool Dancers wore tattered clothing, blackened their faces, or donned 
masks with exceedingly long noses. Their noses were always running and they 
became excited if anyone touched or even mentioned them. They flung mucus 
at one another. They carried out tasks backward and became furious if anyone 
tried to correct them. They were constantly pretending to throw rocks at crowds. 
Some would feign stabbing themselves, using bladders of fake blood to feign in-
jury. But some of their destructiveness was not simulated. “They are armed with 
clubs and stones, which they use on anything that arouses their repugnance for 
beauty and order,” wrote Edward Curtis (1915: 216); “they dislike to see clean 
and beautiful clothing,” one of Boas’ informants added. “They tear and soil it. 
They break canoes, houses, kettles, and boxes; in short, act the mad man in every 
conceivable way” (Boas 1897: 469). Sometimes a crew of Fools in a berserker 
rage would soil everything in sight, filling houses with filth and ordure, even 
pulling houses apart9 (Boas 1890: 66–8; 1897: 468–73, 506, 516, 564, 566–69; 
1921: 1160; 1930: 146–50; Curtis 1915: 215–16, 231–32).
So once again those who are not bound by any sort of order—indeed, who 
express revulsion toward the very idea of order—are also those in charge of 
enforcing it. 
Northwest Coast society was in no sense egalitarian. Perhaps a third of the 
population held aristocratic titles, and in pre-Conquest times roughly a fifth 
were slaves (Donald 1997).10 Still, there was nothing like a state, no apparatus 
of rule. Free adults did not issue commands to one another, let alone commands 
8. For other examples of punishment for laughing: Boas (1897: 525–26, 642). 
9. Since they were obliged to compensate the owners later for any property damage, 
the office was actually rather expensive. For Goldman, the Fool Dancers are “lesser 
forms of war dancers. The nutlmatl represent the madness, the wildness, and the 
obscene side of war and destruction” (1975: 118–19).
10. One role of the Fools prior to conquest had been to sacrifice and carve up a slave for 
the Man-Eater (Boas 1897: 339).
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backed up by threats of force.11 Ordinarily there was nothing like a “tribal po-
lice.” Yet between November and February, when a whole series of “secret so-
ciety” initiations spilled over into a “Winter Ceremonial” season of dances and 
potlatches, the authority of the Fools seems to have spilled over as well. 
Unlike the Californian clowns, they could not give arbitrary orders in their 
own right; they were strictly deputies of the Man-Eater, who alone could issue 
commands.12 We are already beginning to see a process of division of sover-
eignty. The right of command in the Northwest Coast belonged properly to 
“supernatural power” (divinity in the undifferentiated sense);13 when that di-
vinity manifested itself in human form, it was as the crazed Hamatsa, lust-
ing for human flesh. But the Hamatsa mainly just made inarticulate noises; it 
was incapable of ordering anyone to do anything other than fetching food. The 
Man-Eater in this context is almost like a stranger-king manqué, a pure force 
of vital energy bursting into the world of the living, needing to be tamed; with 
the exception that, once domesticated, his sovereignty is destroyed and he is 
rendered once again an ordinary mortal. The Fools, in turn, seem to be stripped 
of any autonomous power of command, and so simply act as enforcers.
The Kwakiutl (like the Pueblo) are also already halfway to the situation de-
scribed by Lowie for so many Plains societies, where throughout the summer 
months—a time when otherwise scattered bands gathered together first for 
the great bison hunts, then for the Sun Dance rituals—certain clans or warrior 
societies would be assigned temporary police powers, allowing them to keep 
discipline in the hunt, impose arbitrary resolutions to disputes, and enforce 
their judgments by the destruction of property, beatings, and even in extreme 
11. In fact, they did not even really have chiefs. 
   Although titleholders are usually referred to as “chiefs” these men and women 
were not political office-holders as such. Indeed, we might say that political 
office-holding as we understand it did not exist on the Northwest Coast. Title-
holders led or were important in their kinship or residential group. In many 
winter villages, the heads of the component villages were ranked, but though 
this gave the “village chief ” considerable prestige and some ritual authority, 
it bestowed little or no power or authority to command in what is usually 
thought of as the political arena. (Donald 1997: 26) 
12. “When a Hamatsa wishes to obtain food he may send anyone hunting or fishing, 
and his orders must be obeyed” (Boas 1890: 64).
13. So in Boas’ later account, speeches at the Winter Ceremonial make frequent 
invocations of following “orders given by the supernatural power” (1930: 97, 124, 
126–27, 166, 172), the latter apparently referring to the divine generically.
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cases killing of recalcitrants, even though, during the rest of the year, disputes 
were resolved through mediation and the last summer’s police no longer had 
any more power than anybody else (Lowie 1927: 103–04; 1948b: 18–19; cf. 
1909: 79, 82, 89, 96–98; 1948a: 40, 162, 325–26, 350; MacLeod 1937; Provinse 
1937: 344–53; Llewellyn, Hoebel, and Adamson 1941). At all times, ultimate 
authority in such societies still rested with councils of elders. But in the ritual 
season, “police” or “soldiers” could act with a fair degree of discretion and impu-
nity—even though there was always a system of rotation to ensure no individual 
or group held such powers two years running. There were some traces here of 
the association of police power with clowns and contraries—in writing of his 
own original fieldwork on the Assiniboine, for instance, Lowie observed that 
some insisted their own Fool Society used to hold police powers in the summer 
months (1909: 72)—but ended up concluding that despite frequent conver-
gences between “clowning” and “police functions” across the Plains, there was no 
systematic relationship between the two.14 In fact, warrior societies, ritual fools 
or contraries, and temporary police associations seem to have largely split apart, 
and there no longer seems to have been any sense in which those assigned police 
powers embodied deities of any sort.15 
We can observe, then, three stages of a logical progression:
1. (California) clowns as embodiments of divine power, with a moral logic 
external and contrary to society, wielding arbitrary powers of command and 
punishment, but only during the course of rituals.
2. (Northwest Coast) Fools as delegates of divine power, with a moral logic 
external and contrary to society, wielding arbitrary police powers during cer-
emonies that extended across the ritual season.
3. (Plains) temporary police societies, no longer divine or external, but wield-
ing arbitrary powers of enforcement delegated to them over the course of 
the ritual season, but not limited to the rituals themselves.
14. “Clownish behavior and police functions likewise occur in varying combinations 
and cannot be taken to define any one type of organization of the Plains Indians” 
(Lowie 1909: 98).
15. “During the Sun Dance police were selected for the preservation of order by the 
Dakota, Crow, Assiniboine, Blackfoot, Sansi, Iowa, Plains-Cree, and the Kansa; 
among some of the groups these police also supervised the conduct of the dance 
ritual” (Provinse 1937: 348). Often in that specific context their power was delegated 
by the officiating priest or master of ceremonies, but they do not seem to have been 
themselves in any sense an extension of metahuman beings. 
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I should emphasize that this is a logical progression, and in no sense an attempt 
at historical reconstruction. The actual course of events, in any given instance, 
was likely far more complicated.16 Still, it represents one way that sovereign 
power could, as it were, burst through the its frame, even while still being care-
fully contained within the ritual season in such a way that it could not, as in the 
modern state, suffuse and inform the entirety of everyday existence. 
In fact, why it did not was precisely Lowie’s problem. Lowie’s 1948 Huxley 
Lecture, “Some aspects of political organization among the American Aborigi-
nes” (1948b), was specifically concerned with why states had largely failed to 
develop in the Americas, and concludes that indigenous Americans had created 
institutional arrangements to ensure that they did not. If this sounds similar to 
Pierre Clastres’ argument in Society against the state (1977), that chiefship among 
most North and South American societies was constructed in such a way that 
arbitrary, sovereign power—authority that could not be questioned since it was 
ultimately backed up by force—could not possibly develop out of it, there is a 
reason. Clastres’ argument was directly taken from Lowie.17 Clastres even ended 
his own essay in the same way as Lowie’s Huxley Lecture: by concluding that 
since secular chiefship was designed to prevent the emergence of powers of 
command, the latter could only have emerged from the religious sphere, from 
prophecy, or some similar appeal to exterior cosmic authority (Lowie 1948b: 
21–2; P. Clastres 1977: 183–86). 
As far as I know, no one has really developed a theory of the prophetic origin 
of the state. Presumably this is because there’s so little evidence to support it. 
One of the few to have taken the argument seriously, Fernando Santos-Granero 
(1993), makes the obvious point that this kind of charismatic authority is no-
toriously unstable, and that even in those places where it does seem to have 
become institutionalized, such as among the Amuesha of the Peruvian Amazon, 
16. Morphologically, the Plains societies, with their extreme seasonal variation and 
annual concentration for hunting of megafauna, probably are (despite their limited 
reliance on agriculture) if anything more analogous for Paleolithic societies across 
much of Eurasia, while the Californians and Northwest Coast societies would, at least 
in comparison, be more Mesolithic. But such analogies are always extremely inexact.
17. In his first exposition of the idea in L’Homme, Clastres does acknowledge the debt, 
noting for instance that his list of chiefly functions is taken directly from Lowie’s 1948 
essay (Clastres 1962: 53, 55, 58), but the relationship has been ignored by Clastres’ later 
avatars (with a few exceptions: e.g., Santos-Granero 1993; Wengrow and Graeber 
2015). What Lowie called “libertarianism,” Clastres referred to as “anarchism,” but in 
the context of their times, the two words meant pretty much the same thing. 
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it leads to a kind of constant gumsa/gumlao-like rise and collapse of priestly do-
mains.18 While there are examples of prophets founding states (Muhammad is 
an obvious example), such events are surprisingly rare in human history.
Still, the insight does ring true in a certain very broad sense. The principal 
example Clastres himself invoked were the Tupí-Guaraní prophets who up-
rooted whole communities to go off in search of a “land without evil,” in which 
the basic dilemmas of death and reproduction would be finally resolved and the 
sundering of the worlds of gods and men undone (see also H. Clastres 1995). 
This kind of utopian vision does, indeed, seem to lie behind the very project of 
creating kingdoms and, later, states. I have myself noted the analogy of the role 
of Nuer prophets, and the Shilluk reth: one might say that where prophets fore-
tell a total resolution of the great dilemmas of human existence in the future, 
divine kings embody a partial resolution of those same dilemmas in the present, 
their courts constituting a kind of paradise. 
Does this mean that divine kingship represents the final explosion of the 
divine into the human domain, a kind of final shattering of its ritual, or seasonal, 
containment? I think this is true only to a very limited degree. Ordinarily, we are 
speaking only of a frail and diminutive sort of paradise.
To illustrate, let me turn to one final North American example, the Natchez 
kingdom of what’s now southern Louisiana. It is considered the only genuinely 
unambiguous example of divine kingship north of the Rio Grande. 
The divine kingship of the Natchez
In 1739, the Jesuit missionary Father Maturin Le Petit put forth the argu-
ment that the Natchez, who called themselves Théoloël or “People of the Sun,” 
were the only American people to have a system of beliefs worthy of the name 
“religion.”19 Natchez religion, he observed, centered on two enormous earthen 
platforms that dominated their Great Village; on top of one of them was a Tem-
ple, atop the other, the house of their ruler, known as the Great Sun, capable of 
holding perhaps four thousand people—that is, the entire Natchez population 
at the time. A spacious plaza lay between. The Temple contained carved images 
18. Santos-Granero suggests one might see the emergence of states when the prophets 
ally with autonomous warrior bands, and become self-reproducing lineages. But 
again, this is basically speculation. 
19. It would appear that “Natchez” was really just the name of what the French called 
the “grand village” in which the Sun resided. 
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and an eternal flame, as well as baskets holding the charred remains of the for-
mer rulers and their servants; common people brought offerings to ancestors 
buried within, but aside from four temple guardians, only members of the royal 
family were allowed to enter:
The Chief of this Nation, who knows nothing on earth more dignified than him-
self, takes the title of brother of the Sun. To enable them better to converse to-
gether, they raise a mound of artificial soil, on which they build his cabin, which 
is of the same construction as the Temple. The door fronts the East, and every 
morning the great Chief honors by his presence the rising of his elder brother, 
and salutes him with many howlings as soon as he appears above the horizon. 
Then he gives orders that they shall light his calumet; he makes him an offering 
of the first three puffs which he draws; afterwards raising his hand above his 
head, and turning from the East to the West, he shows him the direction which 
he must take in his course . . . . (Le Petit 1848: 269–70)
Le Petit’s description is matched by many others. We have multiple accounts 
of the protocol surrounding the Great Sun, as he was ordinarily called, and his 
close relatives, also called Suns. “Their subjects, and even the chiefs of the vil-
lages, never approach them but they salute them three times, setting up a cry, 
which is a kind of howling”—that is, hailing the Great Sun exactly as he himself 
greets the Sun each morning. “They do the same when they retire, and they 
retire walking backwards” (Charlevoix 1763: 315). None might eat with the 
Sun, nor touch any plate or vessel he had touched; his meals were meticulously 
choreographed; when he left his house, carried on his warriors’ shoulders on a 
litter, his subjects had to prostrate themselves and call out when he passed. 
Similar but less stringent etiquette surrounded the Tattooed Serpent, the 
Great Sun’s brother and military commander, and the White Woman, his eldest 
sister, whose child (the Natchez being matrilineal) was to be the next Great Sun. 
All three, they emphasized, had the power of life and death over their subjects. 
“As soon as anyone has had the misfortune to displease any of them, they order 
their guards, whom they call allouez, to kill him. ‘Go and rid me of that dog,’ say 
they, and they are immediately obeyed” (ibid.). The Suns could also help them-
selves to their subjects’ possessions. 
The submissiveness of the savages to their chief, who commands them with the 
most despotic power, is extreme. They obey him in everything he may command 
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them. When he speaks they howl nine times by way of applause and to show 
him their satisfaction, and if he demands the life of any one of them, he comes 
himself to present his head. (Dumont in Swanton 1911: 104) 
Similarly, Le Petit:
The people blindly obey the least wish of their great chief. They look upon him 
as absolute master not only of their property but also of their lives, and not one 
of them would dare refuse him his head. (1848: 271)
The Suns were divine in every sense of the term. They were literally gods—de-
scendants of two children of the Sun, a radiant brother and sister, who had come 
to earth to establish peace by creating the institutions of government—and they 
were also divine in the broader sense that they could act with absolute arbitrari-
ness and impunity. The only limit, in fact, on the actions of Suns is that they ap-
pear to have been forbidden to do violence toward other Suns: members of the 
royal family, who numbered perhaps twenty, could not be harmed under any cir-
cumstances. One unusual result was that royals, and apparently some of the lower 
grades of nobility as well, could only marry commoners—since a Sun’s wives 
or husbands, along with their servants and retainers, all had to be put to death 
as part of the obloquies at their funeral, and this would be impossible if they 
had themselves been of equal rank. The result was a complex system of sinking 
status: while the children of female Suns remained Suns, children of male Suns 
descended one rank down each generation (to “Noble,” then “Honored” status) 
until their great-grandchildren became commoners again. The actual dynamics 
of this system (it was complicated by the fact it was also possible to move up 
ranks by accomplishment in war) have kept anthropologists busy for generations 
trying to figure out exactly how it could work in practice, without the top three 
classes eventually running out of commoners to marry (on the “Natchez para-
dox,” see MacLeod 1924; Josselin de Jong 1928; Haas 1939; Davis 1941; Hart 
1943; Quimby 1946; Tooker 1963; J. L. Fisher 1964; Mason 1964; Brain 1971; 
D. R. White, Murdock, and Scaglion 1971; Knight 1990; Lorenz 2000: 153–57). 
The technicalities need not concern us.20 Suffice it to say the divine qual-
ity of even male Suns was passed on, but only to a certain attenuated degree. 
20. In fact there’s no particular reason to assume Noble and Honored classes could 
only marry commoners in the first place (MacLeod 1924; Tooker 1953; Mason 
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Scandalized French observers noted how women of the ruling matrilineage could 
take lovers as they pleased, but order their commoner husbands’ heads be clapped 
against blocks of wood if they so much as suspected them of infidelity; such 
husbands, one observed, took on the air of masters among the numerous house-
hold servants but stooped like slaves in the presence of their wives, on whose 
death they would, like the rest of the household, be strangled. All members of 
the royal family were assigned servants at birth, many culled from infants born 
on the same day, who were expected to form part of their household in life, and 
accompany their master or mistress in death, along with any “voluntary slaves” 
(Swanton 1911: 100; Milne 2015: 38) who joined the household afterward. 
This seems as close to absolute sovereignty as one might imagine. There 
seems no check at all on royal power. But if one reads the original sources 
carefully, cracks in this façade begin to show. Take the word “Stinkard.” In the 
anthropological literature, the commoner class is regularly referred to as “the 
Stinkards,” since the French sources regularly use the term, but it turns out this 
word was just one of many ways the nobles expressed contempt for ordinary 
people when speaking with each other. It was never used before the commoners 
themselves:
The Natchez Nation is composed of nobility and people. The people are called in 
their language Michi-Michi-Quipy, which signifies Puant (“Stinkard”), a name, 
however, which offends them, and which no one dares to pronounce before 
them, for it would put them in a very bad humor. The Stinkards have a language 
entirely different from the Nobility,21 to whom they are submissive in the last 
degree. (Du Pratz 1774: 328, translation after Swanton 1911: 108) 
“Submissive in the last degree,” that is, unless one used a word they didn’t like.
Such apparently contradictory statements are commonplace in early 
European accounts of distant kingdoms. One encounters them in descriptions 
1964), or that “Honored” were a class at all, for that matter. For what it’s worth, 
I find Knight’s (1990) argument that the Natchez system is a transformation of a 
ranked exogamous clan system of a sort that had likely been common within the 
Mississippian civilization, and Lorenz’s reconstruction (2010: 153–57) of how the 
system might have worked, largely convincing. The phenomenon of sinking status 
will be discussed in greater detail in the final part of this essay.
21. This does not appear to have been true, though there were certain differences in 
vocabulary.
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of courts in Asia, Africa, and the Americas alike. In much the same way that 
European observers would often assert that a given people “go naked”—and 
then go on to describe their clothes—they would often first insist on the un-
limited, “despotic” power of their king—and then go on to elaborate its (often 
very considerable) limits. In the case of the Thécloëls, the confusion has caused 
most recent authorities (e.g., Hudson 1978: 210; Lorenz 2000: 158–59; Balvay 
2008; Milne 2015: 33–38) to conclude that French observers—who were, after 
all, loyal subjects of their own Sun King, Louis XIV—were simply confused 
by unfamiliar forms of deference, and that their assertions of the Great Sun’s 
absolute power had almost nothing to do with the Natchez at all, but were mere 
projections of their own absolutist monarchy. 
This is not entirely untrue. Certainly, in purely political terms, the Great 
Sun’s power was sharply limited.22 War councils would often ignore his advice; 
most of the six subordinate districts—even the three that had members of the 
royal family imposed as governors—pursued independent trade and foreign 
policies that often completely contradicted the king’s; a royal order to turn over 
rebels might simply be refused (Lorenz 1997). On the other hand, accounts of 
arbitrary executions at whim within the king’s “Great Village,” or of retainers 
willingly offering themselves up for sacrifice at the death of a member of the 
royal family, do not appear to be fabricated. George Milne is probably right to 
speak of the French being overawed by the spectacle of an elaborate Mississip-
pian “monarchical theatre” (2015: 37); much of what happened in the Great 
Village did have a theatrical quality—except, of course, it was the kind of thea-
tre where, if a character died, they actually did die. 
As a result, the royal village grew smaller and smaller:
The great Village of the Natchez is at present reduced to a very few Cabins. The 
Reason which I heard for this is that the Savages, from whom the Great Chief 
has the Right to take all they have, get as far away from him as they can; and 
therefore, many Villages of this Nation have been formed at some Distance from 
this. (Charlevoix 1763: 312)
This might help explain the contradiction between reports of extreme obeisance, 
and the royals’ reluctance to use the term “Stinkard” in commoners’ presence. 
Foreign observers almost never got outside the Great Village, a place largely 
22. But, of course, so was that of Louis XIV.
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reduced to Suns, Nobles, and their servants. The only commoners they were 
likely to encounter were the royals’ own wives and husbands, or the visiting del-
egations that would periodically appear to offer contributions of choice meats 
and delicacies—neither of whom it would have been wise for the Suns to gra-
tuitously humiliate. 
Archaeology confirms that not only were the other settlements larger than 
the “Grand Village,” they were actually wealthier (Lorenz 1997: 106–8; 2000: 
168–72). What’s more, relations between center and periphery often seem to 
have taken the form of ritualized hostility. On the one hand, we are told that 
“relatives of the Sun regard the other savages as dirt” (Swanton 1911: 100); on the 
other, we find descriptions of how the common people, in their role of warriors, 
would every year pretend to ambush, capture, and prepare to kill the king, until a 
second mock war party intervened to rescue him (Du Pratz 1774: 319–20). Af-
terward, those same warriors would combine to cultivate a special field of maize 
whose harvest the female Suns would subsequently mimic stealing.23 
What sort of power, then, did the Great Sun have? And how do we char-
acterize such a polity? Most contemporary literature is of little help here. Even 
those who see the French accounts as largely a projection of their own ab-
solutism are content, insofar as they take on the question at all, to fall back 
on the evolutionist language favored by most contemporary archaeologists and 
describe it as a “complex chiefdom” (Lorenz 1997; Milne 2015: 6, 10)—which 
doesn’t really tell you much other than that they think the Natchez should be 
considered one notch lower than a state. Not only is this unedifying, it tends to 
obscure the key feature of arrangements like the Shilluk, or Natchez, or even for 
most of its history the Merina kingdom: that the question of the king’s sover-
eign power (i.e., his absolute ability to impose his will in any way he wished to 
23. The mock battle was ostensibly a reenactment of a historical event when the Great 
Sun actually was nearly captured by an enemy war party, but it’s hard to read it as 
anything but a reminder of how much his life is ultimately in his warriors’ hands. 
Du Pratz provides a description of two feasts; this one, and a harvest festival, of 
which we have several other accounts as well (compiled in Swanton 1911: 113–23). 
The first feast, in March, corresponded to the equinox, and maize planting, and 
the ultimate victory of the white-plumed warriors of the Great Sun over the red-
plumed “enemy” warriors led by the war leader, the Tattooed Serpent, no doubt also 
implied a transition to the half of the year marked by agricultural activity. Warriors 
then go on to plant and tend the special field for the king, which is harvested in July, 
and female Suns pretend to run away with the crop. For present purposes, though, 
I only wish to stress the element of ritualized hostility.
396 ON KINGS
when he was physically present) and the question of his political power (i.e., his 
ability to influence events when he was not physically present) are completely 
separate. The first, kings’ ability to place themselves beyond and outside the laws 
which they uphold, was always absolute in principle (however much it might 
not be in practice).24 If a king cannot, at least in theory, kill his subjects without 
reason, he can hardly be said to be a king at all. But it is notoriously difficult 
for monarchs to wield such power in situations where they are not physically 
there.25 The Great Sun, then, seems to have been in a situation quite similar to 
the Shilluk reth: largely confined to a peculiarly constituted village largely con-
sisting of his wives and attendants (and in his case, his brother and sisters and 
their spouses and attendants), presumably along with the motley assortment 
of criminals, orphans, and runaways who ordinarily collect around such courts, 
inside which his whim was law, outside which his ability to control the course of 
events was almost entirely dependent on his guile and political savvy. 
The Great Sun’s capacity to bring health, prosperity, and fertility to his peo-
ple, on the other hand, was entirely independent of that political influence. In 
fact, there is even some reason to believe it might have been seen as dependent 
on its containment. According to one account, the secret holy of holies within 
the Great Temple was not the eternal fire, but a stone image which was consid-
ered to be the petrified body of the original lawgiver. Apparently that original 
Sun who had “formerly been sent to this place to be the master of the earth, 
had become so terrible that he made men die merely by his look; [so] in order 
to prevent it he had a cabin made for himself into which he entered and had 
himself made into a stone statue” (St. Cosme, in Swanton 1911: 172; 1946: 
779), a secret which was known only to the Suns and their closest confidants. In 
24. It is surely significant, for example, that the laws Du Pratz was told were conveyed 
by the founder of the kingdom—“we must never kill anyone but in defense of our 
own lives; we must never know any other woman besides our own; we must never 
take anything that belongs to another” (1774: 314)—seem precisely those most 
likely to be ignored by the Great Sun and his close relatives. I should emphasize 
that in reality, no one ever really has absolute power in this sense: there are always 
lines one cannot cross, at least without eventually being destroyed for it. But kings 
quite regularly insist that they do, in principle, have this power anyway.
25. Even Tudor kings had trouble with this: their power was so caught up with their 
physical being that in order to get subjects to accept delegated authority they often 
had to rely on members of court who were known to be in the most intimate 
possible physical contact, such as the famous Groom of the Stool of Henry VIII 
(Starkey 1977).
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other words, the Great Sun, who regularly interceded with his ancestors in the 
Temple to bring the powers of life to his people, also kept the potential deadly 
powers of those ancestors contained in precisely the way that his people sought 
to contain his own deadly powers. Again, much as among Shilluk, the divisions 
between heaven and earth were maintained, however tenuously, by the mainte-
nance on every level of at least potential hostility. 
* * *
While the Natchez situation might at first seem a far cry from the kind of 
careful circumscription of police powers we saw in California, the Northwest 
Coast, and societies of the Plains, on another level, all of these can be seen as 
structural variations on a single principle. In every case, sovereign power—the 
power to violate the terms of the ordinary moral order, to create rules, give 
unquestionable, unaccountable orders backed up by threat of punishment—is 
held by humans only insofar as it is an embodiment, extension, refraction, or 
delegate of metahuman beings. In each case, too, the contexts in which such 
power can be exercised are carefully defined, and—since marking something off 
Government by metahuman beings
[Sovereignty contained in time]
Ritual clown police
[Sovereignty contained in space]







Figure 1. The “declownification” of sovereignty.
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as sacred is always a way of creating, preserving, or maintaining its power—this 
circumscription itself plays a role in generating the power of which sovereignty 
is a practical expression. 
Seen this way, the difference between the Kwakiutl and the Théoloël is per-
fectly straightforward. The Kwakiutl contain divine sovereignty in time, giving 
the Fools police powers during the ritual season, but not otherwise. The Théoloël, 
in contrast, contain divine sovereignty in space, limiting it to the theatrical arena 
of the Great Village and the area immediately surrounding the physical body 
of the king. If the Plains societies’ seasonal police represent a partial seculariza-
tion of the first, then more familiar forms of kingship might equally be said to 
be a partial secularization of the second. Yet this secularization is always partial. 
Kings are always sacred, even when they are not in any sense divine. 
ON THE CONSTITUTIVE WAR BETWEEN KING AND PEOPLE
The sovereign is not bound by the laws.
Ulpian
Government is civil war.
Anselme Bellegarrigue
In “The divine kingship of the Shilluk” (chapter 2 in this volume), I suggested 
that monarchies—and, by extension, modern states—are marked by a kind of 
primordial, constitutive war between king and people, one that is prior, even, to 
Carl Schmitt’s purportedly foundational distinction between friend and enemy. It 
is constitutive in the sense that it is through this (antagonistic) relation that both 
king and people can be said to come into being to begin with. This is why even 
when a kingdom is founded on purely voluntary arrangements (as many do ap-
pear to be), it is nonetheless framed as conquest, or even, as Marshall Sahlins ob-
serves (chapter 3), the mutual conquest (“encompassment’) of king and people.26 
In stranger-kingship, one might say that the “social peace,” the truce in that 
war that makes stable kingdoms possible, takes the form of those diarchical 
26. It is worth recalling that immediately after the passage when the Israelites tell Samuel 
they wish to have a king “like other people,” the prophet warns them, prophetically, 
that they’ll soon come to see their relation as adversarial (Samuel 8: 11–19).
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arrangements so beautifully described in Sahlins’ essays on the BaKongo and 
Mexica in this volume (chapters 3 and 4, respectively). In these, royal control 
over the lives of subjects is typically matched by popular control over the land 
and its products, with the indigenous people represented by earth priests or 
other autochthonous authorities with ritual power over the soil. Still, I think 
the idiom of war between king and people draws on and is expressive of an 
even deeper structural reality—the ability to step outside the moral order so as 
to partake of the kind of power capable of creating such an order is always by 
definition an act of violence, and can only be maintained as such. Transgression 
is not in itself necessarily a violent act. The kind of transgression that becomes 
the basis for a power of command over others necessarily must be. It is a form 
of compulsion that lies behind any possible accountability. This is also the deep 
truth about the modern state whose disturbing implications Schmitt ([1922] 
2005)—the German jurist credited with creating the legal basis for the Nazi 
concentration camps—was perhaps the first to work out in a systematic fash-
ion. To say a state is “sovereign” is ultimately to define its highest authorities 
as beyond moral accountability. This not just war; it is total war. Insofar as the 
sovereign intends to apply such compulsion to an entire population within 
a given territory, it ultimately must always be. (The only limitation on such 
total war is that the sovereign cannot wipe out the entire population, or his 
sovereignty would itself cease to exist.) Hence, as I remarked at the end of the 
Shilluk essay, the tendency for modern states to frame their greatest projects in 
terms of some sort of unwinnable war: the war on poverty, crime, drugs, terror, 
and so forth.
Sometimes, this structural conflict can become explicit: Simon Simonse’s 
(1992: 204; 2005: 84) memorable image of the rainmaker king, armed with 
a rifle, single-handedly defending himself against his outraged subjects be-
ing only one dramatic case in point. History is full of occasions when things 
actually did come down to weapons: massacres, insurrections, mutinies, and 
reigns of terror. There is always a continuum, too, between rites of rebellion, 
actual rebellions, and outright revolutions; as we have come to learn (e.g., Berce 
1976), almost any of these things can unexpectedly flip into any of the others. 
I’m hardly saying anything new here. All this has been endlessly debated and 
discussed by historians for many years; but once again, the perspectives and 
materials assembled in this volume suggest that war is by no means the only 
way that the structural conflict can work itself out. And even when it does, 
armed conflict, even between nations, always involves rules, and one might say 
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(as I have argued for unarmed street actions: Graeber 2007c, 2009) that in any 
war, there are always two levels of conflict: within the frame (in which each 
party tries to win), and about the frame (in which they argue about the rules 
of engagement; ultimately, about what winning even means). Here, sovereignty 
is, again, one of those points where such frames implode; where the two levels 
collapse into one another. When a divine king breaks the rules of conventional 
morality, marries his sister or massacres his brothers, this is never just a political 
move (though it might also be a savvy political move), it is always simultane-
ously a metapolitical move, a way of shifting the frame of reference upward to 
a level where it is possible to rule over—and hence fight over—the nature of 
the rules themselves. 
I understand this might seem confusing. My distinction between divine and 
sacred kingship is actually meant to provide a way to navigate this often vexed 
territory. So clarification might be helpful. In proposing that we apply the term 
“divine kings” to monarchs who act like gods—that is, with arbitrariness and 
impunity—rather than those who are actually considered to “be” gods, I am in 
no way suggesting that kings are never considered to be gods (as we’ll see, some 
certainly are), or even that, historically, the attribution of divine status, when it 
does occur, must be considered some sort of secondary elaboration on certain 
forms of practice. I do think Hocart was basically right to say royal powers were 
ultimately modeled on and seen to be derived from those of gods; even if I think 
the devolution was likely to have proceeded in a far more circuitous fashion than 
he would likely have imagined. 
So that’s what I’m not saying. What I am saying is this: if you look at the lit-
erature on divine kingship as we know it from the anthropological record— that 
is, for roughly the last five hundred years—what is really striking is the degree 
to which there is no systematic relation between the theology of kingship—that 
is, the degree to which a monarch is or is not considered to be a god (or the 
avatar or incarnation of a god, or priest, prophet, or earthly representative of a 
god, etc.)—and the degree to which they behave like one. Let us compare the 
Shilluk reth and Ganda kabaka in this context. The reth is explicitly considered 
to be the embodiment of a divine being: Nyikang. But while he is able to wield 
arbitrary and questioned power in principle, his subjects are careful to ensure he 
has virtually no opportunity to do so in practice. In Buganda, in contrast, even 
members of the kabaka’s family insist he’s in no sense a deity and just a human 
being. Yet he still commits outrageous “exploits” that place him beyond mor(t)
al society, still is able to issue commands and order executions with arbitrariness 
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and impunity, even, like some Jovian thunder god casting lightning, to stand at 
the door of his palace with a rifle and pick off random subjects on the street.27 
The two examples, by the way, weren’t chosen entirely at random. The con-
trast between the Shilluk and Ganda kingships has long puzzled outside ob-
servers. Sir James Frazer himself was befuddled by it. His discovery of the Shil-
luk in the 1910s led him to believe most of his boldest hypotheses about the 
divine nature of kingship had been spectacularly confirmed; excited, he sent 
one of his few students, a certain Reverend Roscoe, to investigate the Ganda—
then quite famous in England owing to testimonies of Speke and Burton—as 
a second likely case. The results were endlessly frustrating. True, Roscoe found, 
the kabaka was occasionally referred to as a lubaale or “god,” but typically when 
he was doing something outrageous that only gods could otherwise get away 
with, or directly challenging the gods by raiding their temples and “plundering 
their women, cattle, and goats” (Roscoe and Kaggwa in Ray 1991: 49). But the 
kabaka was rendered no cult, and even the periodic ritual massacres over which 
he presided were never framed in sacrificial terms. What’s more, royal histories 
affirmed that those kings who became too audacious in defying the gods were 
invariably destroyed (Kenny 1988: 611). Despite heroic efforts to shoehorn the 
results into his theoretical model, Frazer found it simply wouldn’t fit. He ended 
up so frustrated he briefly came near to abandoning the idea of divine kingship 
entirely (Ray 1991: 51–52).
In purely sociological terms, the difference between the two kingdoms is 
obvious. The kabaka might have been far more powerful than the Shilluk reth, 
but unlike the latter, he also had to contend with an entrenched and jealous 
priestly class who had no intention of allowing him into their pantheon. As a 
result, he was a divine king in every sense except that of being formally recog-
nized as such. But cases like these only serve to underline the point that, when 
it comes to divine kingship, questions of explicit (as opposed to tacit) theology 
are at best secondary—and, anyway, are likely to be matters of debate rather 
than consensus, even in kingdoms which remain entirely outside the influence 
of Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, or, for that matter, secular republicanism or 
Marxism-Leninism. 
27. On the debate on the kabaka’s divinity, see Roscoe (1911); Irstam (1944); Gale 
(1956); Ingham (1958: 17); Richards (1964); Southwold (1967); Kenny (1988); Ray 
(1991: 39–50); Wrigley (1996: 17, 126–28); Claessen (2015: 11).
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* * *
Insofar as sovereignty is precisely where the frames ordinarily separating ritual 
and politics, human and metahuman, immanent and transcendent, tend to col-
lapse, this is much as one should expect. It is one of the misfortunes of human-
ity, I have suggested, that even the most awful crimes—mass murder foremost 
among them—will tend to take on at least a potentially numinous quality, and 
can, under the right circumstances at least, be made to seem divine. But just as 
most profane acts can be turned to cosmological purposes, so can the elabora-
tion of ritual itself become a political weapon. 
Hence my distinction between divine and sacred kingship. Each, one might 
say, crosses the same line in an opposite direction.28 Kings will try to turn acts of 
arbitrary violence into tokens of divinity; those who wish to control them will 
try to impose ever-more elaborate ritual restrictions that recognize them as sa-
cred beings, but, at the same time, make it increasingly difficult for them to im-
pose their will in arbitrary ways. If one conceives the long war between king and 
people instead as a strategic game (I know I am multiplying metaphors here, 
but I can only beg the reader’s indulgence), we can say that kings will, generally 
speaking, attempt to increase their divinity, and the people, to render them more 
sacred. From this perspective, many of the classic institutions of divine kingship, 
including most of those made famous by Frazer, could be seen as moves, gam-
bits on a conceptual chessboard, with the sovereign attempting to maneuver his 
way out of the various forces marshaled to contain him. Even the emergence of 
what we call “the state” might be seen as just one possible outcome of this game.
Normally, the sides are not entirely mismatched. But the lopsided cases are 
perhaps the most revealing, because they give a sense of what’s ultimately at stake. 
Let me divide the remainder of this essay, then, into two sections, one which 
describes what things look like when a monarch is definitively checkmated, the 
other, the new sorts of problems that arise when a monarch definitively wins.
28. Just to be absolutely clear, let me provide an example of what I’m speaking of in 
each case. An example of profane acts turned to cosmological purposes might be a 
situation where a ruler kills his brothers and marries his sister as an act of simple 
political expedience, but where it nonetheless contributes to the sense that a king is 
a metahuman being. Or where a coup d’état becomes a ritual sacrifice. An example 
of ritual becoming a political weapon might be one where a principle that the king’s 
blood must never be spilled might not prevent assassination (he can always be 
strangled), but has significant effects on his ability to lead his troops in war. 
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When kings lose: The tyranny of abstraction
All these antique fancies clustered, all these cobwebs of the brain were spun about the 
path of the old king, the human god, who enmeshed in them like a fly in the toils of a 
spider, could hardly stir a limb for the threads of custom.
Sir James Frazer, The golden bough 
Thus also the taboo ceremonial of kings is nominally an expression of the highest ven-
eration and a means of guarding them; actually it is the punishment for their elevation, 
the revenge which their subjects take upon them.
Sigmund Freud, Totem and taboo
Often enough it is difficult to draw the line between political and sacral king-murders.
Sture Lagencrantz, The sacred king in Africa
We have already seen one vivid example of hobbled kings in the Shilluk reths, 
who, foiled in their periodic efforts to create an administrative apparatus, ended 
up largely at the mercy of their wives and local village chiefs, surrounded by 
“royal executioners” whose ultimate task was to kill them. Since the Shilluk 
represent the closest approximation yet documented for what might be termed 
Frazerian sacred kingship, it suggests the latter might itself be the form (or at 
least one form) checkmate might take.
I will refer to this as “adverse sacralization”—the imposition of ritual restric-
tions on a ruler as a way to control, contain, or reduce his political power.
It might be useful to examine the defining features of African sacred king-
ship (Irstam 1944; Lagercrantz 1944, 1950; de Heusch 1981, 1982a, 1997), to 
see how many fit this model. It began with Sture Lagercrantz outlining a fairly 
simple list of common features—taboos on mobility, regicide, and incest—but 
has since been expanded to something that might be summarized as follows: 
1. The king is a sacred monster, exterior to society, often seen as a powerful witch 
or sorcerer, a wielder of terrible transgressive power. This power expresses 
itself through a fundamental break with kinship morality, either
a. some form of incest (typically brother–sister marriage, real or symbolic), 
or
b. some act of cannibalism (real or symbolic). 
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2. The king’s health and vitality is bound up with the health, prosperity, and fertility 
of the kingdom (droughts and natural disasters being considered signs of the 
king’s sin or infirmity); this leads to:
3. The king is bound by multiple taboos: for example, he is forbidden to cross 
water, see large bodies of water, or even in a few cases touch water; these 
restrictions always include severe limits on mobility that culminate in com-
plete seclusion.
4. The king cannot die a natural death: some kings are sacrificed after fixed terms 
of four or seven years; even if they are not, if injured, in failing health or 
strength, or in a state of ritual impurity, or if some disaster (failure in war, 
plagues, etc.) demonstrates fading powers that endanger the kingdom, the 
king may be required to commit suicide or, more often, be secretly put to 
death.
Most of these seem to be just local versions of more general principles of king-
ship already discussed. The first is the particular form which the principle of 
sovereignty, or divine kingship, takes in this particular tradition. The second, 
the idea that sovereign power is directly linked with the health, fertility, and 
prosperity of the population, exists almost everywhere where there is a king or 
king-like figure; Frazer compiled endless examples, and the connection can be 
observed from China to the court of Charlemagne (Oakley 2006: 93). Even in 
the United States, one of the best indexes of whether a sitting president will 
be reelected is the number and intensity of tornados during his term of office 
(Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010; Healy and Malhotra 2013). The third is sacred 
kingship itself. By which logic, the fourth, the actual killing of the king, is, as 
Frazer also hinted, simply the culmination of his adverse sacralization. 
The latter would be consonant with the Shilluk material as well, where kings 
become transcendent at the moment when popular hatred becomes the most 
intense. 
René Girard, of course, provides a psychoanalytic analysis of why rancor and 
sacralization coincide: the community projects its internal hatreds onto a single 
figure who is first reviled and destroyed, then, in an abrupt reversal, comes to 
be an object of adoration in implicit recognition of his or her role, as scapegoat, 
in creating social unity. (Christ is his primary example.) Much of the recent 
debate on king-killing has indeed turned on the scapegoat principle: to what 
extent is the king seen as taking on the sins and transgressions of his people, and 
somehow disposing of them, either through purification rituals, or through his 
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own seclusion or death (Simonse 1992, 2005; de Heusch 1997, 2005b; Quigley 
2000; Scubla 2002, 2003, 2005). The critical question has become: Could it 
be said that the “exploits” or transgressions that establish the king as beyond 
morality also make him a potential scapegoat in waiting, so that, when things 
go well, he can be as a transcendent being, but when they do not, he becomes 
once again a simple criminal, and the legitimate object of rebellion, challenge, 
or sacrifice? Some such dynamic does often appear to be at play. But again, it’s 
just as possible to see scapegoating simply as an inevitable consequence of the 
fact that kings are always both sacred figures embodying their people’s unity, 
and politicians. One can just as easily say, “this is just how hardball politics will 
necessarily work itself out under a regime of divine kingship,” than to see in it 
any dark hidden secret of the human soul. 
One thing seems clear: there is simply no systematic relation between sov-
ereignty, scapegoating, regicide, and ascriptions of divinity. In the Equatorian 
societies described by Simonse (2005), rainmakers were often killed during 
droughts by outraged mobs, after a long game of bluff and maneuver. They were 
clearly scapegoated, but they were in no sense gods. Many weren’t even kings. 
At the other extreme, in South Africa, the Luvale “rain-queen” was very much 
considered a divine being in human form. She had to be physically perfect, and 
she was considered impervious to human woes and ailments; she never became 
ill and could not die of natural causes; she was therefore expected to, and appar-
ently did, discreetly end her own life by taking poison after roughly sixty years 
on the throne (Krige and Krige 1943: 165–67).29 Still,
ritual suicide is not conceived to have any relation to the welfare of the country. 
People do not say the country will suffer if the physical powers of the queen 
fail. But ritual suicide does elevate the queen to a divinity; only by her act, not 
because of susceptibility to the weaknesses of man, can she die. (Krige and Krige 
1943: 167)
29. “Among the Lovedu, tradition decrees that the queen shall have no physical defect 
and must poison herself, not when she is old, but at the end of the fourth initiation 
(vudiga) of her reign” (ibid.: 166), but in fact this was when she was old, since vudiga 
were “held by the whole tribe every twelve to fifteen years,” though “an interval 
of twenty years is not considered extraordinary” (ibid.: 114)—so a period of four 
vudiga was minimally forty-eight years and maximally eighty. In fact, at the time 
the Kriges were writing, there had only been three queens in the last hundred and 
forty years (ibid.: 165). 
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The Luvale rain-queen, then, was in no sense a scapegoat. Neither, however, 
did she wield anything in the way of sovereign power. Among the Rukuba of 
Nigeria, the king’s sanctity is preserved when, every fourteen years, any impurity 
affecting him is passed on to an old man who is expelled from the community 
and lives as a beggar for seven years, then dies (Muller 1980; 1990: 59). That 
king actually governs. Among the Ewe of Togo, the “king” does not govern at 
all, but is himself reduced to a scapegoat; banished to a forest on accession, there 
he must remain, celibate, performing rainmaking rituals, until after seven years 
he is put to death—or earlier, in the event of bad harvests. He is only referred 
to as a god (if a bad god) after his death (de Surgey 1990). Similar cases can be 
endlessly elaborated. 
If the relation between these elements is indeed contingent, the particular 
configuration they take in any given case can only have been the outcome of the 
particular play of historical forces. That is, it is an effect of the politics that lie 
behind it. This is what I mean by the politics of kingship. The Rukuba king has 
maneuvered himself himself into a fairly strong position; the Ewe king, if one 
can even call him that, has fallen victim to almost complete adverse sacralization. 
Let us turn, then, to one of the most famous examples of African divine king-
ship, that of the Jukun of Nigeria, to get a sense of how this might come about.
* * *
According to the standard history, the Jukun as a people are said to have reached 
the Benue River valley around ad 950, and their ruling lineage still claim to be 
migrants from Egypt or Mecca (Meek 1931: 22; Stevens 1975: 186). What’s 
sometimes referred to as the “Jukun Empire,” based in the city of Kwarara-
fa, peaked in the seventeenth century, after which its military expansion was 
checked by the stubborn resistance, among others, of the egalitarian Tiv to the 
south. By the nineteenth century, the kingdom also came under intense pressure 
from attacks by jihadis from the north, who sacked their capital and forced them 
to relocate (Abraham 1933: 10; Apata 1998: 79–81).
Their transformation, during this period, was so profound that many have 
begun to question whether the Jukun were ever a military empire at all (Afigo 
2005: 70–73), but the likeliest interpretation of the evidence is that the Jukun 
were at first the center of a classic galactic polity, but one whose rulers, once their 
military ambitions were foiled, gradually came to redefine themselves less as alien 
warriors and more as the ritual leaders of a people who claimed autochthonous 
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status as the original owners of the land (Isichei 1997: 235; Afigo 2005: 72).30 
In the process, the king’s role was likewise transformed: he was largely confined 
to his palace, his person identified with the crops and agricultural fertility, every 
aspect of his life regulated by elaborate taboos (Meek 1931: 126–33, 153–63). It 
seems Jukun kings were always in principle scheduled to die at the end of a seven-
year term, but in early times, unless they failed as warriors, this fate was always 
postponed, and any disabling impurities they may have taken on were transferred 
to a scapegoat slave killed in their stead (ibid.: 139–44; Muller 1990: 58–59). By 
the time our evidence kicks in, in the 1930s, this scapegoat ritual had long since 
fallen into abeyance. Instead it was the king himself who had become a potential 
scapegoat; he could be executed for any number of reasons, whether for crop 
failure or violation of taboos (see also Abraham 1933: 20; Lagercrantz 1950: 348).
Though the Jukun king was never referred to as a god but merely as a “son 
of a god” (it is never said precisely which), and though all things surrounding 
the divinity of the king are, as often, left vague, or kept secret, some notion of 
godlike status seems consonant with the general tenor of the taboos that sur-
rounded him. These kept him from any regular contact with his people. The king 
rarely left his compound, and then under carefully choreographed situations: 
none might gaze at him directly, or touch anything he’d touched; most subjects 
could never come into his presence at all, but only hope to communicate with 
him through layers of officials. Not only contact between king and people, but 
intimate contact between the king and surrounding world of any kind had to be 
negated, hidden, or denied: 
Jukun chiefs and kings .  .  . are not supposed to suffer from the limitations of 
ordinary human beings. They do not “eat,” they do not “sleep,” and they never 
“die.” It is not merely bad manners, but actual sacrilege to use such expressions 
when speaking of a king. When the king eats he does so in private, the food be-
ing proffered to him with the same ritual as is used by priests in offering sacrifice 
to the gods. . . .
30. I should emphasize this is my own reconstruction; earlier colonial historians saw 
the Jukun as a fallen empire, and most contemporary Nigerian historians believe 
that they were always more of a spiritual federation—as Afigo (2005) adds, with 
a core group claiming autochthonous status as earliest settlers of the land. Isichei 
(1997; see also Afolayan 2005: 144) suggested a gradual transformation from a 
warlike power to a ritual one, on the model of Benin, which, she notes, took a 
similar course. I have simply synthesized these views. 
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 The Jukun king must not put his foot on the ground or sit on the ground 
without a mat, possibly because he is a god of the Upper Air or because his dy-
namism might escape into the ground and blast the crops . . . .31 It is taboo for 
the king to pick up anything from the ground. If a Jukun king were to fall off his 
horse, he would, in former times, have been promptly put to death. Being a god 
it may never be said of him that he is ill, and if serious illness overtook him he is 
quietly strangled. (Meek 1931: 126–27)
Any way that the royal body was continuous with or in contact with the physi-
cal world—eating, excretion, sex—was not only performed in secret, but had to 
be treated as if it did not occur at all (excrement, hair or nail clippings, spittle, 
even sandal-prints, had to be hidden away). The king could not directly touch 
the earth, and was often referred to as an airy spirit: when he slept or died, he 
was said to “return to the skies.” 
While there was the usual ideology of the king’s absolute power,32 there’s 
little indication of arbitrary executions or other high-handed behavior. Instead, 
royal anger was seen as dangerous in itself: 
It is a disastrous thing, also, for the Jukun king to fly into a rage, point his finger 
at a man or strike the ground in wrath, for by doing so, he would let loose on the 
community the anger of the gods immanent in his person, and the whole land 
would be infected by blight. If the king were so far to forget himself the offenders 
would immediately render their apologies and take steps to induce him to recall 
or cancel his hasty word or act. They would request one of his sisters’ sons, the 
king’s acolyte, to approach him and calm him, and persuade him to dip his fin-
gers in water in order to purge or rather quench the “fire of his hand,” and when 
this rite had been performed the acolyte would withdraw backwards, sweeping 
the ground in front of the king, in the same way as a priest withdraws when he 
has offered sacrifice to the offended gods. (Meek 1931: 128)
31. It is often difficult in Meek’s text to know what is report and what is speculation, 
but this does seem rooted in Jukun ideas, as we’ll see. 
32. Meek notes that “the Jukun system of government is, in theory at least, of a highly 
despotic nature” (ibid.: 332), but emphasizes this was in no sense true in practice. “If 
the harvests were good people were prepared to put up with a moderate amount of 
tyranny. But excessive tyranny would lead to a demand for his death even if harvests 
were good” (ibid.).
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This passage gives a particularly vivid glimpse of the intimate, indeed, mutu-
ally constitutive, relation between violence and sacralization. Jukun kings may 
not be gods. but they bear within them a divine element, identical with their 
power of command, or sovereignty, and which resides in the heart and right arm 
(Young 1966: 147–49). Each new king acquires this power by consuming the 
powdered heart of his predecessor, mixed in beer, during his coronation; the old 
king’s right hand is also preserved as an amulet (Meek 1931: 168; Muller 1981: 
241). This is presumably why pointing is considered so particularly dangerous. 
It blights the crops. But in a broader sense the king—at least, his human, non-
divine element—is the crops: at public appearances he is regularly hailed as 
“Our Corn, Our Beans, Our Groundnuts” (Meek 1931: 129, 172; Young 1966: 
149–50). And if the crops fail for too long, rather than being mollified and pro-
pitiated, the king himself can be killed; whereon it is said—as it is always said 
when any monarch dies—that he ascended to heaven and became a god owing 
to the malice of his people (Meek 1931: 131; Young 1966: 148).33 
All this clearly recalls the curious dialectic of hostility and sacralization we’ve 
already seen in the myths and rituals surrounding the Shilluk reth. Nyikang 
and his immediate successors, we are told, did not die; they ascended into the 
heavens and became disembodied gods in the face of the rancor of their people. 
Among the Jukun, all monarchs do this. 
However, the ceremonial surrounding the king also suggests that such cos-
mological statements are themselves expressions of a deeper truth, inscribed 
in the very nature of formal etiquette, hierarchical deference, and gestures of 
respect. Recall that the formalities surrounding the Jukun king are simply more 
elaborate versions of those surrounding chiefs and elders, on the one hand, or 
of gods, on the other. In fact, in their most basic elements, such formalities 
can be said to have certain common structural features that can be observed in 
forms of formal deference anywhere— indeed, the very nature of what we call 
“formality.” I’ve offered an analysis of these structural features in an earlier work 
(Graeber 1997); here I can only offer the barest summary. 
33. “When the king became sick, or infirm, or broke any of the royal taboos, or proved 
himself unfortunate, he was secretly put to death. Whether any king was, in the 
olden days, permitted to die a natural death cannot be known” (Meek 1931: 165), 
but “when a Jukun king dies (even if he has been secretly murdered as a result of a 
famine) it is commonly said he has forsaken the world and gone back to the heavens 
in consequence of the wickedness of men” (ibid.: 131). 
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Essentially, the argument is that what anthropologists have traditionally 
called “joking relations” and “relations of avoidance” are simply exaggerated 
forms of a kind of playful familiarity, and formal respect, that might be consid-
ered among the universal building-blocks of human sociality. Deference tends 
to expressed not only by the inferior party averting eyes, or otherwise avoid-
ing contact with the superior (gestures generally accompanied by feelings of 
shame), or by the fact the superior party remains relatively free to engage in or 
initiate such contact if desired, but also by a suppression of any acknowledg-
ment of ways that bodies, and particularly the superior’s body, are continuous 
with the world around them, where, as Bakhtin (1984; cf. Stallybrass and White 
1986; Mbembe 1992) so aptly put it, the borders between bodies in the world 
become permeable or are cast into doubt entirely. These usually include eating 
and drinking to a degree, but almost always they include sexual intercourse, 
pregnancy and labor, excretion, mucus, mutilation, menstruation, death and de-
composition, flatulence, suppurating wounds, and so on. There is an enormous 
degree of cultural variation in which of these are considered most shocking in 
polite company, which relatively trivial; and, as Norbert Elias ([1939] 1978) so 
carefully demonstrated, the borders of shame and embarrassment can advance 
and retreat over time. Still everywhere, the basic list remains the same. And 
topics considered shameful and suppressed in one context are exactly those to 
which people will also appeal when making rude jokes, and celebrated in “jok-
ing relations,”34 which are less humorous than enactments of playful egalitarian 
competition, insult, or hostility, in a kind of systematic inversion of the princi-
ples of avoidance. In such relations, that hierarchical superiority instead turns 
into a constant game of back-and-forth—a sometimes literal wrestling in the 
mud—where the very materiality of the interaction, the lack of clear borders 
between bodies, also emphasizes the temporary, even momentary, nature of any 
victory.35 
To be sacred, as Émile Durkheim reminds us, means “to be set apart,” which 
is also the literal meaning of the Tongan word “tabu.” “Not to be touched.” By 
constituting the object of hierarchical deference as a thing apart, and therefore 
34. I should emphasize that “joking relations” of the classic anthropological variety are 
often not all that funny; they tend to involve play fighting or simple insults (“my, 
you’re ugly”) more than witty banter, though one could argue that witty banter is 
the same thing in an attenuated form.
35. I should also hasten to add that I am not suggesting that all human behavior can be 
placed on a continuum between joking and avoidance; it’s one axis among many.
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at least tacitly as a perfectly self-contained and disembodied entity, floating 
above the muck and mire of the world, such taboos effectively render that object 
an abstraction. Hence it makes sense that kings, and gods, are so often rendered 
homage in similar ways. But the logic of deference also helps explain an appar-
ent paradox: that the more exalted, hence more set apart, a superior is from his 
surroundings, including his inferiors, the more he is also seen as hierarchically 
encompassing those very same inferiors. Because “abstraction” in such situa-
tions always has a dual meaning. It does not just refer to disembodiment; it also 
means being, as it were, moved upward on the taxonomic ladder. 
Lévi-Strauss referred to this as “universalization” versus “particularization” 
(1966: 161). An easy example will suffice: consider the difference in our own 
society between the use of first and last names. A first name (Barack) is yours 
alone, and is hence used to express familiarity; a family name encompasses a 
plethora of first names, and is hence more generic, hence more formal and def-
erential (Mr. Obama)—and of course a title (Mr. President, et al.) is even higher 
up the taxonomic ladder, hence more deferential yet.36 In this sense, Marshall 
Sahlins’ language of “metabeings” is decidedly apt. Gods are often seen as almost 
literally Platonic Forms: the Master of the Seals is also the generic form of all 
seals, which are but tokens of their type. The same tacit logic is at play here as 
well. Consider the common insistence that a sacred king be “without blemish” 
or “physically perfect.” As noted in chapter 2, the very idea of physical perfec-
tion is itself a kind of paradox: Can one so perfectly embody the generic human 
form that one is set apart from other humans as unique?
How does all this relate to sovereignty? 
Well, if nothing else, I think it now makes the opposition between clowns 
and kings worked out in the last section begins to make a great deal more sense. 
In my original essay (Graeber 1997), I emphasized how the great “reformation 
of manners” in early modern Europe might best be considered a generalization 
of avoidance relations, attendant on the rise of possessive individualism, which 
posited everyone as self-contained within the circle and compass of his or her 
property: hence, everyone was now to address everyone else as inferiors had once 
addressed feudal lords. This was the exact opposite of the festive generalization 
36. This is not to say that we are always talking about the relation of (profane) individual 
and (sacred) office in the ritual surrounding sacred kings, as structural-functionalist 
anthropology tended to assume, but rather that that relation is one specific form 
this more general relation of particularization and universalization might take. 
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of joking relations that Bakhtin referred to as “the carnivalesque.” (Obviously, 
this equalization is never perfect. There is always a residual—women, the poor, 
some racialized underclass—which the possessive individual also avoids talking 
about in formal situations, in the same way as one pretends not to notice when 
one’s superior blows his nose or farts.) But the opposition between clowns and 
kings is different. Normally, joking and avoidance relations are between indi-
viduals, or sometimes between groups. One might say the sovereign clown is an 
individual with a joking relation with absolutely everyone; the sacred king, in an 
analogous way, is in a relation of avoidance with everybody else. Hence in the 
first case, the violence essential to the nature of sovereignty is wildly exaggerated, 
in a kind of mock chaos that actually disguises a maintenance of a certain form 
of order (the clowns double as police); in the second, it is largely euphemized, 
along with all the bodily functions that clowns are so notoriously fond of cel-
ebrating—though, in fact, the form of the euphemization can itself become an 
insidious form of violence: since the only way to render a human being a com-
plete abstraction, a self-enclosing Idea divorced from material entanglements, 
is to destroy their body entirely (adverse sacralization taken to its last degree).
* * *
A case could be made that all etiquette has an element of potential violence 
in it. When the rich and powerful feel utterly humiliated (it does sometimes 
happen), it usually has to do with being discovered in some scandalous breach 
of protocol or decorum. But clearly, not all sacralization is adverse. Systems of 
deference overall tend to operate very much to the benefit of those who are 
deferred to. To turn such a system so against itself is unusual. It almost only 
happens to monarchs of one sort or another, or others at the very apex of some 
sort of hierarchy. Why, then, does it happen to them?
In the Jukun case, the king seems to have been demoted from war leader to a 
kind of fetish object, whose secular powers, while they did exist, appear to have 
been entirely outbalanced by those of various palace women (particularly the 
king’s mother and sister, who had their own court and observed similar taboos 
but were never killed), a governing council, and a whole panoply of priests and 
officials (Meek 1931: 333–45; Tamuno 1965: 203; Abubakar 1986). Any at-
tempt by the king to exercise his “absolute” power too aggressively would, Meek 
noted, lead to those surrounding him claiming he had violated some taboo and 
ordering him to be strangled in his sleep (ibid.: 333). 
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In this case, Frazerian sacred kingship was a consequence of political decline. 
Might this be a more general tendency? It’s very hard to judge, because there 
have been so few attempts to look at the phenomenon in any sort of broad-
er historical perspective. What evidence there is is certainly suggestive. Kajsa 
Ekholm (1985a; also 1991: 167–78), for instance, made a detailed examination 
of the BaKongo evidence—one of the few cases where we have good histori-
cal evidence going back more than five centuries—and concluded that Frazer 
had got things precisely backward. The more extreme forms of royal ritual, she 
argued—especially the killing, scapegoating, and imprisonment of monarchs—
was in no sense primordial. As Phyllis Martin (1972: 19–24, 160–64) had docu-
mented for the Loango kingdom, early rulers (called “Maloango”) might have 
been seen as “quasi-divine” beings (their meals, for instance, were conducted 
in secret), but it didn’t stop them from taking an active role in every aspect of 
political life. It was only after the kingdom had largely collapsed under the pres-
sures of the slave trade that a rising merchant class turned the Maloango into a 
sacred being effectively confined to his palace, forbidden to cross water, or touch 
foreign-made goods. 
Even more extreme customs emerged around the dozens of tiny potentates 
who emerged from the collapse of the BaKongo kingdom. The old Kongo king 
was, as we’ve seen (chapter 3), a divine king of the classic stranger-king type, 
if not an especially sacred one. But the kingdom collapsed into civil war, and 
before long, the great capital city of San Salvador lay sacked and abandoned, 
replaced by thousands of tiny villages; the slave trade and subsequent machina-
tions of foreign traders then brought the equivalent of criminal gangs to power 
in many parts of the country. In the process, Ekholm (1985a) writes, divine 
kingship underwent a process of “involution.” Nineteenth-century sources un-
veil a veritable Victorian wonder-cabinet of strange and exotic political forms: 
kings executed on the first day in office who then reigned as ghosts; kings exiled 
to forests like the Priest of Nemi; kings regularly beaten and mutilated by their 
guards and companions; kings who actually were regularly put to death at the 
end of their four- or seven-year terms. 
BaKongo kings had always been elected from among a host of candidates, 
through the offices of the earth-priests who represented the indigenous “own-
ers of the land,” and, by extension, the whole people. But now those indigenous 
authorities effectively seized, and decentralized, power (Ekholm 1991: 171–72). 
“The people” had won the war, and the king was transformed into a kind of 
Clastrean “anti-chief, divested of all real power and immobilized by a plethora 
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of taboos” (Ekholm 1985a: 249). The most extreme form of such adverse sa-
cralization is documented from Nsundi. According to the account of one later 
BaKongo catechist (Laman 1953–68, 2: 140–42; Janzen 1982: 65; MacGaffey 
2000: 148–49), around 1790, the first Nsundi king of Kibunzi, whose title was 
Namenta,37 was a boy kidnapped by his lineage’s wife-givers (i.e., lineage of the 
indigenous priests themselves), and put through a kind of savage parody of a 
typical Central African puberty ritual. Secluded in the forest by his future of-
ficials, he was whipped, starved, and generally mistreated until he came of age. 
“When he was a grown man, he was castrated by the use of a feather of a fishing 
eagle. Then they left him alone, but he was not yet Chief, because he was still 
a prisoner” (MacGaffey 2000: 148). Finally, when it came time for him to take 
office, he was, like kings of old, expected to conquer the capital (defended by 
these same wife-givers) in a ritual battle—except, in this case, it was not a mock 
battle but an actual battle, and if the candidate was killed in combat, the office 
would lie empty until another candidate could be raised again. Offices often lay 
empty for very long periods. But even if Namenta passed the ordeal, and was 
duly invested in the royal leopard-skin regalia, he was treated essentially as a 
magical charm, created by his people, and his main responsibility was in main-
taining various onerous taboos. (He was also ritually married to a woman of the 
wife-giving clan whom his brother was expected to impregnate.)
This represents perhaps the lowest a monarch can fall. Small wonder then 
that some wealthy BaKongo chiefs around this time never went outside without 
weapons, for fear they might be kidnapped and forced to become king (Bastian 
in Ekholm 1991: 168).
Ekholm’s conclusion is that Frazerian kingship is effectively a side-effect 
of European imperialism. As the BaKongo descended from a mighty empire 
to the impoverished prey of predatory merchants, gangsters, and colonialists, 
cosmology itself transformed: the powers of nature were redefined as dangerous 
and evil, and stranger-kings, embodying powers of the wild, became forces to be 
quelled and controlled. Even the ritual scapegoating of kings, Ekholm suggests, 
is a result of this dilemma. This is heady stuff. But she also appears to suggest 
this is a more general pattern, and here we are on much shakier ground. Even the 
37. Laman (1953: 68, 2) says he was the last of his dynasty, and Ekholm (1991: 168) 
echoes this, but as MacGaffey observes, the text actually describes him as the first 
of the dynasty, and names various successors (2000: 150). He concludes there likely 
was no real person named Namenta; he was just the titular founder and a kind of 
template for the investiture of later kings.
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unfortunate Namenta’s successors eventually managed to reassert themselves, 
breaking out of ritual isolation to become judges, merchants, and conquerors, 
and eventually suppressing the unpleasant investiture ritual (MacGaffey 2000: 
150). It’s very hard to see a single direction of development. 
The only other comparative historical analysis I am aware of, by the Rus-
sian anthropologists Dmitri Bondarenko and Andrey Korotayev (2003), points 
in precisely the opposite direction. They suggest that, with certain significant 
exceptions, kings become more sacred as their governments become stronger. 
Some background would be useful. Bondarenko’s research has focused on 
the West African kingdom of Benin, a classic stranger-kingship ruled by a 
monarch of Yoruba descent. The king, called the Oba, was a god who never died, 
who often acted in defiance even of other gods. (The royal symbol, the “bird of 
disaster,” commemorated an early warrior-king who, warned that a bird spotted 
on the way to battle was sent by a god to warn of impending defeat, shot and ate 
the bird but nonetheless marched to victory: Okpewho 1998: 71.) At the same 
time, the Oba’s day-to-day power was balanced against that of the town chiefs 
who represented the indigenous population (Ryder 1969; Bradbury 1967, 1973; 
Rowlands 1993; Okpewho 1998). After an age of expansion in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, there followed a long period of civil wars, culminating in a 
popular rebellion in 1699 which led to the destruction of the capital, and forced 
the king to reach an accommodation with the town chiefs: 
The struggle between the Oba and the chiefs took the form of constant and grad-
ually successful attempts of the latter to limit the sovereign’s profane power by 
means of inflicting new binding taboos on him, and hence volens nolens increas-
ing his sacrality inversely proportional for “lists” of royal taboos . . . . The final act 
ran high in the early seventeenth century when the chiefs succeeded in depriving 
the Oba of the right to command the army in person. Relations of the Europeans 
who visited the Benin court in the late sixteenth–nineteenth centuries are full 
of vivid stories and surprised or contemptuous remarks testifying to the “king’s” 
complete impotence at the face of his “noblemen.” (Bondarenko 2005: 32)
While every newborn child in the kingdom was duly brought before the Oba, 
visitors were only allowed to see his foot (the rest was hidden behind a curtain), 
and the king himself could only leave the palace twice a year. It was the queen 
mother, instead, who was delegated the task of judging important trials and 
mediating disputes (Kaplan 1997). 
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The result in many ways resembles the situation Ekholm describes for the 
BaKongo, from the dominance of merchants, the sequestering of the king from 
any contact with foreigners, even the visions of a terrifying and hostile natural 
universe (Rowlands 1993: 298). But the hidden king gradually took advantage 
of his new position to develop ever-more elaborate ritual powers. Again the 
situation can be likened to a chess game, each move followed by a countermove. 
The king’s sequestration was ostensibly due to his terrifying, witch-like powers, 
which might otherwise devastate the land. The king responded by importing a 
new god from the Yoruba town of Ife—the royal ancestor, Oduduwa, father of 
the original stranger-king—accompanied by ferocious cannibal stranger-priests 
(ibid.). The new priesthood instituted human sacrifices to the royal ancestors 
to protect the kingdom, and these did indeed devastate the land, increasing in 
scale and terror until, by the end of the nineteenth century, hundreds of subjects 
might be rounded up and crucified or beheaded during important rituals or na-
tional crises. (Members of the indigenous chiefs’ clans, however, were immune.) 
These spectacular displays, which so horrified foreign visitors, were in part sim-
ply demonstrations of sovereignty: though the Oba no longer had direct contact 
with his people, he alone could take life (Bradbury 1967: 3). This in turn led to 
further taboos.
Intrigued by such dynamics, Bondarenko and Korotayev (2003) created a 
“Ruler Sacralization Index.” Basing themselves on Henri Claessen and Peter 
Skalník’s database of twenty kingdoms in their book The early state (1978; cf. 
Claessen 1984, 1986), they ran a statistical analysis and discovered that, over-
all, the more powerful the state apparatus—they defined this in terms of the 
presence or absence of impersonal laws and administration—the more sacred 
the ruler becomes. The great exceptions, they note, are Axial Age civilizations, 
or what they call the “Axial Historical Network” (Bondarenko and Korotayev 
2003: 119), from Europe to China, which take off in the opposite direction—
presumably, they say, because of the importance there of priests of the great uni-
versalistic religions, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. Otherwise, 
whether among the Mexica, Yoruba, or in Japan, strong, autonomous bureau-
cratic systems will regularly declare the monarch a quasi-divine being and lock 
him in his palace.
All this is intriguing, but the sample is skewed in so many ways it’s a little 
difficult to know what to make of it. First of all, the list is of “early states,” so 
kingdoms that can in no sense be considered states since they have no signifi-
cant administration—like the Shilluk, or the Natchez—simply aren’t included. 
417NOTES ON THE POLITICS OF DIVINE KINGSHIP
But of course these include many of the prototypical examples of “divine king-
ship.” So: Does sacred kingship tend to decline when kingdoms first turn into 
states (presumably under the aegis of ambitious warrior-kings), only to return 
once they have developed an autonomous administration? 
The Axial Age argument seems biased by the relatively small sample as well. 
The authors argue that the creation of a priestly class in the “Axial Historical 
Network” traces back to Indo-European age-sets, where they see elders as trans-
forming into priests (ibid.: 121–23), and suggest something similar might have 
happened in very early times in the Middle East. But this still doesn’t explain 
why China became an Axial Age civilization, and rejected divinization of the 
emperor, but Japan developed in precisely the opposite direction; or why Hindu 
kingdoms, which have the strongest priestly castes of all, are also most likely to 
have sacred and divinized kings.
I have myself (Graeber 2011a: 223–50) proposed a rather different argu-
ment: that Axial Age civilizations found their origin in the emergence of new 
social and military technologies (especially, professional armies paid in coined 
money), and followed a remarkably similar pattern, whether in China, India, 
or the Mediterranean. The rise of standing armies and eventually slave-based 
empires led first to a highly materialistic phase, where rulers began to treat 
wealth and military power as an end in itself divorced from any larger cosmo-
logical framework; then, to popular movements of contestation which included 
what were to be remembered as the great religious and philosophical traditions; 
then, finally, to a phase when, as the empires reached their limits, their rulers 
embraced one or another of the religious movements in a last-ditch attempt to 
preserve their rule. This historical process led to kingdoms where the constitu-
ent war between king and people was partly displaced onto a war between kings 
and priests, or, anyway, between secular and religious authorities. Or better, per-
haps, it became a kind of three-way contest. God, King, and People all existed 
in dynamic tension with one another.
Nonetheless, adverse sacralization of the monarch was a trick that could 
still be played, and indeed often was. The institution of the harem plays a key 
role. It’s interesting to note that while in most of the kingdoms discussed so 
far, kings had multiple wives, the women were in no way sequestered. Often, in 
fact, it was the king who was confined to the palace, and women who moved 
back and forth, communicating freely with the outside world. Historically, the 
practice of confining palace women can only be traced back to the Sumerian 
Third Dynasty of Ur (2112–2004 BC), though over time the practice seems to 
418 ON KINGS
have become commonplace across much of Eurasia, with the exception of the 
Christian West.38 There is no reason to believe Mesopotamian kings, whether 
Sumerian, Babylonian, or Assyrian, were in any sense confined to the palace, 
but their wives and concubines increasingly were; by Assyrian times, one already 
reads of harsh punishments for anyone who so much as chatted with or gazed 
on one unveiled (Barjamovic 2011: 52). 
The problem, of course, is that if one designs a trap, one can oneself fall into 
it. Eurasian history is full of examples of royal figures who ended up sequestered 
in much the same way as their womenfolk. Probably the most famous example 
are the Ottoman sultans of the late sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, notorious 
in Orientalist fantasy for being, as historian Peter Baer once put it, “hidden in 
the palace like a pearl in an oyster, aloof, secluded, and sublime, hermetically 
sealed from the world, confined and condemned to a wilted life in the harem” 
(2008: 20). As it turns out, the stereotype in this case was not too far off the 
mark. During this period, sultans—not unlike the Byzantine monarchs who 
had come before them—were surrounded by such rigid protocol that ordinary 
subjects were not even allowed to converse with them:
[They] withdrew from subjects and servants and from public view. Because or-
dinary speech was considered undignified for sultans to use, they communicated 
by sign language. Unable even to speak, the sultan became out of touch, and was 
visible only on rare, carefully staged processions through the capital. The sultan 
had become a showpiece and sat silently on his throne in a three-foot turban, like 
an icon, immobile. (Baer 2008: 141; see also Necipoğlu 1991: 102–6)
Once again, too, the effective confinement of the ruler occurred at a time of 
widespread popular unrest: by the mid-sixteenth century, sultans were deprived 
of most of their military functions, there followed a series of Janissary uprisings 
in the capital, then rural upheavals which left large stretches of countryside in 
the empire’s heartlands lost to Celâli rebels (Neumann 2006: 46–47). 
Leslie Peirce (1993) has described the period from 1566 to 1656, from the 
point of view of ruling circles, as “The Age of the Queen Mother.” Prominent 
court women were often in de facto power. The key turning point was Mehmed 
38. This was partly owing to royal monogamy, a custom which goes back at least to 
Rome. Of course, for much of Christian history, many women were cloistered for 
religious purposes, but they were expected to remain celibate.
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IV’s transformation of the system of succession. Earlier, the children of a reign-
ing sultan had been sent off to cut their political teeth as rural governors; then, on 
the sultan’s death, they were expected vie for the throne (often through outright 
warfare), a drama which would end with the winner killing off his remaining 
brothers. Under the new dispensation, the brothers remained alive, but confined 
to a section of the Topkapi Palace in an extension of the harem called the kafes 
(“cages”), in near-complete isolation (Necipoğlu 1991: 175, 178; Peirce 1993: 
99–103;).39 Each would take the throne in turn until none were left and then 
power would revert to the son of the first. This ensured that by the time most did 
come to power, they were not only quite old, but also lacked any experience of 
the world, and often were struggling with severe mental health issues caused by 
decades of solitary confinement. Most reigns in this period were therefore short. 
The most notorious, perhaps, of the period’s rulers, Ibrahim I (“the mad,” r. 
1640–48), exercised absolute and arbitrary power inside the palace, at one point 
ordering his entire harem be tied into weighted sacks and drowned; at the same 
time, he knew almost nothing of life outside, and his interventions in public life 
were largely whimsical. (At one point he is said to have ordered his officials to 
locate the fattest woman in the empire, whom he ultimately made governor of 
Aleppo.) Eventually he was deposed and a child was made sultan in his place. 
During this period, day-to-day power in the palace was wielded above all by 
royal women, the chief consort and queen mother, who were technically slaves. 
Outside it was increasingly in the hands of an emerging bureaucracy. Occasion-
ally a relatively energetic sultan would “escape from the palace” to organize a 
military campaigns or some other royal project. But this was considered a nota-
ble achievement in itself.
I could go on from here to describe the self-enclosing paradises created by 
such walled-up kings, whether in Persia or in China, or the dynamics whereby 
warrior elites would relegate existing kings to boxed-in ceremonial status (as the 
Seljuks did to the later caliphs, or shoguns to the emperor of Japan). But space 
does not permit. Suffice it to say the dialectic of divine and sacred never en-
tirely goes away. Even since the rise of republican forms of government in the 
late eighteenth century, and displacement of sovereignty itself—that is, divin-
ity—entirely from living monarchs onto an even greater abstraction called “the 
people, in practical terms, their defeat has always taken the same form.
39. The confined princes were above all forbidden to procreate, so once a set of brothers 
were all dead, office passed to the eldest child of the first of them. 
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When kings win: The war against the dead
Alexander, who was invincible on the battlefield, was completely helpless in his per-
sonal relationships. For he was ensnared by praise; and when he was called Zeus, he did 
not think he was being mocked, but honored in his passion for the impossible and his 
forgetfulness of nature. 
Agatharchides of Cnidus 
Let Alexander be a god if that’s what’s so important to him.
Damis the Spartan
Let him be the son of both Zeus and Poseidon at the same time if he wants for all 
I care.
Demosthenes of Athens
What happens, then, when kings definitively win? When sovereign power is 
not bottled up in a palace or other bounded utopia, but can operate relatively 
untrammeled across a king’s dominions? It seems to me this introduces an en-
tirely new set of dilemmas, and that these dilemmas also take a fairly predictable 
form. 
It is one thing to take a palace garden, or even a palace, and turn it into a 
tiny model of perfection, a paradise outside of time, process, and decay where 
the fundamental dilemmas of the human condition are—at least momentar-
ily—resolved. It’s quite another to do this to a city or a kingdom. Few even try. 
What’s more, a king’s power breaks out of such a diminutive paradise: that is, 
the less the king’s power is contained in space, the more self-conscious he be-
comes about the fact that power is nonetheless contained in time, and, thus, the 
more he confronts the contradictions of his own mortality.
In a medieval Hebrew version of the Romance of Alexander the Great, the 
great conqueror faces this dilemma directly. Having subjugated the kingdoms 
of the world, he proceeds to scour the earth in search of immortality. Finally, 
winning his way into the Garden of Eden, he locates and is about to take a drink 
from the Waters of (eternal) Life when he hears an unearthly voice:
“Wait! Before you drink of those waters, do you not want to know the conse-
quences?” Then Alexander looked up and saw a radiant being standing before 
him, like the one at the gate of the Garden, and he knew it must be an angel. . . . 
Alexander said simply, “Yes, please tell me.” Then the angel Raziel—for that was 
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who it was—said to Alexander: “Know, then, that whoever drinks these waters 
will know eternal life, but he will never be able to leave this garden.” These words 
greatly startled Alexander, for had the angel not stopped him he would already 
have tasted of those waters and become a prisoner in paradise. (Cited in Ander-
son 2012: 97)
At this, Alexander realized that, given the choice, he preferred to be contained 
in time than in space after all, and abandoned Eden forever.
Every tradition calibrates the basic quandaries of human existence slightly 
differently: the relative importance and particular significance of dilemmas 
surrounding work, sex, suffering, reproduction, or death. Still, there is none 
in which human life is not seen to involve impossible dilemmas, and none in 
which the reality of death is not at least prominent among them. It is a tragedy 
of human existence that we conceive the world in timeless categories, but we are 
not ourselves timeless. Kings tend to become a focus of such problems because 
they are simultaneously a kind of Everyman, an exemplar of the human condi-
tion, but at the same time, beings which have at least the potential to transcend 
that condition. As we’ve seen, even when kings lose, the most effective way of 
controlling them is to force them to pretend that they are bodiless immortals. 
One need only consult ancient fantasies about all-conquering heroes like Alex-
ander to see how much the dilemma continues to haunt them when they win. 
The Epic of Gilgamesh is only the earliest and most famous: Gilgamesh, noto-
riously, having conquered everything he considered worth conquering, became 
depressed contemplating the inevitability of death, and set off on a quest to se-
cure the herb of immortality in a far-off Land of Darkness. As most readers five 
thousand years later will still know, he succeeded, only to carelessly lose it, and 
immortality, to a serpent. At the end of the story, Gilgamesh consoles himself 
by gazing at the walls of Uruk, which he had built, and which will remain his 
enduring testimony. 
Variations of this story appear again and again. Wonder-tales accumulated 
around great works of architecture, typically centering on monarchs who in one 
way or another tried to cheat death. 
Some of these monarchs were, obviously, more successful than others. 
Among the most successful, in legend at least, was the Assyrian queen Semi-
ramis, whom Diodorus Siculus called the “most renowned woman of whom 
we have any record” (2.3.4) and who, by Alexander’s time, was said to have 
conquered nearly the entire known world (Herodotus 1.155, 1.184; Diodorus 
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Siculus 2.3–20; Voltaire 1748; Gilmore 1887; W. R. Smith 1887; Sayce 1888; 
Frazer 1911c: 349–52, 366–68; D. Levi 1944; Eilers 1971; Roux 2001; Dalley 
1996, 2005; Kuhrt 2013). It’s worth dwelling on her story for a moment because 
in the ancient world, for a time, she seems to have become a paradigm for the 
greatest possible realization of human ambitions. 
Scholars still argue about what historical figure, if any, the legendary Semir-
amis was based on. She appears to have originally been an amalgam of a number 
of Mesopotamian queens, most prominent among them Sammuramat, wife of 
the Assyrian King Shamshi-Adad V (823–811 bc), possibly Armenian in ori-
gin, who might have ruled as regent during her son’s minority.40 Scholars, need-
less to say, contest pretty much every detail, but it would seem Sammuramat 
became the Mesopotamian prototype for any autonomous female ruler who led 
military campaigns, patronized sages, and sponsored great works of architecture 
and engineering (Dalley 1996: 531; 2005: 18–19; 2013b: 123–24). Her story 
only seems to have really taken off under the Persian empire (Eilers 1971; Roux 
1992), such that by the time Herodotus visited Babylon three centuries later, 
Semiramis was remembered as the creator of its earthworks and other marvels. 
Herodotus hints at, but does not spell out, more scandalous legends (W.  R. 
Smith 1887: 304). Two generations later, Ctesias, a Greek doctor living in the 
Persian court, provides us with the details (Nichols 2008). 
By the time of Ctesias’ account, the queen has become of semidivine ori-
gins, her mother cursed to turn into a fish, herself raised by doves. Above all, 
though, her story seems to have become a patriarchal fantasy about the terri-
ble—if titillating—things that men in that epoch suspected women would get 
up to if allowed to compete with them on equal footing (cf. Slater 1968; Asher-
Greve 2006).41 In many versions, Semiramis’ rise to power is literally a ritual 
of inversion run amok. She is a beautiful courtesan, or maybe servant girl, who 
tricks King Ninus into allowing her to be queen-for-a-day during a festival; 
then quickly sounds out his disaffected generals and orders him locked up. In 
40. Many even cite specific dates for her reign, 810–806 bc (e.g., D. Levi 1944: 423; 
Eilers 1971: 33–38), but Kuhrt (2013) insists all this is presupposition based on her 
later fame, since there is no direct evidence she was ever regent. 
41. We only know Ctesias’ account from Diodorus and a few other later sources, but 
the latter author seems to have cleaned out many of the more romantic, magical, 
or scandalous elements. All these were later developed in the Greek “Romance of 
Ninus and Semiramis” (D. Levi 1944; Dalley 2013a), which was very popular in the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods.
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others, she merely marries the infatuated king, impresses him with her military 
acumen, and takes power when he dies,42 but either way, Semiramis sets out to 
outdo her former husband’s achievements—no mean feat, as in the stories he’s 
the original founder of the Assyrian empire. She sets off on a series of conquests 
that carry her from Ethiopia to the gates of India, founding the cities of Baby-
lon (she builds its hanging gardens) and Ecbatana in the process, and becomes 
responsible for virtually every impressive monument in western Asia whose au-
thor was otherwise unknown. Semiramis was also said to have shunned remar-
riage, preferring to take lovers from among the most handsome of her soldiers, 
whom she would order killed when she grew bored of them; hence, by the time 
Alexander’s armies were passing through Asia, any mysterious artificial hill was 
referred to as a “mound of Semiramis” and assumed to contain the body of one 
of her paramours. Smith (1887: 306–7) and Frazer (1911c: 372), for this reason, 
felt Semiramis was in part just a secularization of the Mesopotamian goddess 
of war and fertility Inanna/Ishtar/Astarte, whose annual lovers met a similarly 
unhappy fate.43 
Most spectacularly: Semiramis never died. Forewarned by the oracle of Am-
mon in Libya that someone close to her would betray her, but not to resist, when 
she learned her son Ninyas was conspiring with court eunuchs to overthrow 
her, she called him in, announced she was turning over the kingdom to him, 
and simply vanished and became a god. (“Some, making a myth of it,” adds 
Diodorus [2.19.20], “say that she turned into a dove.”) This is particularly im-
portant for this study because Semiramis appears to be the first monarch we 
know of (the first I know of certainly) who was said not to have died but to have 
disappeared this way—the paradigm for Nyikang, and dozens of other African 
42. Diodorus’ version, in which she married a general and then eventually the king, 
whom she impressed by her ingenious stratagems that allowed him to capture the 
city of Bactra, seems to be an attempt to deromanticize the story. Berosus’ lost 
history of Babylon (fr. 5–6) calls Semiramis daughter of a prostitute, or perhaps of 
a holy recluse; Plutarch (Moralia, 243c, 753e) and Pliny (Natural History 6.35) both 
make her a slave-girl in Ninus’ royal household; an otherwise unknown Athenaeus 
whom Diodorus cites as the alternative version, like Aelian (Varia Historia 7.1), 
makes her a courtesan or prostitute herself. Wilder versions of her sexual exploits 
seem to have been circulating as well: Pliny, for instance, has her, like the later 
legend about Catherine the Great, arranging to have sex with a horse (8.15). 
43. Gilgamesh himself, Frazer remarks, refused Inanna’s bed for just this reason (1911c: 
317). On the other hand, insofar as he was divinized, he ended up a god of the dead, 
which presumably would have been his fate as Tammuz-figure as well.
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founders of dynasties, for instance, who likewise vanish and become gods in the 
face of hostility of kin or people.44 
Alexander was quite self-conscious in seeing himself as trying to emulate, 
and if possible outdo, the achievements of Cyrus, the founder of the Achaeme-
nid empire, but even more he saw Semiramis as his rival. His disastrous march 
across the Gedrosian desert to India was meant to match one of her exploits, 
and even at the end of his life, he is reported to have expressed frustration that, 
unlike her, he had never conquered Ethiopia (Arrian 6.24.3, 7.15.4; Stoneman 
2008: 68, 129, 140–43). Like Semiramis, Alexander made himself a god on 
the basis of a visit to the oracle of Ammon in Libya, to the bemused shrugs of 
statesmen back in Greece; he also founded cities, raised monuments, and did all 
the things a great conqueror was supposed to do. But he only truly defeated his 
rival after death, when the Alexander Romance, a marvelous version of his life 
story, was translated into dozens of languages and became perhaps the single 
most popular nonreligious book of the next millennium, easily eclipsing the 
fame of the competing Romance of Ninus and Semiramis. Almost instantly, Alex-
ander himself became the measure of the ultimate possibilities of human ambi-
tion, and his stories go even further than that of Semiramis, not only granting 
him Ethiopia and India, but having him pursue mastery all human knowledge 
and wisdom as well, attempting to attain heaven in a flying machine powered by 
griffons, explore the bottom of the sea in a diving bell, even, by the Middle Ages, 
finding his way to the Garden of Eden. At the same time, he outdid all prede-
cessors in fame not by what he achieved, but by what he didn’t: in the Romance, 
his conquests become simply so many attempts to overcome mortality; he is 
constantly trying to achieve eternal life or at least learn the hour of his death, 
and in this he fails. Like Gilgamesh, he embarks on an impossible quest through 
44. The obvious common feature is that having disappeared, none of these monarchs 
have burial places. Semiramis is said to have built a famous monumental tomb for 
her husband Ninus, but despite leaving tombs of her lovers across western Asia, and 
endless cities, bridges, canals, towers, tunnels, and so forth, there is no evidence in 
any of the sources of her having a tomb—except in one case, as a kind of joke: 
   Semiramis caused a great tomb to be prepared for herself, and on it this 
inscription: “Whatsoever king finds himself in need of money may break into 
this monument and take as much as he wishes.” Darius accordingly broke 
into it, but found no money; he did, however, come upon another inscription 
reading as follows: “If you were not a wicked man with an insatiate greed 
for money, you would not be disturbing the places where the dead are laid.” 
(Plutarch Moralia 173b). 
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a Land of Darkness to obtain the Waters of Life, but in the end, he loses it to 
someone else—not a snake, this time, but his own cook and daughter, whom he 
then punishes by casting them out to live forever with nothing further to show 
for themselves (Dawkins 1937; Stoneman 1995: 98–99; Szalc 2012).45 
One can actually see this as a little structural inversion: Semiramis was a 
queen betrayed by her son, responded with uncharacteristic grace, and thus 
achieved immortality; Alexander was a king betrayed by his daughter, respond-
ed with uncharacteristic fury, and thus did not. In any case, in every version of 
the Romance, his quest to become a god proves unsuccessful.46 As an Axial Age 
hero, the best he can do is finally listen to the various sages, angels, yogis, and 
philosophers he encounters in his journeys and learn to understand and accept 
his mortal limitations. 
* * *
Alexander, then, did attain immortality but only by becoming a kind of Every-
man foolishly pursuing immortality. 
The advantage of these stories, however fantastic, is that they bring home 
what was felt to be at stake in absolute sovereignty. It’s important to be explicit 
about my use of terms here. Sovereignty, in the sense we’ve been using it here, 
was something of a latecomer in Bronze Age Western Asia, whose political 
landscape had long been a checkerboard of temples, palaces, clans, tribes, au-
tonomous cities, and urban neighborhoods. Not only were most “empires” really 
galactic polities of one sort or another, rulers rarely had sovereign (i.e., arbitrary) 
power outside their own palaces, and those who insisted on creating something 
45. In the original Romance, the cook, Andreas, discovers the Waters of Life when, 
ordered to boil a fish for dinner in the Land of Darkness, he takes some water from 
a fountain, and observes the fish come back to life. He drinks some, and preserves 
some in a bottle, which he offers to the king’s daughter Kale in exchange for sexual 
favors. Alexander has him tossed into the ocean with weights tied to him and he 
becomes a sea god, Kale is merely exiled. In later versions, she becomes the sea 
goddess Nereis. In the Islamic tradition, however, Andreas the cook becomes al-
Khidr, the “Green Man,” who, though he does make his home in the sea, is also a 
sage and mystic who wanders the earth eternally, helping strangers or guiding them 
to enlightenment.
46. In fact, he fails to attain immortality in both the divine, and genealogical sense: in 
the story his daughter becomes an exile; his son, in fact, was killed in a palace coup 
not long after his death.
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like an empire of conquest and either declaring themselves world-rulers (e.g., 
Sargon, c. 2340–2284 bc; Frankfort 1948: 228; Liverani 1993) or claiming di-
vine status (Naram-Sin, c. 2254–2218 bc; the kings of the Third Dynasty of Ur, 
c. 2112–2004 bc) achieved immortality only in the sense of being remembered 
for centuries thereafter as models of wickedness (Cooper 1983, 2012). Rulers 
of the Akkadian, Assyrian, Median, and Achaemenid empires aspired to uni-
versal sovereignty in principle. But it’s largely in the wildly exaggerated stories 
that accumulated around figures like Semiramis and Alexander —who not only 
rule the world, but seem to encounter no significant popular resistance—that 
we have a clear sense of what was ultimately at stake even in success. Each of 
these rulers became obsessed with outdoing earlier ones. Each sought immor-
tality by (1) transforming the landscape by works of monumental architecture 
or engineering, (2) having their exploits and achievements preserved in legend 
and romance, and (3) attempting to found an enduring and flourishing dynasty 
(here again Semiramis did better than Alexander: her son Ninyas was said to 
have been succeeded by a long line of descendants).47 
The problem is that the first two often appear to be in direct contradiction 
to the third—so much so that one might be justified in saying we are in the 
presence of a structural contradiction. The more one succeeds in transcending 
the frames of mortal existence, the more one’s latter-day epigones are placed 
in a position of structural rivalry to one’s memory. Here we might consider 
the case of Egypt, where, quite unusually in the Bronze Age world, kings did 
indeed attain the status of gods with absolute sovereign power over their do-
minions. Pharaohs were incarnate divinities, manifestations of Horus; they did 
not die, and many of their tombs were so enormous that (as we are periodically 
reminded on TV) they can still be seen from outer space. Yet for this very reason 
the greatness of any one pharaoh must have been an enormous burden on his 
children, who literally existed in the shadow of the dead. By the time we reach 
the reign of the last pharaoh of the fifth dynasty, Unas (c. 2352–2322 bc), that 
is, the end of the pyramid age, we also find a king who had to contend with the 
existence of nineteen different monumental pharaonic tombs, each of a known 
predecessor, who was also a deity, lingering immortally inside it. 
47. This is not an exhaustive list of ways that successful rulers might seek immortality. 
At the very least one could add: (4) the creation of laws or institutions that endure 
long after one’s death; (5) the collection of famous heirlooms and exotic/distant 
treasures (Helms 1993); and (6) the accumulation of knowledge and wisdom, 
such as Alexander did in founding the Alexandrian Library. But these are less 
immediately relevant to the argument at hand.
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Back in the 1960s, Lewis Mumford (1967: 168–87, 206–23; cf. Fromm 
1973) made the argument that the divine kingships of the Bronze Age were 
in part the result of the emergence of new social technologies. While Egyptian 
mechanical technology was extremely limited—they had little more than pulleys 
and inclined planes—they had already developed production-line techniques of 
breaking up complex tasks into a series of very simple machine-like actions and 
then distributing them across a vast army of people. The first complex machines 
were thus made of human beings. These human machines, in turn, were brought 
under the control of sovereign power through hierarchical chains of command 
that, Mumford suggests, probably first emerged in military contexts. The result 
was unprecedented. It gave ancient rulers power on a scale no human being 
had ever previously experienced, and that very much went to their heads. One 
reads of rulers ordering conquered cities torn down one day and rebuilt the next; 
boasting of bizarre acts of mass sadism such as ordering the murder or mutila-
tion of tens of thousands in a day (whether these claims were actually true or not 
is in a way of secondary importance). As an illustration of the emotional tone of 
the violent megalomania that he saw as arising alongside this new mechanical 
order, Mumford (ibid.: 184) refers us to Unas’ tomb inscriptions, which have 
come to be referred to by Egyptologists as “The Cannibal Hymn”:
The sky darkens; the stars go out; heaven’s vaults tremble; the bones of the earth 
shake; the decans are stilled against them. They have seen Unas rising up in 
power, as a god living on his fathers, feeding on his mothers . . . Unas it is who 
devours people, and who lives upon gods . . . . 
 It is Shezemu [god of judgment] who butchers them for Unas, cooking 
what’s inside them on his evening hearth stones. It is Unas who eats their magi-
cal powers, who swallows their souls. The great ones serve for his morning meal, 
the middle-sized ones for his evening meal; the little ones for his meal at night. 
Of the old gods and goddesses he makes his cooking hearth . . . .
 Unas is the God; older than the eldest. Thousands go round for him; hun-
dreds offer to him. . . . Unas has risen again in the sky; he is crowned as Lord of 
the Horizon. He has broken the joints of their vertebrae; he has taken the hearts 
of the gods . . . . (After Eyre 2002: 7–10; cf. Piankoff 1968)
Mumford did have a point. It’s hard to imagine anything more megalomaniacal 
than a man who claims to literally eat gods for breakfast. At the same time, it’s 
hard to discount the fact that Unas’ pyramid was also one of the smallest of the 
Old Kingdom, perhaps half the size of most of those around it in the Saqqara 
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tomb complex (Bárta 2005), which were themselves a fraction of the size of 
those at Giza. We seem to be witnessing an epic instance of overcompensation. 
One is tempted to speak of pyramid envy. 
Still I would argue that there is a deeper, and more fundamental problem 
behind such grandiloquent posturing: How does one reconcile claims to abso-
lute and universal sovereignty with the lingering existence of previous monarchs 
who continue to claim exactly the same thing? It’s difficult enough when one is 
still a live king. The problem is only compounded when one is just another dead 
one. This dilemma took a particularly acute form in Egypt, where the dead were 
almost constantly present in one form or another: not only were their tombs 
visible from the capital, each with attendant staffs of soul priests and funer-
ary estates, but, as David Wengrow (2006: 142–46, 220-31, 266) has shown, 
bureaucratic structures of production in Egypt had originally emerged largely 
through the need to manage their domains, and Old Kingdom records suggest 
they continued to make up a very large part of Egypt’s economy (Muhs 2016: 
42–45, 106, 125–26.) Another large chunk of the kingdom’s revenue was paid 
directly to gods via various temples. Nineteen pyramids then meant nineteen 
dead pharaohs, each with his own lands and administrative organization, com-
peting not only for ritual attention, but also for their share in the total surplus 
production—that is, the grain, meat, and vegetables being extracted from the 
peasants who inhabited rural estates. Unas’ claims to devour the gods (including 
his own ancestors) might be seen as a defiant assertion of ultimate sovereignty 
from one god surrounded by a host of equally hungry rivals. 
* * *
Curiously, Egyptian monarchs were not the only ones to face this dilemma. The 
situation for Inka emperors was if anything even more extreme. 
The Inka succession system (Cobo [1653] 1979: 111, 248; Conrad 1981; 
Zuidema 1990; Gose 1996a, 1996b; Jenkins 2001; Moore 2004; Yaya 2015) 
is rarely discussed outside of the work of specialists, which is odd because it’s 
clearly the key to understanding the rapid expansion of the Inka empire. The 
latter is one of the few political entities that existed in the American hemi-
sphere before Columbus that is universally recognized to be a state, and it was 
quite a formidable one, extending a uniform system of administration over a 
territory that at its peak spanned some two thousand miles, from Ecuador to 
Chile. The basis of the almost frenetic pace of its expansion (its rulers conquered 
a territory that stretched two thousand miles in little more than a century) lay in 
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a system which ensured that dead rulers continued to hold almost all the powers 
and privileges they had in life.
Inheritance was patrilineal, and sovereign power passed from a dead Inka to 
his eldest, or most capable, son. Sovereign power, however, was almost the only 
thing the new Inka inherited. Old kings were mummified, and the mummies 
had to be treated in much the same way as a living person.
Upon the death of an Inca ruler the rights to govern, to wage war, and to impose 
taxes on the empire passed directly to his principal heir, who became the next 
head of state. However, the deceased emperor’s buildings, servants, chattel, and 
other possessions continued to be treated as his property and were entrusted to a 
corporate social group (panaqa or royal ayllu) containing his other descendants. 
These secondary heirs did not actually receive ownership of the items named 
above; they derived their support from the panaqa’s own holdings. Instead, they 
managed their ancestor’s property for him, using it to care for his mummy and 
maintain his cult. In effect, a deceased emperor’s panaqa treated him as if he were 
still alive. (Conrad 1981: 9)
Each new ruler, or Sapa Inka (“Unique Inka,” his singularity consisting in the 
fact that he was still alive), was therefore expected to gather together a company 
of warriors and conquer new territories with which to support his own court, 
wives, and retainers. In the meantime, his father’s mummy carried on much as 
before, attending rituals, managing his property, holding regular court at his ur-
ban palace or country estates, and throwing feasts for visiting notables, at which 
his will would be conveyed by mediums (Gose 1996a: 19–20). 
Not all rulers would become estate-owning mummies: some died “bad 
deaths” and their bodies were destroyed or not recovered; others died before they 
had managed to conquer any territories of their own to begin with (Yaya 2015: 
651). Still, the accumulation of palaces made Cuzco, the Inka capital, into a very 
unusual sort of city, with an ever-increasing number of fully staffed royal palaces 
(Rowe 1967: 60–61), each the ritual focus on an ever-burgeoning panaqa made 
up of all descendants of the (non-succeeding) children of the former king. 
One reason such an arrangement is so unusual is that it brings out a fun-
damental contradiction in the logic of dynastic rule—one which most systems 
attempt to finesse in one way or another, but which is impossible to ignore in 
situations when old kings are still physically present in such dramatic ways. The 
contradiction is that while older monarchs will always tend to outrank younger 
ones (partly simply by the principle of seniority, partly in most cases too because 
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they are closer to the charisma of the original stranger-king founder of the 
dynasty), their descendants will tend to be ranked the other way around: those 
particularly identified with the earlier rulers will tend to rank lower than those 
identified with more recent ones, and their position in the total genealogical 
order will continue to decline steadily as time goes on. 
This sounds counterintuitive at first, but it makes perfect sense if you con-
sider how such ranked lineage systems work. If you imagine a genealogy start-
ing with King A, and proceeding through A’s eldest son, King B, then B’s eldest 
son, King C, and so on, then the descendants of the younger (noninheriting) 
sons of King A have only declining status to look forward over time. After all, 
the younger sons of King B are still descended from King A (King B’s father), 
the younger sons of King C still descended from A and B as well, and so forth, 
down to the children of the present king today, who are of course princes, and of 
the highest rank of all. Nonetheless, a lineage founded by the younger children 
of King A, the founder of the dynasty, and only descended from King A and not 
any of the others, will tend to be identified with King A, typically be charged 
with taking care of his tomb or shrines or relics, or otherwise maintain a special 
ritual status based on their identification with the founder of the dynasty and 
greatest of all kings. And the descendants of King B will likely enjoy a slightly 
lower ritual status, of C lower than that, and so on. 
Thus, the lowest-ranking royal lineage will be the guardian of the memory 
of the highest-ranking royal ancestor.
Lineages where everyone is ranked in order of birth are referred to in the 
anthropological literature as “conical clans” or “ramages,” and their implications 
have been worked out in detail (Kirchhoff 1949, 1955; Sahlins 1958; for appli-
cation to the Inka case, Jenkins 2001). If the founder of a lineage has three chil-
dren—let’s assume for simplicity’s sake that whether they are sons or daughters 
doesn’t matter, which is in fact often the case—then they are ranked numbers 1, 
2, and 3, but if each of those has three children, the children of the second are 
no longer number 2, but numbers 4, 5, and 6, in the next generation, numbers 
10–19, and so on. The technical term for this is “sinking status” (H. Geertz and 
C. Geertz 1975: 124–31; C. Geertz 1980: 26–32). If one does not become king, 
one’s descendants have no place to go but down, and one can expect one’s line 
to become lower and lower in rank as time goes on. It’s commonplace in such 
a system to have a cut-off point: thus, among both the Natchez and Merina, it 
was said that after seven generations royal descendants lose any noble privileges 
and become commoners again. 
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In reality, of course, things are never this simple, since human beings nor-
mally have two parents, not one, and marriage allows one to avoid the inevita-
bility of decline—either by marrying back up, or by marrying outside the system 
entirely (the stranger-king principle again). But the more a unilinear genealogy, 
matrilineal or patrilineal or cognatic, is determinant of status, the more will the 
principle of sinking status, inevitably, apply. 
In the Inka case, for instance, in 1532, the Valley of Cuzco surrounding the 
capital came to be entirely occupied by members of the ten panaqa descended 
from former kings, and these were indeed ranked by genealogical distance from 
the core lines (Zuidema 1964, 1989; Gose 1996b: 405; Jenkins 2011: 179–81). 
All claimed descent from Manco Capac, founder of the empire, but the panaqa 
specifically identified with Manco Capac, Chima Panaqa, and which kept the 
founder’s image and conducted rituals on his behalf, in fact ranked lowest (Bau-
er 1998: 125–26). 
What I am proposing here is that, in the case of royal genealogies at least (and 
these are, by definition, ranked), there are in fact two different kinds of sinking 
status at play, and that they work at cross-purposes. On the one hand, collateral 
branches will inevitably spin off the royal line, just like the panaqa, and each new 
one that spins off pushes all the older ones even further downward in rank. We 
can refer to this “collateral” or “horizontal” descending status: the further a lineage 
gets from the center, the less exalted it becomes. On the other hand, we can also 
distinguish a principle of vertical descending status, that applies within the core 
dynastic line itself.48 All things being equal, the founder of a dynasty will neces-
sarily rank higher than his descendants, for the same reason that fathers outrank 
sons, and because the longer a dynasty endures, the more distant the current ruler 
will be seen to fall from the original (often alien) sources of his or her power.
I think this is a structural feature, or, at the very least, a constant tendency 
within any dynastic system; but the problem becomes all the more acute in 
traditional societies where history itself is seen as a process of rupture or decline 
from mythic or heroic times. Michael Puett has argued that in Bronze Age 
China, during the Shang (c .1600–1046 BC) and Zhou (1046–256 BC) dynas-
ties, this problem became systemic. Each ruler’s ritual role was to sacrifice to his 
father, who would then intervene with his own father, and so on, up the chain to 
48. The terminology was first suggested to me by Marshall Sahlins; it somewhat echoes 
Clifford Geertz, who speaks of genealogical status “dimming” both vertically and 
horizontally in Bali (1980: 16), but the usage is not identical. 
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the original founder of the dynasty, who would intervene with God (or heaven) 
for the well-being of his people:
In such a sacrificial system, however, there was a built-in inevitability of de-
cline. . . . Since it was defined genealogically each subsequent generation would 
grow ever more distant from the ancestors serving Heaven. . . . As reigning kings 
grew ritually weaker, rival claimants from powerful lineages inevitably began 
seeking allegiances that would allow them to overthrow the king and begin a 
new dynasty. (Puett 2012: 214)
Puett makes the intriguing argument that the First Emperor (259–210 BC) 
attempted to break the cycle by declaring himself a god, who could therefore 
remain available for direct contact for his descendants, no matter what the ge-
nealogical distance; but the project failed, leading, ultimately, to the distinctly 
human Chinese conception of kingship we find in the Han and thereafter 
(ibid.: 216–18; cf. 2002: 237–45). Still, Chinese sages simply found other rea-
sons to insist that dynasties tended toward inevitable decline. 
The term “sinking status” was originally coined by the Geertzes (1975) to 
describe the ranked lineage system of Bali, where lineages that spin off core de-
scent lines are always in danger of losing status over time, but here too one can 
speak of both vertical and horizontal sinking status. All Balinese kings claim 
descent from the princes who fled from the downfall of the Javanese kingdom 
of Majapahit, but the Babad Dalem chronicle recounts how even the highest-
ranking branch of the royal line, the kings of Gelgel and Klungkung, steadily 
decline from their divine origins when one misstep or another leads to a fall 
from grace: hence even the rank of kings, as indicated by their titles, descends 
from godlike Mpu, to priestly Sri, to the relatively modest warrior titles Dalem 
and Dewa (see C. Geertz 1980: 15–18; Weiner 1995: 105–35; Acciaioli 2009: 
62–65). Here, the contradiction between vertical and horizontal principles plays 
itself out explicitly, since each lineage that splits off from the royal line should 
rank properly higher than those who split earlier, but, in fact, the effect is coun-
tered by the fact that the ruling line itself was losing rank—no doubt creating all 
sorts of opportunities for neighbors to develop deeply felt disagreements about 
who is ultimately superior to who (see fig. 2).49
49. For some reason, all the spin-off lines in figure 2 are represented as descended from 
Satria lineages that are formally of the same rank, but there were dadia or lineages 
descended from later monarchs as well. 
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Figure 2. Sinking status (Acciaioli 2009: 63).
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* * *
Rather than multiply examples (the idea that royal dynasties are often seen as 
prone to decadence is hardly controversial), let me sum up the argument so far.
I have proposed that when kings definitively win what I’ve called the con-
stitutive war between sovereign and people, succeeding in extending sovereign 
power to their kingdom as a whole, they will tend to take the assumption of 
their godlike status (the very weapon used against them when popular forces 
win) as inspiration to actually try to transcend mortality. They will make them-
selves legends, transform the landscape, create dynasties. However, insofar as 
they succeed, this will always create problems for their successors, especially if 
those successors wish to do the same. Generations fall in rivalry with one an-
other. Living kings find themselves choked and surrounded by the dead.
Now, I do not think this problem is peculiar to royal dynasties. Actually, 
something like this is likely to happen wherever the status of the living is de-
pendent on ancestors who are similar to themselves. 
I first came to this conclusion when thinking about mortuary ritual in high-
land Madagascar (Graeber 1995), where famadihana ceremonies, which people 
of all social backgrounds now perform, have a peculiar double-edged quality. 
Such rituals simultaneously celebrate the memories of the dead, and allow de-
scendants to efface those memories by literally pulverizing the ancestors’ bodies. 
This ambivalence can be observed wherever ancestors take human form. On 
the one hand, if one has no ancestors at all, one is not really a social person (in 
Madagascar one becomes a “lost person,” which is a polite way of saying “slave”); 
on the other, if an ancestor is simply someone who succeeded in keeping his 
children around him and being remembered as the founder or great ancestor of 
a village or clan or tomb, then that ancestor will inevitably be in a position of 
rivalry in relation to any descendant whose ultimate ambition is to do the same. 
I suspect we are in the presence of a general sociological principle here. 
When ancestors are seen as being fundamentally different from their descend-
ants, or as existing in a fundamentally different kind of time (the Australian 
Dreamtime, for example), they tend to be seen as sources of power for their 
present-day descendants; when they are fundamentally similar and living in 
the same sort of time, like Malagasy ancestors, they tend to be seen as rivals 
and sources of constraint. The former is particularly true of those societies of 
Australia and North and South America that are marked by totemism, where 
ancestral figures are not even human, or exist in a kind of mythological time 
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where present-day differences between gods, humans, and animals did not yet 
exist; the latter tends to be the case in societies in Africa, East Asia, and the 
Austronesian world, where one instead finds widespread worship or propitia-
tion of named human ancestors.
Highland Malagasy mortuary ritual, I also suggested, is to a certain degree 
a popularization of royal ritual. This raises the intriguing question of how often 
and to what extent ancestor cults on the popular level are always appropria-
tions of, or at least influenced by, royal or aristocratic practice. The matter can 
only be resolved through further research, and no doubt the relation is one of 
mutual appropriation; but for present purposes, I will merely point out that it is 
in precisely in those parts of the world marked by ancestor worship where one 
also encounters kingdoms, whereas in the totemic zone, monarchy effectively 
does not exist.50 There are, as in all things, a few exceptions (largely in East 
Africa, including curiously both Ganda and Shilluk), but the Americas would 
seem to provide strong confirmation, since it is precisely in those places where 
we do find kingdoms—in the Andes, and among Maya and Zapotec—where 
totemism is weak or nonexistent, and one finds ancestor cults instead.51 
Be this as it may, throughout the totemic zone, ancestors, while often seen as 
dangerous, give various forms of power to their descendants; throughout the zone 
50. Obviously it is hardly the case that all societies that practice ancestor worship 
are kingdoms; I am merely pointing out that in those parts of the world where 
ancestors are propitiated, monarchy is a common form of government, whereas in 
those parts of the world marked by totemic clan systems, it is not. The argument is 
much more complicated than I can develop here. On the one hand, as I noted in the 
case of the Merina monarchy in chapter 5, monarchic and aristocratic systems tend 
to deny commoners genealogies, which helps explain why it is often in the more 
egalitarian polities around kingdoms (Nuer, Tiv, Tallensi, et al.) that one finds the 
most generalized systems of ancestor worship; on the other hand, in appropriating 
royal practices, commoners also end up with the same problems in that the ancestors 
tend to be demanding, vindictive, and so on.
51. This seems to hold true even in North America—the Natchez had totemic clans 
by 1900, but the consensus seems to be they borrowed them from neighbors after 
the kingdom was destroyed (Swanton 1905: 667; Knight 1990: 14). The fact that 
cults of aristocratic ancestors appear to have flourished under the Mississippian 
kingdoms, and largely vanished with the monarchy itself (Knight 1986: 683-84; 
Ethridge 2010: 224) suggests that at least in the Americas, it is not so much that 
societies with ancestor worship are more likely to develop kingdoms, but that the 
presence of kingdoms are likely to lead, eventually at least, to the dissemination 
of ancestor cults. The one possible exception is among the Mexica, where neither 
ancestor worship nor totemism is present. 
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marked by propitiation of named human ancestors, royal, aristocratic, or other-
wise, ancestral spirits tend to impose themselves in unwanted ways: at best, they 
need to be constantly propitiated, at worst, they make themselves known through 
the vindictive or arbitrary (i.e., sovereign) infliction of disaster and death.52 
Kings invariably have ancestors of the human type, and those ancestors reg-
ularly tend to become a problem. Typically, the original stranger-king founder 
of a dynasty is seen as a source of legitimacy and power rather than a constraint 
(unless, that is, the current monarch is particularly ambitious), but the closer 
one comes to the present, the more of a burden ancestral memories tend to 
become. The Egyptian and Peruvian mummies are just extreme examples of a 
more general tendency. Just as much of the panoply of Frazerian sacred kingship 
can be seen as a series of techniques for reining in and controlling monarchs, so 
too can many of the ritual institutions one sees in kingdoms where sovereignty 
has, indeed, broken out of its initial frame, where kings have won, as I’ve put it, 
be seen as consisting of so many strategies for coping with this problem—itself 
mere one manifestation of the more general problem of vertical sinking status.
Space does not permit a detailed exposition, but a rough list of such strate-
gies would at the very least include:
1. killing or exiling the dead, in the sense of erasing or marginalizing their 
memories;
2. becoming the dead, in the sense of creating a positional succession system;
3. outdoing one’s ancestors in some dramatic way, the most historically impor-
tant of which appear to have been: 
a. the creation of monuments;
b. the conquest of new territories;
c. mass human sacrifice; and
4. turning history on its head and inventing a myth of progress. 
52. This is clearly true in most African and Austronesian cases; Japan, China, and 
other East Asian societies might seem exceptions, since ancestors there are 
always represented at least superficially in a benevolent light. But in fact ancestors 
everywhere are represented in a superficially benevolent light; the veneer just seems 
much thicker in these cases, largely I suspect owing to the existence of intellectual 
traditions such as Confucianism that have turned the idealization into a moral 
exercise. In neither the elite nor popular tradition, though, do ancestors benefit 
their descendants, and on the popular level, if unpropitiated, they are apt to turn 
into dangerous ghosts (Kwon 2008: 20–25; Puett 2013).
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Let me end by considering these briefly, one at a time:
1. Killing or exiling the dead
“Genealogical amnesia” (or “structural amnesia”) is an inevitable feature of any 
system of descent. Not all dead can be remembered. Clans, for instance, are 
descent groups that claim descent from a single ancestor but cannot trace the 
intermediary links to their own grandparents (or however far back they remem-
ber), everyone in between is simply forgotten. But even in a segmentary lineage 
system like the Nuer, where ostensibly everyone can trace back to the founders 
of their descent groups through an unbroken chain of ancestors, there is an 
“amnesiac space” (M. Douglas 1980: 84) five generations back, a memory hole 
into which ancestors must disappear to ensure that there are always only ten 
to twelve generations between the founding ancestors, who always remain the 
same, and the present. 
When the bodies of ancestors are physically there (as in highland Mala-
gasy tombs, or Inka mummies), or ancestors otherwise memorialized in physical 
shrines, relics, or other material tokens, this obviously becomes much harder to 
do. The objects themselves must be dealt with in some way. The same is true 
when genealogies are preserved in writing, as with Chinese ancestral tablets, or 
when there are institutional structures (such as the Egyptian funerary priests, 
or Shilluk royal lineages) whose existence is based on keeping those memories 
alive. In the case of royal ancestors, any or all these things are likely to be the 
case. There is always a social and material apparatus of memory. For this rea-
son, kings often find it very difficult to efface the memories of particular royal 
ancestors even if they wish to. I’ve already mentioned the story of the Shilluk 
king who tried, and failed, to sneak into the shrine of a royal ancestor in or-
der to demote his descendants (see chapter 2). Even the much more powerful 
Ganda kings were sometimes foiled in similar attempts. When one particularly 
high-handed kabaka ordered the shrine of a divinized ancestor be burned to 
the ground, “a spark from the burning shrine flew up and burned the Queen 
Mother’s breast,” leaving a wound that continued to pain her until the king 
finally relented and ordered the shrine be restored to its former state (Kagwa 
1971: 74; Wrigley 1996: 211).53
53. Generally speaking, it would seem that royal ancestors were seen as not particularly 
remarkable ancestral spirits by royals, and as gods by everyone else (Ray 1991: 150–53). 
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For kings to erase ancestral memories, then, requires extreme measures, and 
those measures may backfire. Attempts to wipe ancestors out of history, as, for 
instance, the New Kingdom pharaoh Thutmoses III famously tried to wipe out 
his mother Hatshepsut and her steward Senenmut, rarely succeed (though ad-
mittedly if such a project did succeed completely, we would not know about it).54 
Still, even when ancestors cannot be destroyed, they can be marginalized or 
made irrelevant. Stranger-kingship itself might be seen in some cases as a way 
of wiping the slate clean by starting over somewhere else. Another approach is 
to mark some sort of fundamental break or rupture so as to announce a new 
dynasty. Obviously, this is more likely to be an expedient used by popular forces 
or court officials against sitting kings, but there are also cases where the dynastic 
break appears to be internal. The case of Unas is again instructive. He is consid-
ered the last ruler of the Fifth Dynasty, but in fact there is no evidence his suc-
cessor, Teti, was an outsider in any particular sense (W. S. Smith 1971: 189–91; 
Rice 2003: 210; Grimal 1988: 79–81)—most of Unas’ court officials remained 
in place, and the new pharaoh, presumably from at least a collateral branch of 
the ruling line, appears to have married one of the old pharaoh’s daughters to 
preserve continuity. He also founded a new capital further from the old burial 
grounds and built two pyramids, in addition to his own, for his primary wives, 
all of which suggests an effort to restart the historical memory—and, presum-
ably, limit the postmortem ambitions of the overweening Unas. In the latter 
endeavor he had only very limited success, since Unas was later revived as a local 
deity, and was still receiving popular cult around Saqqara many centuries later 
during the Middle and New Kingdoms, by which time Teti would appear to 
have been largely forgotten (Malek 2000: 250–56).
This leads to the final peril of attempts to marginalize earlier rulers, ances-
tors or otherwise: that even if the social apparatus by which their memories are 
maintained is thoroughly uprooted, they may become popular heroes, taken up 
as a weapon on the other side of the constitutive war between king and people. 
This often happens at the end of dynasties. The first recorded case we have is, 
surprisingly, the Emperor Nero, the last of the Julio-Claudians. Nero is now 
54. I should emphasize that I am speaking here of the difficulty of destroying the 
memories of a king’s own ancestors. The systematic destruction and/or desecration 
of the apparatus of memory for conquered rulers is a regular practice; our first 
historical record of such practices coming from the Assyrian empire, which would 
regularly attempt to uproot and destroy the memory of conquered dynasties 
(Suriano 2010: 65–67), but the practice is commonplace.
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remembered through the eyes of his enemies as a monster, a bloodthirsty psy-
chopath who, ridiculously, fancied himself a great poet, actor, and musician. But 
even in the official accounts there are strong indications that his eccentricities 
actually cut quite the other way: during his early reign he systematically re-
fused to sign death warrants, and even ordered that gladiators no longer fight 
to the death at games he sponsored. (He did, however, on one occasion order 
that senators themselves take part in the now bloodless fencing contests, which 
might begin to explain some of the vitriol.) He also attempted to negotiate 
a permanent peace with Rome’s main imperial rival Parthia.55 Odd though it 
may seem, Nero was about as close to a pacifist as Rome produced. He might 
have gone a bit further than some in trying to glorify his name and preserve his 
memory (“he took the former appellations from many things and numerous 
places and gave them new ones from his own name. He also called the month 
of April Neroneus and was minded to name Rome Neropolis” [Suetonius, Nero 
55]). After Nero was overthrown in a military coup in ad 68, all of this appa-
ratus of memory was immediately dismantled, he became one of the few Julio-
Claudians never to be deified,56 and attempts were made to paint him as a tyrant 
so awful that the subsequent imposition of military rule was entirely justified 
(Henderson 1905; Griffin 1984; Champlin 2003).
Most of Nero’s former subjects, apparently, disagreed. Already in ad 96, we 
read that “even now, everybody wishes Nero were still alive; and the great ma-
jority believe that he is” (Dio Chrysostom 21.10). Three different pretenders 
55. Nero’s misfortune was that while he was anything but brutal by Roman standards, 
those relative few on whom he did vent his wrath—Christians, who were widely 
held to have been responsible for the fire that devastated Rome in ad 64, and the 
senatorial class, after many, including his former mentor Seneca, were implicated 
in an assassination plot in ad 65—were precisely those who wrote later histories. 
For what it’s worth, I have always personally suspected that Christians (perhaps 
the Peter faction) actually were at least partly responsible for the great fire—some 
certainly can be seen to be gloating about it in Revelations 18.8-20—and that Nero 
might not have actually died in ad 68 at all, since the account of his suddenly 
abandoning a plan to flee to the east for no particular reason and instead killing 
himself (Suetonius Nero 48–49) seems novelistic and implausible. For all we know, 
the “imposter” who ended up in Persia was really him.
56. Normal practice was to deify emperors only after their deaths so the reigning 
princeps could be referred to as “son of a god” (divi filius). Nero thus duly deified his 
adopted father Claudius, and later added his wife Poppaea and daughter Claudia, 
but for obvious reasons he did not receive the same honors after his own death 
(Woolf 2002: 250).
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claiming to be Nero appeared in the eastern provinces, at least one sparking a 
widespread revolt; the Parthians kept another as a bargaining chip; and as late as 
ad 410, St. Augustine of Hippo wrote that pagans still insisted Nero was sleep-
ing somewhere, waiting “until the time is right” to reclaim his throne, just as 
Christians feared that, though dead, he would rise from the grave as Antichrist 
(Civ. Dei 20.19.3). As one biographer writes:
The persistent expectation that Nero would return from hiding (or from the 
dead, in the negative formulation of the Antichrist) puts him into the select 
company of historical figures whom people wanted to return, figures like King 
Arthur, Charlemagne, Saint Olaf, Frederick Barbarossa, Frederick II, Constan-
tine XI, Tsar Alexander I, and Elvis Presley. (Champlin 2003: 21)
The latter, significantly, referred to as “the King.”57 To which list one might add 
Cuatemoc in Mexico and Tupac Amaru in Peru. Almost every one of these was 
a figure whose memory his successors had attempted, vainly, to suppress. 
2. Becoming the dead 
Another way to solve the problem is by declaring oneself the same person as 
a previous, more famous ruler, or, even more, through a system of positional 
succession, saying that all kings are effectively the same person. Think of this 
perhaps as the ultimate extension of Marshall Sahlins’ “kinship” or “heroic I,” 
whereby a Maori chief can tell an enemy, “I killed your grandfather,” referring 
to an event that happened many centuries before (Prytz-Johansen 1954: 29–31; 
Sahlins 1983a: 522–23; 2013: 36–37). 
Stephanie Dalley (2005: 20) has argued that the former approach was quite 
common in the ancient Middle East, where living monarchs could assimilate 
themselves to more famous antecedents, “prototypes” of great rulers—as, say, 
Sargon I of Assyria (722–705 bc) simply took on the name and persona of 
Sargon of Akkad (c. 2340–2284 bc), or various independently minded queens 
in the same part of the world all became “Semiramis.”58 One might say there is 
57. For an excellent Durkheimian analysis of Elvis as messiah figure in the American 
religion of consumerism, see Stromberg (1990).
58. “A striking feature of ancient Mesopotamian history is the naming of a new king 
after a much earlier king of a different dynasty to whom he was unrelated. Sargon, 
Naram-Sin, and Nebuchadnezzar are three obvious examples” (Dalley 2005: 20).
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a strong form and a weak form of such identification. Almost all kings will play 
this game in the weak sense: either by identifying with past heroes (as Edward 
IV, to take a fairly random example, presented himself as a reincarnation of 
King Arthur [Hughes 2002]), or just by all taking the same name: this is why in 
the High Middle Ages almost all English monarchs were named either Henry 
or Edward, and France had sixteen different kings named Louis. Attempting 
this strategy in the strong sense of claiming to actually be Sargon, or Arthur, or 
the last Louis, is relatively rare. All Shilluk reths are embodiments of the found-
er, “Nyikang,” but one reason the Shilluk kingship is considered so interesting 
and exotic is because they are one of the few to take this principle to its logical 
conclusion, and even among the Shilluk, it’s not as if the historical personalities 
of individual sovereigns are actually wiped out. 
In fact, positional succession systems, whereby whoever takes a given office 
is assimilated to some historical prototype, are much more typical of relatively 
egalitarian political orders like the seventeenth-/eighteenth-century Haudeno-
saunee (“League of the Iroquois”), where the characters said to have been in-
volved in the creation of the League centuries before were still very much alive: 
the fire-keeper of the central Onondaga lodge was always Thadodaho; the Roll 
Call of the Founders recorded the names of fifty original chiefs who were still 
present at every League council (Morgan 1851: 64–65; Graeber 2001: 121–29; 
Abler 2004). But these were societies where there was no real difference be-
tween names and titles, since each clan had a fixed stock of names, which could 
only be portioned out by clan matrons one at a time, and the entire effect seems 
to be to minimize the scope for personal self-aggrandizement.59 Kings tend to 
avoid positional succession for exactly this reason. It might allow them to de-
stroy their ancestors’ ability to make a unique name for themselves, but only by 
the sacrifice of their own. 
There are few exceptions. Perhaps the most famous is the Luapulu king-
dom of Central Africa, whose ruler is always Kazembe (Cunnison 1956, 1957, 
1959)—but only because the Luapulu dynasty appears to have conquered a 
group of people who, very unusually for Africa, practice positional succession 
in their lineages. (When a man or woman dies, for instance, another is given 
their name, and accedes to their possessions and even family, though they are 
59. For this reason, the two most famous figures in the epic, considered the founders of 
the League—Deganawideh and Hiawatha—still exist as titles, but their positions 
are never filled. 
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allowed after a brief decent interval to divorce an unwanted spouse acquired in 
this way.) By far the more common pattern is the weak version exemplified by 
the medieval notion of the “King’s Two Bodies” (Kantorowicz 1957), where the 
king is a flesh-and-blood individual, capable of receiving personal allegiance, 
and an immortal concept at the same time.
3. Outdoing the dead
This one is fairly self-explanatory; we’ve already seen how even kings who ac-
complish feats so extraordinary their own ancestors vanish (does anyone know 
or care who Alexander’s grandparents were?) will make up some imaginary rival 
like Semiramis to compete with. We’ve also seen how monarchs dealt with the 
continued presence of mummified ancestors in political life in two very different 
circumstances: in Peru, where each new Inka had to conquer a new territory to 
feed their dependents; and in Egypt, where, the Nile Valley being circumscribed 
and further opportunities for conquest rarely available, the result was an efflo-
rescence of monumental architecture unparalleled before or since. 
Building monuments, of course, is effective only if one manages to attach 
one’s name to that monument over the long term. It can be difficult to make 
names stick. As we’ve seen in the case of Semiramis, if you establish enduring 
fame—however you manage to attain it—you will also tend to get credit for all 
sorts of monuments you did not build and probably never even touched or saw, 
in much the way that all witty things said in late-nineteenth-century America 
now tend to be attributed to Mark Twain, or in England, to either George 
Bernard Shaw or Oscar Wilde, leaving those who actually did say the witty 
things or build the various earthworks, walls, towers, and cities ascribed to the 
queen to languish in obscurity.
There is another option I haven’t really discussed, however, and that’s a 
hypertrophy of sovereignty itself, in the specific sense of arbitrary destructive 
power. It is hard to find any other explanation for why, when kings do manage to 
accumulate enough power that their kingdoms can be called “states”—basically 
that tipping-point at which kings can be definitively said to win—one of the 
first things they do is embark on some kind of campaign of ritualized murder. 
Such massacres include the acts of mass sadism that, as Lewis Mumford used 
to point out (1967: 183–85), we so often squeamishly write out of history—the 
massacres, torture, mutilation—but typically, in this initial phase at least, they 
can justifiably be labeled human sacrifice. 
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For archaeologists, for instance, it is notorious that the mass slaughter of 
retainers at the burial of rulers tends to mark the very first stages of the emer-
gence of states.60 It can sometimes escalate to the massacre of entire courts. The 
phenomenon has been thoroughly documented among other places for early 
Egypt, Ur, Nubia, Cahokia, China, Korea, Tibet, and Japan; as well as the Mo-
che in Peru, Scythians, and Huns (Childe 1945; Davies 1984; Parker Pearson 
1999; van Dijk 2007; Morris 2007, 2014). It has also been documented ethno-
graphically in West Africa, India, and among the Natchez. As the final example 
makes clear, when one is dealing with kings whose absolute and arbitrary power 
was largely confined to the circle of their own court, such mass killings might 
best viewed as a kind of final supernova of sovereignty—but a sovereignty still 
incapable, for all its blazing out in glory, of bursting through its frames. It’s also 
important to remember these sacrifices were organized not by the former king 
(who was after all dead) but by his successor. In this light it’s telling that at least 
two of the more dramatic cases of retainer sacrifice (Peru, early Egypt) are in 
precisely places where later we find dead kings maintaining their own courts 
and retinues, and competing with the living for a share of the surplus—suggest-
ing one motive might simply be to ensure this did not occur. Instead, in a curi-
ous twist, a final display of divine power that ostensibly catapults the ruler into 
godhood also serves to wipe out the entire human apparatus that had served to, 
in Audrey Richards’ (1964) felicitous phrase, “keep the king divine.”
Why, then, does it stop? Ellen Morris (2014: 86–87) suggests that, histori-
cally, retainer sacrifice tends to lead to a dangerous game of one-upmanship. 
Other royal households, or just wealthy and powerful ones, will adopt the prac-
tice; kings will then feel they have to kill even more retainers to assert their ex-
ceptional nature. They will also, inevitably, come to measure themselves against 
former kings. We have some good descriptions of what the process might look 
like at its peak from the West African kingdoms of Asante, Benin, and Da-
homey (Law 1985; Rowlands 1993; Terray 1994), as well as Buganda (Ray 
1991), which seem to roughly approximate, in scale and general tenor, what 
has been documented archaeologically from Bronze Age China (R. Campbell 
2014). As the circle of those slated for death expands from intimates, who one 
can at least imagine gave up their lives voluntarily, to entire courts, to massacres 
60. “Large-scale retainer sacrifices are typically witnessed when a state suddenly and 
dramatically expands in geographic domain and coercive power. At such times the 
conception of the ruler is ripe for reformulation” (E. F. Morris 2007: 17 n. 3). 
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of hundreds or even thousands of prisoners or war, criminals, or simply random 
subjects swept up on the roads, in displays of sheer arbitrary power. 
The royal funerary process ended with an orgy of killing, called kiwendo, or “mass 
execution,” which inaugurated the shrine of the deceased king. Such killings 
occurred whenever a royal shrine was rebuilt or on the rare occasions when the 
king visited such a shrine in person. In 1880, Mutesa reportedly had two thou-
sand people killed at [his father] Ssunna’s shrine after it was rebuilt. The victims, 
who were peasants traveling to the capital and transporting goods in the service 
of their chiefs, were captured by the royal police as they approached the narrow 
bridges leading to the capital . . . . (Ray 1991: 169)
Here, sovereignty does break through its containing frames—as part of a curi-
ous double game whereby living kings, in an ostensible bid to honor their ances-
tors, actually vied to outdo them. But the fact of sovereignty exploding its limits 
and challenging the dead in this way also tended to render it untenable. In many 
African cases, we find kings remarking on the burden of constantly having to 
display their vitality through the deaths of others.61 Mutesa, as it happened, had 
no such compunctions, but as a result his memory became infamous and after 
his reign the executions largely ceased.
This is what usually happens. In all the cases we know best, at least, once 
matters reach such a pass, some kind of moral backlash eventually begins to set 
in. Or popular unrest. Or both. This may lead to abandoning the custom entirely, 
usually when converting to a world religion (e.g., Buddhism in Korea: Conte 
and Kim 2016; Christianity in Buganda and Benin); it might lead to gradual 
adoption of symbolic substitutes, such as the armies of terracotta soldiers in An-
yang (R. Campbell 2014); it might even lead to a kind of attenuated populariza-
tion, where broad sections of the elite adopt the practice but only in carefully 
limited form. The latter appears to be the case with sáti in certain parts of India, 
where the widows of high-caste men were expected to commit suicide at their 
husbands’ funeral (E. J. Thompson 1928; Morris 2014: 84),62 but the fact that 
61. So, for example, David Livingstone was told if the kabaka didn’t kill people, people 
would think he was dead (Ray 1991: 179), and Benin’s oba told one foreign visitor 
he was “sick of it all,” but felt he had no choice (Roth 1903: 66). 
62. This statement is somewhat contentious. Retainer sacrifice used to be referred to in 
the archaeological literature as “sáti-burials” until Trigger (1969: 257) pointed out 
there was no evidence for retainer sacrifice in India. Still, the fact that the practice 
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the practice spread from rulers’ households via warrior castes is certainly sugges-
tive. It also brings home the deep logic of such sacrificial projects: to telegraph, 
as clearly as possible, that certain lives have value only for the sake of others. 
Foreign observers often expressed shock at the willingness of many wives, serv-
ants, and other intimates of dead kings and grandees to voluntarily follow them 
to the grave (though, invariably, some were more enthusiastic than others). The 
high-caste Hindu household where the wife is taught to address and treat her 
husband like a god, and to throw herself on his pyre, is just a more explicit form 
of the same logic of self-sacrifice that expects widows in Mediterranean coun-
tries to spend the rest of their days wearing black in mourning (or, in parts of 
India where sáti is not practiced, white in mourning); but at the same it is also a 
microcosmic version of the patrimonial kingdom, which, as described by Hocart 
(1950), is itself seen as a giant household where each social group ultimate ex-
ists primarily for its allotted role in feeding, maintaining, and deifying the king. 
One might go further. Are not these mass ritual killings—especially those 
that ensue when the violence explodes the framework of the royal household 
and does become veritable civicide (Feeley-Harnik 1985: 277)—moments 
when the contradiction between two notions of the relations of king and peo-
ple, one, the notion of kingdom as household, the other, of the constitutive war, 
is actually exposed? As always, the sheer arbitrariness, the lack of meaning63 
in the selection of victims—who are often swept up entirely at random—is 
itself a way of conveying the absolute nature of royal power. If one cannot kill 
everyone, the closest one can come is to demonstrate one might kill anyone. 
This remains true when the massacres are specifically intended to appease royal 
ancestors (as in Benin), when they are sacrifices to gods, but not to ancestors (as 
among the Mexica), when they are directed against witches (as in Madagascar: 
S. Ellis 2002), or, finally, when they serve no purpose other than to demonstrate 
the king’s absolute “power of life and death over his subjects” (as in Ganda 
coronation rituals: Mair 1934: 179). Whatever the excuse, the same logic of es-
calation seemed to apply—likely leading to the eventual abandonment of mass 
began with rulers and then spread via the warrior castes, and foreign accounts of 
hundreds of women sacrificing themselves at royal funerals (e.g., Barbosa [1518] 
1918: 213–14), suggest something on the scale of the most dramatic examples of 
retainer sacrifice elsewhere.
63. I am using “meaning” in the hermeneutic sense of intentionality behind a statement 
or an act.
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killing for fear that the contradictions of sovereignty might eventually destroy 
the kingdom itself.64
4. Reversing the direction of history
Just about all of these expedients, then, are fraught with difficulties, or likely to 
self-destruct. There is one final approach. One can challenge the logic of sinking 
status directly, by reframing history not as a story of inevitable decline, but as 
one of incremental progress.
We are used to assuming that the idea of progress is a recent innovation, 
and that all “traditional” societies (i.e., all societies up until, say, Renaissance or 
even perhaps Enlightenment Europe) assumed, instead, that they descended 
from gods rather than having evolved from savages. In fact, a significant number 
of human societies seemed to have held both positions at the same time. As 
Arthur Lovejoy exhaustively documented for Greco-Roman antiquity, it was 
nearly universally assumed, by most ancient authors, that humans once lived 
in caves and subsisted on nuts and berries, before the discovery of the arts and 
sciences brought about urban civilization (Lovejoy and Boas 1935; cf. Adelstein 
1967; Nisbet 1980). What they differed on—and here they often differed quite 
sharply—was not the reality of progress, but its moral significance: whether 
the earliest days of humanity should be considered a Golden Age, or a time of 
benighted savagery. Advocates of “Primitivist” and “Anti-Primitivist” positions 
continued to debate the question until Christianity succeeded in temporarily 
settling matters in favor of Eden for roughly a millennium. (Then, of course, it 
started up again much as before.)
These debates are relevant because very often the inventions or discoveries 
that made civilized life possible were ascribed to kings. Or gods; but for this 
very reason, the two categories, kings and gods, often came to overlap. Hecat-
aeus represented the Egyptian gods as great inventors, made kings for their 
creations: of writing (Thoth), agriculture (Isis), viniculture (Osiris), and so on 
(Diodorus Siculus 1.13.3, 1.14–16; 1.43. 6). Later Euhemerus was to turn his 
account into a general theory, arguing that all stories about gods were really 
memories of kings, queens, and other remarkable mortals, and it became regular 
64. One might speculate that the common folktale motifs of wicked kings cursed with 
insatiable demands for human flesh or blood, of whom the prototype perhaps is the 
Persian Zahhak, might reflect to some degree on this structural condition. 
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practice, even among those who were not outright Euhemerists, to ascribe dis-
coveries to rulers who had gone on to become deities: Semiramis, for instance, 
was credited by Pliny with the invention of both weaving (ibid.: 7.417) and 
certain types of long-hulled ships (ibid.: 7.57). 
China around the same time witnessed similar debates. There, too, was the 
assumption of a gradual invention of arts and techniques, and the “sages” who 
made these inventions and discoveries were frequently represented as monarchs. 
(The Yellow Emperor, for example, was held to be have been personally respon-
sible for the invention of house-building and weaving, and his wife invented 
silk.) There, too, a lively controversy about the moral status of technological 
progress ensued, with Mohists seeing technological and social invention as a 
rise from savagery, Taoists as a fall from a Golden Age, and Confucians taking 
a variety of nuanced positions in between (Needham 1954: 51–54; J. Levi 1977; 
Puett 2002). 
If all one is doing here is taking stories of the creation of cultural institutions 
by primordial gods, and transposing them to stories of their creation by primor-
dial kings, the ramifications might not be particularly profound. It still leaves 
kings of the present day very much in the shadow of their ancestors. In fact, if 
one represents the founder of one’s kingdom also as the inventor of farming, or 
metallurgy, or music, competition would seem absolutely hopeless. Still, if one 
sees history, instead, as a gradual and ongoing series of discoveries and inven-
tions—as some Hellenistic Greek and later Chinese writers did do—then this 
at least allows for the possibility of competition, even the possibility of intro-
ducing revolutionary innovations in the present day. Perhaps the best way to see 
it is this: a monarch who considers himself one of a long line of inventors can 
treat the principle of sovereignty, which allows him to step outside traditional 
structures and institutions, in the same way as that by which he can step outside 
law and morality, to make himself a kind of internal stranger-king, capable of 
injecting new infusions of creative power to disrupt existing traditions from 
within. As a result—and this is what is crucial in this context—it allows a king 
to both identify himself with an ancient tradition (of kings as innovators) and at 
the same time to assert his ultimate superiority to them, by laying claim to the 
cumulative legacy of all their innovations, and his own besides.
I’ve already noted, in chapter 5, that the history of the Merina kingdom was 
conceived along such lines. The Tantara ny andriana, a twelve-hundred-page 
history and ethnography of Imerina written in the 1860s or 1870s by Merina 
authors and assembled by a Jesuit missionary named Callet (1908), represents 
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the history of the kingdom as the progressive invention, discovery, or appear-
ance of key institutions by successive Merina kings (the terminology used seems 
to be intentionally vague as to which):
Andriamoramorana—division of game, basic principles of hierarchy.
Andriandranolava—political oratory. 
Rafohy, Rangita—astrology, first-fruits (santatra) rituals.
Andriamanelo—iron weapons, metallurgy, pottery, canoes, circumcision ritu-
als, money and commerce.
Ralambo—domestication of cattle, sheep, divination, medicine, protective 
talismans (sampy), marriage customs, New Year’s festival.
Andrianjaka—customs of burial and mourning, royal ancestor cult.
(Andriantompokoindrindra—ancestor of noble order, did not reign: writing.)
(Andriandranandro—ancestor of noble order, did not reign: muskets.)
Andriantsitakatrandriana—riziculture, irrigation, court etiquette.
Andriamasinavalona—legal principles, poison oracle, slavery, additional 
marriage customs (divorce, polygyny).
What’s crucial for our purposes is that where in most cases of inventor kings 
(such as the Chinese, Vietnamese, Javanese, Persian, Inka, or Mexica tradi-
tions), it’s the earliest kings who discover the most important principles and 
institutions, here it’s the three kings in the middle, Andriamanelo, Ralambo, 
and Andrianjaka, who are the most creative. These three are in fact represented 
as marking a dramatic break with those who came before, who are generi-
cally referred to as “Vazimba,” fundamentally uncivilized beings familiar with 
magic and certain elementary social forms, but innocent of metallurgy and 
agriculture.
There has been a great deal of debate about the exact meaning of this word 
“Vazimba,” which nowadays can be used to refer either to an ancestor whose 
body was never properly buried or whose descendants have forgotten them, 
and whose spirit thus lurks in wild and watery places, or, in many oral his-
tories, to an aboriginal population driven out by the country’s current inhab-
itants. When early missionaries heard stories about Vazimba, they inevitable 
assumed they represented some kind of primitive “race,” possibly pygmies, who 
had been driven out by the country’s current “hova” inhabitants, who they as-
sumed to be a wave of later immigrants from Malaysia. (“Hova” in fact just 
means “commoner.”) 
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This was clearly not the case, and as a result, many contemporary historians 
(e.g., Berg 1977, 1980; cf. Dez 1971a; Domenichini 2007) have come to dis-
count the stories entirely, suggesting, for instance, that when oral histories speak 
of earlier rulers as “Vazimba,” they merely mean that they were buried in lakes 
or their bodies were otherwise lost. But the matter is slightly more complicated. 
On the one hand, numerous stories, often from quite early on, actually do speak 
of wars between hova and Vazimba, with the former, led by King Andriamanelo, 
taking advantage of their newly invented iron-tipped spears to put the latter to 
rout and drive them fleeing to the west (W. Ellis 1838, II: Callet 1908; Savaron 
1928, 1931; G. Ralaimihoatra 1973; Raombana 1980). On the other hand, they 
also insist that Andriamanelo was himself the son one of the last two Vazimba 
Queens—sources differ as to which—who bear the intentionally unappealing 
names of Rafohy and Rangita (“Short” and “Frizzy”).65 
There is no space here to go into the details—people have spent lifetimes 
trying to figure these stories out, there are endless traditions with endless sub-
tleties of interpretation—but one thing seems abundantly clear: we are dealing 
here with a classic stranger-king narrative that’s been rewritten. For instance, 
the father of Andriamanelo the great inventor is either not mentioned at all, 
or treated as completely insignificant.66 He is spoken of as if the only thing 
important about him is that he was the child of Rafohy or Rangita (the sources 
differ as to which). If we consult figure 3, however, it becomes clear what’s really 
happening.67
65. In fact, our earliest printed source, William Ellis (1838, II: 117) even says 
Andriamanelo himself was a Vazimba, presumably because his mother was. If 
nothing else, this shows how fluid the categories were.
66. It is given either as the otherwise unknown Ramanahimanjaka (Callet 1908: 9) or 
equally unknown Manelobe ( Jully 1898), but the overwhelming majority of sources 
are content simply not to bring up the question of the king’s father at all. Jully 
attempted to link “Manelobe,” which seems a made-up name, to the Zafindraminia, 
but these do not seem to be based on anything in the Malagasy accounts, just what 
colonial writers assumed ought to be the case. 
67. The diagram is my own schematized synthesis; needless to say almost every 
detail is contested by someone or other. Delivré (1974: 77–99) provides the most 
comprehensive review of sources for royal genealogies, starting with the Rabetrano 
manuscript of 1842; Berg (1977) and David Rasamuel (2007: 205–19) offer 
important critical reviews; I have made extensive use of Gilbert Ralaimihoatra 
(1974) here as well, which uses an alternate tradition based on manuscripts also 
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There are, in fact, two royal genealogies.68 The first, the one on the left, stretches 
back through an unbroken line of fathers and sons to the very earliest days of 
humanity. Once upon a time, the story goes, one of God’s children descended to 
the earth to play with the Vazimba in the great eastern forests, but was trapped 
there after being tricked into inadvertently eating some mutton (Callet 1908: 
68. Actually considerably more than two—for instance, the Zanak’Andriamamilaza, 
though represented here, have their own genealogy, which claims to stretch back 
to a stranger-king founder Andriantomara, purportedly from Indonesia in the 
thirteenth century ad (Ramilison 1952; Rakotomalala 2011). Any number of 
others had to be integrated, or effaced, in order to patch together the existing one.
Figure 3. 
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11 n. 1). God punished the Vazimba—who are represented as being primitives, 
innocent of agriculture or herding—by leaving his son to rule them, and also 
provided a daughter for him to marry. The fruit of that incestuous union became 
the royal line. Their tombs (still remembered in the early nineteenth century 
when all this was first written down) trace a steady movement westward from 
the edge of the forests to the center of the Great Plateau, which was eventually 
to become the heartland of the Merina kingdom.
The royal line on the right occupied that future heartland all along. So one 
would imagine that they would normally be the “Vazimba” line. And indeed 
some of their descendants (the Antehiroka and Talasora in particular) are still 
referred to as “Vazimba” and occasionally as “owners of the land” (Fugelstad 
1982; Domenichini 1982, 2004). 
There are also hints this opposition, between forest and interior, must have 
once been central to royal ritual. As explained in chapter 5, in this volume, 
at least since the reign of Andrianampoinimerina (1787–1810), there was an 
elite group with the somewhat daunting title of velond-rai-aman-dreny (“Those 
Whose Mothers and Fathers Are Still Living”) drawn from certain privileged 
ancestries,69 who were charged with maintaining royal tombs, conveying first-
fruits, and presiding over key events in the life of the royal household. While 
some of these were ancestries rewarded for having performed some special ser-
vice for the monarchy, any team of Velondraiamandreny had to include at least 
one group that lived on the edge of the Great Forest, and one Vazimba group 
from the central highlands. In the diagram above, the Andriampenitra and 
Zafimamy represent the foresters, and the above-mentioned Antehiroka and 
Talasora are the indigenous “owners of the land.”70
69. Most highland descent groups are localized, and in principle endogamous; they focus 
on tanin-drazana (ancestral lands) containing their founder’s tomb. Maurice Bloch 
(1971) proposed to call these “demes,” but the term has not been largely taken up; 
in the nineteenth century they are referred to as firenena (literally, “motherhoods,” 
though they are cognatic with a patrilineal bias), or foko (just “group”). Nowadays, 
there does not seem to be a regular term for them at all. I’m here adopting “ancestry” 
as a generic usage from Feeley-Harnik (1991).
70. These were the only four for whom clear genealogical information was available. 
Sometimes it’s ambiguous: for instance, the Tahiamanangaona claimed andriana 
status on the basis of their having been “companions” (namany) of Andriandranando, 
which usually means collaterals of some kind but the actual link is not recorded 
(Callet 1908: 1214–215). There were in fact two groups of velond-rai-aman-
dreny, one for Antananarivo, one for Ambohimanga, these being the twin capitals 
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These velond-rai-amen-dreny must be carefully distinguished from the an-
driana, which means both “king” and “those descendants of royalty who still 
partake in royal status.” Andriana are divided into seven orders, the oldest being, 
as the principle of horizontal sinking status would dictate, the lowest in rank. 
According to traditions the rank system was reorganized three times, by three 
different kings (Ralambo, Andriamasinavalona, Andrianampoinimerina) to add 
new orders and push the older ones back. Many of the velond-rai-aman-dreny 
insisted they were really andriana as well, or had once been, but had been de-
moted in one of the previous reorganizations. 
* * *
So, originally, there would appear to have been a fairly simple opposition be-
tween invading stranger-kings and indigenous “owners of the land,” with the 
andriana being the most recent descendants of the first. But at some point, 
however, something happened. The pieces were rearranged. The two Vazimba 
Queens, Rafohy and Rangita—remembered as local ancestors in the old sa-
cred capital of Alasora—were inserted at the end of the first genealogy, and 
the three generations after them were framed as a time of great inventions, 
when the divine spark already manifest in that line from its origins was seen 
as bursting out in great feats of—often violent—creativity. Stories of stranger-
king invaders became stories of technologically superior creator kings routing 
their enemies. Most of the major institutions of Merina society were said to 
of the Merina kingdom. We have much better information for the second. The 
Antananarivo group include the Zanak’Andriampenitra (forest), Antehiroka/
Zanadahy (Vazimba), Zafintsoala (probably same as Trimofoloalina, benefactors), 
and Tahiamanangaona (possibly Vazimba, former andriana); the Ambohimanga 
group includes the Zanak’Andrianato and Andriamamilaza (forest), Talasora/
Andriamitondra (Vazimba), Tehitany and Zanamarofatsy (benefactors). Callet’s 
sources go into elaborate detail about the different sorts of forest products (eels, 
hedgehogs, honey, certain species of liana, etc.) brought by the different forest 
groups, but are mostly vague about how these items were employed. Insofar as 
there’s a clear division of labor, the Vazimba groups appear to carry out the key 
ritual actions (particularly those involving aggression: killing the sacrificial oxen, 
performing the circumcision on royal children, laying down the red earth in the 
tomb and placing the royal bodies in it, etc.), whereas, as noted previously, andriana 
groups do all the acts of creation, fashioning, or construction (ibid.: 15, 163–65, 254, 
256–62, 306–9, 316, 390, 401, 407–11, 423–24, 435, 533–35, 589–90, 632, 812–13, 
1136–137, 1211–214; Cousins [1876] 1963: 44–45; Domenichini 1978). 
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have been invented by, or “appeared” under, such kings and their companions 
during the three generations immediately following Rafohy and Rangita, but 
kings continued to be seen as at least potential inventors. Even those lines that 
broke off the royal genealogy that continued to be recognized as andriana were 
those who were identified with (and often continued to maintain monopolies 
on) particular technological breakthroughs: writing, metallurgy, and so forth. 
Crucially, this allowed all rulers before Andriamanelo, of any royal line, to be 
uniformly written off as mere primitives from an earlier historical epoch “when 
Vazimba ruled the land” (Savaron 1928: 68). 
We don’t know precisely when this happened, but most likely it was around 
the time of that Merina monarchs began reclaiming the vast Betsimitatra 
marshes surrounding Antananarivo (Raison 1972; Cabanes 1974), an enor-
mous project which created thousands of hectares of new land, and, it seems, 
a reversal of the older system where kings ruled over people, but the indig-
enous tompon’tany or “masters of the land” still owned the soil. Merina kings 
began referring to themselves as tompon’tany, claiming possession of all land in 
the kingdom, as an extension of the elementary principle of sovereignty,71 and 
groups like the Talasora and Antehiroka were stripped of any ritual role in rela-
tion to the land they might once have had and reduced to “nurturing” the royal 
household and maintaining the royal dead (Fugelstad 1982: 65–70). 
Whereas in Bali, whose rulers also claim divine origins, kings continually 
decline from grace, creating a contradiction of vertical and horizontal sinking 
status, Merina kings in this new version of dynastic history advance—which, if 
nothing else, means the two principles, ascending status for the kings, descend-
ing status for everyone who splits off the royal line, are brought in consonance 
with one another. 
The progressive ideology helps explain the Napoleonic ambitions of 
nineteenth-century Merina kings, who all aspired to become Enlightenment 
71. For instance, the Tantara observes that insofar as the king is “tompony’tany,” he 
has ultimate sovereignty; others may possess specific portions and even sell it, but 
they may not sell it to anyone who is not the king’s subject as it would bring it 
out from under the king’s ultimate control (Callet 1908:365). Sovereignty was 
conceived not just as the power over life and death but as the power to appropriate 
and dispose of land or possessions with impunity; thus, it is said that when King 
Andriamasinavalona granted a benefactor’s family permanent immunity from all 
accusations of crime against persons or property, his advisor Andriamampandry 
quickly intervened to point out that anyone who had that right effectively would be 
king, since that is what the essence of sovereignty consists of (Kingdon 1889: 5–6). 
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philosopher-kings, and how they came to be seen by their subjects above all as 
playful and obstreperous children. I think it also helps explain how the logic of 
the royal ancestral cult came to be popularized, culminating in the development 
of the kind of spectacular mortuary ritual—the landscape dotted everywhere 
with stone tombs, the periodic festivals which draw even urban professionals 
to flock to the countryside to exhume the bodies of their ancestors and rewrap 
them with new silk shrouds—that the highlands are famous for to this day. The 
problem the Merina sovereigns faced was above all how to hold their own in 
the face of the ever-burgeoning, and ever more ancient, legions of the ancestral 
dead. (“Even the dead,” one Malagasy proverb goes, “desire to be more nu-
merous.”) Even after the magnificent gesture of writing them all off as primi-
tive “Vazimba,” local people seem to have maintained the cults of their bygone 
monarchs’ tombs, now mixed up with an older conception of Vazimba spirits 
of lost spirits of the waters and the wild, as the true “owners of the land” (e.g., 
Callet 1908: 256). With the collapse of the monarchy after the French inva-
sion of 1895, every local descent group immediately claimed tompon’tany status, 
insisting they were owners of their own ancestral territories. The overwhelming 
majority also insisted that their founding ancestors, or razambe, were themselves 
of some kind of royal descent.
Such claims are not necessarily fabrications. Since there were so many 
kings and kingdoms over such a long period, and since cognatic descent al-
lows one to trace through either male or female lines, no doubt virtually any-
one in Imerina could make such a claim on some basis or another. What did 
happen to all the collateral lineages that spun off the ruling dynasty before 
Andriamanelo (apart from those that were named velond-rai-aman-dreny)? 
We cannot know. The sources are focused almost exclusively on those closest 
to royalty. But occasionally more obscure groups do come into focus for one 
reason or another. 
In 1895, for instance, shortly after French forces had seized the Malagasy 
capital, there was an insurrection in the lands surrounding Arivonimamo in 
which a family of Quaker missionaries were killed. It was spearheaded by a 
very large descent group called the Zanak’Antitra, and for this reason that 
group—which is not even mentioned in the 1,243 pages of the Tantara ny an-
driana—came under a degree of sustained attention (Clark 1896; Renel 1920: 
39, 128–29; M. Rasamuel 1947, 1948; Peetz 1951a; Danielli 1952). Thus we 
have some idea what the story of a local ancestor might look like around the 
time mortuary rituals, as they have come to be practiced today, were taking 
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shape (Larson 2001). The Zanak’Antitra claimed to be descended from a line 
of andriana that split off from the Zanak’Andriampenitra, forest-dwellers of 
the Ankaratra mountains, far to the south of the Merina heartland—the lat-
ter, a group which themselves claimed to have split off from the royal dynasty 
many generations before (as seen in figure 3 above).72 Sometime around 1790, 
they say their ancestor Andriantsihianka and his family were forced to flee their 
ancestral lands during a disastrous war and asked for refuge from a certain Prin-
cess Ravao. She agreed to take them in on condition he renounce his andriana 
status. Later, even when her husband, king Andrianampoinimerina, offered to 
restore his rank, Andriantsihianka refused, insisting that he preferred not to 
rule over others.
By the 1990s, this story appears to have become a template. The vast major-
ity of rural people insisted their ancestors were, at some point, andriana. Many 
insisted they still were.73 In effect, the country is now populated by the descend-
ants of dozens of little stranger-kings—with the result that that same logic of 
sinking status and the burden of rivalrous, oppressive, and ever-more-numerous 
ancestors that once haunted the center of power has instead been pushed off 
onto just about everybody else.74 We are left with a population struggling with 
the memories of their own grandparents and great-grandparents through the 
very tools (adverse sacralization, effacement, etc.) once deployed against kings, 
in a kind of generalized war against the dead.
72. As with all such things, the derivation is contested: Grandidier (1914: 650) accepts 
it; Dez (1971b: 104) is more skeptical.
73. Where I did my fieldwork around Arivonimamo, the largest descent groups were 
the Andrianetivola and Zanakantitra, both of whom claimed to have been refugees 
who gave up their andriana status, the Andriamasoandro, who claim descent from a 
different line of kings, and the Andriatsimihenina, who alone insisted on commoner 
status, but were otherwise vague about their origins. I myself worked in a community 
of Andrianamboninolona or Zanak’Ambony, who traced back to the fifth officially 
ranked order of andriana. They kept their rank as they had been placed as military 
colonists in the region under Andrianampoinimerina (Graeber 2007a: 99–100). 
Pier Larson has collected numerous local histories from the Vakinankaratra region 
which begin with refugees willingly abandoning their andriana status.
74. I am, of course, simplifying massively. Most people in the very heartland of the old 
kingdom identify with hova ancestries that were closely allied with royalty; matters 
are also much complicated by the presence of a large population of descendants of 
slaves who have simultaneously become de facto guardians of the royal ancestors 
and in certain respects identify with Vazimba.
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CONCLUSIONS
This is an essay on the archaeology of sovereignty (sometimes in the literal 
sense, mostly though metaphoric); it is very much not an essay on the origins 
of the state. The reader will probably have noticed I barely touch on the subject. 
This is intentional. Some of the kingdoms discussed in this essay (Inka, 
China, et al.) are universally considered to be states; with others (Benin, Natchez, 
et al.), it depends on one’s definition; still others (Shilluk, Jukun, et al.), almost 
no one would consider to be states. Yet for the specific questions I am inves-
tigating here, whether or not a kingdom is a state makes very little difference.
It seems to me that “the state” is itself becoming something of a shopworn 
concept. Since the mid-twentieth century there have been endless debates, for 
instance, about “the origins of the state”—in fact, when treating with the sort 
of material I’ve been treating with here, it often seems to be considered about 
the only question really worth asking. Such debates almost always assume that 
“the state” is just one thing, and that in speaking of the origins of the state one 
is necessarily also speaking of the origins of urbanization, written literature, 
law, exploitation, bureaucracy, science, and almost anything else of enduring im-
portance that happened between the dawn of agriculture and the Renaissance, 
aside, perhaps, from the rise of world religions. From our current vantage, it has 
become increasingly clear this is simply wrong. “The state” would better be seen 
as an amalgam of heterogeneous elements often of entirely separate origins that 
happened to have come together in certain times and places, and now appear to 
be in the process of drifting apart. 
One aim of this collection has been to begin to develop a new set of frame-
works, and in this essay, I have been examining the notion of sovereignty—
which I think to be embedded in what we call “divine kingship”—in that light. 
Asking about the origins of sovereignty is very different than asking about the 
origins of the state. But it is, perhaps, of even greater long-term significance. 
* * *
It might be well to clarify what I mean by “sovereignty” before turning to my con-
clusions. At its simplest, the term refers to the power of command. But the power 
of command is not itself a simple concept. All human languages we know of have 
imperative forms, and in any society there will be situations where it is consid-
ered appropriate for some individuals to tell others what to do. This need have 
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very little to do with larger power structures. It might even to some degree fly in 
the face of them. In highland Madagascar, women use imperative forms freely, 
especially in managing household affairs (Graeber 1996b). It’s far more com-
mon to see women issuing direct orders to men than the other way around; but 
such societies can in no sense be considered matriarchies. One of the ways male 
patriarchs express their authority, in fact, is by their refusal to give direct orders.
Malagasy women, when they send children off on errands, or tell their hus-
band to stop drinking and come and help set the table, have little or no means 
of compulsion at their disposal. In that sense, they are not really issuing “com-
mands.” What I mean by the “power of command” is, instead, the ability to issue 
orders backed up by the threat of punishment.75 
Now, those who live in liberal societies are also used to making a sharp 
distinction between situations where such commands can be issued “arbitrarily,” 
by individuals—say, a dictator, or gangster—and situations where the individual 
issuing the orders is seen as enforcing a system of rules or laws. This, however, is 
ultimately a somewhat artificial distinction. First of all, the distinction is blurry 
at best in practice. Even in the most legalistic order, officials are allowed a degree 
of “discretion” over when, how, and whether to issue orders or sanctions (when 
they claim their hands are tied, they’re usually being dishonest), and they are al-
most always protected from any serious consequences if they do break the rules. 
A judge or employee of the tax office knows he will never be charged with theft 
or extortion even if it’s found he knowingly dunned money on false pretenses, 
and a policeman or prison guard knows he will never be charged with murder or 
assault—or even, for that matter, rape—pretty much no matter what he does. As 
a result, orders given by a dictator, and a traffic cop in a constitutional republic, 
have far more in common with each other than either do with orders given by 
someone with no coercive power at all. 
75. Said punishment may not be immediately physical, but is ultimately physical in 
nature: firing an employee is not itself violent, but can have effects equivalent to 
violence in a context where someone without money can expect to be, for instance, 
physically forced out of from their home for nonpayment of rent. The formulation 
also assumes a preponderance of means of punishment on one side. A Malagasy 
woman might have a number of ways to sanction a husband who refuses orders 
to carry out a task, but the husband has even more. I might note the patriarchal 
stereotype of housewives as “nags” could be considered the direct result of delegating 
managerial responsibilities to women without also granting them adequate means 
of enforcement.
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In theory, of course, the traffic cop is different than the dictator because he 
has been duly appointed within a constitutional order, following correct proce-
dures—even if he may not be following correct procedures when he shoots or 
arrests someone; but all one is really saying here is that insofar as he can exercise 
discretion—that is, arbitrary power—it is as an extension of the sovereignty 
(arbitrary power) of the government itself. That sovereignty, as Carl Schmitt 
periodically appears, like some embarrassing uncle, to remind us, consists above 
all in the ability to set the law aside. It is the ghost of divine kingship still hang-
ing over us. The police who regularly get away with murder are simply exercising 
that small—but lethal—bit of royal power that has been delegated to them by 
its current holder, an entity we refer to as “the people.” 
I will return to this point later on. All I want to draw attention to here is that 
there is a reason the word “order” has the semantic range that it does. Sover-
eignty, in the sense of the power to stand outside a moral or legal order and as a 
consequence to be able to create new rules, to embody (at least potential) chaos 
so as to impose order, and the power of command, the ability to give “orders” in 
the military sense, invariably draw on and partake of one another. This is what 
I’m referring to when I speak of the “principle of sovereignty.” 
Divine kingship simply represents this principle in its purest form. The “mo-
nopoly of coercive force” which Weber so famously attributed to the modern 
state is its secularization. 
What I have tried to do in this essay is to develop at least an initial outline, 
first, of how the principle of sovereignty originally came into being, and, second, of 
what tends to happen when sovereignty becomes the central organizing principle 
of political life—as it remains almost everywhere today. I want to emphasize that 
I don’t think there was anything particularly inevitable about this development. 
One could probably make a case that in any complex human society there are likely 
to be some circumstances in which some people can issue arbitrary commands—
that is, unless there is a social consensus that powers of command are wrong and 
inappropriate. Still, there is an enormous difference between a social order in 
which sovereign powers appear in some limited circumstances, and one where 
sovereignty is the dominant organizing principle of social life. Historically, the 
latter is much less common. In most of the earliest civilizations we know about, for 
instance, sovereignty does not appear to have played this role. Egypt had its divine 
king, and so it seems did China; but in the Indus Valley, the Tripolye civilization, 
even early Mesopotamia for the most part, we see no sign of such a figure, or any 
other human entity claiming to be either the ultimate source or ultimate arbiter 
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of the legitimate use of force—let alone one that stood outside the legal or moral 
order and thus claimed to constitute it.76 Even in classical Greece, at least before 
Alexander, such powers remained firmly in the hands of the gods.77 
Once the principle of sovereign power takes root, however, it appears to be 
almost impossible to get rid of. Kings can be killed; kingship abolished; but even 
then, the principle of sovereignty tends to remain. Therefore, understanding the 
history of this principle could hardly be more important. 
* * *
The first conclusion this exploration reached is that while Hocart’s hypothesis 
of the ritual origins of royal power seems confirmed by—or, at the very least, is 
perfectly consistent with—the evidence, the devolution of divine powers onto 
mortal humans, or, perhaps better said, its breaking out of ritual frames, did not 
follow a single or a simple trajectory. Most hunter-gatherers we know of have 
plenty of kings, but they studiously avoid allowing sovereign powers to fall into 
the hands of mortal humans, at least on any sort of ongoing basis, and usually in 
any form at all. There seems no reason to believe this was not true in the distant 
past as well. Societies in which powers of command can only be exercised in 
ritual contexts have certainly been documented. In many, at least—the societies 
of central California are one example, but there are other very similar examples 
in Chile and Tierra del Fuego (Loeb 1931)—these powers do take on aspects 
of what I’m calling sovereignty, in that those giving the orders make a point of 
breaking ordinary rules and conventions so as to demonstrate that they stand 
outside the moral order, can act arbitrarily and with impunity, even make up 
76. In other words, a state according to either Weber’s definition, or that of his teacher 
Jhering—the latter defined the state not, like Weber, as the only entity whose 
agents had the legitimate right to use coercive force within a territory, but, rather, 
as the institution which has the exclusive right to judge the legitimacy of any use of 
coercive force. I might note here that even Egypt tended to swing back and forth 
between dynastic periods and extremely long interdynastic periods where there was 
no pharaoh, so even here sovereignty was at the very least episodic.
77. It is even possible that in world-historical terms, kingship only became the 
predominant mode of political organization relatively recently. The Bronze Age 
seems to have been dominated by decentralized confederations, either aristocratic 
or relatively egalitarian. Kingdoms, while they did exist, appear to have often been 
small. It’s only much later that monarchy becomes, as it were, the default mode of 
political organization.
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rules as they go along. But for this reason they are also seen as ridiculous. And 
the clowns that exercise such powers tend to be the last people who would ex-
ercise power of any sort in everyday life. 
This opens up a specific trajectory, where sovereign powers, while gradu-
ally losing their clownish aspects, are nonetheless contained within a specific 
ritual season or time or year. The alternate trajectory—the one which can lead 
to full-fledged divine kings and hence ultimately to (among other things) the 
modern nation-state, allows sovereign powers to emerge on an ongoing basis. 
But instead they are confined in space. The actual historical origins of such ar-
rangements remain obscure. Perhaps they always will. The Natchez, the best 
example of a classic divine kingship we know of in North America, appear at 
the tail end of a long political history beginning with the peaceful and decen-
tralized Hopewell civilization, based on some kind of ritual amphictyonies, the 
rise of the vast imperial center of Cahokia, its abandonment and replacement by 
a number of smaller warring kingdoms, and their collapse and replacement by 
tribal republics that explicitly rejected the principle of hereditary authority (the 
Natchez being by the eighteenth century about the only old-fashioned Missis-
sippian divine kingship still extant). 
Whatever the background, the Natchez case illustrates structural features 
which, I think, can be found in any divine kingship. It might be helpful to list 
them:
1. The sovereign’s origins are external to society (stranger-king).
2. The sovereign remains in a fundamental sense external to society, insofar as 
he is not bound by ordinary morality or law.
3. All insist on the sovereign’s absolute power over the life, death, and property 
of subjects when physically present.
4. The physical presence of the sovereign is carefully circumscribed.
5. Sovereign and people exist in a fundamental constitutive antagonism (war), 
which is paradoxically seen as key to the sovereign’s immortality, and trans-
cendent, metahuman quality.
a. In life, this manifests itself adverse sacralization: the imposition of elabo-
rate taboos that deny the mortal qualities of the king, cut him off from 
regular contact with his subjects, and often, imprison him in a carefully 
bounded physical space (village, compound, palace).
b. Such acts of adverse sacralization at the same time often make that vil-
lage, compound, or palace into a kind of miniature paradise where basic 
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dilemmas of mortal existence can be seen to be at least temporarily or 
provisionally overcome.
c. Ritual regicide (documented mainly in Africa) is simply the most ex-
treme form of such adverse sacralization.
Consider again the Jewish version of the story of Alexander the Great, where 
the conqueror almost finds himself trapped forever in the Garden of Eden. It 
is, in its own way, a perfect expression of the tensions within the concept of 
sovereignty. In his quest to become a god, the all-conquering king finally attains 
Eden, and has before him the prospect of finally undoing all the dilemmas of 
human existence that were a consequence of the Fall—but only on condition 
he be denied all contact with his subjects. In which case, in what sense is he a 
sovereign?
This dilemma was perhaps formulated most explicitly in the Greco-Roman 
world, since the classical gods were so obviously figures of desire: they were not 
merely metahumans (Platonic representations of the perfect forms of power, 
wisdom, beauty, or proficiency)—at least in literature, they were always rep-
resented as just human enough that worshipers could imagine what it might 
be like to themselves embody such a principle forever, even if such a dream 
could only inspire permanent frustration. Hence their notorious envy of hu-
man happiness, whose full achievement would mean they would no longer 
exist. It is significant, I think, that such pantheons were, in both Greece and 
Rome, largely created in the wake of the collapse of systems of divine kingship. 
In that sense, the Euhemerists were right: they are gods inspired by humans 
aspiring to be gods.
Since one cannot actually become a Greek god (as that is the entire point 
of Greek gods: they are that which it is impossible to become, however much 
you might like to), and since return to a prelapsarian state is neither possible 
nor desirable, the absolute victory of kings only creates (or exacerbates) another 
set of problems: how to deal with the burden of one’s own ancestors insofar as 
those ancestors have succeeded in finding a way to attain at least partial im-
mortality. The second half of this essay—the bulk of it, actually—is an outline of 
some of the difficulties (e.g., the contradiction of vertical and horizontal sink-
ing status) dynastic monarchs can create, and some of the strategies latter-day 
monarchs have adopted to deal with such difficulties. (Not all of them: conquest 
and marriage, for instance, were largely unaddressed.) None of these strategies 
are completely effective. But they help explain some of the apparently irrational 
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aspects of many early kingdoms, from the frenetic expansiveness of the Inkas, or 
monument-building of early Egypt, to systematic massacres of royal courtiers 
that followed so many early sovereigns’ deaths. 
* * *
What does all this have to say about our situation in the present? As I have said, 
the principle of sovereignty is still with us; once it becomes the organizing prin-
ciple of social life, anywhere, it tends to prove extraordinarily difficult to uproot. 
Few, at this point, seem to be able to imagine what it would meant to uproot it. 
This is partly because some of the elements we are discussing here are el-
ementary structures of human social existence that will always be present in 
human life in one form or another. There will always be a tendency for those 
who successfully violate norms and conventions, particularly violently, to be 
seen either as divine, or as buffoons—and sometimes both at the same time, as 
Achille Mbembe (1992) has argued of African kleptocrats, and one might just 
as easily say of European heads of state like Silvio Berlusconi or American ones 
like Donald Trump. The only way we could really make sure such buffoons never 
gain systematic coercive power over their fellows is to get rid of the apparatus of 
coercion itself. The logic of sacralization and abstraction, adverse and otherwise, 
will probably always be with us as well, though for the moment at least elites 
have done rather well at minimizing its adverse aspects. 
Still, sovereignty in the form we have it now is a very specific thing with a 
very specific history. To take the story down to the present day would, no doubt, 
require another book—or at the very least another over-long essay. But it might 
be well to end with at least an outline of what it might be like. 
This book, focusing as it does on divine kingship, has had relatively little 
to say even about Axial Age kingship—that is, the kind that became prevalent 
in the core regions of Eurasia after, say, about ad 500. The appearance of the 
great world religions, which, as I’ve said, emerged largely as a popular reaction 
to the increasingly cynical, materialist basis of early Axial Age kingship, led to 
endlessly complicated theological debates about the status of worldly monarchs 
in China, India, and the Christian and Muslim worlds. Francis Oakley (2006, 
2010) has mapped out some of the complexities of Christian thought on the 
subject, much of it focusing on which person of the Trinity the king or emperor 
most resembled. These were crucial in negotiating the balance of power between 
church and temporal authorities in a time and place where sovereignty was, as 
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the saying goes, “parcelized” (Wood 2002)—that is, broken up and distributed 
in an endless variety of often contradictory and overlapping ways. 
Modern nation-states, of course, are based on the principle of “popular sov-
ereignty,” that is, that since the Age of Revolutions at the end of the seventeenth 
century and beginning of the eighteenth, the power once held by kings is now 
ultimately held by an entity called “the people.” Now, on the face of it, this 
makes very little sense, since who else can sovereign power be exercised on but 
the people, and what can it possibly mean to exercise a punitive and extralegal 
power on oneself ? One is almost tempted to conclude that the notion of popu-
lar sovereignty has come to play the same role that Enlightenment critics and 
conservative defenders of the church both argued that the Mystery of the Trin-
ity had played in the Middle Ages: the very fact that it made no sense rendered 
it the perfect expression of authority, since a profession of faith then necessarily 
meant accepting that there was someone else far wiser than you could ever be. 
The only difference, in that case, would be that the higher wisdom of archbish-
ops has now been passed to that of constitutional lawyers.78
Still, I think, the reality is a bit more complicated. The “people” being re-
ferred to in the notion of “popular sovereignty” is a rather different creature than 
the kind that face off against Shilluk or Malagasy kings. I suspect it is a product 
more of empires than of kingdoms. I also suspect that empires—the kind that 
gave birth to the modern notion of the nation-state, anyway—are quite different 
from the galactic polities described in this book, however much the latter might 
often superficially resemble them. What I am speaking of here are empires that 
are not, like so many kingdoms, essentially voluntary arrangements dressed up 
in antagonistic terms, but arrangements genuinely rooted in military conquest, 
or converting voluntary arrangements into those ultimately founded in force. 
No ongoing human relation is ever founded exclusively on force, of course; but 
still, it was when the Athenian demos declared that its allies were no longer free 
to leave the alliance, lest their cities be attacked, that the Delian League became 
the Athenian empire. 
There is something interesting about such arrangements. They are rarely, if 
ever, simply a matter of a royal dynasty imposing itself on an ever-greater array 
78. The notion of popular sovereignty might depart from the logic of transgression so 
evidenced in other forms of sovereign power, but in fact it does not: the legitimacy of 
systems of constitutional law is derived from “the people,” but the people conveyed 
that legitimacy through revolution, American, French, etc.—that is, through acts of 
illegal violence.
464 ON KINGS
of conquered peoples. Many in fact do not begin as kingdoms at all, but as re-
publics (like the Athenian, Carthaginian, or Roman empires, or the American 
more recently), alliances of nomadic clans (like the Goths, Avars, Arabs, and 
Mongols), and so on.79 If they congeal around a single emperor, of necessity 
a stranger to most of those he governs, he may well trace his origins to wan-
dering heroes from distant realms, in good stranger-king fashion; but the key 
structural feature of any true empire is not the emperor, but the existence of a 
core population that provides the heart of its military, whether Akkadians, Han, 
Mexica, Romans, Persians, Franks, Tatars, Russians, Athenians, Amhara-Tigre, 
or French. As a result—and this is crucial I think—a degree of sovereignty 
is, effectively, vested in the imperial nation itself. These are for this reason the 
first nations properly so called. This leads to a complex political struggle where 
conquered peoples increasingly come to define themselves in national terms 
as well. Thus do empires become the nurseries of nations, and ethnolinguistic 
groups that see their destiny as bound, in some sense, with a real or imagined 
apparatus of rule. 
This is not a story we can tell here. But it underlines just how much the ap-
parently exotic tribulations of bygone monarchs still find their echoes in forms 
of ultimately arbitrary power that still surround us, like so many bruised and 
indignant deities, in national politics to this day.
79. Empires might begin without a king, or with a relatively weak one, and then congeal 
around an imperial line over time; alternately, they might begin as kingdoms, like 
the English, French, or Russian, and then develop some variety of republican form. 
Bibliography
Abinal, Antoine, and Victorine Malzac. 1899. Dictionnaire malgache–français. Tanana-
rive: Imprimerie de la Mission catholique, Mahamasina
Abler, Thomas S. 2004. “Seneca moieties and hereditary chieftainships: The early-nine-
teenth-century political organization of an Iroquois nation.” Ethnohistory 51 (3): 
459–88.
Abraham, Roy Clive. 1933. The Tiv people. Lagos: Government Printer.
Abubakar, Sa’ad. 1986. “Precolonial government and administration among the Jukun.” 
Annals of Borno 3: 1–13.
Acciaioli, Greg. 2009. “Distinguishing hierarchy and precedence: Comparing status dis-
tinctions in South Asia and the Austronesian world, with special reference to South 
Sulawesi.” In Precedence: Social differentiation in the Austronesian world, edited by Mi-
chael P. Vischer, 51–90. Canberra: ANU Press.
Ackerman, M. 1833. Histoire des révolutions de Madagascar, depuis 1642 jusqu’à nos jours. 
Paris: Librairie Gide.
Adelstein, Ludwig. 1967. The idea of progress in classical antiquity. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press.
Adler, Alfred. 1977. “Faiseurs de pluie, faiseurs d’ordre.” Libre 2: 45–68.
———. 1982. Le mort est le masque du roi: La royauté sacrée des Moundang du Tchad. Paris: 
Payot.
———. 1987. “Royauté et sacrifice chez les Moundang du Tchad.” In Sous le masque de 
l ’animal: Essais sur le sacrifice en Afrique noire, edited by Michel Cartry, 89–130. Paris: 
Presses Universaires de France.
466 ON KINGS
Afigbo, Adiele. 2005. Nigerian history, politics and affairs: The collected essays of Adiele Afig-
bo. Asmara: Africa World Press.
Afolayan, Funso. 2005 “Benue River peoples: Jukun and Kwarafa.” In Encyclopedia of Afri-
can history, Vol. 1, edited by Kevin Shillington, 143–44. New York: Fitzroy-Dearborn.
Alpers, Edward, and Christopher Ehret. 1975. “Eastern Africa.” In The Cambridge history 
of Africa, Vol. 4: From c.1660 to c.1790, edited by Richard Gray, 469–536. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Andaya, Leonard. 1993. The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the early modern period. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.
———. 2006. “The stranger-king complex in Bugis-Makassar.” Paper presented at the 
KITLV Workshop, “Stranger-kings in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.” Jakarta, In-
donesia, 5–7 June.
Anderson, Graham. 2012. “The Alexander Romance and the pattern of hero-legend.” In 
The Alexander Romance in Persia and the East, edited by Richard Stoneman, Kyle 
Erickson, and Ian Netton, 83–102. Groningen: Bakuis Publishing.
Ando, Clifford. 2013. Imperial ideology and provincial loyalty in the Roman Empire. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
André, C. 1899. De l ’esclavage à Madagascar. Paris: Arthur Rousseau.
Andriamanantsiety, Z. J. 1975. Tantaran’ Andrianamboninolona. Antananarivo: Musée 
d’Art et d’Archéologie de l’ Université de Madagascar.
Andriamifidy,  Pasteur. 1950. Tantaran’Ambohitrarahaba, Karakain’ny Terak’Andriamanarefo. 
Antananarivo: Antsiva Ambandia. 
Anon. 1879a. “Ny mampanankarena ny olona: Ny lapitaly.” Mpanolo Tsaina 1 ( January): 
1–8.
———. 1879b. “Ny mampanankarena ny olona: Ny karama.” Mpanolo Tsaina 2 (April): 
114–22.
———. 1900. “A brief native account of Radama II.” Antananarivo Annual and Mada-
gascar Magazine 23: 486–88. 
———. 1956. “The installation of a new Shilluk king.” Sudan Notes and Records 37: 
99–101.
Apata, Z. O. 1998. “Migrations, changes and conflicts: A study of inter-group relations.” 
Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 2: 79–87.
Arens, William. 1979. “The divine kingship of the Shilluk: A contemporary evaluation.” 
Ethnos 44: 167–81.
———. 1983. “A note on Evans-Pritchard and the prophets.” Anthropos 78: 1–16.
467BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 1984. “The demise of kings and the meaning of kingship: Royal funerary cer-
emony in the contemporary southern Sudan and Renaissance France.” Anthropos 79: 
355–67. 
Århem, Kaj. 2016. “Southeast Asian animism in context.” In Animism in Southeast Asia, 
edited by Kaj Århem and Guido Sprenger, 3–20. London: Routledge.
Århem, Kaj, and Guido Sprenger, eds. 2016. Animism in Southeast Asia. London: 
Routledge.
Asher-Greve, Julia. 2006. “From ‘Semiramis of Babylon’ to ‘Semiramis of Hammer-
smith’?” In Orientalism, Assyriology and the Bible, edited by Steven Holloway, 323–73. 
Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press.
Atkinson, Ronald R. 1989. “The evolution of ethnicity among the Acholi of Uganda: The 
precolonial phase.” Ethnohistory 36: 19–43.
Augustins, Georges. 1971. “Esquisse d’une histoire de l’Imamo.” Bulletin de Madagascar 
301: 547–58.
Backus, Charles. 1981. The Nan-Chao kingdom and T’ang Chinese southwestern frontier. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baer, Mark David. 2008. Honored by the glory of Islam: Conversion and conquest in Ottoman 
Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1984. Rabelais and his world. Translated by Hélène Iswolsky. Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press. 
Balandier, Georges. 1968. Daily life in the kingdom of Kongo: From the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth century. Translated by Helen Weaver. New York: Pantheon Books.
———. 1972. Political anthropology. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. Harmonds-
worth: Penguin.
Balikici, Asen. 1970. The Netsilik Eskimo. Garden City, NY: The Natural History Press.
Balvay, Arnaud. 2008. La Révolte des Natchez. Paris: Éditions du Félin.
Barbosa, Duarte. (1518) 1918. The Book of Duarte Barbosa: An account of the countries 
bordering on the Indian Ocean and their inhabitants. Translated by Mansel Longworth 
Dames. London: Hakluyt Society. 
Barjamovic, Gojko. 2011. “Pride, pomp and circumstance: Palace, court and household in 
Assyria 879–612 bce.” In Royal courts in dynastic states and empires: A global perspec-
tive, edited by Jeroen Duindam, Tülay Artan, and Metin Kunt, 27–62. Leiden: Brill.
Barrett, S. A. 1917. “Ceremonies of the Porno Indians.” University of California Publica-
tions in American Archaeology and Ethnology 12: 397–441.
———. 1919. “The Wintun Hesi ceremony.” University of California Publications in 
American Archaeology and Ethnology 14: 437–88.
468 ON KINGS
Bárta, Miroslav. 2005. “The location of the Old Kingdom Pyramids in Egypt.” Cam-
bridge Archaeological Journal 15 (2): 177–91. 
Barth, Fredrik. 1969. Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organization of culture differ-
ence. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
———. 1975. Ritual and knowledge among the Baktaman of New Guinea. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.
———. 1987. Cosmologies in the making: A generative approach to cultural variation in in-
ner New Guinea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bascom, William. 1965. “The forms of folklore prose narratives.” The Journal of American 
Folklore 78 (307): 3–20.
Bateson, Gregory. 1935. “Cultural contact and schismogenesis.” Man 35: 178–83.
———. 1958. Naven. Second edition. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bauer, Brian S. 1998. The sacred landscape of the Inca: The Cusco Ceque system. Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press.
Beattie, John. 1971. The Nyoro state. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Beidelman, Thomas O. 1966a. “The ox and Nuer sacrifice: Some Freudian hypotheses 
about Nuer symbolism.” Man (N.S.) 1: 453–67.
———. 1966b. “Swazi royal ritual.” Africa 36 (4): 373–405.
———. 1981. “The Nuer concept of Thek and the meaning of sin: Explanation, transla-
tion, and social structure.” History of Religions 21 (2): 126–55.
Beltrame, Giovanni. 1881. Il fiume bianco e i Dénka. Verona: Mazziana.
Benjamin, Walter. 1978. “Critique of violence.” In Reflections: Essays, aphorisms, auto-
biographical writings, 277–300. Edited by Peter Demetz. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
Berce, Yves-Marie. 1976. Fête et révolte. Paris: Hachette.
Bere, R. M. 1947. “An outline of Acholi history.” The Uganda Journal 11: 1–8.
Berg, Gerald. 1977. “The myth of racial strife and Merina kinglists: The transformation 
of texts.” History in Africa 4: 1–30.
———. 1979. “Royal authority and the protector system in nineteenth-century Ime-
rina.” In Madagascar in history: Essays from the 1970s, edited by Raymond K. Kent, 
102–22. Albany: The Foundation for Malagasy Studies.
———. 1980. “Some words about Merina historical texts.” In The African past speaks: 
Essays on oral tradition and history, edited by Joseph Calder Miller, 221–39. London: 
Dawson.
———. 1988. “Sacred acquisition: Andrianampoinimerina at Ambohimanga, 1777–
1790.” Journal of African History 29 (2): 191–211.
469BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 1995. “Writing history: Ranavalona the ancestral bureaucrat.” History in Africa 
22: 73–92.
———. 1996. “Virtù, and fortuna in Radama’s nascent bureaucracy, 1816–1828.” History 
in Africa 23: 29–73.
———. 1998. “Radama’s smile: Domestic challenges to royal ideology in early nine-
teenth-century Imerina.” History in Africa 25: 69–92.
Bernard-Thierry, Solange. 1960. “Les Pélerinages des Hauts-Plateaux Malgaches.” In Les 
Pélerinages, sources orientales III, 289–301. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Berndt, Ronald M. 1953. Djaggawul: An Aboriginal religious cult of north-eastern Arnhem 
Land. New York: Philosophical Library.
Bierhorst, John. 1992. History and mythology of the Aztecs: The Codex Chimalpopoca. Tuc-
son: University of Arizona Press.
Birmingham, David. 1975. “Central Africa from Cameroons to the Zambezi.” In The 
Cambridge history of Africa, Vol.4: From c. 1600 to c. 1790, edited by Richard Gray, 
325–83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Blitz, John H. 1999. “Mississippian chiefdoms and the fission–fusion process.” American 
Antiquity 64 (4): 577–92.
Bloch, Maurice. 1971. Placing the dead: Tombs, ancestral villages, and kinship organization 
in Madagascar. London: Seminar Press.
———. 1977. “The disconnection between power and rank as a process: An outline of 
the development of kingdoms in Central Madagascar.” European Journal of Sociology 
18: 303–30.
———. 1982. “Death, women and power.” In Death and the regeneration of life, edited 
by Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry, 211–30. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
———. 1985. “Almost eating the ancestors.” Man (N.S.) 20: 631–46.
———. 1986. From blessing to violence: History and ideology in the circumcision ritual of the 
Merina of Madagascar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1989. “The ritual of the royal bath in Madagascar: The dissolution of death, 
birth, and fertility into authority.” In Ritual, history and power: Selected papers in an-
thropology, 187–211. London: Athlone Press.
———. 1995. “The symbolism of tombs and houses in Austronesian societies with refer-
ence to two Malagasy cases.” Austronesian Studies August: 1–26. 
———. 2008. “Why religion is nothing special but is central.” Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B 363: 2055–61.
Boas, Franz. (1888) 1961. The Central Eskimo. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
470 ON KINGS
———. 1890. “Second general report on the Indians of British Columbia.” In Sixth 
report on the north-western tribes in Canada, 10–163. London: British Association for 
the Advancement of Science.
———. 1897. “The social organization and secret societies of the Kwakiutl Indians.” 
Report of the US National Museum for 1895, 311–738.
———. 1899. “Fieldwork for the British Association, 1888–1897.” In A Franz Boas 
reader: The shaping of American anthropology, 1883–1911, edited by George Stocking, 
88–106. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1901. “The Eskimo of Baffin Land and Hudson Bay.” Bulletin of the American 
Museum of Natural History, Vol. 15.
———. 1921. “Ethnology of the Kwakiutl, based on data collected by George Hunt.” 
Thirty-fifth annual report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the 
Smithsonian Institution, 1913–1914, Parts 1 and 2. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office.
———. 1925. “Contributions to the ethnology of the Kwakiutl.” Columbia University 
contributions to anthropology, Vol. III. New York: Columbia University Press.
———. 1930. “The religion of the Kwakiutl Indians.” Columbia University contributions 
to anthropology, Vol. X. New York: Columbia University Press.
———. 1935. “Kwakiutl culture as reflected in mythology.” Memoirs of the American 
Folk-lore Society, Vol. 28. New York: G. E. Stechert.
———. 1940. “The social organization of the Kwakiutl.” In Race, language and culture, 
356-69. New York: Free Press.
Bogoras, Waldemar. 1904–9. “The Chukchee.” Memoirs of the American Museum of Natu-
ral History, Vol. XI. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Bondarenko, Dmitri M. 2005. “A homoarchic alternative to homoarchic state: Benin 
kingdom of the 13th–19th centuries.” Social Evolution and History 4 (2): 18–89. 
Bondarenko, Dmitri M., and Andrey V. Korotayev. 2003. “‘Early state’ in cross-cultural 
perspective: A statistical reanalysis of Henri J. M. Claessen’s database.” Cross-Cultur-
al Research 37 (1): 105–32.
Bostoen, Koen, Odjas Ndonda Tshiyavi, and Gilles-Maurice Schriver. 2013. “On the 
origin of the royal Kong title ngangula.” Africana Linguistica 19: 53–83.
Boston, J. S. 1968. The Igala kingdom. Ibadan: Oxford University Press.
Bouveignes, Olivier and Msgr. J. Cuvelier. 1951. Jerome de Montesarchio: Apotre du vieux 
Congo. Namur: Collection Lavigerie.
Bradbury, R. E. 1957. “The Benin kingdom and the Edo-speaking peoples of south-
western Nigeria.” Ethnographic Survey of Africa, Western Africa, Part XIII. London: 
International African Institute.
471BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 1967. “Kingdom of Benin.” In West African kingdoms in the nineteenth century, 
edited by Daryll Forde and P.M. Kaberry, 1–35. London: Oxford University Press 
for the International African Institute. 
———. 1973. Benin studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brain, Jeffrey. 1971. “The Natchez ‘Paradox’.” Ethnology 10 (2): 215–22.
Bray, Warwick. 1978. “Civilising the Aztecs.” In The evolution of social systems, edited by 
Jonathan Friedman and Michael Rowlands, 373–98. Liverpool: Duckworth.
Brennan, Paul W. 1977. Let sleeping snakes lie: Central Enga traditional religious belief and 
ritual. Bedford Park, South Australia: Association for the Study of Religion, Special 
Studies in Religion no. 1. 
Brewer, Jeffrey. 1981. “Bimanese personal names: Meaning and use.” Ethnology 20 (3): 
203–15.
Brightman, Robert. 1999. “Traditions of subversion and the subversion of tradition: 
Cultural criticism in Maidu clown performances.” American Anthropologist 101 (2): 
272–87. 
Brisch, Nicole, ed. 2008. Religion and power: Divine kingship in the ancient world and 
beyond. Oriental Institute Seminars no. 4. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the 
University of Chicago. 
Brown, C. C. E., ed. 1952. “‘The Sejarah Melayu or ‘Malay Annals’: A translation of 
Raffles MS 18.” Journal of the Malaya Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 25: 7–276.
Brown, Jennifer S., and Robert Brightman. 1988. “The order of the dreamed”: George Nel-
son on Cree and Northern Ojibwa religion and myth. St. Paul: Minnesota Historical 
Society Press.
Brumbaugh, Robert. 1987. “The Rainbow Serpent in the Upper Sepik.” Anthropos 82: 
25–33.
———. 1990. “Afek Sang: The ‘Old Woman” myth of the Mountain Ok.” In Children 
of Afek: Tradition and change among the Mountain Ok of central New Guinea, edited 
by Barry Craig and David Hyndman, 54–87. University of Sydney. Oceania Mono-
graph 40.
Brundage, Burr Cartwright. 1979. Fifth sun: Aztec gods, Aztec world. Austin: University 
of Texas Press.
Burton, John W. 1980. “Sacrifice: A polythetic class of Atuot religious thought.” Journal 
of Religion in Africa 11 (2): 93–105.
Burton, John W. 1982. “Nilotic women: A diachronic perspective.” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 20 (3): 467–91.
Burton, W.F.P. 1961. Luba religion and magic in custom and belief. Tervuren, Belgium: 
Musée Royal de l’Afrique Central, Sciences Humaines no. 35.
472 ON KINGS
Cabanes, Robert. 1972. “Cultes des possession dans la plaine de Tananarive.” Cahiers du 
Centre d’Étude des Coutumes 9: 33–66.
———. 1974. “Evolution des formes sociales de la production agricole dans la plaine de 
Tananarive.” Cahiers du Centre d’Étude des Coutumes 10: 47–60. 
Callet, R. P. 1908. Tantara ny andriana eto Madagascar. 2 vols. Tananarive: Académie 
Malgache.
Calnek, Edward E. 1974. “The Sahagun Texts as a source of sociological information.” In 
Sixteenth-century Mexico: The work of Sahagun, edited by M. S. Edmundson, 189–204. 
Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research.
———. 1982. “Patterns of empire formation in the Valley of Mexico, late postclassic 
period, 1200–1521.” In The Inca and Aztec states, 1400–1800: Anthropology and history, 
edited by Collier George, Renato J. Rosaldo, and John D. Wirth, 43–62. New York: 
Academic Press.
Camboué, R. P. 1907. “Notes sur quelques mœurs et coutumes malgaches.” Anthropos 2: 
981–89.
———. 1909. “Les Dix premiers ans de l’enfance chez le Malgaches : Circoncision, nom, 
éducation.” Anthropos 4: 375–86. 
Campbell, Gwyn. 2005. An economic history of imperial Madagascar, 1750–1895: The rise 
and fall of an island empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, Roderick. 2014. “Transformations of violence: On humanity and inhuman-
ity in early China.” In Violence and civilization: Studies of social violence in history and 
prehistory, edited by Roderick Campbell, 94–118. Oxford: Oxbow.
Carrasco, David. 2000. Quetzalcoatl and the irony of empire: Myths and prophecies in the 
Aztec tradition. Revised edition. Boulder: University Press of Colorado.
Carrasco, Pedro. 1971. “Social organization of ancient Mexico.” In Archaeology of ancient 
Mexico, handbook of Middle American Indians, Vol. 10, edited by Gordon F. Ekholm 
and Ignacio Bernal, 349–75. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Champlin, Edward. 2003. Nero. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chapus, Georges-Sully. and Emmanuel Ratsimba, eds. 1953–1958. Histoires des rois, 
Vol. 4 (French translation of Callet’s Tantara ny andriana). Tananarive: Académie 
Malgache.
Charlevoix, Père. 1763. Letters to the Duchess of Lesdiguieres. London: R. Goadby.
Chase, Arlen F., and Diane Z. Chase. 1996. “More kin than king: Centralized political 
structure among the late classical Maya.” Current Anthropology 37: 803–10.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Kelly M. Mann, 1998. The Wintu and their neighbors: A 
very small world system in northern California. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
473BIBLIOGRAPHY
Childe, V. Gordon. 1945. “Directional changes in funerary practices during 50,000 
years.” Man 4: 13–19. 
Chimalpahin, Don Domingo de San Auton Munon Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin. 
1997. Codex Chimalpahin, Vol. 2. Edited and translated by Arthur J. O. Anderson 
and Susan Schroeder. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Claessen, Henri J. M. 1984. “The internal dynamics of the early state.” Current Anthro-
pology 25: 365–70.
———. 1986. “Kingship in the early state.” Bijdragen tot de taal-, land-, en volkenkunde 
142 (28): 113–27. 
———. 2015. “Sacred kingship: The African case.” Social Evolution & History 14 (1): 
3–48.
Claessen, Henri J. M., and Peter Skalník. 1978. The early state. The Hague: Mouton.
Clark, Henry. 1896. “The Zanak’Antitra tribe: Its origins and peculiarities.” Antanana-
rivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine 16: 450–56.
Clastres, Hélène. 1995. The Land-Without-Evil: Tupí-Guaraní prophetism. Translated by 
Jacqueline Grenez Brovender. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Clastres, Pierre. 1962. “Échange et pouvoir: Philosophie de la chefferie indienne.” 
L’Homme II (1): 51–65.
———. 1977. Society against the state: The leader as servant and the humane uses of power 
among the Indians of the Americas. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Urizen 
Books.
Clendinnen, Inga. 1991. Aztecs: An interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Cobo, Bernabe P. (1653) 1979. History of the Inca empire: An account of the Indians, customs 
and their origins together with a treatise on Inca legend, history and social institutions. 
Translated by Roland Hamilton. Austin: University of Texas.
Codere, Helen. 1950. Fighting with property: A study of Kwakiutl potlatching and warfare. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Coedès, Georges. 1968. The Indianized states of Southeast Asia. Canberra: Australian Na-
tional University Press.
Cohen, Ronald 1976. “The natural history of hierarchy: A case study.” In Power and 
control: Social structures and their transformations, edited by Tom R. Burns and Walter 
Buckley, 185–214. Berkeley Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
———. 1981. “Evolution, fission and the early state.” In The study of the state, edited by 
Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalník, 87–115. The Hague: Mouton.
Cole, Jennifer. 2001. Forget colonialism: Sacrifice and the art of memory in Madagascar. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
474 ON KINGS
Collins, Randall. 1992. “The geopolitical and economic world-systems of kinship-based 
and agrarian-coercive societies.” Review: Comparing World-Systems 15 (3): 373–88.
Collins, Robert O., and James M. Burns, 2007. A history of sub-Saharan Africa. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Conrad, Geoffrey W. 1981. “Cultural materialism, split inheritance, and the expansion of 
ancient Peruvian empires.” American Antiquity 46 (1): 3–26.
Conte, Matthew, and Jangsuk Kim. 2016. “An economy of human sacrifice: The practice 
of sunjang in an ancient state of Korea.” Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 44: 
14–30.
Cooper, Jerrold. 1983. The curse of Agade. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
———. 2012. “Divine kingship in Mesopotamia, a fleeting phenomenon.” In Religion 
and power: Divine kingship in the ancient world and beyond, edited by Nicole Brisch, 
261–66. Oriental Institute Seminars no. 4. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the 
University of Chicago. 
Copalle, André. (1826) 1970. Voyage à la capitale du roi Radama, 1825–1826. Antanana-
rivo, Madagascar: Association Malgache d’Archéologie.
Cortés, Hernando. 1843. The despatches of Hernando Cortés: The conqueror of Mexico, ad-
dressed to Emperor Charles V, written during the conquest, and containing a narrative of 
its events. Translated by George Folsom. New York: Wiley & Putnam.
Cousins, William E. 1873. Malagasy Kabary from the time of Andrianampoinimerina. An-
tananarivo: Printed at the Press of the London Missionary Society. 
———. (1876) 1963. Fomba gasy. Edited by H. Randzavola. Antananarivo: 
Imarivolanitr`a.
———. 1896. “The abolition of slavery in Madagascar: With some remarks on Malagasy 
slavery generally.” Antananarivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine 21: 446–50.
Craig, Barry, and George E. B. Morren, Jr. 1990. “The human ecology of the Mountain-
Ok of central New Guinea: A regional and inter-regional approach.” In Children of 
Afek: Tradition and change among the Mountain-Ok of central New Guinea, edited by 
Barry Craig and David Hyndman, 9–26. University of Sydney. Oceania Monograph 
40.
Crazzolara, J. P. 1950. The Lwoo, Part I: Lwoo migrations. Verona: Missioni Africane. 
———. 1951. The Lwoo, Part II: Lwoo traditions. Verona: Missioni Africane.
Crocker, Jon Christopher. 1985. Vital souls: Bororo cosmology, natural symbolism, and sha-
manism. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press.
Crumrine, N. Ross. 1969. “Čapakoba, the Mayo Easter ceremonial impersonator: Ex-
planations of ritual clowning.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 8 (1): 1–22.
475BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cunnison, Ian G. 1951. History on the Luapula: An essay on the historical notions of a central 
African tribe. Capetown: The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.
———. 1956. “Perpetual kinship: A political institution of the Luapula peoples.” Rho-
des-Livingstone Journal 20: 28–48.
———. 1957. “History and genealogies in a conquest state.” American Anthropologist 59: 
20–31.
———. 1959. The Luapula peoples of northern Rhodesia. Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press for The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute of Northern Rhodesia.
Curtis, Edward S. 1907. The North American Indian, Vol. I: The Jicarillo, Navaho. New 
York: Johnson Reprint.
———. 1915. The North American Indian, Vol. X: The Kwakiutl. New York: Johnson 
Reprint. 
Cuvelier, Joseph. 1946. L’ancien royaume de Congo: Fondation, découverte, première évan-
gélisation de l ’ancien Royaume de Congo, règne du Grand Roi Affonso Mvemba Nzinga. 
Brussels: Brouwer.
Cuvelier, Joseph, and Louis Jadin. 1954. “L’ancien Congo, d’après les archives romaines 
(1518–1640).” Académie royal des sciences coloniales: Section des sciences morales et poli-
tiques. Mémoires 36 (1)
D’Hertefelte, Marcel. 1964. “Mythes et idéologies dans le Rwanda ancient et contempo-
rain.” In The historian in Tropical Africa, edited by Jan Vansina, Raymond Mauny, and 
L. V. Thomas, 219–38. London: Oxford University Press.
Dahle, Lars Nilsen and John Sims. (1887) 1986. Anganon’ny ntaolo, tantara mampiseho 
ny fombandrazana sy ny finoana sasany nanganany. Edited by L. Sims. Antananarivo: 
Trano Printy Loterana.
Dalley, Stephanie. 1996. “Herodotos and Babylon.” Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 91: 
525–32.
———. 2005. “Semiramis in history and legend: A case study in interpretation of an 
Assyrian historical tradition, with observations on archetypes in ancient historiog-
raphy, on euhemerism before Euhemerus, and on the so-called Greek ethnographic 
style.” In Cultural borrowings and ethnic appropriations in antiquity, edited by Erich S. 
Gruen, 12–22. Oriens et Occidens VIII. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
———. 2013a. “The Greek romance of Ninus and Semiramis.” In The romance between 
Greece and the East, edited by Tim Whitmarsh and Stuart Thomson, 117–26. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2013b. The mystery of the Hanging Garden of Babylon: An elusive wonder traced. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
476 ON KINGS
Danieli, Mary. 1952. “Andriantsihianika and the clan of the Zanak’Antitra.” Folklore 63 
(1): 46–47.
Danowski, Déborah, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. 2017. The ends of the world. Trans-
lated by Rodrigo Guimaraes Nunes. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Dapper, Olfert. (1686) 1970. Description de l ’Afrique. New York: Johnson Reprint.
Davidson, Andrew. 1867. “Choreomania: An historical sketch, with some account of 
an epidemic observed in Madagascar.” Edinburgh Medical Journal August: 124–36.
———. 1889. “The ramanenjana or dancing mania of Madagascar.” The Antananarivo 
Annual and Madagascar Magazine 13: 19–27. 
Davies, Nigel. 1974. The Aztecs: A history. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
———. 1977. The Toltecs: Until the fall of Tula. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
———. 1980. The Toltec heritage: From the fall of Tula to the rise of Tenochtitlan. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press.
———. 1984. “Human sacrifice in the Old World and the New: Some similarities and 
differences.” In Rituals of human sacrifice in Mesoamerica, edited by Elizabeth H. 
Boone, 211–26. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library.
Davis, Kingsley. 1941. “Intermarriage in caste societies.” American Anthropologist 43: 
376–95.
Dawkins, Richard MacGillivray. 1937. “Alexander and the Water of Life.” Medium Ae-
vum 6 (3): 173–86.
de Heusch, Luc. 1958. Essai sur le symbolisme de l ’inceste royal en Afrique. Brussels: Uni-
versité Libre de Bruxelles.
———. 1962. Le pouvoir et la sacré. Annales du Centre d’Étude des Religions 1. Brussels: 
Institute de Sociologie, Université Libre de Bruxelles.
———. 1966. Le Rwanda et la civilization interlacustre: Étude d’anthropologie historique et 
structural. Brussels: Université de Bruxelles Libre.
———. 1981. “Nouveaux regards sur la royauté sacré.” Anthropologie et Societés 5  (3): 
65–84.
———. 1982a. The drunken king, or The origin of the state. Translated by Roy Willis. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
———. 1982b. Rois né d’un coeur de vache. Paris: Gallimard.
———. 1991. “The king comes from elsewhere.” In Body and space: Symbolic models of 
unity and division in African cosmology and experience, edited by Anita-Jacobson-
Widding, 109–17. Uppsala: Studies in Cultural Anthropology 16.
———. 1997. “The symbolic mechanisms of kingship: Rediscovering Frazer.” Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 3 (2): 313–32.
———. 2000. Le roi de Kongo et les monstres sacrés. Paris: Gallimard.
477BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 2005a. “Forms of sacralized power in Africa.” In The character of kingship, edited 
by Declan Quigley, 25–37. Oxford: Berg. 
———. 2005b. “A reply to Lucien Scubla.” In The character of kingship, edited by Declan 
Quigley, 63–66. Oxford: Berg.
de Surgey, Albert. 1988. Le Système religieux des Evhe. Paris: Harmattan.
———. 1990. “Le prêtre-roi des Evhé du Sud-Togo.” In Systèmes de pensée en Afrique 
noire, Vol. 10: Chefs et rois sacrés, edited by Luc de Heusch, 93–120. Paris: École 
Pratique des Hautes Études.
Delivré, Alain. 1974. L’Histoire des rois d’Imerina: Interprétation d’une tradition orale. 
Paris: Klincksieck.
Descola, Philippe. 1996. In the society of nature: A native ecology in Amazonia. Translated 
by Nora Scott. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2013. Beyond nature and culture. Translated by Janet Lloyd. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Devereux, George, and Edwin M. Loeb. 1943. “Antagonistic acculturation.” American 
Sociological Review 8: 133–47.
Dewar, Robert, and Henry Wright. 1993. “The culture history of Madagascar.” Journal of 
World History 7 (4): 417–66.
Dez, Jacques. 1971a. “Essai sur le concept de Vazimba.” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malagache 
49 (2): 13–20.
———. 1971b. La légende de l ’Ankaratra. Tananarive: Université de Madagascar, Faculté 
des lettres et sciences humaines.
Dixon, Roland B. 1902. “Maidu Myths.” Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural His-
tory 17: 33–118.
Dixon, Roland B. 1905. “The Northern Maidu.” Bulletin of the American Museum of Nat-
ural History 27: 121–343.
———. 1907. The Shasta. New York: American Museum of Natural History.
Domenichini, Jean-Pierre. 1977. Les Dieux au service des rois: Histoire des Palladium 
d’Emyrne. Paris: Karthala.
———. 1982. “Antehiroka et Vazimba: Contribution à l’histoire de la société du XVIIIe 
au XIXe siècle.” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache 56 (1–2): 11–21.
———. 2004. “Vazimba et esprits helo: La profondeur chronologique.” Études Océan 
Indien 51–52: 2–19.
———. 2007. “La question Vazimba: Historiographie et politique.” Centre d’histoire de 
l’Université de la Réunion.
478 ON KINGS
Domenichini, Jean-Pierre, and Bakoly Domenichini-Ramiaramanana. 1980. “Regards 
croisés sur les grands Sycomores, ou l’armée noire des anciens princes d’Imerina.” 
Asie du Sud Est et Monde Insulindien XI (1–4): 55–95. 
Domenichini-Ramiaramanana, Bakoly. 1982. Du ohabolana au hainteny: Langue, littéra-
ture et politique à Madagascar. Paris: Karthala. 
Donald, Leland. 1997. Aboriginal slavery on the northwest coast of North America. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
Douglas, Eduardo de J. 2010. In the palace of Nezahualcoyotl: Painting manuscripts, writing 
the pre-Hispanic past in early colonial period Tetzcoco. Austin: University of Texas Press
Douglas, Mary. 1959. “Animals in Lele religious symbolism.” Africa 27: 46–58.
———. 1980. Evans-Pritchard. London: Fontana Books.
Driberg, Jack Herbert. 1932. “The status of women among the Nilotics and Nilo-Ham-
ites.” Africa 5 (4): 404–21.
Drinkwater, John F. 1978. “The rise and fall of the Gallic Iulli: Aspects of the develop-
ment of the aristocracy of the Three Gauls under the empire.” Latomus 37: 817–50.
Drucker, Philip. 1940. “Kwakiutl dancing societies.” University of California Anthropo-
logical Records 2, no. 6: 200–30. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Drucker-Brown, Susan. 1975. Ritual aspects of the Mamprussi kingship. Cambridge: Af-
rican Studies Center.
Du Pratz, La Page. 1774. History of Louisiana. London: T. Becket.
Duran, Frey Diego. 1994. The history of the Indians of New Spain. Translated by Doris 
Heiden. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Dutton, George E., Jayne S. Werner, and John K. Whitmore, eds. 2012. Sources of Viet-
namese tradition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Edland, Sigmund. 2006. Evangelists or envoys? The role of British missionaries at turn-
ing points in Malagasy political history, 1820–1840. Documentary and analysis. School 
of Mission and Theology Dissertation series Vol. 3. Stavenger: Misjonshøgskolens 
forlag.
Edmonds, William J. 1895. “By-gone ornamentation and dress among the Hova Mala-
gasy.” Antananarivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine 20: 469–77.
———. 1897. “Charms and superstitions in Southeast Imerina.” Antananarivo Annual 
and Madagascar Magazine 22: 61-67
Egharevba, Jacob. 1968. A short history of Benin. Fourth edition. Ibadan: Ibadan Univer-
sity Press.
Eilers, Wilhem. 1971. Semiramis. Entstehung und Nachhall einer altorientalischen Saga. 
Osterreiche Akadamie der Wissenschaften Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sit-
zungsberichte, Vol. 274, Abhandlung 2. Vienna. 
479BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ekholm, Kajsa. 1972. Power and prestige: The rise and fall of the Kongo kingdom. Uppsala: 
Skriv Service AB.
———. 1978 “External exchange and the transformation of central African social sys-
tems.” In The evolution of social systems, edited by Jonathan Friedman and Michael 
Rowlands, 115–36. Liverpool: Duckworth
———. 1980 “On the limitation of civilization: The structure and dynamics of global 
systems.” Dialectical Anthropology 5: 155–66.
———. 1985a. “Sad stories of the death of kings: The involution of divine kingship.” 
Ethnos 50: 248–72.
———. 1985b. “Towards a global anthropology,” Critique of Anthropology 5: 97–119.
———. 1991. Catastrophe and creation: The transformation of an African culture. Philadel-
phia: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Ekholm, Kasja, and Jonathan Friedman. 1979. “‘Capital,’ imperialism and exploitation 
in ancient world systems.” In Power and propaganda: A symposium on ancient em-
pires, edited by Mogens Trollo Larsen, 41–58. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Studies 
in Assyriology.
Elias, Norbert. (1939) 1978. The civilizing process I: The history of manners. Translated by 
Edmund Jephcott. New York: Pantheon Books.
Elkin, A. P. 1930a. “The Rainbow Serpent myth in North-West Australia.” Oceania 1: 
349–52.
———. 1930b. “Rock paintings of North-West Australia.” Oceania 1: 257–79.
Ellen, R. F. 1986. “Conundrums about panjandrums: On the use of titles in the relations 
of political subordination in the Moluccas and along the Papuan coast.” Indonesia 
14: 47–62.
Ellis, Stephen. 1985. The rising of the red shawls: A revolt in Madagascar, 1895–1899. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2002. “Witch-hunting in Central Madagascar, 1828–1861.” Past and Present 
175: 90–123
Ellis, William. 1838. History of Madagascar. 2 vols. London: Fisher & Son. 
———. 1867. Madagascar revisited, describing the events of a new reign, and the revolution 
which followed. London: John Murray.
Elmberg, John-Erik. 1968. Balance and circulation: Aspects of tradition and change among 
the Mejprat of Irian-Barat. Stockholm: The Ethnographical Museum, Monograph Se-
ries no. 12.
Ethridge, Robbie. 2010. From Chicaza to Chickasaw The European Invasion and the Trans-
formation of the Mississippian World, 1540–1715. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press. 
480 ON KINGS
Evans-Pritchard, E.  E. 1937. Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1948. The divine kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan. The 
Frazer Lecture for 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1940. The Nuer: a description of the modes of livelihood and political institutions of a 
Nilotic people. Oxford: Clarendon Press
———. 1949. The Sanusi of Cyrenaica. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1951. “Shilluk king-killing.” Man 51: 116.
——— 1954. “The meaning of sacrifice among the Nuer.” Journal of the Royal Anthropo-
logical Institute 84: 21–33.
———. 1956. Nuer religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1957. “The origin of the ruling clan of Azande.” Southwestern Journal of Anthro-
pology 13: 322–43.
———. 1971. The Azande: History and political institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Evens, T. M. S. 1989. “The Nuer incest prohibition and the nature of kinship: Alterologi-
cal eeckoning.” Cultural Anthropology 4 (4): 323–46.
Eyre, Christopher. 2002. The cannibal hymn: A cultural and literary study. Liverpool: Liv-
erpool University Press.
Fairley, Nancy J. 1987. “Ideology and state formation: The Ekie of Southern Zaïre.” In 
The African frontier: The reproduction of traditional African societies, edited by Igor 
Kopytoff, 89–100. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Fallers, Lloyd. 1965. Bantu bureaucracy: A century of political evolution among the Basoga of 
Uganda. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fausto, Carlos. 2012. “Too many owners: Mastery and ownership in Amazonia.” In Ani-
mism in rainforest and tundra: Personhood, animals, plants, and things in contemporary 
Amazonia and Siberia, edited by Marc Brightman, Vanessa Elisa Grotti, and Olga 
Ulturgasheva, 29–47. New York: Berghahn Books.
Feachem, Richard. 1973. “The religious belief and ritual of the Raiapu Enga.” Oceania 
43: 259–85.
Federici, Silvia. 2012. Revolution at point zero: Housework, reproduction, and feminist 
struggle. San Francisco: PM Press.
Feeley-Harnik, Gillian. 1974. “Divine kingship and the meaning of history among the 
Sakalava of Madagascar.” Man (N.S.) 13: 402–17.
———. 1982. “The king’s men in Madagascar: Slavery, citizenship and Sakalava mon-
archy.” Africa 52: 31–50.
———. 1984. “The political economy of death: Communication and change in Mala-
gasy colonial history.” American Ethnologist 8: 231–54.
481BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 1985. “Issues in divine kingship.” Annual Review of Anthropology 14: 273–313.
———. 1986. “Ritual and work in Madagascar.” In Madagascar: Society and history, ed-
ited by C. P. Kottak, J.-A. Rakotoarisoa, A. Southall, and P. Vérin, 151–74. Durham, 
NC: Carolina Academic Press.
Feierman, Steven. 1968. “The Shambaa.” In Tanzania before 1900, edited by Andrew 
Roberts, 1–15. Nairobi: East African Publishing House
———. 1974. The Shambaa kingdoms: A history. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Firaketana.1937. Firaketana ny fiteny sy ny zavatra Malagasy, edited by Ravelojaona, 
Randzavola, and Rajaona. 6 vols. Tananarive. Madagascar: Imprimerie Industrie. 
Firth, Raymond. 1971. History and traditions of Tikopia. Wellington: The Polynesian 
Society.
Fischer, J. L. 1964. “Solutions for the Natchez Paradox.” Ethnology 3: 53–65. 
Fisher, H. J. 1975. “The central Sahara and Sudan.” In The Cambridge history of Africa, 
Vol.4: From c. 1600 to c. 1790, edited by Richard Gray, 58–141. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Folbre, Nancy. 1995. “Holding hands at midnight: The paradox of caring labor.” Feminist 
Economics 1 (1): 73–92.
Forge, Anthony. 1990. “The power of culture and the culture of power.” In Sepik heritage: 
Tradition and change in Papua New Guinea, edited by Nancy Lutkehaus, 160–70. 
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
Formicola, Vincenza. 2007. “From the Sunghir children to the Romito dwarf: Aspects of 
the Upper Paleolithic funerary landscape.” Current Anthropology 48: 446–53.
Fortes, Meyer. 1940. “The political system of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast.” 
In African political systems, edited by Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 238–
71. London: Oxford University Press.
———. 1945. The dynamics of clanship among the Tallensi. London: Oxford University 
Press for The International African Institute.
———. (1949) 1969. The web of kinship among the Tallensi. London: Oxford University 
Press for The International African Institute. 
Fortes, Meyer, and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds. 1940. African political systems. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
Frankfort, Henri. 1948. Kingship and the gods: A study of ancient Near Eastern religion as 
the integration of society and nature. Chicago: Oriental Institute.
Frankfort, H., and H. A. Frankfort. (1946) 1977. “Introduction.” In The intellectual ad-
venture of ancient man: An essay on speculative thought in the ancient Near East, H. 
Frankfort, H. A. Frankfort, John A. Wilson, Thorkild Jacobsen, and William A. Ir-
win, 1–27. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
482 ON KINGS
Fraser, Robert. 1990. The making of The golden bough: The origins and growth of an argu-
ment. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Frazer, James George. 1911a. The dying god: Part III of The golden bough. London: 
Macmillan. 
———. 1911b. The magic art and the evolution of kings: Part I of The golden bough. London: 
Macmillan.
———. 1911c. The scapegoat: Part VI of The golden bough. London: Macmillan.
———. 1918. Folklore in the Old Testament: Studies in comparative religion, legend and law, 
Vol. 3. London: Macmillan & Co.
———. (1921) 1976. “Introduction.” In Apollodorus: The library, Vol. 1, ed. James George 
Frazer, ix–xliii. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Freeman, Joseph John, and David Johns. 1840. A narrative of the persecution of the Chris-
tians in Madagascar. London: John Snow.
Fried, Morton H. 1967. The evolution of political society: An essay in political anthropology. 
New York: Random House.
———. 1975. The notion of tribe. Menlo Park, CA: Cummings.
Friedman, Jonathan. 1992. “General historical and culturally specific properties of global 
systems.” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 15: 335–72.
Friedman, Jonathan, and Michael J. Rowlands. 1978. “Notes toward an epigenetic model 
of the evolution of ‘civilization.’” In The evolution of social systems, edited by Jonathan 
Friedman and Michael J. Rowlands, 201–76. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press.
Friedman, Kajsa Ekholm, and Jonathan Friedman 2008. Historical transformations: The 
anthropology of global systems. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Fromm, Erich. 1973. The anatomy of human destructiveness. New York: Holt Rinehart & 
Winston.
Frost, John. 1974. “A history of the Shilluk of the Southern Sudan.” Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Santa Barbara.
Fugelstad, Finn. 1982. “The Tompon-Tany and Tompon-Drano in the history of Central 
and Western Madagascar.” History in Africa 9: 61–76.
Gale, H. P. 1956. “Mutesa I—was he a god? The enigma of Kiganda paganism.” Uganda 
Journal 20: 72–87. 
Gardener, D. S. 1987. “Spirits and conceptions of agency among the Mianmin of Papua 
New Guinea.” Oceania 57: 161–77.
Geertz, Clifford. 1980. Negara: The theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
483BIBLIOGRAPHY
Geertz, Hildred, and Clifford Geertz. 1964. “Teknonymy in Bali: Parenthood, age-grad-
ing and genealogical amnesia.” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland 94 (2): 94–108.
———. 1975. Kinship in Bali. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gell, Alfred. 1997. “Exalting the king and obstructing the state: A political interpreta-
tion of royal ritual in Bastar District, central India.” Journal of the Royal Anthropologi-
cal Institute (N.S.) 3 (3): 433–55. 
Gesick, Lorraine. 1983. “Introduction.” In Centers, symbols, and hierarchies: Essays on the 
classical states of Southeast Asia, edited by Lorraine Gesick, 1–8. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph Series no. 23.
Gewertz, Deborah B. 1983. Sepik River societies: A historical ethnography of Chambri and 
their neighbors. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
———. 1991. “Symmetrical schismogenesis revisited?” Oceania 61: 236–39.
Giersch, C. Patterson. 2006. Asian borderlands: The transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan 
frontier. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Giesey, R. E. 1967. The royal funerary ceremony in Renaissance France. Geneva: Libraire 
E. Droz.
Gifford, Edward Wilson. 1927. “Southern Maidu religious ceremonies.” American An-
thropologist (N.S.) 29 (3): 214–57.
Gillespie, Susan. 1989. The Aztec kings: The construction of rulership in Mexica history. Tuc-
son: University of Arizona Press.
Gilmore, John. 1887. “The origins of the Semiramis legend.” The English Historical Re-
view 2 (8): 729–34.
Girard, René. 1977. Violence and the sacred. Translated by Patrick Gregory. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
———. 1989. The scapegoat. Translated by Yvonne Freccero. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.
Girling, F. K. 1960. The Acholi of Uganda. Colonial Office: Colonial Research Studies no. 
30. London: HM Stationery Office.
Glasse, R. M. 1965. “The Huli of the Southern Highlands.” In Gods, ghosts, and men in 
Melanesia: Some religions of Australian New Guinea and the New Hebrides, edited by 
Peter Lawrence and Mervyn J. Meggitt, 27–49. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, Irving. 1975. The mouth of heaven: An introduction to Kwakiutl religious thought. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Goodenough, Ward H. 1986 “Sky World and this world: The place of Kachaw in Micro-
nesian cosmology,” American Anthropologist 88: 551–68.
484 ON KINGS
Gose, Peter. 1996a. “Oracles, divine kingship, and political representation in the Inka 
state.” Ethnohistory 43 (1): 1–32.
———. 1996b. “The past is a lower moiety: Diarchy, history, and divine kingship in the 
Inka empire.” History and Anthropology 9 (4): 383–414. 
Graeber, David. 1995. “Dancing with corpses reconsidered: An interpretation of Fama-
dihana in Arivonimamo (Madagascar).” American Ethnologist 22 (2): 258–78. 
———. 1996a. “Beads and money: Notes toward a theory of wealth and power.” Ameri-
can Ethnologist 23 (1): 4–24. 
———. 1996b. “Love magic and political morality in Central Madagascar, 1875–1990.” 
Gender and History 8 (3): 416–39.
———. 1997. “Manners, deference and private property.” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 39 (4): 694–728.
———. 2001. Toward an anthropological theory of value: The false coin of our own dreams. 
New York: Palgrave.
———. 2004. Fragments of an anarchist anthropology. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.
———. 2005. “Fetishism and social creativity, or fetishes are gods in process of construc-
tion.” Anthropological Theory 5 (4): 407–38.
———. 2007a. Lost people: Magic and the legacy of slavery in Madagascar. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
———. 2007b. “On the phenomenology of giant puppets: Broken windows, imaginary 
jars of urine, and the cosmological role of the police in American culture.” In Pos-
sibilities: Essays on hierarchy, rebellion, and desire, 375–418. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
———. 2007c. “Oppression.” In Possibilities: Essays on hierarchy, rebellion and desire, 255–
98. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
———. 2009. Direct action: An ethnography. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
———. 2011a. Debt: The first 5000 years. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House.
———. 2011b. “The divine kingship of the Shilluk: On violence, utopia and the human 
condition, or, elements for an archaeology of sovereignty.” HAU: The Journal of Ethno-
graphic Theory 1 (1): 1–62.
Grandidier, Alfred. 1914. Histoire physique, naturelle et politique de Madagascar, Vol. IV, 
Book 2: Ethnographie. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.
Gray, Robert 1961. A history of the Southern Sudan, 1839–1889. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Grey, Sir George. (1855) 1956. Polynesian mythology. New York: Taplinger.
Griffin, Miriam T. 1984. Nero: The end of a dynasty. London: Batsford.
Grimal, Nicolas. 1988. A history of ancient Egypt. London: Blackwell.
485BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gumplowicz, Ludwig. 1899. The outlines of sociology. Philadelphia: American Academy of 
Political and Social Science.
Guyer, Jane. 1993. “Wealth in people and self-realization in Equatorial Africa.” Man 
(N.S.) 28: 243–65.
Haas, M. R. 1939. “Natchez and Chitimacha clans and kinship terminology.” American 
Anthropologist 41: 597–610.
Haile, John. 1891. “Famadihana, a Malagasy burial custom.” Antananarivo Annual and 
Madagascar Magazine 16: 406–16.
Hallowell, A. Irving. 1960. “Ojibwas ontology, behavior, and world view.” In Culture in 
history: Essays in honor of Paul Radin, edited by Stanley Diamond, 17–49. New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Halpern, Abraham M. 1988. “Southeastern Pomo ceremonials: The Kuksu Cult and its 
successors.” University of California Anthropological Records 29. Berkeley: University 
of California Press
Hamayon, Roberta N. 1996. “Shamanism in Siberia: From partnership in supernature 
to counter-power in society.” In Shamanism, history, and the state, edited by Nicholas 
Thomas and Carolyn Humphrey, 76–89. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Handelman, Don. 1981. “The ritual clown: Attributes and affinities.” Anthropos 76: 
321–70. 
Hansen, Thomas Blom, and Finn Stepputat 2005. Sovereign bodies: Citizens, migrants, 
and states in the postcolonial world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2006. “Sovereignty revisited.” Annual Review of Anthropology 35: 295–315.
Haring, Lee. 1982. Malagasy tale index. Folklore Fellows Communications no. 231. Hel-
sinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia. 
———. 1992. The verbal arts in Madagascar: Performance in historical perspective. Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Harrison, Simon. 1985. “Ritual hierarchy and secular equality in a Sepik River village.” 
American Ethnologist 12: 413–26.
———. 1990. Stealing people’s names: History and politics in a Sepik River cosmology. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hart, C. W. M. 1943. “A reconsideration of Natchez social structure.” American Anthro-
pologist 45: 379–86.
Hastie, James. N.d. “Diary of James Hastie.” Typescript copy, National Archives, 
Antananarivo. 
Healy, Andrew J., and Neil Malhotra. 2013. “Retrospective voting reconsidered.” Annual 
Review of Political Science 16: 285–306.
486 ON KINGS
Healy, Andrew J., Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2010. “Irrelevant events 
affect voters’ evaluations of government performance.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107 (29): 12804–9.
Hébert, Jean-Claude.1958. “La parenté à plaisanterie à Madagascar.” Bulletin de 
l ’Académie Malgache 142: 175–217; 143: 267–33. 
Helms, Mary. 1988. Ulysses’ sail: An ethnographic odyssey of power, knowledge and geograph-
ical distance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 1993. Craft and the kingly ideal: Art, trade, and power. Austin: University of Texas 
Press.
———. 1998. Access to origins: Affines, ancestors, and aristocrats. Austin: University of 
Texas Press.
Henderson, Bernard W. 1905. The life and principate of the Emperor Nero. London: 
Methuen.
Herman, John E. 2006. Amid the clouds and mists: China’s colonization of Guizhou, 1200–
1700. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hiatt, L. R. 1996. Arguments about Aborigines: Australia and the evolution of social anthro-
pology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hieb, Louis. 1972. “Meaning and mismeaning: Toward an understanding of the ritual 
clown.” In New perspectives on the Pueblos, edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 163–95. Albu-
querque: University of New Mexico Press. 
Hilton, Anne. 1985. The kingdom of Kongo. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hocart, A. M. (1927) 1969. Kingship. London: Oxford University Press.
———. 1929 Lau Islands, Fiji. Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin 62.
———. 1933. The progress of man: A short survey of his evolution, his customs and his works. 
London: Methuen.
———. (1936) 1970. Kings and councillors: An essay in the comparative anatomy of human 
society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. (1950) 1968. Caste: A comparative study. New York: Russell and Russell.
———. (1952) 1970. The life-giving myth and other essays. London: Tavistock and 
Methuen.
———. 1954 Social origins. London: Watts.
Hodgkins, Gael Atherton. 1977. “The sea spirit of the Central Eskimo: Mistress of 
sea animals and supreme spirit.” Ph.D. dissertation, Divinity School, University of 
Chicago.
Hofmayr, Wilhelm. 1911. “Religion der Shilluk.” Anthropos 6: 120–31.
———. 1925. Die Shilluk: Geschichte, Religion, und Leben einze Niloten-Stammes. Möld-
ing: Verlag der Administration des Anthropos.
487BIBLIOGRAPHY
Houlder, James A. 1912. Among the Malagasy: An unconventional record of missionary ex-
perience. London: James Clarke.
———. (1915) 1960. Ohabolana or Malagasy proverbs: Illustrating the wit and wisdom of 
the Hova of Madagascar. Antananarivo: Trano Printy FLM. 
Howell, P. P. 1941. “The Shilluk settlement.” Sudan Notes and Records 24: 47–67.
———. 1944. “The installation of the Shilluk king.” Man 44: 145–47.
———. 1952a. “The death and burial of reth Dak wad Fadiet of the Shilluk.” Sudan 
Notes and Records 33: 156–65.
———. 1952b. “The death of reth Dak wad Fadiet and the installation of his successor: 
A preliminary note.” Man 52: 102–4.
———. 1952c. “Observations on the Shilluk of the Upper Nile: The laws of homicide 
and the legal functions of the Reth.” Africa 22: 97–119.
———. 1953a. “The election and installation of reth Kur wad Fafiti of the Shilluk.” 
Sudan Notes and Records 34: 189–203.
———. 1953b. “Observations on the Shilluk of the Upper Nile: Customary law: Mar-
riage and the violation of rights in women.” Africa 23: 94–109.
———. N.d. Howell Papers, Archives, University of Durham, SAD 68–69. 
Howell, P. P., and W. P. G. Thomson. 1946. “The death of a Reth of the Shilluk and the 
installation of his successor.” Sudan Notes and Records 27: 5–85.
Howell, Signe. 1985. “Equality and hierarchy in Chewong classification.” In Contexts and 
levels: Anthropological essays of hierarchy, edited by R. H. Barnes, Daniel de Coppet, 
and R. J. Parkin, 167–80. Oxford: JASO.
———. 1989. Society and cosmos: Chewong of Peninsular Malaysia. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
———. 2012. “Knowledge, morality, and causality, in a ‘luckless’ society: The case of the 
Chewong in the Malaysian Rain Forest.” Social Analysis 56: 133–47.
Hudson, Charles. 1978. Southeastern Indians. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
Hughes, Jonathan. 2002. Arthurian myths and alchemy: The kingship of Edward IV. Stroud: 
Sutton Publishing.
Huxley, Francis. 1956. Affable savages: An anthropologist among the Urubu Indians of Bra-
zil. London: Rupert Hart-Davis.
Ingham, Kenneth. 1958. The making of modern Uganda. London: Allen & Unwin.
Irstam, Tristram. 1944. The king of Ganda: Studies in the institutions of sacral kingship in 
Africa. The Ethnographical Museum of Sweden (N.S.) 8. Stockholm.
Isichei, Elizabeth. 1997. A history of African societies to 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
488 ON KINGS
Ixtlilxóchitl, Fernando D’Alva. 1840. Histoire des Chichimeques; ou des anciens rois de Tez-
cuco. 2 vols. Paris: Bertrand.
Izard, Michel. 1985. Gens du pouvior, gens de la terre: Les institutions politiques de l ’ancien 
royaume du Yatenga (Bassin de la Volta Blanche). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
——— 1990. “De quelques paramètres de la souveraineté.” In Systèmes de pensée en Af-
rique noire, Vol. 10: Chefs et rois sacrés, edited by Luc de Heusch, 69–91. Paris: École 
Pratique des Hautes Études.
Izard, Michel, and J. Ki-zerbo, 1992. “From the Niger to the Volta.” In General history 
of Africa, Vol. V: Africa from the sixteenth to eighteenth century, edited by B. A. Ogot, 
327–67. Berkeley: University of California Press for UNESCO.
Jacobsen, Thorkild. (1946) 1977. “Mesopotamia: The cosmos as a state.” In The intellec-
tual adventure of ancient man: An essay on speculative thought in the ancient Near East, 
H. Frankfort, H. A. Frankfort, John A. Wilson, Thorkild Jacobsen, and William A. 
Irwin, 125–84. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Janzen, John M. 1982. Lemba, 1650–1930: A drum of affliction in Africa and the New 
World. New York: Garland Press.
Jenkins, David. 2001. “The Inka conical clan.” Journal of Anthropological Research 57 (2): 
167–95.
Johansen, J. Prytz. 1954. The Maori and his religion in its non-ritualistic aspects. Copenha-
gen: Munksgaartd.
Johnson, Rev. Samuel. (1921) 2006. The history of the Yorubas. Lagos: CSS Ltd.
Jorgensen, Dan. 1980. “What’s in a name: The meaning of meaningless in Telefolmin.” 
Ethos 8: 349–66.
———. 1990a. “Placing the past and moving the present: Myth and contemporary his-
tory in Telefolmin.” Culture 10: 47–56.
———. 1990b. “Secrecy’s turns.” Canberra Anthropology 13: 40–47.
———. 1990c. “The Telefolip and the architecture of ethnic identity in the Sepik Head-
waters.” In Children of Afek: Tradition and change among the Mountain Ok of Central 
New Guinea, edited by Barry Craig and David Hyndman, 151–60. Oceanica Mono-
graph 40.
———. 1996. “Regional history and ethnic identity in the hub of New Guinea: The 
emergence of the Min.” Oceania 66: 189–210.
———. 1998. “Whose nature? Invading bush spirits, traveling ancestors, and mining in 
Telefolmin.” Social Analysis 42: 100–16.
Josselin de Jong, J. P. B. 1928. “The Natchez social system.” Proceedings, 23rd International 
Congress of Americanists: 553–62.
489BIBLIOGRAPHY
Julien, Gustave. 1909. Institutions politiques et sociales de Madagascar. 2 vols. Paris: Libraire 
Orientale et Americaine.
Jully, Antoine.1898. “Notes sur Robin.” Notes, reconaissances et explorations March: 
511–16.
———. 1899a. “Croyances et pratiques superstitieuses chez les Merinas ou Hoves.” Re-
vue de Madagascar 1 (October): 311–28. 
———. 1899b. “Documents historiques: Origine des ‘Andriana’ ou nobles.” Notes, reco-
naissances et explorations 1 (19): 890–98.
Kagwa, Apolo. 1971. Kings of Buganda. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
Kantorowicz, E. H. 1957. The king’s two bodies: A study in medieval political theology. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kaplan, Flora E. 1997. “Iyoba: The queen mother of Benin.” In Queens, queen, others, 
priestesses, and power: Case studies in African gender, edited by Flora E. Kaplan, 73–
102. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 810. New York: New York 
Academy of Sciences. 
Kapteijns, Lidwien, and Jay Spaulding. 1982. “Precolonial trade between states in the 
Eastern Sudan, ca 1700–ca 1900.” African Economic History 11: 29–62.
Kasanga, Fernand. 1956. Tantaran’ ny Antemoro-Anakara teto Imerina tamin’ny andron’ 
Andrianampoinimerina sy Ilaidama. Tananarive: Societé Imprimerie Antananarivo.
Kasetsiri, Charnvit. 1976. The rise of Ayudhya: A history of Siam in the fourteenth and fif-
teenth century. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Keesing, Roger. 1982. Kwaio religion: The living and the dead in a Solomon Islands society. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Kellogg, Susan M. 1986. “Kinship and social organization in early colonial Tenochtit-
lan.” In Ethnohistory: Supplement to the Handbook of Middle American Indians, Vol. 4, 
edited by Ronald Spores, 103–21. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Kenny, Michael. 1988. “Mutesa’s crime: Hubris and the control of African kings.” Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 30: 595–612.
Kent, Raymond.1970. Early kingdoms in Madagascar, 1500–1700. New York: Holt, Rine-
hart & Winston.
Kingdon, A. 1889. “A Malagasy hero, who offered himself for his king and his country.” 
Antananarivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine 8: 1–7.
Kirchhoff, Paul. 1949. “The social and political organization of the Andean peoples.” In 
Handbook of South American Indians, Vol. 5, edited by Julian H. Steward, 293–311. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
———. 1955. “The principles of clanship in human society.” Davidson Journal of Anthro-
pology 1: 1–10. 
490 ON KINGS
Knight, Vernon James. 1986. “The institutional organization of Mississippian religion.” 
American Antiquity 51 (4): 675–87. 
———. 1990. “Social organization and the evolution of hierarchy in southeastern chief-
doms.” Journal of Anthropological Research 46 (1): 1–23.
Kopytoff, Igor. 1989. “The internal African frontier: The making of African political 
culture.” In The African frontier: The reproduction of traditional African societies, edited 
by Igor Kopytoff, 3–84. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Kowalewski Stephen A. 1996. “Clout, corn, copper, core–periphery, culture area.” In Pre-
Columbian world systems, edited by Peter N. Peregrine and Gary M. Feinman, 39–50. 
Madison, WI: Prehistory Press.
Krige, E. Jensen, and J. D. Krige. 1943. The realm of a rain queen: A study of the pattern of 
the Lovedu society. Cape Town: Juta & Company.
Kroeber, Alfred L. 1922. Elements of culture in native California. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
———. 1925. Handbook of the Indians of California. Bureau of American Ethnology Bul-
letin 78. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution.
———. 1932. “The Patwin and their neighbors.” University of California Publications in 
American Archaeology and Ethnology 29 (4): 253–423.
———. 1945. “The ancient oikoumene as an historic culture aggregate,” Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute 75: 9–20.
———. 1947. Cultural and natural areas of Native North America. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
———. 1948. Anthropology: Race, language, culture, psychology, prehistory. New York: Har-
court, Brace and Company.
Kuhrt, Amelie. 2013. “Semiramis (Sammuramat).” In The encyclopedia of ancient history, 
edited by Roger S. Bagnall, Kai Brodersen, Craige B. Champion, Andrew Erskine, 
and Sabine R. Huebner, 6133–34. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kunijwok, G. A. W. 1982. “Government and community in a modern state: A case study 
of the Shilluk and their neighbors.” Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, Bodleian Library.
Kurimoto, Eisei. 1992. “An ethnography of ‘bitterness’: Cucumber and sacrifice reconsid-
ered.” Journal of Religion in Africa 22 (1): 47–65.
Kus, Susan, and Victor Raharijaona. 2000. “House to palace, village to state: Scaling up 
architecture and ideology.” American Anthropologist 102 (1): 98–113.
———. 2001. “‘To dare to wear the cloak of another before their very eyes’: State co-
optation and local re-appropriation in mortuary rituals of Central Madagascar.” Ar-
chaeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association 10 (1): 114–31.
491BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 2008. “‘Desires of the heart’ and laws of the marketplace: Money and poetics, 
past and present, in Highland Madagascar.” Research in Economic Anthropology 27: 
149–85.
Kwon, Heonik. 2008. Ghosts of war in Vietnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lagercrantz, Sture. 1944. “The sacral king in Africa.” Ethnos 9 (3/4): 118–40.
———. 1950. Contribution to the ethnography of Africa. Studia Ethnographica Upsaliensia 
1. Uppsala: Uppsala universitet. Institutionen för allmän och jämförande etnografi.
Laman, Karl. E. 1953–68. The Kongo II. Studia Ethnographica Upsaliensa. 4 vols. Upp-
sala: Almqvist & Wiksell.
Lambek, Michael. 2002. The weight of the past: living with history in Mahajanga, Mada-
gascar. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lan, David 1985. Guns and rain: Guerillas and spirit mediums in Zimbabwe. London: 
James Currey.
Lancaster, Chet S. 1989. “Political structure and ethnicity in an immigrant society: The 
Goba of the Zambezi.” In The African frontier: The reproduction of traditional African 
societies, edited by Igor Kopytoff, 101–21. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Lang, Andrew. (1898) 1968. The making of religion. New York: AMS Press.
Larson, Pier. 1995. “Multiple narratives, gendered voices: Remembering the past in 
Highland Central Madagascar.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 
28: 295–325.
———. 1996. “Desperately seeking ‘the Merina’ (Central Madagascar): Reading eth-
nonyms and their semantic fields in African identity histories.” Journal of Southern 
African Studies 22 (4): 541–60.
———. 2000. History and memory in the age of enslavement: Becoming Merina in Highland 
Madagascar, 1770–1822. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. 
———. 2001. “Austronesian mortuary ritual in history: Transformations of secondary 
burial (Famadihana) in Highland Madagascar.” Ethnohistory 48 (1/2): 123–55.
———. 2006. “Review of Gwyn Campbell, An economic history of imperial Madagascar, 
1750–1895: The rise and fall of an island empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008.” American Historical Review 111 (5): 1644–45.
Law, Robin. 1985. “Human sacrifice in pre-colonial West Africa.” African Affairs 84: 53–87.
Lawrence, Peter, and Mervyn J. Meggitt. 1965. “Introduction.” In Gods, ghosts, and men 
in Melanesia: Some religions of Australian New Guinea and the New Hebrides, edited by 
Peter Lawrence and Mervyn J. Meggitt, 1–26. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Le Petit, Père Maturin. 1848. “The massacre by the Natchez (1729).” In The early Jesuit 
missions in North America, Vol. 1, edited by William Ingraham, 265–312. New York: 
Wiley.
492 ON KINGS
Leach, Edmund. 1954. Political systems of Highland Burma. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
———. 1961. Rethinking anthropology. London: Cunningham & Sons.
———. 1976. Culture and communication: The logic by which symbols are connected. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2011. “Kingship and divinity: The unpublished Frazer Lecture, Oxford, 28 Oc-
tober 1982.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 1: 279–93.
Lehman, F. K. 1967. “Burma: Kayah societies as a function of the Shan–Burma–Karen 
context.” In Contemporary change in traditional societies, Vol. II: Asian rural societies, 
edited by Julian H. Steward, 1–104. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Lejamble, G. 1972. “Les fondements du pouvoir royal en Imerina.” Bulletin du Mada-
gascar 311: 349–67.
Levi, Doro. 1944. “The novel of Ninus and Semiramis.” Proceedings of the American Philo-
sophical Society 87 (5): 420–28.
Levi, Jean. 1977. “Le mythe de l’âge d’or et les théories de l’évolution en Chine ancienne.” 
L’Homme 17 (1): 73–103.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1952. Race and history. New York: UNESCO.
———. 1966. The savage mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1971. “Rapports de symétrie entre rites et mythes de peuples voisins.” In The 
translations of culture: Essays for E. E. Evans-Pritchard, edited by T. O. Beidelman, 
161–78. London: Tavistock.
———. 1990. Mythologiques, Vol. 4: The naked man. Translated by John Weightman and 
Doreen Weightman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1995. The story of Lynx. Translated by Catherine Tihanyi. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Lieberman, Victor. 2003. Strange parallels: Southeast Asia in global context, c.800–1830, 
Vol. 1: Integration on the mainland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lienhardt, R. Godfrey 1952. “The Shilluk of the Upper Nile.” In African worlds, edited 
by Daryl Forde, 138–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1953. “Nilotic kings and their mothers’ kin.” Africa 25 (1): 29–42.
———. 1961. Divinity and experience: The religion of the Dinka. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1979. “Getting your own back: Themes in Nilotic myth.” In Studies in social 
anthropology, edited by J. H. M. Beattie and R. Godfrey Lienhardt, 213–37. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Lincoln, Bruce. 2007. Religion, empire, and torture: The case of Achaemenian Persia, with a 
postscript on Abu Ghraib. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
493BIBLIOGRAPHY
Liverani, Mario, ed. 1993. Akkad, the first world empire: Structure, ideology, traditions. 
Padua: Sargon srl.
Llewellyn, K. M., and E. Adamson Hoebel. 1941. The Cheyenne way: Conflict and case law 
in primitive jurisprudence. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Loeb, Edwin M. 1926. “Pomo folkways.” University of California Publications in American 
Archaeology and Ethnology 19: 149–405.
———. 1931. “The religious organizations of north-central California and Tierra del 
Fuego.” American Anthropologist (N.S.) 33 (4): 517–56.
———. 1932. “The Western Kuksu Cult.” University of California Publications in Ameri-
can Archaeology and Ethnology 31 (1): 1–137.
———. 1933. “The Eastern Kuksu Cult. University of California Publications in American 
Archaeology and Ethnology 33 (2): 139–231. 
Lombard, Jacques. 1965. Structures de type “feodal” en Afrique noire: Étude des dynamismes 
internes et des relations sociales chez les Bariba du Dahomey. Paris: Mouton.
Lommel, Andreas. (1952) 1997. The Unambal: A tribe in Northwest Australia. Carnarvon 
Gorge, Queensland: Takarakka Nowam Kas Publications.
Lorenz, Karl G. 1997. “A re-examination of Natchez sociopolitical complexity: A view 
from the grand village and beyond.” Southeastern Archaeology 16 (2): 97–112.
———. 2000. “The Natchez of Southwest Mississippi.” In Indians of the Greater South-
east: Historical archaeology and ethnohistory, edited by Bonnie G. McEwan, 142–77. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
Lovejoy, Arthur O., and George Boas. 1935. Primitivism and related ideas in antiquity. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Lowie, Robert H. 1909. The Assiniboine. Anthropological Papers of the American Mu-
seum of Natural History IV. New York: The Trustees.
———. 1917. Notes on the social organization and customs of the Mandan, Hidatsa and 
Crow Indians. Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History 
XXI (2). New York: The Trustees.
———. 1927. The origin of the state. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company.
———. 1948a. Social organization. New York: Rinehart.
———. 1948b. “Some aspects of political organization among the American aborigines.” 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 78  (1/2): 
11–24.
MacGaffey, Wyatt. 1970. Custom and government in Lower Congo. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
———. 1974. “Oral tradition in Central Africa.” International Journal of African Histori-
cal Studies 7: 417–26.
494 ON KINGS
———. 1976. “African history, anthropology, and the rationality of natives.” History in 
Africa 5: 101–20.
———. 1981. “African ideology and belief: A survey.” African Studies Review 24: 227–74.
———. 1986. Religion and society in Central Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
———. 2000. Kongo political culture: The conceptual challenge of the particular. Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press.
———. 2003. “Crossing the river: Myth and movement in Central Africa.” International 
Symposium, Angola on the move: Transport routes, communication, and history, Berlin, 
September 24–26. https://www.zmo.de/angola/Papers/MacGaffey_(29-03-04).pdf. 
———. 2005. “Changing representations in Central African history.” Journal of African 
History 2: 189–207.
MacLeod, William Christie. 1924. “Natchez political evolution.” American Anthropolo-
gist 26: 201–29.
———. 1933. “Mortuary and sacrificial anthropophagy on the Northwest Coast of 
North America and its culture-historical sources.” Journal de la Société des améri-
canistes (N.S.) 25 (2): 335–66.
———. 1937. “Police and punishment among Native Americans of the Plains.” Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology 28 (2): 181–201.
Mair, Lucy. 1934. An African people in the twentieth century. London: G. Routledge & 
Sons.
———. 1977. African kingdoms. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Makarius, Linda. 1970. “Ritual clowns and symbolical behavior.” Diogenes 69: 45–73. 
Malek, Jaromír. 2000. “Old Kingdom rulers as ‘local saints’ in the Memphite area during 
the Middle Kingdom.” In Abusir and Saqqara in the year 2000, edited by Miroslav 
Bárta and Jaromír Krejčí, 241–58. Prague: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Re-
public, Oriental Institute. 
Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1948. Magic, science and religion and other essays. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Malkin, Irad. 1998. The return of Odysseus: Colonization and ethnicity. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Marsden, William. 1811. The history of Sumatra. London: J. McCreery.
Martin, Phyllis. 1972. The external trade of the Loango Coast, 1576–1870. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Mason, Carol. 1964. “Natchez class structure.” Ethnohistory 11 (2): 120–33. 
Mathews. A. B. 1950. “The Kisra legend.” African Studies 9 (3): 144–47. 
495BIBLIOGRAPHY
Matthews, Thomas Trotter. 1881. Notes of nine years’ mission work in the Province of Voni-
zongo, north west Madagascar. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
Mauss, Marcel. (1925) 2016. The gift: Expanded edition. Translated by Jane I. Guyer. Chi-
cago: Hau Books.
Mayeur, Nicolas. (1777) 1913. “Voyage dans le Sud et dans l’intérieure des terres et pat-
iculièrement au pays d’Hancove (janvier à décembre 1777).” Bulletin de l ’Académie 
Malgache 12 (1): 139–76.
———. (1793) 1913. “Voyage au pays d’Ancove (1785).” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache 
12 (2): 14–49.
Mbembe, Achille. 1992. “The banality of power and the aesthetics of vulgarity in the 
postcolony.” Public Culture 4 (2): 1–30.
Meek, Charles Kingsley. 1931. A Sudanese kingdom: An ethnographical study of the Jukun 
peoples of Nigeria. London: Kegan Paul.
Meggitt, Mervyn J. 1965. “The Mae Enga of the Western Highlands.” In Gods, ghosts 
and men in Melanesia: Some religions of Australian New Guinea and the New Hebri-
des, edited by Peter Lawrence and Mervyn J. Meggitt, 105–31. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press.
Mercer, Patricia. 1971. “Shilluk trade and politics from the mid-seventeenth century to 
1861.” Journal of African History 12 (3): 407–26.
Merkur, Daniel. 1991. Powers which we do not know: Gods and spirits of the Inuit. Moscow: 
University of Idaho Press.
Milne, George. 2015. Natchez Country: Indians, colonists, and landscapes of race in French 
Louisiana. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Mogenson, Hanne. 2002. “The resilience of Juok: Confronting suffering in Eastern 
Uganda.” Africa 72 (2): 420–36.
Molet, Louis. 1976. “Conception, naissance et circoncision à Madagascar.” L’Homme 
16 (1): 33–64.
Moore, Jerry D. 2004. “The social basis of sacred spaces in the Prehispanic Andes: Ritual 
landscapes of the dead in Chimú and Inka societies.” Journal of Archaeological Method 
and Theory 11 (1): 83–124.
Morgan, Lewis H. 1851. League of the Ho-dé-no-sau-nee, or Iroquois. New York: Rochester. 
Morland-Simpson, H. F. 1888. “Ethnographical museums.” Archaeological Review 2 (2): 
73–90.
Morris, Ellen F. 2007. “Sacrifice for the state: First Dynasty royal funerals and the rites 
at Macramallah’s rectangle.” In Performing death: Social analyses of funerary traditions 
in the ancient Near East and Mediterranean, edited by Nicola Laneri, 15–38. Oriental 
Institute Seminars 3. Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
496 ON KINGS
———. 2014. “(Un)dying loyalty: Meditations on retainer sacrifice in ancient Egypt and 
elsewhere.” In Violence and civilization: Studies of social violence in history and prehis-
tory, edited by Roderick Campbell, 61–93. Oxford: Oxbow.
Motolinia, Toribo de Benavente. 1951. Motolinia’s history of the Indians of New Spain. 
Translated by Francis Borgia Steck. Washington, DC: Academy of American Fran-
ciscan History.
Muhs, Brian. 2016. The ancient Egyptian economy: 3000–30 BCE. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Muller, Jean-Claude. 1980. Le Roi bouc émissaire: Pouvoir et rituel chez les Rukuba du Ni-
géria Centrale. Paris: L’Harmattan.
———. 1981. “Divine kingship in chiefdoms and states: A single ideological model.” In 
The study of the state, edited by Henri J. M. and Peter Skalník, 239–50. The Hague: 
Mouton. 
———. 1990. “Transgression, rites de rajeunissement et mort culturelle chez les Jukun 
et les Rukuba (Nigeria Central).” Systèmes de pensée en Afrique noire, Vol. 10: Chefs et 
rois sacrés, edited by Luc de Heusch, 49–67. Paris: École Pratique des Hautes Études.
Mumford, Lewis. 1967. The myth of the machine, Vol. I: Technics and human development. 
New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich. 
Munn, Nancy. 1986. Walbiri ethnography: Graphic representation and cultural symbolism in 
a Central Australian society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Munro, P. 1918. “Installation of the ret of the Chol (King of the Shilluks).” In Pagan 
tribes of the Nilotic Sudan, edited by Charles Gabriel Seligman and Brenda Z. Selig-
man, 541–47. London: Routledge.
Myers, Fred R. 1986. Pintup Country, Pintup self: Sentiment, place, and politics among 
Western Desert Aborigines. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Nadel, S. F. 1935. “The king’s hangman: A judicial organization in Central Nigeria.” Man 
35: 129–132.
———. 1942. A black Byzantium: The kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria. London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Nakano Glenn, Evelyn. 2012. Forced to care: Coercion and caregiving in America. Cam-
bridge. MA: Harvard University Press.
Necipoğlu, Gülrü. 1991. Architecture, ceremonial, and power: The Topkapi Palace in the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Needham, Joseph. 1954. Science and civilization in China, Vol. I: Introductory orientations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
497BIBLIOGRAPHY
Neumann, Christopher K. 2006. “Political and diplomatic developments.” In Cambridge 
history of Turkey, Vol. III: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, edited by Suraiya 
N. Faroqhi, 44–67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Newman Philip. 1965. Knowing the Gururumba. New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston.
Nichols, Andrew. 2008. “The complete fragments of Ctesias of Cnidus: Translation and 
commentary with an introduction.” Doctoral dissertation, University of Florida. 
Nicholson, H. B. 2001. Topiltzin Quetzalcoatl: The once and future Lord of the Toltecs. Boul-
der: University Press of Colorado.
Nimuendaju, Curt. (1939) 1967. The Apinaye. Oosterhout: Anthropological Publications.
Nisbet, Robert. 1980. A history of the idea of progress. New York: Basic Books.
Norbeck, Edward. 1961. Religion in primitive society. New York: Harper & Row.
Nyaba, Peter Adwok. 2006. “The Chollo predicament: The Threat of Physical Extermina-
tion and Cultural Extinction of a People.” Nairobi: Larjour Consultancy. http://suda-
neseonline.com/board/1/msg/THE-CHOLLO-PREDICAMENT-1023007079.
html.
Oakley, Francis. 2006. Kingship: The politics of enchantment. London: Blackwell.
———. 2010. Empty bottles of gentilism: Kingship and the divine in late antiquity and the 
early Middle Ages. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Obayemi, Ade M. 1992. “The Yoruba- and Edo-speaking peoples and their neighbours.” 
In History of Africa, Vol. 1, edited by J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, 250–322. 
Harlow: Longman.
Oberg, K. 1940. “The kingdom of Ankole in Uganda.” In African political systems, edited 
by Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 121–64. London: Oxford University 
Press. 
Ogot, B. A. 1961. “The concept of juok.” African Studies 20: 134–40.
———. 1964. “Kingship and statelessness among the Nilotes.” In The historian in Tropi-
cal Africa, edited by Jan Vansina, Raymond Mauny, and L. V. Thomas, 294–99. Lon-
don: Oxford University Press. 
Okpewho, Isidore. 1998. Once upon a kingdom: Myth, hegemony, and identity. Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press. 
Oliver, Lieutenant S. P. 1866. Among the Malagasy: Sketches in the Provinces of Tamatave, 
Betanimena, and Ankova. London: Day & Son.
Oliver, Roland. 1955. “The traditional histories of Buganda, Bunyoro, and Nkole.” Jour-
nal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 85: 111–17.
Oosten, J. G. 1976. The theoretical structure of the religion of the Netsilik and Iglulik. Gron-
ingen: Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen.
498 ON KINGS
Opler, M. E. 1938. “The sacred clowns of the Chiricahua and Mescalero Indians.” El 
Palacio 44: 75–79.
Ottino, Paul. 1983. “Les Andriambahoaka malgaches et l’héritage indonésien.” In Les 
Souverains de Madagascar, edited by Françoise Raison-Jourde, 71–96. Paris: Karthala.
———. 1986. L’Étrangère intime: Essai d’anthropologie de la civilisation de l ’ancien Mada-
gascar. Paris: Éditions des Archives Contemporaines.
———. 1993. “The mythology of the Highlands of Madagascar and the political cycle of 
the Andriambahoaka.” In Mythologies, Vol. 2: Asian mythologies, edited by Yves Bon-
nefoy and Wendy Doniger, 961–76. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Overing, Joanna. 1983–84. “Elementary structures of reciprocity: A comparative note on 
Guianese, Central Brazilian, and North-West Amazonian socio-political thought.” 
Anthropologica 59–62: 331–48.
———. 1989 “The aesthetics of production: The sense of community among the Cubeo 
and Piaroa.” Dialectical Anthropology 14: 159–75.
Oyler, D. S. 1918a. “Nikawng and the Shilluk migration.” Sudan Notes and Records 1: 
107–15.
———. 1918b. “Nikawng’s place in the Shilluk religion.” Sudan Notes and Records 1: 
283–301.
———. 1919. “The Shilluk’s belief in the Evil Eye.” Sudan Notes and Records 2: 122–37.
———. 1920a. “The Shilluk peace ceremony.” Sudan Notes and Records 3: 296–99.
———. 1920b. “The Shilluk’s belief in the good medicine man.” Sudan Notes and Records 
3: 110–16.
———. 1926. “Shilluk notes.” Sudan Notes and Records 9: 57–68.
Packard, Randall M. 1981. Chiefship and cosmology: An historical study of political competi-
tion. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Pagels, Elaine. 1988. Adam, Eve, and the serpent. New York: Random House.
Paiva Manso, Visconde de. 1877. Historia de Congo. Lisbon: Typographie di Academia.
Park, George. 1990. “Making sense of religion by direct observation: An application of 
frame analysis.” In Beyond Goffman: Studies on communication, institution, and social 
interaction, edited by Stephen Harold Riggins, 235–76. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Parker Pearson, Mike. 1999. The archaeology of death and burial. Texas A & M University 
Anthropology Series 3. College Station: Texas A & M University Press. 
Parsons, Elsie Clews. 1929. The social organization of the Tewa of New Mexico. Menasha, 
WI: American Anthropological Association.
———. 1933. “Some Aztec and Pueblo parallels.” American Anthropologist (N.S.) 35 (4): 
611–31.
———. 1939. Pueblo Indian religion, Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
499BIBLIOGRAPHY
Parsons, Elsie Clews, and Ralph L. Biels. 1939. “The sacred clowns of the Pueblo and 
Mayo-Yaqui Indians.” American Anthropologist (N.S.) 36 (4): 491–514.
Paul, A. 1952 “The Mar of the Shilluk.” Sudan Notes and Records 33: 165–66.
Pearse, John. 1899. “Women in Madagascar: Their social position, employments and 
influence.” Antananarivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine 23: 262–76.
Peetz, Edith. 1951a. “Report of a visit to the shrine of Andriantsihanika.” Folklore 42: 
456–58.
———. 1951b. “A visit to Andrianambodilova, Ambohimiarina, Tananarive, on 1st 
Alakaosy.” Folklore 42: 453–56. 
Peirce, Leslie. 1993. The imperial harem: Women and sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pelliot, Paul. 1903. “Le Fou-nan.” Bulletin de L’École Francaise de L’Exteme Orient 3: 
248–303.
Pemberton, John, III, and Furso J. Afolayau. 1996. Yoruba sacred kingship. Washington, 
DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Peregrine, Peter N. 1996. “Introduction: World systems theory and archaeology.” In Pre-
Columbian world systems, edited by Peter N. Peregrine and Gary M. Feinman, 1–10. 
Madison, WI: Prehistory Press.
Petri, Helmut. (1954) 2011. The dying world in Northwest Australia. Carlisle, Western 
Australia: Hesperian Press.
Piankoff, Alexandre. 1968. The Pyramid of Unas. Egyptian Religious Texts and Represen-
tations 5. Bollingen Series XL. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pigafetta, Filipio (1591) 1881. A report on the kingdom of Congo and the surrounding coun-
tries, drawn on the writings and discoveries of the Portuguese, Duarte Lopez. London: 
John Murray.
Pollock, Sheldon. 2009. The language of the gods in the world of men: Sanksrit, culture, and 
power in premodern India. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Powers, Stephen. 1877. Tribes of California. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Preaux, Jean-G. 1962 “La sacralité du pouvoir royal à Rome.” Le pouvoir et la sacré, edited 
by Luc de Heusch. Annales du Centre d’Étude des Religions 1: 103–21.
Prou, Michel. 1987. Malagasy “Un pas de plus”: Vers l ’histoire du “Royaume de Madagascar” 
au XIXe siècle, Vol. I. Paris: Harmattan.
Provinse, John H. 1937. “The underlying sanctions of Plains Indian Culture.” In Social 
anthropology of North American tribes, edited by Fred Eggan, 341–76. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Prytz-Johansen, Jørgen. 1954. The Maori and his religion in its non-ritualistic aspects. Co-
penhagen: I Kommission Hos, Ejnar Munksgaard. 
500 ON KINGS
Puett, Michael J. 2001. The ambivalence of creation: Debates concerning innovation and 
artifice in early China. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
———. 2002. To become a god: Cosmology, sacrifice, and self-divinization in early China. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
———. 2012. “Human and divine kingship in early China: Comparative perspectives.” 
In Religion and power: Divine kingship in the ancient world and beyond, edited by 
Nicole Brisch, 207–20. Oriental Institute Seminars no. 4. Chicago: The Oriental 
Institute of the University of Chicago. 
———. 2013. “Economies of ghosts, gods, and goods: The history and anthropology of 
Chinese temple networks.” In Radical egalitarianism: Local realities, global relations, 
edited by Felicity Aulino, Miriam Goheen, and Stanley J. Tambiah, 91–100. New 
York: Fordham University Press.
Pumphrey, M. E. C. 1936 “Shilluk ‘royal’ language conventions.” Sudan Notes and Records 
20: 319–321.
———. 1941. “The Shilluk tribe.” Sudan Notes and Records 24: 1–46.
Quigley, Declan. 1993. The interpretation of caste. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 2000. “Scapegoats: The killing of kings and ordinary people.” Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 6 (2): 237–54.
———. 2005. “Introduction: The character of kingship.” In The character of kinghip, ed-
ited by Declan Quigley, 1–23. Oxford: Berg.
Quimby, George. 1946. “Natchez social structure as an instrument of assimiliation.” 
American Anthropologist 48: 134–36.
Rabary, Pasitera. 1910. 
Rabeson Jacques. 1948. Tantaran’ny Tsimiamboholahy: Ahitana ny vako-drazana famon-
gatra, izay misy ny levenam-bola fitadidy. Antananarivo: Imprimerie Tananarivienne. 
Radcliffe-Brown, A.  R. 1926. “The Rainbow-Serpent myth in South-east Australia.” 
Journal of the Royal Aanthropological Institute 56: 19–25.
Radimilahy, C., S. Andriamampianina, S. Blanchy, J.-A. Rakotoarisoa, and S. Razafi-
mahazo. 2006 “Lieux de culte autochtone à Antananarivo.” In Le dieux au service du 
people, edited by Sophie Blanchy, Jean-Aimé Rakotoarisoa, Philippe Beaujard, and 
Chantal Radimilahy, 143–91. Paris: Karthala. 
Radin, Paul. 1914. “Religion of the North American Indians.” Journal of American Folk-
lore 27: 355–73.
Rafamantanantsoa-Zafimahery, G. M. 1966. “La conseil du roi dans l’ancien organisa-
tion du royaume de l’Imerina.” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache 44: 137–45. 
Raison Jean-Pierre. 1972. “Utilisation du sol et organisation de l’espace en Imerina anci-
enne.” Terre Malgache = Tony Malagasy 13: 97–121.
501BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 1984. Les Hautes Terres de Madagascar et leurs confins occidentaux: Enracinement et 
mobilité des sociétés rurales. 2 vols. Paris: Karthala.
Raison-Jourde, Françoise. 1976. “Les Ramanenjana: Une mise en cause populaire du 
christianisme en Imerina, 1863.” Asie du sud-est et le monde insulindien VII (ii–iii): 
271–93.
———. 1983a. “De la restauration des talismans royaux au baptême de 1869 en Imeri-
na.” In Les Souverains de Madagascar: L’histoire royale et ses resurgences contemporaines, 
edited by Françoise Raison-Jourde, 337–69. Paris: Karthala.
———. 1983b. “Introduction.” In Les Souverains de Madagascar: L’histoire royale et ses 
resurgences contemporaines, edited by Françoise Raison-Jourde, 7–68. Paris: Karthala.
———, ed. 1983c. Les Soverains de Madagascar: L’histoire royale et ses resurgences contem-
poraines, pp. 337-69. Paris: Karthala.
———. 1991. Bible et pouvoir à Madagascar au XIXe siècle: Invention d’une identité chréti-
enne et construction de l ’Etat (1780–1880). Paris: Karthala. 
Rajemisa-Raolison, Régis. 1985. Rakibolana Malagasy. Fianarantsoa: Ambozatany.
Rakotomalala. 2011. A migration from Indonesia to Madagascar: Arya Damar alias Andri-
antomara. Alasora.
Rakotomanolo, Seth. 1981. Ny foko manendy. Mahitsy: Monastera Ambohimanjakarano.
Ralaimihoatra, Édouard. 1969. Histoire de Madagascar. Antananarivo: Hachette.
Ralaimihoatra, Gilbert. 1973. “Les premier rois d’Imerina et la tradition Vazimba.” Bul-
letin de l ’Académie Malgache 50 (2): 25–32.
———. 1974. “Généalogue des anciens rois Vazimba et Merina (du quatorziéme siècle 
au milieu du dix-septième siècle).” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache 51 (1): 47–53.
Ralibera, Daniel. 1977. “Recherche sur la conversion de Ranavalona II.” Omaly sy Anio 
5: 302–12.
Ramilison, Emmanuel. 1952. Ny loharanon’ny andriana Nanjaka teto Imerina: Andrian-
tomaro-Andriamamilaza. 2 vols. Ambatomitsangana: Imprimerie Ankehitriny.
Ramirez, José Fernando. 1903. Histoire de l ’origine des Indiens qui habitent la Nouvelle 
Espagne selon leurs traditions. Paris: Leroux.
Randles, W. G. L. 1968. L’Ancien royaume du Congo—des origines a la fin du XIXe siècle. 
Paris: Mouton. 
Randriamarosata, Pasteur. 1959. Tantaran’Ambohitrimanjaka sy fiakarana. Antananarivo: 
Imprimerie Mami. 
Randrianja, Solofo, and Stephen Ellis. 2009. Madagascar: A short history. London: Hurst.
Raombana. 1980. Histoires 1: La haute époque Merina, de la legende à l ’histoire (des origines 
à 1870). Edited by Simon Ayache. Fianarantsoa: Ambozontany.
502 ON KINGS
———. 1994. Histoires 2: Vers l ’unfication de l ’île et la civilization nouvelle (1810–1828). 
Edited by Simon Ayache, editor. Antananarivo: Ambozontany.
———. N.d. Annales. Manuscript preserved in the archives of the Académie Malgache, 
Antananarivo. 
Rappaport, Roy A. 1967. Pigs for the ancestors: Ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea people. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Rasamimanana, Dr. J., and L. Razafindrazaka. 1909. Fanasoavana ny tantaran’ ny Mala-
gasy: Ny andriantompokoindrindra: Araka ny filazana nangonin’ i D. J. Rasamimanana 
sy L. Razafindrazaka. Ambohimalaza. 
Rasamuel, David. 2007. Fanongoavana: Une capitale princière malgache du XIVe siècle. An-
tananarivo: Arguments.
Rasamuel, Maurice. 1947. Ny tabataba eto Andrefan’ankaratra sy ny Zanak’antitra. Anta-
nanarivo: Trano Printy FJKM Imarivolanitra.
———. 1948. Ny menalamba tao Andrefan’Ankaratra 1895 sy 1896 sy ny Zanak’Antitra. 3 
vols. Antananarivo: Imprimerie Soarano.
Rasmussen, Knud. 1930. Intellectual culture of the Hudson Bay Eskimos. Report of the 
Fifth Thule Expedition, 1921–22, Vol. VII. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel 
Nordisk Forlag.
———. 1931. The Netsilik Eskimos: Social life and material culture. Report of the Fifth 
Thule Expedition, 1921–22, Vol. VIII. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nor-
disk Forlag.
Ratsimba, Antoine. Tantaran’ny Zanak’Andrianetivola. Arivonimamo: Family Notebook.
Rattray, R. S. 1932. The tribes of the Ashanti hinterland. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ravenstein, Enerst George, ed. 1901. The strange adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh in 
Angola and adjoining regions. London: The Haklyut Society.
Ray, Benjamin C. 1991. Myth, ritual and kingship in Buganda. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Razafiarison, Aina Andrianavalona. 2014. Apports des traditions dans les successions royales 
Merina. Paris: Harmattan. 
Razafintsalama, Adolphe. 1981. Les Tsimahafotsy d’Ambohimanga: Organisation familiale 
et sociale en Imerina (Madagascar). Paris: SELAF.
Reefe, Thomas Q. 1981. The rainbow and the kings: A history of the Luba Empire to 1891. 
Berkeley: University of California Press
Régnon, Henry de. 1863. Madagascar et le roi Radama II. Paris: Toinon.
Renel, Charles. 1910. Contes de Madagascar. Paris: E. Leroux.
———. 1915. “Les amulettes malgaches: Ody et sampy.” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache 
(N.S.) 2: 31–279).
503BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 1920. “Ancêtres et dieux.” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache (N.S.) 5: 1–261. 
Riad, Mohamed. 1953. “Some observations of a fieldtrip among the Shilluk.” Wiener 
Volkerkundliche Mitteilungen 3: 70–78.
———. 1959. “The divine kingship of the Shilluk and its origin.” Archiv für Völkerkunde 
14: 141–284.
Rice, Michael. 2003. Egypt’s making: The origins of ancient Egypt, 4000 BC–2000 BC. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Richards, Audrey I. 1940. “The political system of the Bemba tribe: North-Eastern Rho-
desia.” In African political systems, edited by Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 
83–120. London: Oxford University Press.
———. 1960. “The interlacustrine Bantu: General characteristics.” In East African 
chiefs: A study of political development in some Uganda and Tanganyika tribes, edited by 
Audrey I. Richards, 27–40. New York: Praeger.
———. 1961. Land, labour and diet in Northern Rhodesia: An economic study of the Bemba 
tribe. London: Oxford University Press.
———. 1964. “Authority patterns in traditional Buganda.” In The king’s men, edited by 
Lloyd Fallers, 256–93. London: Oxford University Press.
———. 1968. “Keeping the king divine.” Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute: 
23–35.
———. 1969. “General characteristics.” In East African chiefs: A study of political devel-
opment in some Uganda and Tanganyika tribes, edited by Audrey I. Richards, 27–40. 
New York: Praeger.
Richardson, John. 1885. A new Malagasy–English dictionary. Antananarivo: London 
Missionary Society.
Robbins, Joel. 1995. “Dispossessing the spirits: Christian transformations of desire and 
ecology among the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea.” Ethnology 34: 211–24. 
———. 1999. “This is our money: Modernism, regionalism, and dual currency in Urap-
min.” In Money and modernity: State and local currencies in contemporary Melanesia, 
edited by David Akins and Joel Robbins, 82–102. Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press.
———. 2004. Becoming sinners: Christianity and moral torment in Papua New Guines. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Roberts, Andrew, ed. 1968. Tanzania before 1900. Nairobi: East African Publishing 
House.
Rock, Joseph. 1947. The ancient Na-Khu kingdom of Southwest China. 2 vols. Harvard–
Yenching Institute Monograph 8–9. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
504 ON KINGS
Roscoe, John. 1911. The Baganda: An account of their native customs and beliefs. London: 
Macmillan.
———. 1915. The Northern Bantu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1923a. The Bakitara of Bunyoro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1923b. The Banyankole. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roscoe, John. 1933. The Bakitara or Bunyoro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, M. 1998. History of the Inca realm. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Roth, H. Ling. 1903. Great Benin: Its customs, art, and horrors. Halifax: H. King and Sons.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1997. The social contract and other political writings. Edited by 
Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roux, Georges. 1992. “Sémiramis la reine mystérieuse d’Orient.” In Initiation à l ’Orient 
ancien: De Sumer à la Bible, edited by Jean Bottéro, 194–203. Série Histoire 170. 
Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
———. 2001. “Semiramis: The builder of Babylon.” In Everyday life in ancient Mesopota-
mia, edited by Jean Bottéro, 141–61. Translated by Andrea Nevill. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Rowe, John H. 1967. “What kind of a settlement was Inca Cuzco?” Ñawpa Pacha 5: 
59–76.
Rowlands, Michael. 1993. “The good and bad death: Ritual killing and historical trans-
formation in a West African kingdom.” Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde 39: 
291–301.
Rutherford, Danilyn. 1998. “Love, violence, and foreign wealth: Knowledge and history 
in Biak, Irian Jaya.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 4: 258–81.
———. 2003. Raiding the land of the foreigners. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ruud, Jørgen. 1960. Taboo: A study of Malagasy beliefs and customs. New York: Humanities 
Press.
Ryder, A. F. C. 1969. Benin and the Europeans, 1485–1897. London: Longman.
Sahagún, Bernadino de. 1953–82. Florentine Codex: General history of the things of New 
Spain. 12 vols. Translated by Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble. School 
of American Research Monograph 14. Salt Lake City: School of American Research 
and University of Utah press.
Sahlins, Marshall. 1958. Social stratification in Polynesia. Seattle: University of Washing-
ton Press
———. 1981a. Historical metaphors and mythical realities: Structure in the early history of 
the Sandwich Island Kingdom. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
505BIBLIOGRAPHY
———. 1981b. “The stranger-king or Dumézil among the Fijians.” Journal of Pacific 
History 16: 107–32. 
———. 1983a. “Other times, other customs: The anthropology of history.” American 
Anthropologist 85 (5): 517–44.
———. 1983b. “Raw women, cooked men, and other ‘great things’ of the Fijian Islands.” 
In The ethnography of cannibalism, edited by Paul Brown and Donald Tuzin, 72–93. 
Washington, DC: Society for Psychological Anthropology.
———. 1985. Islands of history. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1992. Anahulu: The anthropology of history in the kingdom of Hawai‘i, Vol 1: His-
torical ethnography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2008. “The stranger-king or, elementary forms of the politics of life.” Indonesia 
and the Malay World 36: 177–94.
———. 2010. “The whole is a part: Intercultural politics of order and change.” In Experi-
ments in holism: Theory and practice in contemporary anthropology, edited by Ton Otto 
and Nils Bubandt, 102–26. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
———. 2011a. “The alterity of power and vice versa, with reflections on stranger-kings 
and the real-politics of the marvelous.” In Power in history: From medieval Ireland to 
the post-modern world, edited by Anthony McElligot et al., 283–308. Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press.
———. 2011b. “Twin-born with greatness: The dual kingship of Sparta.” HAU: Journal of 
Ethnographic Theory 1: 63–102.
———. 2012a. “Alterity and autochthony: Austronesian cosmographies of the marve-
lous.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2: 131–60.
———. 2012b. Waiting for Foucault, still. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.
———. 2013. What kinship is—and is not. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2014 “Stranger-kings in general: The cosmo-logics of power.” In Framing cos-
mologies: The anthropology of worlds, edited by Allen Abramson and Martin Holbraad, 
137–63. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Santos-Granero, Fernando. 1993. “From prisoner of the group to darling of the gods: An 
approach to the issue of power in South America.” L’Homme XXXIII (2–4): 213–30. 
Sather, Clifford. 1996. “‘All threads are white’: Iban egalitarianism reconsidered.” In Ori-
gins, ancestry and alliance: Explorations in Austronesian ethnography, edited by James 
J. Fox and Clifford Sather, 73–112. Canberra: Department of Anthropology, The 
Australian National University.
Savaron, Charles. 1912. “Notes sur le Farihin-dRangita (marais de Rangita), Nord 
d’Imerimanjaka.” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache (N.S.) X: 373–77.
506 ON KINGS
———. 1928. “Contribution à l’histoire de l’Imerina.” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache 
(N.S.) XI: 61–81.
———. 1931. “Notes d’histoire malgache.” Bulletin de l ’Académie Malgache (N.S.) XIV: 
55–73.
Sayce, A. H. 1888. “The Legend of Semiramis.” The English Historical Review 3  (9): 
104–113.
Schafer, Edward H. 1963. The golden peaches of Samarkand: A study of T’ang exotics. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
———. 1967. The vermillion bird: T’ang images of the south. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Schiefflin, Edward L. 2005. The sorrow of the lonely and the burning of the dancers. Second 
edition. New York: Palgrave.
Schmitt, Carl. (1922) 2005. Political theology: Four chapters on the concept of sovereignty. 
Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schnepel, Burkhard. 1986. “Five approaches to the theory of divine kingship and the 
kingship of the Shilluk of the Southern Sudan.” Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library.
———. 1988. “Shilluk royal ceremonies of death and installation.” Anthropos 83: 433–52.
———. 1990. “Shilluk kingship: Power struggles and the question of succession.” An-
thropos 85: 105–24.
———. 1991. “Continuity despite and through death: Regicide and royal shrines among 
the Shilluk of Southern Sudan.” Africa 61 (1): 40–70.
———. 1995. Twinned beings: Kings and effigies in Southern Sudan, East India and Re-
naissance France. Göteborg: Institute for Advanced Studies in Social Anthropology. 
Schrauwers, Albert. 2004. “H(h)ouses, E(e)state and class: On the importance of capitals 
in central Sulawsi.” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 160 (1): 72–94.
Schwartz, Peter Hammond. 1989. “‘His Majesty the baby’: Narcissism and royal author-
ity.” Political Theory 17 (2): 266–90.
———. 1990. “Rejoinder to Springborg.” Political Theory 18 (4): 686–89.
Scott, James C. 2009. The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast 
Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Scubla, Lucien. 2002. “Hocart and the royal road to anthropological understanding.” 
Social Anthropology 10 (3): 359–76.
———. 2003. “Roi sacré, victime sacrificielle et victime émissaire.” Revue du MAUSS 
22: 197–221.
———. 2005. “Sacred king, sacrificial victim, surrogate victim or Frazer, Hocart, Girard.” 
In The character of kinghip, edited by Declan Quigley, 38–62. Oxford: Berg.
507BIBLIOGRAPHY
Seligman, Adam, Robert Weller, Michael Puett, and Bennett Simon. 2008. Ritual and 
its consequences: An essay on the limits of sincerity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Seligman, Charles Gabriel. 1911. “The cult of Nyakang and the divine kings of the Shil-
luk.” Fourth Report of the Wellcome Tropical Research Laboratories, Vol. B, General Sci-
ence: 216–38.
———. 1931. “The religion of the pagan tribes of the White Nile.” Africa 4 (1): 1–21.
———. 1934. Egypt and Negro Africa: A study in divine kingship. The 1933 Frazer Lec-
ture. London: Routledge.
Seligman, Charles Gabriel, and Brenda Z. Seligman. 1932. “The Shilluk.” In Pagan tribes 
of the Nilotic Sudan, edited by Charles Gabriel Seligman and Brenda Z. Seligman, 
37–105. London: Routledge.
Sibree, James. 1880. Madagascar: The great African island. London: Trübner & Co.
———. 1889. “The oratory, songs, legends, and folktales of the Malagasy Part II.” Anta-
nanarivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine 14: 171–81.
———. 1896. Madagascar before the conquest: The island, the country, and the people. Lon-
don: T. Fisher Unwin.
———. 1897. “The Malagasy custom of ‘brotherhood by blood.’” Antananarivo Annual 
and Madagascar Magazine 21: 1–6.
Simmel George. 1950. “The stranger. In The sociology of Georg Simmel, edited by Kurt H. 
Wolff, 402–8. New York: Free Press.
Simonse, Simon. 1992. Kings of disaster: Dualism, centralism and the scapegoat king in the 
Southeastern Sudan. Leiden: Brill. 
———. 2005. “Tragedy, ritual and power in Nilotic regicide: The regicidal dramas of the 
Eastern Nilotes of Sudan in contemporary perspective.” In The character of kinghip, 
edited by Declan Quigley, 67–100. Oxford: Berg.
Skeat, Walter William. 1900. Malay magic. London: Macmillan.
Skinner, Elliott P. 1964. The Mossi of the Upper Volta: The political development of a Sudanese 
people. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Slater, Philip Eliot. 1968. The glory of Hera: Greek mythology and the Greek family. Boston: 
Beacon Press.
Smith, W. Robertson. 1887. “Ctesias and the Semiramis legend.” The English Historical 
Review 2 (6): 303–17.
Smith, W. Stevenson. 1971. “The Old Kingdom in Egypt and the beginning of the First 
Intermediate Period.” In The Cambridge ancient History, third edition, Vol. 1, Part 2: 
Early history of the Middle East, edited by I. E. S. Edwards, C. J. Badd, and N. G. L. 
Hammond, 145–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
508 ON KINGS
Soury-Lavergne and de la Devéze (Pères). “La fête de la circoncision en Imerina (Mada-
gascar): Autrefois et aujourd’hui.” Anthropos 7 (2): 336–71.
———. 1913. “La Fête nationale du Fandroana en Imerina (Madagascar).” Anthropos 9 
(2/3): 306–24. 
Sousa Martins, Rui de. 1999. “Mito e historia no noroeste de Angola.” Arquipelago. His-
toria (2nd series) III: 495–550.
Soustelle, Jacques. 1964. Daily life of the Aztecs. London: Pelican.
Southall, Aidan. (1956) 2004. Alur society: A study in processes and types of domination. 
Münster: International African Institute/LIT Verlag.
———. 1988. “The segmentary state in Africa and Asia.” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 30: 52–82.
———. 1989. “Power, sanctity and symbolism in the political economy of the Nilotes.” 
In Creativity of power: Cosmology and action in African society, edited by William 
Arens and Ivan Karp, 183–222. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution.
Southwold, Martin. 1967. “Was the kingdom sacred?” Muwazo I: 17–23.
Speck, Frank. 1977. Naskapi: The savage hunters of the Labrador Peninsula. Norman: Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Press.
Spencer, Robert F. 1959. The North Alaskan Eskimo: A study in ecology and society. Smith-
sonian Institution Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 171. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office.
Springborg, Patricia. 1990. “‘His Majesty is a baby?’: A critical response to Peter Ham-
mond Schwartz.” Political Theory 18 (4): 673–85.
Stallybrass, Peter, and Allon White. 1986. The politics and poetics of transgression. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Standing, Herbert F. 1887a. The children of Madagascar. London: Religious Tract Society.
———. 1887b. “The tribal divisions of the Hova Malagasy.” Antananarivo Annual and 
Madagascar Magazine XI: 354–58. 
Stanner, W. E. H. 1959–63. On Aboriginal religion. University of Sydney. Oceania Mon-
ograph no. 11.
Starkey, David. 1977. “Representation through intimacy: A study in the symbolism of 
monarchy and court office in early modern England.” In Symbols and sentiments: 
Cross-cultural studies in symbolism, edited by Ioan Lewis, 187–224. London: Aca-
demic Press. 
Stevens, Phillips. 1975. “The Kisra legend and the distortion of historical tradition.” Jour-
nal of African History 16 (2): 185–200.
Steward, Julian H. 1931. “The ceremonial buffoon of the American Indian.” Papers of the 
Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters 14: 187–207. 
509BIBLIOGRAPHY
Stewart, Marjorie H. 1993. Borgu and its kingdoms: A reconstruction of a western Sudanese 
Polity. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press
Stoneman, Richard. 1995. “Oriental Motifs in the Alexander Romance.” Antichthon 26: 
95–113.
———. 2008. Alexander the Great: A life in legend. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Strathern, Andrew. 1970. “The female and male cults of Mount Hagen.” Man (N.S.) 5: 
571–85.
———. 1993. “Great-men, leaders, big-men: The link of ritual power.” Journal de la So-
ciété des Océanistes 97: 145–58.
Strathern, Andrew, and Marilyn Strathern. 1968. “Marsupials and magic: A study of 
spell symbolism among the Mbowamb.” In Dialectic in practical religion, edited by 
E. R. Leach, 179–202. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Department 
of Archaeology and Anthropology.
Strauss, Hermann. (1962) 1990. The Mi-culture of the Mount Hagen people, Papua New 
Guinea. Edited by Gabriele Stürzenhofecker and Andrew Strathern. Translated by 
Brian Shields. Pittsburgh Ethnology Monographs no. 13. Department of Anthro-
polgy, University of Pittsburgh.
Stromberg, Peter. 1990. “Elvis alive? The ideology of modern consumerism.” Journal of 
Popular Culture 24 (3): 11–19.
Suriano, Matthew J. 2010. The politics of dead kings: Dynastic ancestors in the Book of Kings 
and sncient Israel. Forschungen zum Alten Testament 2. Reihe. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck.
Swain, Tony. 1993. A place for strangers: Toward a history of Australian Aboriginal being. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Swanton, John R. 1911. Indian Tribes of the Lower Mississippi Valley and adjacent coast 
of the Gulf of Mexico. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Museum Bureau of American 
Ethnology Bulletin 43.
———. 1912. “Sun worship in the southeast.” American Anthropologist (N.S.) 30  (2): 
206–13.
———. 1946. Indians of the southeastern United States. Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Museum Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 147.
Szalc, Walter. 2012. “In search of the Water of Life: The Alexander Romance and In-
dian mythology.” In The Alexander Romance in Persia and the East, edited by Richard 
Stoneman, Kyle Erickson, and Ian Netton, 327–38. Groningen: Bakuis Publishing. 
Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraja. 1976. World conqueror and world renouncer: A study of Bud-
dhism and polity in Thailand against a historical background. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
510 ON KINGS
———. 1984. The Buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
———. 1985. Culture, thought, and social action: An anthropological perspective. Cam-
bridge MA: Harvard University Press.
———. 1987. The Buddhist conception of universal king and its manifestations in South and 
Southeast Asia. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.
Tamuno, T. N. 1965. “Peoples of the Niger–Benue confluence.” In A thousand years of 
West African history, edited by J. F. Ade Ajayi and Ian Espie, 201–11. Ibadan: Ibadan 
University Press. 
Tanner, Marie. 1993. The last descendant of Aeneus: The Hapsburgs and the mythic image of 
the emperor. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tatje, Terrence, and Francis L. K. Hsu. 1969. “Variations in ancestor worship beliefs and 
their relation to kinship.” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 25 (2): 153–72.
Taylor, Keith 1993. “The early kingdoms.” In The Cambridge history of Southeast Asia, 
Vol.2, edited by Nicholas Turling, 137–82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, Luke. 1990. “The Rainbow Serpent as visual metaphor in Western Arnhem 
Land.” Oceania 60: 329–44.
Terray, Emmanuel. 1994. “Le pouvoir, le sang et la mort dans le royaume asante au XIXe 
siècle.” Cahiers d’études africaines 34 (136): 549–61. 
Tezozomoc, Alvaro. 1853. Histoire du Mexique. 2 vols. Paris: Jannet
Theuws, Jacques A. T. 1983. World and word: Luba thought and literature. St. Augustin: 
Verlag des Anthropos-Instituts.
Thompson, Edward J. 1928. Suttee: A historical and philosophical enquiry into the Hindu rite 
of widow-burning. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Thomson, W. P. G. 1948. “Further notes on the death of a reth of the Shilluk (1945).” 
Sudan Notes and Records 29: 151–60.
Thornton, John K. 1983. The kingdom of Kongo: Civil war and transition, 1641–1718. 
Madison University of Wisconsin Press.
———. 2001. “The origin and early history of the kingdom of Kongo, c. 1350–1550.” 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 34 (1): 89–120.
Took, Jennifer. 2005. A native chieftain in Southwest China: Franchising a Tai chieftaincy 
under the Tusi system of late imperial China. Leiden: Brill.
Tooker, Elizabeth. 1963. “Natchez social organization: Fact or anthropological folklore?” 
Ethnohistory 10: 358–72. 
Townsend, Richard Fraser. 1987. “Coronation at Tenochtitlan.” In The Aztec templo may-
or, edited by Elizabeth Hill Boone, 371–409. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks 
Pre-Columbian Symposia and Colloquia.
511BIBLIOGRAPHY
Trigger, Bruce G. 1969. “The social significance of the diadems in the royal tombs at 
Ballana.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 28 (4): 255–61.
Turner, Victor. 1957. Schism and continuity in an African society: A study in Ndembu village 
life. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
———. (1969) 2008. The ritual process: Structure and anti-structure. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Aldine.
Turton, Andrew. 2000. “Introduction.” In Civility and savagery: Social identity in Tai 
states, edited by Andrew Turton, 3–31. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press.
Tylor, Edward Burnett. 1903. Primitive culture: Researches into the development of mythol-
ogy, philosophy, religion, language, art, and custom. Fourth edition, 2 vols. London: 
John Murray.
Udal, John O. 1998. The Nile in darkness: Conquest and exploration, 1504–1862. Norwich: 
Michael Russell. 
Valentine, C. A. 1965. “The Lalkai of New Britain.” In Gods, ghosts, and men in Melanesia: 
Some religions of Australia New Guinea and the New Hebrides, edited by Peter Law-
rence and Mervyn J. Meggitt, 162–97. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 
Valeri, Valerio. 2000. The forest of taboos: Morality, hunting, and identity among the Huaulu 
of the Moluccas. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Valette, Jean. 1962. Études sur le règne de Radama Ier. Antananarivo: Imprimerie Nationale.
———. 1979. “Radama I, the unification of Madagascar and the modernization of Im-
erina (1810–1828).” In Madagascar in history: Essays from the 1970s, edited by Ray-
mond K. Kent, 168–96. Albany, NY: Foundation for Malagasy Studies. 
van Dijk, Jacobus. 2007. “Retainer sacrifice in Egypt and Nubia.” In Studies in history 
and anthropology of religion, Vol. 1: The strange world of human sacrifice, edited by Jan 
Bremmer, 135–55. Leuven: Peeters Publishers. 
van Everbroeck, Nestor. 1961. Mbomb’ipoku le seigneur à l ’Abîme: Histoire, croyances, or-
ganisation clanique, politique, judiciaire, vie familiale des Bolia, Sé̲nge̲le̲ et Ntómb’é njálé. 
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